- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Miscellaneous
Edited by Armin W. Schulz (University of Kansas)
About this topic
| Summary |
The philosophy of cognitive science concerns philosophical issues that arise in cognitive science. Indeed, cognitive science is itself partly a philosophical project: it combines tools and insights from psychology, neuroscience, artificial intelligence, biology, anthropology, and philosophy. Initially unified by a commitment to a computational and representational outlook on cognition, cognitive science has increasingly come to embrace a wide variety of theoretical and methodological outlooks. Major questions that are being considered in the philosophy of cognitive science include: (i) Which (if any) cognitive processes or states are innate (in which organisms)? (ii) Should cognitive processes be seen as computational processes—and, if so, over what do they compute? (iii) What are the relationships between cognitive processes and neural (and other physiological) processes? |
| Key works | Fodor 1983 is a classic—and still very influential—defense of the view that the mind consists of a handful of specialized and informationally encapsulated input and output systems, plus a central reasoning system. A more recent defense of a different, more empiricist view of cognition is in Prinz 2002 . |
| Introductions | Two good introductions are: Clark 2001 Thagard 2006 |
Show all references
Related
Subcategories
Nativism in Cognitive Science (34 | 12)
Evolution of Cognition (216 | 48)
Extended Cognition* (343 | 22)
Animal Minds (294 | 27)
Animal Consciousness (80 | 13)
Animal Cognition (95 | 10)
Animal Mind Sciences (46 | 1)
Animal Minds, Misc (46)
Intelligence (47)
Cognitive Ontologies* (51)
See also
- General Philosophy of Science (53,821)
Contents
10009 found
Order:
| 1 — 50 / 10009 |
Material to categorize
- Emotional creativity: Emotional experience as creative product.Radek Trnka - 2023 - In: Cambridge Handbook of Creativity and Emotions (pp. 321-339). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Z. Ivcevic, J. D. Hoffmann & J. C. Kaufman.This chapter summarizes the conceptual foundations and research on emotional creativity. Emotional creativity is defined as a pattern of cognitive abilities and personality traits related to originality and appropriateness in emotional experience. This construct pervades human creative performance and represents an important link between emotional experience and cognitive processes. Empirical research in this field has revealed various links of emotional creativity to personality variables (e.g., openness to experience), positive affect, fantasy proneness, coping strategies, post-traumatic growth, better self-understanding, and one’s engagement (...)
- What are Coincidences? A Philosophical Guide Between Science and Common Sense.Alessandra Melas & Pietro Salis - 2023 - Wilmington: Vernon Press.It is a common opinion that chance events cannot be understood in causal terms. Conversely, according to a causal view of chance, intersections between independent causal chains originate accidental events, called “coincidences”. Firstly, this book explores this causal conception of chance and tries to shed new light on it. Such a view has been defended by authors like Antoine Augustine Cournot and Jacques Monod. Second, a relevant alternative is provided by those accounts that, instead of acknowledging an intersection among causal (...)
- How do people use and appraise concepts?James A. Hampton (ed.) - forthcoming - Switzerland: Springer Nature.To approach the many challenges involved in the notion of engineering concepts, it is important to have a clear idea of the starting point – the concepts that people use in their everyday lives, in conversations and in expressing beliefs, desires, intentions and so forth. The first Section of this chapter introduces evidence that I have accumulated over the last many years concerning the flexibility, context-dependence, and vagueness of such common concepts. The concept engineer needs to understand the structure of (...)
- Modelling Belief Dynamics.Manuel Bremer - manuscriptThe following considerations concern modelling Belief Dynamics (BD) not just in the sense of a formalization, but rather in the sense of building a computational model and implementing the corresponding data structures and algorithms of recomputing beliefs. The purpose of such a project is to illustrate some ideas about belief changes in a Web of Beliefs (WoB) to explore and deepen one's understanding of belief changes by trying to implement or improve corresponding algorithms.
- Expanded Social Reality: A New Framework to Study Social Systems.Lucia C. Neco - 2024 - Dissertation, University of Western AustraliaHumans are social beings. However, we are not alone in the realm of social reality; we share this space with diverse entities, including more than just animals. The term "social" has recently been applied to describe the collective behaviors of microorganisms and plants, as well as interactions among parts and groups of organisms. Therefore, there is a need to develop a framework that enables the study of social phenomena in a clearer and less restrictive manner. In this thesis, I lay (...)Remove from this listExport citation
Bookmark - The Ecological Brain: Unifying the Sciences of Brain, Body, and Environment.Favela Luis H. - 2024 - Routledge.The Ecological Brain is the first book of its kind, using complexity science to integrate the seemingly disparate fields of ecological psychology and neuroscience. The book develops a unique framework for unifying investigations and explanations of mind that span brain, body, and environment: the NeuroEcological Nexus Theory (NExT). Beginning with an introduction to the history of the fields, the author provides an assessment of why ecological psychology and neuroscience are commonly viewed as irreconcilable methods for investigating and explaining cognition, intelligent (...)
- Hasty Generalizations Are Pervasive in Experimental Philosophy: A Systematic Analysis.Uwe Peters & Olivier Lemeire - 2023 - Philosophy of Science.Scientists may sometimes generalize from their samples to broader populations when they have not yet sufficiently supported this generalization. Do such hasty generalizations also occur in experimental philosophy? To check, we analyzed 171 experimental philosophy studies published between 2017 and 2023. We found that most studies tested only Western populations but generalized beyond them without justification. There was also no evidence that studies with broader conclusions had larger, more diverse samples, but they nonetheless had higher citation impact. Our analyses reveal (...)
- The imaginary inner inside the cognitive science of religion.Christopher Hoyt - 2023 - In Robert Vinten (ed.), Wittgenstein and the Cognitive Science of Religion. London: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 73-91.Scientists working on the cognitive science of religion (CSR) are eager to have us believe that they have recently uncovered the unconscious origins of religious beliefs and practices. Though their theories differ in detail, CSR researchers generally agree that religion is the product of faculties of mind that evolved to serve our adaptive needs, but which sometimes produce the false beliefs and incoherent practices of religious life. Pascal Boyer, a leading figure and a reasonable representative of the mode of thinking (...)$93.99 new (collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this list Direct downloadExport citation Bookmark
- Antirepresentationalism Before and After Rorty.Barbara Herrnstein Smith - 2022 - Common Knowledge 28 (3):424-442.Richard Rorty's rejection of prevailing interior-mirror understandings of the presumed relationship between “minds” and “nature,” along with his promotion of nonrepresentational accounts of knowledge, truth, and science, participates in a rich tradition of jointly pragmatist and constructivist views that spans the twentieth century. This contribution to the symposium “Whatever Happened to Richard Rorty?” considers Rorty's complex and ambivalent relation to that tradition, particularly to the work of his American pragmatist predecessors, William James and John Dewey, and to subsequent pragmatist-constructivist antirepresentationalism (...)
- Reasoning with Concepts: A Unifying Framework.Peter Gärdenfors & Matías Osta-Vélez - 2023 - Minds and Machines 1 (3):451-485.Over the past few decades, cognitive science has identified several forms of reasoning that make essential use of conceptual knowledge. Despite significant theoretical and empirical progress, there is still no unified framework for understanding how concepts are used in reasoning. This paper argues that the theory of conceptual spaces is capable of filling this gap. Our strategy is to demonstrate how various inference mechanisms which clearly rely on conceptual information—including similarity, typicality, and diagnosticity-based reasoning—can be modeled using principles derived from (...)
- Sono solo parole ChatGPT: anatomia e raccomandazioni per l’uso.Tommaso Caselli, Antonio Lieto, Malvina Nissim & Viviana Patti - 2023 - Sistemi Intelligenti 4:1-10.
- Towards Biologically Plausible Artificial Vision.Mason Westfall - forthcoming - Behavioral and Brain Sciences.Quilty-Dunn et al. argue that DCNNs optimized for image classification exemplify structural disanalogies to human vision. A different kind of artificial vision—found in reinforcement learning agents navigating artificial three-dimensional environments—can be expected to be more human-like. Recent work suggests that language-like representations substantially improves these agents’ performance, lending some indirect support to the LoTH.
- Implicit Cognition, Dual Process Theory, and Moral Judgment.Charlie Blunden, Paul Rehren & Hanno Sauer - 2023 - In J. Robert Thompson (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Implicit Cognition. Abingdon / New York: Routledge. pp. 105-114.Implicit cognition is cognition that happens automatically and (typically) non-consciously. In moral psychology, implicit cognition is almost always understood in terms of dual process models of moral judgment. In this chapter, we address the question whether implicit moral judgment is usefully cashed out in terms of automatic (“type 1”) processes, and what the limitations of this approach are. Our chapter has six sections. In (1), we provide a brief overview of dual process models of domain-general (moral and non-moral) cognition. (2) (...)$56.95 new (collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this list Direct download (2 more)Export citation Bookmark
- Désaturer l'esprit. Usages du pragmatisme.Pierre Steiner - 2018 - Paris: Questions théoriques.
- Limitations of Embodied Theory and the Representational Pluralism.Huitong Zhou - manuscriptSince the mid to late 1970s, the traditional paradigm of cognitive theory has been increasingly questioned in the fields of philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence. With the rise of embodied cognition, psychologists have begun to understand conceptual representation in terms of embodiment, emphasizing the role of the subject's sensorimotor system and bodily experience in conceptual representation. Although there is a large body of empirical research to support the theory of embodied cognition, it still fails to provide a reasonable (...)
- A Planning Theory of Belief.Sara Aronowitz - forthcoming - Philosophical Perspectives.What does it mean to hold a belief? Some of our ways of speaking in English suggest that to hold a belief is to have something in your mind: beliefs are things we acquire, defend, recover, and so on (Abelson, 1986). That is, believing is a matter of being in a state of having a thing. In this paper, I will argue for an alternative: believing is something we do. This is not a new suggestion. For instance, Matthew Boyle (2011) (...)
- Ecological-enactive account of autism spectrum disorder.Janko Nešić - 2023 - Synthese 201 (2):1-22.Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a psychopathological condition characterized by persistent deficits in social interaction and communication, and restricted, repetitive patterns of behavior and interests. To build an ecological-enactive account of autism, I propose we should endorse the affordance-based approach of the skilled intentionality framework (SIF). In SIF, embodied cognition is understood as skilled engagement with affordances in the sociomaterial environment of the ecological niche by which an individual tends toward the optimal grip. The human econiche offers a whole landscape (...)
- The Puzzle of Belief.Neil Van Leeuwen & Tania Lombrozo - 2023 - Cognitive Science 47 (2):e13245.The notion of belief appears frequently in cognitive science. Yet it has resisted definition of the sort that could clarify inquiry. How then might a cognitive science of belief proceed? Here we propose a form of pluralism about believing. According to this view, there are importantly different ways to "believe" an idea. These distinct psychological kinds occur within a multi-dimensional property space, with different property clusters within that space constituting distinct varieties of believing. We propose that discovering such property clusters (...)
- From Life-Like to Mind-Like Explanation: Natural Agency and the Cognitive Sciences.Alex Djedovic - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Toronto, St. George CampusThis dissertation argues that cognition is a kind of natural agency. Natural agency is the capacity that certain systems have to act in accordance with their own norms. Natural agents are systems that bias their repertoires in response to affordances in the pursuit of their goals. -/- Cognition is a special mode of this general phenomenon. Cognitive systems are agents that have the additional capacity to actively take their worlds to be certain ways, regardless of whether the world is really (...)
- On the Foundations of Computing. Computing as the Fourth Great Domain of Science. [REVIEW]Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic - 2023 - Global Philosophy 33 (1):1-12.This review essay analyzes the book by Giuseppe Primiero, On the foundations of computing. Oxford: Oxford University Press (ISBN 978-0-19-883564-6/hbk; 978-0-19-883565-3/pbk). xix, 296 p. (2020). It gives a critical view from the perspective of physical computing as a foundation of computing and argues that the neglected pillar of material computation (Stepney) should be brought centerstage and computing recognized as the fourth great domain of science (Denning).
- Dual aspect theory (Spinoza-Velmans) versus the EDWs perspective by Gabriel Vacariu (January 2023).Gabriel Vacariu - manuscriptOn January 2023, I received an email from somebody regarding Velmans’s article 2008. After I took a look at the paper, I started to read his book 2000. Therefore, in this section, I will investigate Velmans’ works from 2000 and 2008. I emphasize that the main difference between Spinoza’s (Velmans) dual aspect theory and my EDWs approach is the framework of thinking: Spinoza, Velmans and everybody until me had been working within the unicorn world (the Universe/world), while my EDWs assumes (...)
- Desde el pluralismo integrativo hacia un modelo enactivo en psiquiatría.Cristián Orus Norte - 2022 - Culturas Cientificas 3 (2):4-34.La búsqueda de un pluralismo integrativo en filosofía de la ciencia presenta ecos fructíferos en discusiones contemporáneas de la filosofía de la psiquiatría, sobre todo en torno a la necesidad de un pluralismo que supere un reduccionismo neurobiológico y un eclecticismo biopsicosocial. Los trabajos de la filósofa Sandra Mitchell constituirán un punto de partida para visualizar la necesidad de un paradigma pluralista, al mismo tiempo que permitirán exponer la tesis de que es necesario un modelo que permita una integración real (...)
- Do We Perceive Reality?John Klasios - 2022 - arXiv.The cognitive scientist Donald Hoffman argues that we don't perceive reality: spacetime, objects, colors, sounds, tastes, and so forth, are all merely an interface that we evolved to track evolutionary fitness rather than to perceive truths about external reality. In this paper, I expound on his argument, then I extend it, primarily, by looking at key ideas in physics that are quite germane to it. Among the topics in physics that I discuss are black holes, the holographic principle, string theory, (...)
- A Context-Sensitive and Non-Linguistic Approach to Abstract Concepts.Peter Langland-Hassan & Charles Davis - 2022 - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 378.Despite the recent upsurge in research on abstract concepts, there remain puzzles at the foundation of their empirical study. These are most evident when we consider what is required to assess a person’s abstract conceptual abilities without using language as a prompt or requiring it as a response—as in classic non-verbal categorization tasks, which are standardly considered tests of conceptual understanding. After distinguishing two divergent strands in the most common conception of what it is for a concept to be abstract, (...)
- La redefinición del concepto de juicio en la explicación cognitivista de las emociones.Rodrigo Braicovich - 2021 - Eikasia Revista de Filosofía 102:129-151.Una de las premisas centrales del modelo cognitivista de explicación de las emociones consiste en afirmar que toda emoción es un juicio, afirmación que conduce a lo que denominaré el problema de la restrictividad, es decir, al hecho de que dicho modelo parece impedirnos atribuir emociones a entidades que carecen (temporal o estructuralmente) de la capacidad de juzgar. El objetivo del artículo consistirá en relevar las estrategias a las que recurren los dos autores que han defendido el modelo cognitivista de (...)
- Bioethics, Experimental Approaches.Jonathan Lewis, Joanna Demaree-Cotton & Brian Earp - 2023 - In M. Sellers & S. Kirste (eds.), Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 1-8.This entry summarizes an emerging subdiscipline of both empirical bioethics and experimental philosophy (“x-phi”) which has variously been referred to as experimental philosophical bioethics, experimental bioethics, or simply “bioxphi”. Like empirical bioethics, bioxphi uses data-driven research methods to capture what various stakeholders think (feel, judge, etc.) about moral issues of relevance to bioethics. However, like its other parent discipline of x-phi, bioxphi tends to favor experiment-based designs drawn from the cognitive sciences – including psychology, neuroscience, and behavioral economics – to (...)$1999.99 new (collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this list Direct download (2 more)Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
- Counting with Cilia: The Role of Morphological Computation in Basal Cognition Research.Wiktor Rorot - 2022 - Entropy 24 (11):1581.“Morphological computation” is an increasingly important concept in robotics, artificial intelligence, and philosophy of the mind. It is used to understand how the body contributes to cognition and control of behavior. Its understanding in terms of "offloading" computation from the brain to the body has been criticized as misleading, and it has been suggested that the use of the concept conflates three classes of distinct processes. In fact, these criticisms implicitly hang on accepting a semantic definition of what constitutes computation. (...)
- Generalization Bias in Science.Uwe Peters, Alexander Krauss & Oliver Braganza - 2022 - Cognitive Science 46 (9):e13188.Many scientists routinely generalize from study samples to larger populations. It is commonly assumed that this cognitive process of scientific induction is a voluntary inference in which researchers assess the generalizability of their data and then draw conclusions accordingly. We challenge this view and argue for a novel account. The account describes scientific induction as involving by default a generalization bias that operates automatically and frequently leads researchers to unintentionally generalize their findings without sufficient evidence. The result is unwarranted, overgeneralized (...)
- Algorithmic Political Bias Can Reduce Political Polarization.Uwe Peters - 2022 - Philosophy and Technology 35 (3):1-7.Does algorithmic political bias contribute to an entrenchment and polarization of political positions? Franke argues that it may do so because the bias involves classifications of people as liberals, conservatives, etc., and individuals often conform to the ways in which they are classified. I provide a novel example of this phenomenon in human–computer interactions and introduce a social psychological mechanism that has been overlooked in this context but should be experimentally explored. Furthermore, while Franke proposes that algorithmic political classifications entrench (...)
- Cultural attraction theory.Christophe Heintz - 2018 - In Hilarry Callan and Simon Coleman (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Anthropology.Cultural Attraction Theory (CAT), also referred to as cultural epidemiology, is an evolutionary theory of culture. It provides conceptual tools and a theoretical framework for explaining why and how ideas, practices, artifacts and other cultural items spread and persist in a community and its habitat. It states that cultural phenomena result from psychological or ecological factors of attraction.
- Do Bayesian Models of Cognition Show That We Are (Bayes) Rational?Arnon Levy - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science:1-13.According to [Bayesian] models” in cognitive neuroscience, says a recent textbook, “the human mind behaves like a capable data scientist”. Do they? That is to say, do such model show we are rational? I argue that Bayesian models of cognition, perhaps surprisingly, do not and indeed cannot, show that we are Bayesian-rational. The key reason is that such models appeal to approximations, a fact that carries significant implications. After outlining the argument, I critique two responses, seen in recent cognitive neuroscience. (...)
- Coordinating Behaviors: Is social interaction scripted?Gen Eickers - 2023 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 53 (1):85-99.Some philosophical and psychological approaches to social interaction posit a powerful explanatory tool for explaining how we navigate social situations: scripts. Scripts tell people how to interact in different situational and cultural contexts depending on social roles such as gender. A script theory of social interaction puts emphasis on understanding the world as normatively structured. Social structures place demands, roles, and ways to behave in the social world upon us, which, in turn, guide the ways we interact with one another (...)
- Constructing Persons: On the Personal–Subpersonal Distinction.Mason Westfall - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology:1-29.What’s the difference between those psychological posits that are ‘me’ and those that are not? Distinguishing between these psychological kinds is important in many domains, but an account of what the distinction consists in is challenging. I argue for Psychological Constructionism: those psychological posits that correspond to the kinds within folk psychology are personal, and those that don’t, aren’t. I suggest that only constructionism can answer a fundamental challenge in characterizing the personal level—the plurality problem. The things that plausibly qualify (...)
- Are machines radically contextualist?Ryan M. Nefdt - forthcoming - Mind and Language.In this article, I describe a novel position on the semantics of artificial intelligence. I present a problem for the current artificial neural networks used in machine learning, specifically with relation to natural language tasks. I then propose that from a metasemantic level, meaning in machines can best be interpreted as radically contextualist. Finally, I consider what this might mean for human-level semantic competence from a comparative perspective.
- Algorithmic Political Bias in Artificial Intelligence Systems.Uwe Peters - 2022 - Philosophy and Technology 35 (2):1-23.Some artificial intelligence systems can display algorithmic bias, i.e. they may produce outputs that unfairly discriminate against people based on their social identity. Much research on this topic focuses on algorithmic bias that disadvantages people based on their gender or racial identity. The related ethical problems are significant and well known. Algorithmic bias against other aspects of people’s social identity, for instance, their political orientation, remains largely unexplored. This paper argues that algorithmic bias against people’s political orientation can arise in (...)
- Enactivism and the Paradox of Moral Perception.Janna Van Grunsven - 2021 - Topoi 41 (2):287-298.In this paper I home in on an ethical phenomenon that is powerfully elucidated by means of enactive resources but that has, to my knowledge, not yet been explicitly addressed in the literature. The phenomenon in question concerns what I will term the paradox of moral perception, which, to be clear, does not refer to a logical but to a phenomenological-practical paradoxicality. Specifically, I have in mind the seemingly contradictory phenomenon that perceiving persons as moral subjects is at once incredibly (...)
- Enactive Ethics: Difference Becoming Participation.Ezequiel A. Di Paolo & Hanne De Jaegher - 2021 - Topoi 41 (2):241-256.Enactive cognitive science combines questions in epistemology, ontology, and ethics by conceiving of bodies as open-ended and mutually transforming through activity. While enaction is not a theory of ethics, it can contribute to its foundations. We present a schematization of enactive ideas that underlie traditional distinctions between Being, Knowing, and Doing. Ethics in this scheme begins in the relation between knowing and becoming. Critical of dichotomous thinking, we approach the questions of alterity and ethical reality. Alterity is relevant to the (...)
- Health and Illness as Enacted Phenomena.Fredrik Svenaeus - 2021 - Topoi 41 (2):373-382.In this paper I explore health and illness through the lens of enactivism, which is understood and developed as a bodily-based worldly-engaged phenomenology. Various health theories – biomedical, ability-based, biopsychosocial – are introduced and scrutinized from the point of view of enactivism and phenomenology. Health is ultimately argued to consist in a central world-disclosing aspect of what is called existential feelings, experienced by way of transparency and ease in carrying out important life projects. Health, in such a phenomenologically enacted understanding, (...)
- The Is and Oughts of Remembering.Erik Myin & Ludger van Dijk - 2022 - Topoi 41 (2):275-285.One can be reproached for not remembering. Remembering and forgetting shows who and what one values. Indeed, memory is constitutively normative. Theoretical approaches to memory should be sensitive to this normative character. We will argue that traditional views that consider memory as the storing and retrieval of mental content, fail to consider the practices we need for telling the truth about our past. We introduce the Radically Enactive view of Cognition, or REC, as well-placed to recognize the central role of (...)
- The Enacted Ethics of Self-injury.Zsuzsanna Chappell - 2022 - Topoi 41 (2):383-394.Enactivism has much to offer to moral, social and political philosophy through giving a new perspective on existing ethical problems and improving our understanding of morally ambiguous behaviours. I illustrate this through the case of self-injury, a common problematic behaviour which has so far received little philosophical attention. My aim in this paper has been to use ideas from enactivism in order to explore self-injury without assuming a priori that it is morally or socially wrong under all circumstances, seeking to (...)
- A New Theory of Serendipity: Nature, Emergence and Mechanism.Quan-Hoang Vuong (ed.) - 2022 - Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter.
- An Investigation of Scientific Phenomena.David Colaco - 2019 - Dissertation, University of PittsburghMy dissertation is on scientific phenomena, their characterization, and their role in scientific inquiry. I focus on three questions. First, what do characterizations of scientific phenomena represent? To answer this, I investigate what it means to characterize a phenomenon, as opposed to describing the results of individual studies. Second, how do researchers develop these characterizations? This question relates to the logic of discovery: I examine how researchers use existing theories and methods to explore systems, search for phenomena, and develop representations (...)Remove from this listExport citation Bookmark
- Integrating Philosophy of Understanding with the Cognitive Sciences.Kareem Khalifa, Farhan Islam, J. P. Gamboa, Daniel Wilkenfeld & Daniel Kostić - 2022 - Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience 16.We provide two programmatic frameworks for integrating philosophical research on understanding with complementary work in computer science, psychology, and neuroscience. First, philosophical theories of understanding have consequences about how agents should reason if they are to understand that can then be evaluated empirically by their concordance with findings in scientific studies of reasoning. Second, these studies use a multitude of explanations, and a philosophical theory of understanding is well suited to integrating these explanations in illuminating ways.
- Exploring RoBERTa's theory of mind through textual entailment.Michael Cohen - manuscriptWithin psychology, philosophy, and cognitive science, theory of mind refers to the cognitive ability to reason about the mental states of other people, thus recognizing them as having beliefs, knowledge, intentions and emotions of their own. In this project, we construct a natural language inference (NLD) dataset that tests the ability of a state of the art language model, RoBERTa-large finetuned on the MNLI dataset, to make theory of mind inferences related to knowledge and belief. Experimental results suggest that the (...)
- Reflexões acerca de Big Data e Cognição.Joao Kogler - 2020 - In Mariana C. Broens Edna A. De Souza (ed.), Big Data: Implicações Epistemológicas e Éticas. São Paulo, State of São Paulo, Brazil: Editora Filoczar. pp. 145-157.In this essay we examine the relationships between Big Data and cognition, in particular human cognition. The reason for exploring such relationships lies in two aspects. First, because in the domain of cognitive science, many speculate about the benefits that the uses of Big Data analysis techniques can provide to the characterization and understanding of cognition. Secondly, because the scientific and technological sectors that promote data analysis activities, particularly statistics, computer science and data science, naturally accustomed to working with Big (...)Remove from this listExport citation Bookmark
- The Literalist Fallacy & the Free Energy Principle: Model building, Scientific Realism and Instrumentalism.Michael David Kirchhoff, Julian Kiverstein & Ian Robertson - manuscriptDisagreement about how best to think of the relation between theories and the realities they represent has a longstanding and venerable history. We take up this debate in relation to the free energy principle (FEP) - a contemporary framework in computational neuroscience, theoretical biology and the philosophy of cognitive science. The FEP is very ambitious, extending from the brain sciences to the biology of self-organisation. In this context, some find apparent discrepancies between the map (the FEP) and the territory (target (...)
- Extended implicit bias: When the metaphysics and ethics of implicit bias collide.Uwe Peters - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.It has recently been argued that to tackle social injustice, implicit biases and unjust social structures should be targeted equally because they sustain and ontologically overlap with each other. Here I develop this thought further by relating it to the hypothesis of extended cognition. I argue that if we accept common conditions for extended cognition then people’s implicit biases are often partly realized by and so extended into unjust social structures. This supports the view that we should counteract psychological and (...)
- Einstein's Wonder.Enrico Gasco - 2020 - XL SISFA Conference.In his Autobiographical Notes Einstein recognizes the importance of wonder in the cognitive process by stating that it occurs when an experience comes into conflict with a sufficiently stable world of concepts. Already in classical philosophy, wonder is considered the starting point of philosophizing as Plato highlights in Theaetetus and Aristotle in Metaphysics. To describe what the wonder consists of we will suggest a Dynamic Frames and we will use it to describe the role of wonder in the years of (...)
- Probability logic.Niki Pfeifer - forthcoming - In M. Knauff & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), Handbook of Rationality. Cambridge, MA, USA:This chapter presents probability logic as a rationality framework for human reasoning under uncertainty. Selected formal-normative aspects of probability logic are discussed in the light of experimental evidence. Specifically, probability logic is characterized as a generalization of bivalent truth-functional propositional logic (short “logic”), as being connexive, and as being nonmonotonic. The chapter discusses selected argument forms and associated uncertainty propagation rules. Throughout the chapter, the descriptive validity of probability logic is compared to logic, which was used as the gold standard (...)
- The Context of Suffering: Empirical Insights into the Problem of Evil.Ian M. Church, Isaac Warchol & Justin Barrett - 2022 - TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology 6 (1):1-16.While the evidential problem of evil has been enormously influential within the contemporary philosophical literature—William Rowe’s 1979 formulation in “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism” being the most seminal—no academic research has explored what cognitive mechanisms might underwrite the appearance of pointlessness in target examples of suffering. In this exploratory paper, we show that the perception of pointlessness in the target examples of suffering that underwrite Rowe’s seminal formulation of the problem of evil is contingent on the (...)
| 1 — 50 / 10009 |
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-6968689d5f-brlq2 N