Philosophy of Action

Edited by Constantine Sandis (University of Hertfordshire)
Assistant editor: István Zárdai (Keio University)
86 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 86
  1. added 2017-11-21
    A Strengthening of the Consequence Argument for Incompatibilism.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2017 - Analysis 77 (4):705-715.
    The aim of the Consequence Argument is to show that, if determinism is true, no one has, or ever had, any choice about anything. In the stock version of the argument, its two premisses state that no one is, or ever was, able to act so that the past would have been different and no one is, or ever was, able to act so that the laws of nature would have been different. This stock version fails, however, because it requires (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. added 2017-11-21
    Figuring Out How to Proceed with Evaluation After Figuring Out What Matters.Chrisoula Andreou - 2016 - Dialogue 55:621-637.
    I focus on David Gauthier’s intriguing suggestion that actions are not to be evaluated directly but via an evaluation of deliberative procedures. I argue that this suggestion is misleading, since even the most direct evaluation of (intentional) actions involves the evaluation of different ways of deliberating about what to do. Relatedly, a complete picture of what an agent is or might be (intentionally) doing cannot be disentangled from a complete picture of how s/he is or might be deliberating. A more (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. added 2017-11-20
    Can Physics Make Us Free?Tuomas K. Pernu - forthcoming - Frontiers in Physics.
    A thoroughly physical view on reality and our common sense view on agency and free will seem to be in a direct conflict with each other: if everything that happens is determined by prior physical events, so too are all our actions and conscious decisions; you actually have no choice but to do what you are destined to do. Although this way of thinking has intuitive appeal, and a long history, it has recently began to gain critical attention. A number (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. added 2017-11-20
    A Stronger Doctrine of Double Effect.Ben Bronner & Simon Goldstein - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-13.
    Many believe that intended harms are more difficult to justify than are harms that result as a foreseen side effect of one's conduct. We describe cases of harming in which the harm is not intended, yet the harmful act nevertheless runs afoul of the intuitive moral constraint that governs intended harms. We note that these cases provide new and improved counterexamples to the so-called Simple View, according to which intentionally phi-ing requires intending to phi. We then give a new theory (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. added 2017-11-18
    Social Preference Under Twofold Uncertainty.Philippe Mongin & Marcus Pivato - manuscript
    We investigate the conflict between the ex ante and ex post criteria of social welfare in a new framework of individual and social decisions, which distinguishes between two sources of uncertainty, here interpreted as an objective and a subjective source respectively. This framework makes it possible to endow the individuals and society not only with ex ante and ex post preferences, as is usually done, but also with interim preferences of two kinds, and correspondingly, to introduce interim forms of the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. added 2017-11-18
    Intending Is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism.Berislav Marusic & John Schwenkler - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    We argue that intentions are beliefs—beliefs that are held in light of, and made rational by, practical reasoning. To intend to do something is neither more nor less than to believe, on the basis of one’s practical reasoning, that one will do it. The identification of the mental state of intention with the mental state of belief is what we call strong cognitivism about intentions. It is a strong form of cognitivism because we identify intentions with beliefs, rather than maintaining (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. added 2017-11-17
    Can Reason Establish the Goals of Action? Assessing Interpretations of Aristotle’s Theory of Agency.Juan Pablo Bermúdez - forthcoming - Discusiones Filosóficas.
    Scholarship on Aristotle’s theory of action has recently veered toward an intellectualist position, according to which reason is in charge of setting the goals of action. This position has recently been criticized by an anti-intellectualism revival, according to which character, and not reason, sets the goals of action. I argue that neither view can sufficiently account for the complexities of Aristotle’s theory, and suggest a middle way that combines the strengths of both while avoiding their pitfalls. The key problem for (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. added 2017-11-15
    Does God Have the Moral Standing to Blame?Patrick Todd - forthcoming - Faith and Philosophy.
    In this paper, I introduce a problem to the philosophy of religion – the problem of divine moral standing – and explain how this problem is distinct from (albeit related to) the more familiar problem of evil (with which it is often conflated). In short, the problem is this: in virtue of how God would be (or, on some given conception, is) “involved in” our actions, how is it that God has the moral standing to blame us for performing those (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. added 2017-11-15
    Rationality, Time and Normativity: On Hedden’s Time-Slice Rationality.Sabine Döring & Bahadir Eker - 2017 - Analysis 77 (3):571-585.
    In his stimulating recent book Reasons without Persons, Brian Hedden develops a novel theory of rationality that he calls Time-Slice Rationality. One of the main theses of TSR is that all rational requirements are synchronic. We argue here first that this thesis is not well-motivated. We also demonstrate that Hedden is in fact committed to an even stronger claim about the rationality of an agent at a time. Finally, we provide some arguments against the conception of rationality that results from (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. added 2017-11-09
    The Public Health-Quarantine Model.Gregg D. Caruso - forthcoming - In Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press.
    One of the most frequently voiced criticisms of free will skepticism is that it is unable to adequately deal with criminal behavior and that the responses it would permit as justified are insufficient for acceptable social policy. This concern is fueled by two factors. The first is that one of the most prominent justifications for punishing criminals, retributivism, is incompatible with free will skepticism. The second concern is that alternative justifications that are not ruled out by the skeptical view per (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. added 2017-11-07
    Downward Causation and Supervenience: The Non-Reductionist’s Extra Argument for Incompatibilism.Joana Rigato - forthcoming - Philosophical Explorations:1-16.
    Agent-causal theories of free will, which rely on a non-reductionist account of the agent, have traditionally been associated with libertarianism. However, some authors have recently argued in favor of compatibilist agent-causal accounts. In this essay, I will show that such accounts cannot avoid serious problems of implausibility or incoherence. A careful analysis of the implications of non-reductionist views of the agent (event-causal or agent-causal as they may be) reveals that such views necessarily imply either the denial of the principle of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. added 2017-11-07
    Spontaneous Decisions and Free Will: Empirical Results and Philosophical Considerations.Joana Rigato, Masayoshi Murakami & Zachary Mainen - 2014 - Cold Spring Harbor Symposia on Quantitative Biology 79:177-184.
    Spontaneous actions are preceded by brain signals that may sometimes be detected hundreds of milliseconds in advance of a subject's conscious intention to act. These signals have been claimed to reflect prior unconscious decisions, raising doubts about the causal role of conscious will. Murakami et al. (2014. Nat Neurosci 17: 1574–1582) have recently argued for a different interpretation. During a task in which rats spontaneously decided when to abort waiting, the authors recorded neurons in the secondary motor cortex. The neural (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. added 2017-11-07
    Hugh J. McCann, Creation and the Sovereignty of God. [REVIEW]Garrett Pendergraft - 2013 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 12.
  14. added 2017-11-06
    Descartes on Will and Suspension of Judgment: Affectivity of the Reasons for Doubt.Jan Forsman - 2017 - In Gábor Boros, Judit Szalai & Oliver Istvan Toth (eds.), The Concept of Affectivity in Early Modern Philosophy. Budapest, Hungary: pp. 38-58.
    In this paper, I join the so-called voluntarism debate on Descartes’s theory of will and judgment, arguing for an indirect doxastic voluntarism reading of Descartes, as opposed to a classic, or direct doxastic voluntarism. More specifically, I examine the question whether Descartes thinks the will can have a direct and full control over one’s suspension of judgment. Descartes was a doxastic voluntarist, maintaining that the will has some kind of control over one’s doxastic states, such as belief and doubt. According (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. added 2017-11-03
    Reasoning with Unconditional Intention in Advance.Jens Gillessen - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Research.
    Suppose that you intend to go to the theater. Are you therein intending the unconditional proposition that you go to the theater? That would seem to be deeply irrational; after all, you surely do not intend to go if, for instance, in the next instant an earthquake is going to devastate the city. What we intend we do not intend ‘no matter what,’ it is often said. But if so—how can anyone ever rationally intend simply to perform an action of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. added 2017-11-03
    Locke and Leibniz on Freedom and Necessity.Idan Shimony & Yekutiel Shoham - 2016 - In Wenchao Li (ed.), Für Unser Glück Oder Das Glück Anderer, X. Internationaler Leibniz-Kongress. Hildesheim: Georg Olms. pp. Vol. 1, 573-588.
    Locke and Leibniz are often classified as proponents of compatibilist theories of human freedom, since both maintain that freedom is consistent with determinism and that the difference between being and not being free turns on how one is determined. However, we will argue in this paper that their versions of compatibilism are essentially different and that they have significantly distinct commitments to compatibilism. To this end, we will first analyze the definitions and examples for freedom and necessity that Locke and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. added 2017-11-02
    Causation & Free Will, by Carolina Sartorio.Horacio Spector - forthcoming - Mind:fzx030.
    © Mind Association 2017In Causation and Free Will Carolina Sartorio offers an intricate argument for the claim ‘that actual sequences are sufficient grounds for freedom: they ground freedom, and nothing is required to ground it other than themselves, or their own grounds’. On this view, free will with respect to a choice or action is not explained in terms of the agent’s having alternative possibilities. Like Harry Frankfurt, Sartorio rejects the Principle of Alternate Possibilities : Principle of Alternate Possibilities : (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. added 2017-11-02
    A Critical Review of Methodologies and Results in Recent Research on Belief in Free Will.Ewusi-Boisvert Esthelle & Racine Eric - forthcoming - Neuroethics:1-14.
    There might be value in examining the phenomenon of free will, without attempting to solve the debate surrounding its existence. Studies have suggested that diminishing belief in free will increases cheating behavior and that basic physiological states such as appetite diminish free will. These findings, if robust, could have important philosophical and ethical implications. Accordingly, we aimed to critically review methodologies and results in the body of literature that speaks to the two following questions: whether certain factors can change belief (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. added 2017-11-02
    The Implications of Rejecting Free Will: An Empirical Analysis.Morris Stephen - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology:1-23.
    While skeptical arguments concerning free will have been a common element of philosophical discourse for thousands of years, one could make the case that such arguments have never been more numerous or forceful than at present. In response to these skeptical attacks, some philosophers and psychologists have expressed concern that the widespread acceptance of such skeptical attitudes could have devastating social consequences. In this paper, I set out to address whether such concerns are well-founded. I argue that there is reason (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. added 2017-11-02
    Why Determinism in Physics has No Implications for Free Will.Esfeld Michael - unknown
    This paper argues for the following three theses: There is a clear reason to prefer physical theories with deterministic dynamical equations: such theories are both maximally simple and maximally rich in information, since given an initial configuration of matter and the dynamical equations, the whole evolution of the configuration of matter is fixed. There is a clear way how to introduce probabilities in a deterministic physical theory, namely as answer to the question of what evolution of a specific system we (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. added 2017-11-01
    Aesthetic Rationality.Keren Gorodeisky & Eric Marcus - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.
    We argue that the aesthetic domain falls inside the scope of rationality, but does so in its own way. To explain an action or belief by citing someone’s reason is to state a factor in virtue of whose support the action was performed or the proposition believed. But aesthetic judgment is a stance neither on whether a proposition is to be believed nor on whether an action is to be done, but rather on whether an object is to be appreciated. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. added 2017-10-31
    Why We Should Promote Irrationality.Sebastian Schmidt - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (4):605-615.
    The author defends the claim that there are cases in which we should promote irrationality by arguing (1) that it is sometimes better to be in an irrational state of mind, and (2) that we can often influence our state of mind via our actions. The first claim is supported by presenting cases of irrational _belief_ and by countering a common line of argument associated with William K. Clifford, who defended the idea that having an irrational belief is always worse (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. added 2017-10-30
    Questions for a Science of Moral Responsibility.Marcelo Fischborn - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-14.
    In the last few decades, the literature on moral responsibility has been increasingly populated by scientific studies. Studies in neuroscience and psychology, in particular, have been claimed to be relevant for discussions about moral responsibility in a number of ways. And at the same time, there is not yet a systematic understanding of the sort of questions a science of moral responsibility is supposed to answer. This paper is an attempt to move toward such an understanding. I discuss three models (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. added 2017-10-30
    The Relationship Between Moral Responsibility and Freedom.Benjamin Rossi & Ted Warfield - 2016 - In Kevin Timpe, Meghan Griffith & Neil Levy (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Free Will. New York: Routledge. pp. 612-623.
  25. added 2017-10-29
    Personal Ideals as Metaphors.Nick Riggle - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association.
    What is it to have and act on a personal ideal? Someone who aspires to be a philosopher might imaginatively think “I am a philosopher” by way of motivating herself to think hard about a philosophical question. But doing so seems to require her to act on an inaccurate self-description, given that she isn’t yet what she regards herself as being. J. David Velleman develops the thought that action-by-ideal involves a kind of fictional self-conception. My aim is to expand our (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. added 2017-10-27
    Embodied Cognition, Habit, and Natural Agency in Hegel’s Anthropology.Italo Testa - forthcoming - In Marina F. Bykova & Kenneth R. Westphal (eds.), The Palgrave Hegel Handbook. Palgrave MacMillan.
    The aim of this chapter is to discuss the central role of the notion of " habit " (Gewohnheit) in Hegel's theory of " embodiment " (Verleiblichung) and to show that the philosophical outcome of the Anthropology is that habit, understood as a sensorimotor life form, is not only an enabling condition for there to be mindedness, but is more strongly an ontological constitutive condition of all its levels of manifestation. Moreover, I will argue that Hegel's approach somehow makes a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. added 2017-10-25
    From A Rational Point Of View.Tim Henning - forthcoming - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    When we discuss normative reasons, oughts, requirements of rationality, hypothetical imperatives (or “anankastic conditionals”), motivating reasons and so on, we often use verbs like “believe” and “want” to capture a relevant subject’s perspective. According to the received view about sentences involving these verbs, what they do is describe the subject’s mental states. Many puzzles concerning normative discourse have to do with the role that mental states consequently appear to play in this discourse. This book uses tools from formal semantics and (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. added 2017-10-25
    Is There Such a Thing as a Social Science?Robert Vinten - 2016 - Dokos 17:53-86.
    This paper looks at the centrality of action in social disciplines and examines the implications of this for whether social disciplines can be called scientific. Various reasons for calling social disciplines scientific are examined and rejected: (1) the claim that social disciplines are reducible to natural scientific ones, (2) the claim, from Donald Davidson, that reasons for action are to be construed in causal terms, (3) the claim that social disciplines employ, or should employ, the methodologies of the natural sciences. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. added 2017-10-25
    Henri de Lubac. Teologia e dogma nella storia. L'influsso di Blondel.Antonio Russo (ed.) - 1990 - Rome: Studium.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. added 2017-10-24
    Mens Rea Ascription, Expertise and Outcome Effects: Professional Judges Surveyed.Markus Kneer & Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde - 2017 - Cognition 169:139-146.
    A coherent practice of mens rea (‘guilty mind’) ascription in criminal law presupposes a concept of mens rea which is insensitive to the moral valence of an action’s outcome. For instance, an assessment of whether an agent harmed another person intentionally should be unaffected by the severity of harm done. Ascriptions of intentionality made by laypeople, however, are subject to a strong outcome bias. As demonstrated by the Knobe effect, a knowingly incurred negative side effect is standardly judged intentional, whereas (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  31. added 2017-10-24
    The Systemic Mind and a Conceptual Framework for the Psychosocial Environment of Business Enterprises: Practical Implications for Systemic Leadership Training.Radek Trnka & Petr Parma - 2015 - In Martin Kuška & M. J. Jandl (eds.), Current Research in Psychosocial Arena: Thinking about Health, Society and Culture. Wien: Sigmund Freud PrivatUniversitäts Verlag. pp. 68-79.
    This chapter introduces a research-based conceptual framework for the study of the inner psychosocial reality of business enterprises. It is called the Inner Organizational Ecosystem Approach (IOEA). This model is systemic in nature, and it defines the basic features of small and medium-size enterprises, such as elements, structures, borders, social actors, organizational climate, processes and resources. Further, it also covers the dynamics of psychosocial reality, processes, emergent qualities and the higher-order subsystems of the overall organizational ecosystem, including the global business (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. added 2017-10-23
    Targeting Human Shields.Amir Saemi & Philip Atkins - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    In this paper, we are concerned with the morality of killing human shields. Many moral philosophers seem to believe that knowingly killing human shields necessarily involves intentionally targeting human shields. If we assume that the distinction between intention and foresight is morally significant, then this view would entail that it is generally harder to justify a military operation in which human shields are knowingly killed than a military operation in which the same number of casualties result as a merely foreseen (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. added 2017-10-23
    Time-Slice Rationality and Filling in Plans.Justin Snedegar - 2017 - Analysis 77 (3):595-607.
    In Reasons Without Persons, Brian Hedden argues that a theory of rationality need not provide diachronic norms for reasoning, since we can explain all we need to explain about rationality using purely synchronic norms. This article argues that a theory of rationality should contain at least one diachronic norm for reasoning, namely a norm to fill in the details of one's coarse-grained or partial plans. It also explores a possible synchronic approach to this aspect of rationality.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. added 2017-10-21
    The Sure-Thing Principle and P2.Yang Liu - 2017 - Economics Letters 159:221-223.
    This paper offers a fine analysis of different versions of the well known sure-thing principle. We show that Savage's formal formulation of the principle, i.e., his second postulate (P2), is strictly stronger than what is intended originally.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. added 2017-10-21
    Team Reasoning: Theory and Evidence.Jurgis Karpus & Natalie Gold - 2017 - In Julian Kiverstein (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of the Social Mind. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 400-417.
    The chapter reviews recent theoretical and empirical developments concerning the theory of team reasoning in game theoretic interactions.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. added 2017-10-20
    Bayesian Decision Theory and Stochastic Independence.Philippe Mongin - 2017 - TARK 2017.
    Stochastic independence has a complex status in probability theory. It is not part of the definition of a probability measure, but it is nonetheless an essential property for the mathematical development of this theory. Bayesian decision theorists such as Savage can be criticized for being silent about stochastic independence. From their current preference axioms, they can derive no more than the definitional properties of a probability measure. In a new framework of twofold uncertainty, we introduce preference axioms that entail not (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. added 2017-10-20
    Gilbert Ryle: Können und Wissen.Andreas Kemmerling - 1975 - In Josef Speck (ed.), Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen – Philosophie der Gegenwart III. Göttingen: UTB. pp. 126-166.
  38. added 2017-10-17
    Reasoning with Reasons.Daniel Star - forthcoming - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 241-59.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. added 2017-10-17
    Introduction.Daniel Star - forthcoming - In The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  40. added 2017-10-17
    Intellectual Skill and the Rylean Regress.Brian Weatherson - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267):370-386.
    Intelligent activity requires the use of various intellectual skills. While these skills are connected to knowledge, they should not be identified with knowledge. There are realistic examples where the skills in question come apart from knowledge. That is, there are realistic cases of knowledge without skill, and of skill without knowledge. Whether a person is intelligent depends, in part, on whether they have these skills. Whether a particular action is intelligent depends, in part, on whether it was produced by an (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. added 2017-10-17
    Hugh J. McCann (Ed.), Free Will and Classical Theism: The Significance of Freedom in Perfect Being Theology. [REVIEW]Garrett Pendergraft - 2017 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 16.
    This volume collects a set of papers that were presented at a conference on “Big Questions in Free Will,” held at the University of Saint Thomas in October of 2014. It is dedicated to its editor, who passed away shortly after completing the manuscript. I will briefly summarize each of the 11 chapters and then offer a few critical comments.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. added 2017-10-17
    Rolling Back the Luck Problem for Libertarianism.Zac Cogley - 2015 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 3 (1):121-137.
    I here sketch a reply to Peter van Inwagen’s Rollback Argument, which suggests that libertarian accounts of free agency are beset by problems involving luck. Van Inwagen imagines an indeterministic agent whose universe is repeatedly ‘rolled back’ by God to the time of her choice. Since the agent’s choice is indeterministic, her choices are sometimes di erent in the imaginary rollback scenarios. I show that although this is true, this need not impair her control over what she does. I develop (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. added 2017-10-16
    Free Will and Epistemology: A Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom.Robert Lockie - forthcoming - London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic.
    This is a work concerned with justification and freedom and the relationship between these. Its summational aim is to defend a transcendental argument for free will – that we could not be epistemically justified in undermining a strong notion of free will, as a strong notion of free will would be required for any such process of undermining to be itself epistemically justified. The book advances two transcendental arguments – for a deontically internalist conception of epistemic justification and the aforementioned (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. added 2017-10-11
    Duhemian Themes in Expected Utility Theory.Philippe Mongin - 2009 - In Anastasios Brenner and Jean Gayon (ed.), French Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 303-357.
    This monographic chapter explains how expected utility (EU) theory arose in von Neumann and Morgenstern, how it was called into question by Allais and others, and how it gave way to non-EU theories, at least among the specialized quarters of decion theory. I organize the narrative around the idea that the successive theoretical moves amounted to resolving Duhem-Quine underdetermination problems, so they can be assessed in terms of the philosophical recommendations made to overcome these problems. I actually follow Duhem's recommendation, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. added 2017-10-11
    Utility Theory and Ethics.Philippe Mongin & Claude D'Aspremont - 1998 - In Handbook of Utility Theory, 1. Kluwer: pp. 371-481.
    This book-length chapter draws technical and philosophical connections between utility theory and social ethics. After the introductory section 1, section 2 proposes some philosophical and historical clarifications on the utility concept.; this includes a discussion of welfare and welfarism. Section 3 is brief summary of technical aspects of utility theory. Section 4 introduces the aggregative setting of social choice theory when interpersonal comparisons of utility are allowed, and using this setting, contrasts the derivation of utilitarianism with that of the Rawlsian (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. added 2017-10-10
    Taylor’s Critique of Procedural Liberalism and Modern Practical Rationality.H. Nelson Jair Cuchumbé - 2010 - Ideas Y Valores 59 (143):33-49.
    This article examines Charles Taylor’s critique of the model of procedural liberalism and the modern conception of practical rationality. The starting point is that Taylor’s critique is based on contributions of the substantive philosophical tradition, which makes possible an alternative liberalism project different from procedural liberalism. To prove this point of view, in first place, it presents Taylor’s approach to the debate between alternative liberalism and procedural liberalism. Secondly, it exposes the conception of practical rationality suggested by Taylor in his (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. added 2017-10-10
    Begründen und Rechtfertigen: Eine Untersuchung zum Verhältnis zwischen rationalen Erfordernissen und prävalenten Handlungsgründen.Konstantin Pollok - 2009 - Berlin / New York: de Gruyter.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. added 2017-10-09
    A questão do livre-arbítrio em John R. Searle: uma contraposição do naturalismo biológico ao fisicalismo e ao funcionalismo.Daniel P. Nunes & Everaldo Cescon - 2015 - Cognitio-Estudos 12 (2):179-190.
    This paper compares the theses of physicalism and functionalism – particularly the computacionalist line – with the biological naturalism of John Searle regarding the possibility of free will. In such contrast, each line is decomposed into its statements so that they can be reviewed. It is argued that the searlean biological naturalism can explain more than the other two philosophies on how free action can have the source of its motivation in what is external to the mental state that makes (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. added 2017-10-07
    Expected Comparative Utility Theory: A New Theory of Rational Choice.David Robert - forthcoming - Philosophical Forum.
    This paper proposes a new theory of rational choice, Expected Comparative Utility (ECU) Theory. It is first argued that for any decision option, a, and any state of the world, S, the measure of the choiceworthiness of a in S is the comparative utility of a in S – that is, the difference in utility, in S, between a and whichever alternative to a carries the greatest utility in S. On the basis of this principle, it is then argued, roughly (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. added 2017-10-06
    The Guise of the Ought-to-Be. A Deontic View of the Intentionality of Desire.Federico Lauria - 2017 - In The Nature of Desire. New York: Oxford University Press.
    How are we to understand the intentionality of desire? According to the two classical views, desire is either a positive evaluation or a disposition to act. This essay examines these conceptions of desire and argues for a deontic alternative, namely the view that desiring is representing a state of affairs as what ought to be. Three lines of criticism of the classical pictures of desire are provided. The first concerns desire’s direction of fit, i.e. the intuition that the world should (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 86