The philosophy of cognitive science concerns philosophical issues that arise in cognitive science. Indeed, cognitive science is itself partly a philosophical project: it combines tools and insights from psychology, neuroscience, artificial intelligence, biology, anthropology, and philosophy. Initially unified by a commitment to a computational and representational outlook on cognition, cognitive science has increasingly come to embrace a wide variety of theoretical and methodological outlooks. Major questions that are being considered in the philosophy of cognitive science include: (i) Which (if any) cognitive processes or states are innate (in which organisms)? (ii) Should cognitive processes be seen as computational processes—and, if so, over what do they compute? (iii) What are the relationships between cognitive processes and neural (and other physiological) processes?
|Key works||Fodor 1983 is a classic—and still very influential—defense of the view that the mind consists of a handful of specialized and informationally encapsulated input and output systems, plus a central reasoning system. A more recent defense of a different, more empiricist view of cognition is in Prinz 2002 .|
|Introductions||Two good introductions are: Clark 2001 Thagard 2007|
- General Philosophy of Science (49,434)
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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