Philosophy of Cognitive Science

One proposed explanation for a particular kind of temporal preference lies in a disparity between the emotional intensity of memory compared to anticipation. According to the memory/anticipation disparity explanation, the utility of anticipation of a particular event if that event is future, whether positive or negative, is greater than the utility of retrospection of that same event if it is past, whether positive or negative, and consequently, overall utility is maximized when we prefer negative events to be located in the (...) past rather than the future, and positive ones in the future rather than the past. To have this preference is to be (at least apparently) future biased. If this explanation is correct, it would tend to confer rational justification upon these preferences. This paper empirically investigates this explanation. Our results suggest that, at most, this explanation might be a partial one of some people’s preferences some of the time, rather than a general explanation of future bias. In turn, this lends some indirect support to a competing explanation that appeals to temporal asymmetries in emotion and attention. Since that explanation would arguably tend not to confer rational justification upon (apparently) future-biased preferences, we argue that our findings provide some reason to be skeptical that these preferences are, in general, rationally justified. (shrink)

Simulation theory is a radical and yet increasingly popular view about episodic memory. It is the view that episodic memory and episodic simulation are the same natural kind. I argue that while simulation theory offers an important insight, it also makes an overreach. While episodic memory and episodic simulation likely reflect a common natural kind, they also differ in natural kind. They differ in natural kind because episodic memory is partly defined by projectible properties and memory trace mechanisms that episodic (...) simulation lacks. (shrink)

Sometimes, we act in concert with others, as when we go for a walk together, or when two mathematicians try to prove a difficult theorem with each other. An interesting question is what distinguishes the actions of individuals that together constitute some joint activity from those that amount to a mere aggregation of individual behaviours. It is common for philosophers to appeal to collective intentionality to explain such instances of shared agency. This framework generalizes the approach traditionally used to explain (...) individual action: a behaviour is an action just in case it causally follows from the relevant intention. Contemporary philosophers of action, as well as cognitive psychologists, however, have criticised this way of explaining individual actions, favouring instead an approach that puts “control” or “guidance” as the discerning factor: a behaviour is an action just in case the agent controls it, or just in case it is guided by the agent. In this paper, I argue that we should include talk of guidance even in cases of joint action. I first show that problems of deviant causation arise also in cases of joint action, and that therefore guidance is required to face this issue. Then, I show what a “capacity to guide” amounts to for a group and how joint guidance relates to individual guidance. Joint guidance is actually constituted by task co-representation and the sense of commitment. I argue that an approach that favours joint guidance over collective intentions eschews a lot of metaphysical problems about collective mentality and group subjects, and it is thus more explanatorily fruitful. (shrink)

This paper examines biology-inspired costly signaling explanations when applied to human conduct. Such explanations are part of a trend in the human behavioral sciences to investigate elements of human behavior as outcomes of quasi-Darwinian processes. The paper addresses four methodological concerns. The first worry is that quite often the requisite empirical support, in terms of population dynamics, appears to be missing. Second, fairly plausible alternative explanations are not considered or too easily disregarded. Third, the mechanism that is supposed to cause (...) reproduction and spread in a population is insufficiently spelled out. Fourth, and more specifically, it is often unclear how exactly false signaling (cheating) would be selected against. (shrink)

Devotion is associated with showing commitment to what individuals choose. But is perceived devotion influenced by how individuals react to what they did not choose? Two experiments (N = 1,000) indicate that rejecting alternatives is a key behavioral cue for assessing devotion. Study 1 documents the basic effect: individuals who reject alternatives were seen as more devoted than individuals who accept or are ambiguous toward alternatives. The result remained regardless of whether individuals self-identified with being devoted and exerted effort toward (...) their target of devotion. Rejecting alternatives predicted greater likelihood of being trusted and viewed as living a good life, mediated by perceived devotion. Study 2 examined whether people distinguish between different types of devotees who reject alternatives, in terms of the process (mindful vs. mindless) and nature (neutral vs. harmful to the self) of their choices. Individuals who engaged in harmful devotion were less likely to be perceived as devoted, trusted, or living a good life than individuals who did not. Individuals who mindlessly rejected alternatives were also evaluated more negatively than individuals who mindfully rejected alternatives. Altogether, these findings not only illuminate how rejecting alternatives inform our understanding of devotion but also reveal its broader impact on social evaluations. (shrink)

People tend to show greater liking for expressions of sadness when these expressions are described as art. Why does this effect arise? One obvious hypothesis would be that describing something as art makes people more likely to regard it as fictional, and people prefer expressions of sadness that are not real. We contrast this obvious hypothesis with a hypothesis derived from the philosophical literature. On this alternative hypothesis, describing something as art makes people more inclined to appropriate it, i.e., to (...) see it as an expression of their own sadness. Study 1 found that describing the exact same sad text as art (e.g., a monologue) as opposed to not-art (e.g., a diary entry) led to increased liking for the work. Study 2 showed that this effect is not mediated by fictionality. Study 3 showed that the effect is mediated by appropriation. Study 4 looked at the impact of a manipulation of fictionality. Describing a work as fictional did lead to increased liking, but this effect was completely mediated by appropriation. These results provide at least some initial support for the appropriation hypothesis. (shrink)

Stibbard-Hawkes forcefully alerts us to the pitfall of false-negative reasoning in symbolic archaeology. We highlight the twin problem of false-positive reasoning in what we call the “false-symbol problem.” False symbols are intuitively special entities that, owing to their non-utilitarian nature, invite symbolic interpretation. But they are not symbolic. We link the false-symbol problem to work in comparative primate cognition, taking “primate art” as our main example.

Stibbard-Hawkes shows that cultures using material symbols might well not leave traces of that practice in the archaeological record. The paper thus poses an important challenge: When is absence of evidence evidence of absence? This commentary uses behavioural ecology to make modest progress on this problem.

Stibbard-Hawkes' taphonomic findings are valuable, and his call for caution warranted, but the hazards he raises are being mitigated by a multi-pronged approach; current research on behavioural/cognitive modernity is not based solely on material chronology. Theories synthesize data from archaeology, anthropology, psychology, neuroscience, and genetics, and predictions arising from these theories are tested with mathematical and agent-based models.

While we are sympathetic with Stibbard-Hawkes’ approach, we disagree with the proposal to switch to a “cognitively modern” null for all Homo species. We argue in favor of a more evidence-driven approach, inspired by recent debates in comparative cognition. Ultimately, parsing the contributions of different genetic and extra-genetic factors in human evolution is more promising than setting a priori nulls.

Our commentary suggests that different materialities (fragile, enduring, and mixed) may influence cognitive evolution. Building on Stibbard-Hawkes, we propose that predictive brains minimise errors and seek information, actively structuring environments for epistemic benefits. This perspective complements Stibbard-Hawkes' view.

The objective of this paper is to examine whether the category of affordances and the potential mechanisms governing their actualization can offer a valuable framework for a deeper understanding of mental disorders, particularly addiction. In recent years, the category of affordances has been applied in analyzing schizophrenia, depression, or obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). In the paper we concentrate on substance use disorder (SUD) and argue that it can be characterized in terms of reshaping the field of affordances and an inability to (...) inhibit inappropriate affordances. To support this approach, we refer to the neuronal mechanism (involving the cortico-subcortical loops (CSL)) that is responsible for decision-making and action choice as part of a continuous competition between possible patterns of interaction with the environment. In the context of addiction, this mechanism is impaired, resulting in disruptions to motor, emotional, and cognitive functions, including decision-making. The adopted perspective allows the study of addiction to include descriptions at the sub-personal, personal, and supra-personal levels, which addresses both phenomenological descriptions of people with SUD and the neural mechanisms behind them. Moreover, this perspective has potential applications in various therapeutic strategies. (shrink)

This issue of Philosophical Psychology hosts two book symposia. One is on Elizabeth Barnes’s book, Health Problems: Philosophical Puzzles about the Nature of Health (Oxford University Press, 2023),...

This essay (written by Mark in dialogue with Stephan and including supporting commentary by Stanley Krippner and others1) is not a comprehensive survey of psi and anthropology, nor does it contain a thorough overview of Castaneda's work. Rather, it seeks to explore two primary questions. First, whatever became of the interest in psi and anthropology that led to the founding of the Society for the Anthropology of Consciousness? Second, what is the relationship between the anthropology of consciousness and transpersonal psychology? (...) Answers to these questions offer a glimpse into the historical origins of SAC as well as a historical understanding of the relationship between SAC and the Association for Transpersonal Psychology2. (shrink)

The article delves into the need for an anthropological exploration of consciousness in the modern context. While anthropology's core focus has always been the study of the human subject, this study argues that consciousness has emerged as a fundamental aspect that underpins all human phenomena. The historical trajectory of anthropology, from its positivist leanings to contemporary shifts like the phenomenological and ontological turns, is examined to highlight the evolving perspective on subjectivity and alterity. The author's ethnographic studies, particularly within the (...) realm of contemplative practices like traditional Buddhist meditation and mindfulness, reveal a crucial connection between consciousness and anthropological inquiry, challenging the inherent bias and dualistic thinking within anthropology, particularly concerning the dichotomy of self and other, evident even in studies of meditation. The proposal of “mindful ethnography” is introduced as a means to transcend this dualism, drawing inspiration from Buddhist philosophy. The study presents consciousness as a central concern for anthropology, calling for a reevaluation of traditional frameworks and the adoption of a more mindful and non-dualistic approach to anthropological research. Through a thorough investigation of consciousness, the article seeks to provide a nuanced understanding of human experience and reshape the trajectory of anthropological inquiry in a modern context. (shrink)

This paper analyzes Dolores's case of collective spirit possession as a paroxysmic form of possession idiom, serving as a powerful and creative internal mechanism that both safeguards and revitalizes the core structure of ancestor worship. Drawing on my ethnographic research in North Honduras since 2009, my study reveals that rather than leading to the erosion of possession rituals, entropic forces, such as resistance, modernity, and impiety serve as vital resources, reinforcing the foundations of ancestor worship. This paper explores possession idioms (...) and striking events, such as contagion, abduction, dramatization, illness, and death to highlight the resilience of a possession-based religion as a self-sustaining total social system rooted in “tradition,” yet shaped by a dynamic interplay of historical, cultural, and personal experiences. While traditional interpretations of spirit possession have viewed possession cults as forms of protest against hegemonic power—“a weapon of the weak” used to gain respect and process trauma—I suggest that spirit possession is multifaceted, ambiguous and underdetermined, operating within a social theater where critique, social irony, impiety, historical consciousness, and the carnivalesque intersect. (shrink)

In the wake of recent advancements in the field of AI, this paper investigates the impact of recommender systems and generative models on human decisional and creative autonomy. For this purpose, we adopt Dennett’s conception of autonomy as self-control. We show that recommender systems can play a double role in relation to decisional autonomy: as information filter, they can augment self-control in decision-making, but also act as mechanisms of remote control that clamp degrees of freedom. As for generative models in (...) AI, we show that they can be seen as a powerful system of selection and suggestion (similar to standard recommender systems) but also as an instrument for information production. We suggest that the latter perspective opens new possibilities in terms of creative autonomy. Additionally, for both systems we propose a distinction between “extrinsic” and “intrinsic” mechanisms and effects. Through Dennett’s theory of self-control, this paper offers new insights into the relation between AI and human autonomy by framing it in terms of remote or self-control and by addressing the impact of generative models on creative autonomy. (shrink)

Proper names—expressions such as “Barack Obama” or “New York”—play a crucial role in the philosophical debate on reference, that is, the relation that allows words to stand for entities of the world. In an elicited production test, Devitt and Porot prompt participants to use proper names to compare the Descriptivist Theory and the Causal‐Historical Theory on proper names’ reference. According to the Descriptivist Theory, names refer to the entity that fulfills the description that speakers associate with them. In contrast, the (...) Causal‐Historical Theory holds that names refer to the entity at the origin of the causal‐historical chain of uses, regardless of any description. Devitt and Porot consider a criticism of their work, which they call “New‐Meaning objection”: upon reading the vignette, the participant gains access to some facts unknown to the people within the fictional scenario. As a consequence, the descriptivist participant may undertake the elicited production test by relying upon a new meaning that is in force within a linguistic community “in the know.” In that case, the Descriptivist Theory predicts the same name usage as the Causal‐Historical Theory. While Devitt and Porot address the objection also with a follow‐up experiment, they consider the criticism theoretically flawed, arguing that names do not change meaning any time speakers acquire new information about the world. In this article, I argue that, contrary to Devitt and Porot's claim, their vignette inclines the descriptivist participant to assume that the name has acquired a new meaning. (shrink)

The project is aimed at an arduous task of precise identification of medicinal plant species with the problem being pertinent in those industries that include botany, Ayurveda, pharmacology, and biomedical research. Most of the traditional identification methods are quite serious challenges for users, researchers, and students because they are usually time-consuming, knowledge-intensive, and prone to human errors. Our proposal develops an advanced web-based application for this process by utilizing state-of-the-art methods in image processing and machine learning. We will create a (...) platform where users can upload or take pictures of plant specimens and obtain accurate identifications and comprehensive medical information by using machine learning algorithms with plant species image datasets. This application is done in a way that the interface would be user-friendly and favor research, identification, and learning, especially for Ayurvedic practitioners, biomedical specialists, botanists, and students. Therefore, our project is aimed at developing an exhaustive and reliable solution for medicinal plant identification and study by overcoming the deficiencies of existing systems, such as a small dataset, poor variable quality, and lack of complete medicinal information. (shrink)

Mirrors are more than reflective surfaces; they are portals to self-perception influenced by a tapestry of developmental, psychological, and cultural factors. In this paper, we explore the interplay between these factors by investigating the effect of beliefs on mirror images and clarifying how negative self-perception develops. We analyse the phenomenon of mirror self-recognition and the development of beliefs about oneself, attempting to clarify how emotionally charged beliefs could influence our experience with the mirror. Our proposal offers insights into body dysmorphia (...) disorders, emphasizing the importance of the interaction between belief and self-perception in this and related disorders. (shrink)

The explanatory model proposed by Sijilmassi et al. appeals to fitness interdependence, and is highly plausible for small-scale societies. We argue that it is less so in the context of the larger societies that much of their empirical evidence is drawn from, and that this is because fitness interdependence does not readily scale up in the way the model requires.

The commentaries addressed various aspects of our account of historical myths. We respond by clarifying the evolutionary theory of coalitional psychology that underlies our claims (R1). This addresses concerns about the role of fitness interdependence in large groups (R2), cultural transmission processes (R3), alternative routes to nation-building (R4) and the role of proximal mechanisms (R5). Finally, we evaluate alternative theories (R6) and discuss directions for future research (R7).

Myths about a remote shared past can certainly promote cooperation between distantly related people, seemingly via their impact on our social cognition, and ultimately facilitate the achievement of complex tasks in large-scale societies. Nonetheless, the creation and transmission of these complex narratives are not possible without the parallel development of sophisticated language(s), endowed with properties like displacement (enabling mental travels in space and time) and complex syntax (enabling the assembly and communication of complex thoughts).

This commentary adds elements of analysis from the new evolutionary sociology that might help to support the mythologic hypothesis. It discusses the likelihood of a more generalized processer rather than exactly evolved psychological mechanisms, the consequences of bottlenecks, and the importance of utilizing molecular, fossil, and primate data in the authors' research program.