Philosophical Methods

_What is this thing called Philosophical Methodology?_ is the ideal introduction for students challenged with the idea of ‘doing’ philosophy for the first time. This textbook explores this socially-engaged and collaborative discipline in an accessible and comprehensive way by carefully weighing up the costs and benefits of philosophical theories, embracing new tools for philosophical progress, and scrutinizing the practice of philosophical methodology to help improve philosophy for generations to come. James Andow encourages newcomers to think carefully about the nature and (...) value of the various philosophical methods introduced and provides a way into contemporary metaphilosophical debates about philosophical methods. Chapter summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary make this an indispensable introduction for students grappling with this topic for the first time. (shrink)

In her familiar lucid style Penelope Maddy takes us on a journey to formulate an answer to the question what it is what philosophers actually do, while at the same time dealing with the question why skeptical arguments about our knowledge of the outside world are a challenge any serious philosopher should at least take seriously. -/- To write a book for non-philosophers about what it is exactly that philosophers do, is by no means easy. Still, Maddy has succeeded very (...) well with this book. It is very well written and not at all difficult to understand for a non-philosophical audience. It is an invitation to the reader to delve deeper into the fascinating world of philosophy and metaphilosophy. (shrink)

Over the last decade, a call for greater “realism” in political theory has challenged the goals and methods that are implicit in much contemporary “normative” theory. However, realists have yet to produce a convincing alternative research program that is “constructive” rather than primarily “critical” in nature. I argue that given their common wariness of a devotion to abstract principles, realists should consider adopting John Dewey’s vision of theoretical expertise as an expansive kind of prediction that engages all of our historical, (...) scientific, and imaginative resources. After demonstrating that realists are in need of such an affirmative vision, I outline Dewey’s original proposal, and elaborate its value in contemporary circumstances as a “predictive” method for political theory that stands between familiar critical and normative approaches. (shrink)

The underrepresentation of women, people of color, and especially women of color—and the corresponding overrepresentation of white men—is more pronounced in philosophy than in many of the sciences. I suggest that part of the explanation for this lies in the role played by the idealized rational self, a concept that is relatively influential in philosophy but rarely employed in the sciences. The idealized rational self models the mind as consistent, unified, rationally transcendent, and introspectively transparent. I hypothesize that acceptance of (...) the idealized rational self leads philosophers to underestimate the influence of implicit bias on their own judgments and prevents them from enacting the reforms necessary to minimize the effects of implicit bias on institutional decision-making procedures. I consider recent experiments in social psychology that suggest that an increased sense of one’s own objectivity leads to greater reliance on bias in hiring scenarios, and I hypothesize how these results might be applied to philosophers’ evaluative judgments. I discuss ways that the idealized rational self is susceptible to broader critiques of ideal theory, and I consider some of the ways that the picture functions as a tool of active ignorance and color-evasive racism. (shrink)

Infinite regress arguments are used by philosophers as methods of refutation. A hypothesis is defective if it generates an infinite series when either such a series does not exist or its supposed existence would not serve the explanatory purpose for which it was postulated.

Metaphysicians frequently appeal to the idea that theoretical simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics, in the sense that, all other things being equal, simpler metaphysical theories are more likely to be true. In this paper I defend the notion that theoretical simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics, against several recent objections. I do not give any direct arguments for the thesis that simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics, since I am aware of no such arguments. I do argue, however, that (...) there is no special problem with the notion that simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics. More specifically, I argue that if you accept the idea that simplicity is truth conducive in science, then it would be objectionably arbitrary to reject the idea that simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics. (shrink)

This is the most comprehensive book ever published on philosophical methodology. A team of thirty-eight of the world's leading philosophers present original essays on various aspects of how philosophy should be and is done. The first part is devoted to broad traditions and approaches to philosophical methodology. The entries in the second part address topics in philosophical methodology, such as intuitions, conceptual analysis, and transcendental arguments. The third part of the book is devoted to essays about the interconnections between philosophy (...) and neighbouring fields, including those of mathematics, psychology, literature and film, and neuroscience. (shrink)

The objectivity and utility of experimental data as evidential support for knowledge-claims may be found suspect when it is shown that the interpretation of experimental data is inevitably complicated by social factors like experimenter effects, subject effects and demand characteristics, social factors which affect experimental data are themselves sensitive to societal conventions or cultural values, all observations are necessarily theory-dependent, and experimental data have limited generality because they are collected in artificial settings. These critiques of experimental data are answered by (...) showing that not all empirical studies are experiments, experimental methodology is developed to exclude alternate interpretations of data, theoretical disputes and their settlement take place in the context of a particular frame of reference, and objectivity can be achieved with observations neutral to the to-be-corroborated theory despite theory-dependent observations if distinctions are made between prior observation and evidential observation and between a to-be-corroborated theory and the theory underlying the identity of evidential response. (shrink)

Little attention is given to Richard Rorty’s metaethical views. No doubt this stems from the fact that most commentators are more interested in his metaphilosophical views; most see his metaethical views, offered in scattered passages, as just the downstream runoff from higher-level reflection. This article considers Rorty’s metaethics on their own merits, quite apart from whether his global picture works. I ultimately argue that Rorty’s metaethical outlook is attractive but beset by internal difficulties. Specifically, I contend that Rorty does not (...) and cannot remain faithful to the methodological approach to metaethics for which he advocates. At the paper’s close, I gesture at a nearby methodological approach that best approximates Rorty’s metaethical methodology. (shrink)

In this essay I address the question, “What is the subject matter of phenomenological research?” I argue that in spite of the increasing popularity of phenomenology, the answers to this question have been brief and cursory. As a result, contemporary phenomenologists lack a clear framework within which to articulate the aims and results of their research, and cannot easily engage each other in constructive and critical discourse. Examining the literature on phenomenology’s identity, I show how the question of phenomenology’s subject (...) matter has been systematically neglected. It has been overshadowed by an unending concern with phenomenology’s methodological identity. However, an examination of recent contributions to this literature reveals that a concern with articulating phenomenology’s subject matter has gradually increased, although such articulations remain preliminary. In light of this, I delineate, define, and illustrate three layers of phenomenological research, which I term “existentials,” “modes,” and “prejudices.” While the delineation of these layers is drawn primarily from classical phenomenological texts, they are defined and illustrated through the use of more contemporary literature. Following the articulation of this subject matter, I briefly consider some of the debates—both foundational and applied—that can be facilitated by the adoption of this framework. (shrink)

Anscombe holds that a proper account of intentional action must exhibit “a ‘form’ of description of events.” But what does that mean? To answer this question, I compare the method of Anscombe’s Intention with that of Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic—another classic work of analytic philosophy that consciously opposes itself to psychological explanations. On the one hand, positively, I aim to identify and elucidate the kind of account of intentional action that Anscombe attempts to provide. On the other hand, negatively, I (...) hope to dispel the canard that Anscombe’s opposition to the causal theory of action is a product of “behaviorism.”. (shrink)

Notwithstanding the numerous errors in this piece, the core teaching remains unscathed: Arithmetic (or any other branch of mathematics) cannot do moral work. If it appears otherwise, that simply means some nonstandard version of the relevant area of mathematics will work. -/- Negative results can indeed sometimes be shown using mathematics, but not on such fundamental normative questions as whether something/someone has rights. Also, mathematics can put into relief, sometimes, a fundamental normative question, even though it cannot resolve it.

I examine a number of infinite regress arguments whose infinite regresses are presented or described in terms of recurring questions and answers in order to determine whether such recurring questions have any role in generating these infinite regresses, or in disqualifying the recurring answers. I argue that despite the existence of such infinite regress arguments and the suggestions of some philosophers, these recurring questions have no such roles. Some ways of handling these infinite regress arguments are then proposed.

I investigate various logical and contextual factors involved in the derivation and use of infinite regresses in infinite regress arguments. I discuss the concept of a regress; identify different kinds of infinite regresses; clarify the core structure of most infinite regress arguments; use the logic of binary relations to explain the derivation of the most common kind of infinite regress encountered in my research; explain how circular definitions and circular explanations entail infinite regresses; discuss the rhetorical features of infinite regress (...) arguments that are presented or analyzed in terms of recurring questions and answers; examine different conditions under which an infinite regress is used to refute a statement; identify different structures of infinite regress arguments that are presented or analyzed in terms of recurring problems and solutions. (shrink)

This paper discusses some of the ways in which circular definitions and circular explanations entail or fail to entail infinite regresses. And since not all infinite regresses are vicious, a few criteria of viciousness are examined in order to determine when the entailment of a regress refutes a circular definition or a circular explanation.

Experimental philosophy of language uses experimental methods developed in the cognitive sciences to investigate topics of interest to philosophers of language. This article describes the methodological background for the development of experimental approaches to topics in philosophy of language, distinguishes negative and positive projects in experimental philosophy of language, and evaluates experimental work on the reference of proper names and natural kind terms. The reliability of expert judgments vs. the judgments of ordinary speakers, the role that ambiguity plays in influencing (...) responses to experiments, and the reliability of meta-linguistic judgments are also assessed. (shrink)

A continuing concern of many feminists and non-feminists alike has been to identify a distinctive feminist method of inquiry. This essay argues that this method question is misguided and should be abandoned. In doing so it takes up the distinctions between and relationships among methods, methodologies and epistemologies; proposes that the concern to identify sources of the power of feminist analyses motivates the method question; and suggests how to pursue this project.

This edition of the Prolegomena presents Kant's thought clearly by paying careful attention to his original language. An extensive translator's introduction considers the origin and purpose of the Prolegomena, examines Kant's use of the analytic method, compares the structure of the Prolegomena to that of the Critique of Pure Reason, examines Kant's relation to Hume as expressed in this work, briefly surveys the work's reception, and offers a note on texts and translation. Detailed scholarly notes accompany the translation itself.