Philosophy of Consciousness

1. Our 'vision' of our surroundings is minimal as to the richness of what is out there. That is because our eyes and optical faculties are severely limited in seeing a semblance of that reality. -/- 2. When speaking of 'reality', there are numberless levels of that subject matter. There is the reality of what each organism sees. There is the reality of the different conditions a perceiving person is in, for example, what is the speed the observing agent watching (...) the perceived object and that will change the 'reality' of what they see if we change the speed. -/- 3. In summation there is no unity in any perceived object. (shrink)

Космовізі — це термін, який має означати набір основ, з яких виникає системне розуміння Всесвіту, його складових як життя, світу, в якому ми живемо, природи, людського феномену та їхніх взаємозв’язків. Таким чином, це галузь аналітичної філософії, що живиться науками, метою якої є це сукупне та епістемологічно стійке знання про все, що ми є і що містить у собі, що оточує нас і що будь-яким чином до нас відноситься. Це щось таке ж давнє, як людська думка, і, окрім використання елементів наукової (...) космології, воно охоплює все у філософії та науці, що стосується Всесвіту та життя. Космогляд — це не набір ідей, гіпотез і припущень, а система, заснована на спостереженнях, аналізі, доказах і демонстраціях. Жодне космобачення не має на меті визначати, встановлювати чи пропонувати, а лише розуміти, аналізувати та інтерпретувати. Кожен з нас будує і транспортує своє космогляд протягом життя, не встановлюючи форми, як фон для нашого мислення і поведінки . Лінгвістично термін «космовізія» походить від німецької мови, що еквівалентно поняттю « Weltanschauung», яке використовували кілька філософів. Однак цей лінгвістичний зв’язок незастосовний, оскільки він суперечить тому, що ми пропонуємо як космовізію. Це німецьке слово відноситься до дологічного або протоекспериментального бачення реальності з інтуїтивним контекстом і далеко не критичним знанням, яке ще не існувало на момент його формулювання. Безсумнівно, космовізії, у тому сенсі, як ми їх розуміємо, містять і використовують ці протоекспериментальні або до-логічні елементи, які включають історію, колективне несвідоме та всі архетипи, які ми носимо. Однак у концепції, яку ми тут застосовуємо, космовізія виходить далеко за межі цього змісту, по-перше, постійно підпорядковуючи його теперішньому критичному мисленню і, нарешті, роблячи аналітичний досвід (а не саму думку чи інтуїцію) своїм справжнім всесвітом. У цій роботі ми прагнемо окреслити космогляд, заснований на реаліях, які пропонує сьогодні наука. Ми ніколи не пропонуємо займатися наукою; або теоретизувати філософію, але ми завжди будемо прагнути отримати їхню підтримку або, принаймні, захистити їх від когнітивних викривлень, які ми зазвичай несемо. (shrink)

Concerning Nicolaus Cusanus’ (Nicholas of Cusa, 1401–1464) mysticism of the intellect, his approach to the problem of ineffability deserves the special attention of researchers. Preceded by a general exposition on the topic of the inconceivability of the experience of the foundational autopoietic self-reference of thinking and speaking, this article shows how Nicolaus Cusanus has developed a complex approach to the problem of an “ineffable way of speaking” (ineffable fari). Cusanus developed a set of approaches to non-negatable cataphatic “pointing rods” (Max (...) Scheler) and apophatic ways of thinking about what is to be understood as ineffable in the sense of a philosophical form of mysticism. Both are still inspiring and highly relevant for the discussion today. In terms of the overall interior development of his philosophical way of “eloquent silence” (German: beredtes Schweigen), it is notable that Cusanus eventually referred to both ways of affirmative and negative theology in their dialectic interdependence. Eventually, he found increasingly simple ways to point the way towards the “likeness of the path along which the seeker must walk.” In his later works, Cusanus developed a unique understanding of the problem of ineffability about philosophical mysticism, the potential of which remains to be explored further in the future. (shrink)

The introspective devices framework proposed by Kammerer and Frankish (2023) offers an attractive conceptual tool for evaluating and developing accounts of introspection. However, the framework assumes that different views about the nature of introspection can be easily evaluated against a set of common criteria. In this paper, I set out to test this assumption by analyzing two formal models of introspection using the introspective device framework. The question I aim to answer is not only whether models developed outside of philosophy (...) can be successfully evaluated against the set of conceptual criteria proposed by Kammerer and Frankish, but also whether this kind of evaluation can reveal some limitations inherent to the framework. (shrink)

This article comprehensively examines how information processing relates to attention and consciousness. We argue that no current theoretical framework investigating consciousness has a satisfactory and holistic account of their informational relationship. Our key theoretical contribution is showing how the dissociation between consciousness and attention must be understood in informational terms in order to make the debate scientifically sound. No current theories clarify the difference between attention and consciousness in terms of information. We conclude with two proposals to advance the debate. (...) First, neurobiological homeostatic processes need to be more explicitly associated with conscious information processing, since information processed through attention is algorithmic, rather than being homeostatic. Second, to understand subjectivity in informational terms, we must define information uniqueness in consciousness (e.g., irreproducible information, biologically encrypted information). These approaches could help cognitive scientists better understand conflicting accounts of the neural correlates of consciousness and work toward a more unified theoretical framework. (shrink)

Many different methodological approaches have been proposed to infer the presence of consciousness in non-human systems. In this paper, a version of the theory-heavy approach is defended. Theory-heavy approaches rely heavily on considerations from theories of consciousness to make inferences about non-human consciousness. Recently, the theory-heavy approach has been critiqued in the form of Birch's (Noûs, 56(1): 133-153, 2022) dilemma of demandingness and Shevlin's (Mind & Language, 36(2): 297-314, 2021) specificity problem. I argue that an alternative characterization of the approach (...) avoids these challenges; a so-called credence-based theory-heavy approach. Theorists can generate interpretations of their theory, at different levels of generality, and operationalize these into theory-informed markers. These theory-informed are assigned a likelihood and are used to assess the probability that a target system is conscious. In addition, some remaining challenges for this approach are discussed, most notably a consensus problem and the problem of calibrating the likelihoods associated with theory-informed markers. Lastly, I explore methodological pluralism and assess how the credence-based theory-heavy approach can benefit from other methodological approaches. (shrink)

宇宙观是一个词汇，应该意味着一组基础，从中产生对 宇宙的系统性理解，包括生命、我们所处的世界、自然 界、人类现象及其相互关系。因此，这是一种由科学支 持的分析哲学领域，其目标是对我们周围及与我们相关 的所有事物的综合而认识，并在认识上具有认识论的支 持。它是与人类思维一样古老的存在，并且除了运用科 学宇宙学的元素外，还涵盖了所有涉及宇宙和生命的哲 学和科学。 一个宇宙观并不是一组想法、假设和假定，而是一个基 于观察、分析、证据和论证的系统。没有一个宇宙观会 试图定义、确立或提出，而只是理解、分析和解释。每 个人在一生中构建和承载着自己的宇宙观，作为我们思 维和行为的背景。 从语言学角度来看，术语“宇宙观”来源于德语，相当 于多位哲学家所使用的“Weltanschauung”概念。然 而，这种语言上的关系并不适用，因为它与我们所提出 的宇宙观相悖。这个德语词指的是一种先前逻辑或原始 实验性的现实观，具有直觉性的背景，并且在其形成时 6 还不存在批判性的认识。毫无疑问，在我们理解的意义 上，宇宙观包含并使用了这些原始实验性或先前逻辑的 元素，包括历史、集体无意识和我们所承载的所有原型。 然而，在我们应用的概念中，宇宙观远远超越了这些内 容，首先是因为它不断地将其置于当前的批判性思维之 下，并最终使经验成为其真实的宇宙，而非仅仅是思维 或直觉。 安东尼奥·洛佩斯展示了这一内容的广度：1 “宇宙观并不是思维的产物。它并非源于简单 的求知欲望。对现实的理解是宇宙观形成的重 要时刻，但仅仅是其中之一。它源自生活的行 为，源自对生命的经验，源自我们心灵的整体 结构。将生命提升到意识中，在对现实的认识、 对生命的价值以及意志的现实性中，是人类在 生活观念的发展中所做的缓慢而艰难的工作。 （W. Dilthey, 1992 [1911]: 120）”。 -/- 在这项工作中，我们试图勾勒出一种基于当今科学所提 供的现实的宇宙观。我们在任何时候都不会试图进行科 学研究，或对哲学进行理论化，而始终努力在它们的支 持下，或至少在它们的保护下，免受我们通常所带有的 认知扭曲的影响。 .

Authors believe we can reverse humanity's destructive environmental path, positing that a new worldview of a "quantum paradigm" is emerging in society, based on awareness that consciousness is a universal energy field from which we form our reality-and guide civilizations to find solutions combining Western medicine and Eastern wisdom traditions to create better lives for all.

Từ hồi đại phu Chèo Bẻo cuối xóm già ngẫn, nhớ nhớ quên quên, mất khả năng khám chữa bệnh, cơ bản tình hình sức khỏe xóm chim xuống dốc. Nhiều chuyện kỳ quái xảy ra chỉ vì cái sự đi xuống của sức khỏe vật lý lẫn tinh thần của chúng chim trong xóm.

В данной работе рассматриваются важнейшие вопросы о коллективном воображаемом и его отношениях с реальностью и истиной. Сначала мы рассмотрим эту тему в концептуальных рамках, а затем проведем соответствующий фактологический анализ наглядных поведенческих реалий. Мы будем опираться не только на методологию, но и, главным образом, на постулаты и положения аналитической философии, которые, безусловно, будут проявляться на протяжении всего исследования и могут быть идентифицированы по признакам, описанным Пересом : Рабосси (1975) отстаивает идею, что аналитическая философия может быть идентифицирована путем рассмотрения некоторых семейных (...) сходств. Он предлагает следующие семейные черты: позитивное отношение к научному знанию; осторожное отношение к метафизике; представление о философии как о концептуальной задаче, в которой в качестве метода используется концептуальный анализ; тесная связь между языком и философией; стремление к аргументированным ответам на философские проблемы; поиск концептуальной ясности. Эти базовые понятия включают в себя культурное, социальное, религиозное, научное, философское, моральное и политическое содержание, принадлежащее каждому и коллективному существованию. В данной статье мы не будем дискутировать и доказывать. Наша цель — не систематическая методология, не критика и не доказательство. Настоящая работа основана на аналитической рефлексии. Мы будем рассуждать как можно более полно и глубоко и излагать результаты своих размышлений. Несмотря на междисциплинарный характер темы и методологическую открытость к принятию вклада из любой области науки, данная работа относится к психологии и онтологии, или, другими словами, к социальной и онтологической психологии. Свободная методология, направляющая такие размышления, охватывает и рассматривает все, что приближается к согласованности с философской и психологической эпистемологией. Эта методология не гонится за доказательствами, а ищет взаимосвязь между существующими доказательствами любой природы и величины, выводя когерентный смысл реальных вещей. (shrink)

somehow, an ilusion can be the path to a surprinsingly truth about yourself.

Writing for a better world, for better persons, on the street, the neighbourhood, the academy and the church.

Our sense of smell pervasively influences our most common behaviors and daily experience, yet little is known about olfactory consciousness. Over the past decade and a half research in both the fields of Consciousness Studies and Olfaction has blossomed, however, olfactory consciousness has received little to no attention. The olfactory systems unique anatomy, functional organization, sensory processes, and perceptual experiences offers a fecund area for exploring all aspects of consciousness, as well as a external perspective for re-examining the assumptions of (...) contemporary theories of consciousness. It has even been suggested that the olfactory system may represent the minimal neuroanatomy that is required for conscious processing. Here, we seek contributions that should serve as the foundation for future research concerning consciousness using olfaction as a model. -/- Given the variegated nature of research on consciousness, we seek original papers including review articles, original research, and theoretical contributions concerning the nature of olfactory consciousness. The scope of the special edition widely incorporates olfaction as it relates to Consciousness, Awareness, Attention, Phenomenal- or Access-Consciousness, and Qualia. Research concerning olfaction and cross-modal integration as it relates to conscious experience is also welcome. -/- As the initial foray into this uncharted area of research, we welcome contributions from across all disciplines contributing to cognitive neuroscience, including neurobiology, neurology, psychology, philosophy, linguistics, and computer sciences. It is our hope that this special edition will serve as the impetus for future interdisciplinary research on olfaction and consciousness. (shrink)

According to the transparency thesis, some conscious states are transparent or “diaphanous”. This thesis is often believed to be incompatible with an inner‐awareness account of phenomenal consciousness. In this article, I reject this incompatibility. Instead, I defend a compatibilist approach to transparency. To date, most attempts to do so require a rejection of strong transparency in favor of weak transparency. In this view, transparent states can be attended to by attending (in the right way) to the presented world: that is, (...) they are merely translucent. Here, I first argue that this understanding of transparency is too weak to qualify as a compatibilist view. Drawing on insights from Franz Brentano, I then describe a middle road between strong and weak transparency. The crucial idea is that, although transparent states cannot be attended to, they can be noticed (under suitable conditions). This view, I submit, allows supporters of inner awareness to commit themselves to a more interesting understanding of transparency—moderate transparency—that preserves the initial intuition underlying the transparency metaphor. (shrink)

In contrast to mainstream accounts which explain the aesthetic experience of people with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) in terms of cognitive abilities, this paper suggests as an alternative explanation the “emotional abilities approach”. We present an example of a person with ASD who is able to exercise a variety of emotional abilities in aesthetic contexts but who has difficulties exhibiting their equivalents in interpersonal relations. Using an autobiographical account, we demonstrate first that there is at least one precedent where a (...) person with ASD can exercise a series of emotional abilities when engaging with art works. Second, we offer also an explanation about why aesthetic contexts might enable this person to exercise emotional abilities which in interpersonal contexts seem to be blocked. (shrink)

Drawing upon interdisciplinary research to rectify the neglect shown to smell in contemporary philosophy Stinking Philosophy! demonstrates the importance of examining olfactory philosophy as its own area of research. The purpose of this books is not to shame philosophy for its stench rather over the course of more than a decade I have been arguing that studying smell provides a means of making lateral progress on a range of central debates in philosophy of mind and perception. The book weaves together (...) my research on smell into a coherent coverage of the nature of odors, how we represent smells, think and communicate about smells as categories, and what smell can teach us about consciousness. (shrink)

Among the mysterious and wondrous characteristics of minds, the deepest and most mysterious one, yet also the most overlooked, is their particularity. It is a special and most fundamental kind of particularity: each of us experiences life through their own, private, unique, and non-duplicable perspective, which is what fundamentally differentiates him/her from the rest of the universe and gives him/her their unique identity. There is an infinity of possible first-person perspectives, and each mind has a unique one. The particular perspective (...) of each mind is accessible only from within that mind itself while from the outside it is indistinguishable from the infinity of other existing or possible perspectives. For the rest of the universe, what is particular about a certain mind is completely hidden. The paper begins with a consideration of the "pairing problem", i.e. of how minds are paired to bodies, which serves to elucidate this concept of particularity of minds. If the mind is reducible to fundamental phenomena associated with a body’s physics or material constitution, then the pairing rule should be traceable there. Which particular mind will emerge from a particular body (i.e. whether it will be me, you, or someone else) should depend/supervene on either the particular structure of that body, or on the particular matter that constitutes it. But it can depend/supervene on neither: on one hand, bodily structure is duplicable but particular minds are not (if exact copies of my body were made, I would not also be paired to those other bodies; other persons would be. All those bodies would be structurally identical, so the structure of the body cannot determine the particularity of the person paired to it), and on the other hand the particular matter that constitutes our bodies changes every day but we remain the same persons. The paper then proceeds to deeper arguments: The uniqueness of a mind's particularity, its complete hiddenness from the rest of the universe, and its complete external similarity with the particularities of all other minds makes it impossible that it is dependent on anything external to it, making the mind an independent substance. (shrink)

Our human forms of embodiment, the many various ways real bodies appear in the real world, structure our experiences, memories, thoughts, and language in ways both subtle and important. On The Good Place, we have bodies in the afterlife, and they must be real enough that they can be filled with pins and butthole spiders. Researchers recognized the importance of having a body in the real world as a method of building artificial intelligence (AI). Throughout the first three seasons of (...) The Good Place, Janet herself recognizes the ways she is changing. The change is subtle early on, so it's easy to continue to see her as the Busty Alexa that Eleanor sees at first. Janet is a refreshing way to think about AI going forward. She is a model for how AI researchers ought to think about the emergence of mind, thoughts and feelings that a system previously lacked. (shrink)

According to the grounding theory of powers, fundamental physical properties should be thought of as qualities that ground dispositions. Although this view has recently been defended by many different philosophers, there is no consensus for how the view should be developed within a broader metaphysics of properties. Recently, Tugby has argued that the view should be developed in the context of a Platonic theory of properties, where properties are abstract universals. I will argue that the view should not be developed (...) within such a framework. Either the view should be developed with an ontology of Aristotelian properties, or it should be developed in a Nominalist framework that contains no properties at all. (shrink)

Jonathan Edwards' article “Modern Monads: Leibniz, Continuity, and the Stream of Consciousness” deals with Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's (1646– 1716) famous monadology, especially with the perceiving entity, i.e. the subject or monad, and its identity over time. Edwards asks whether it is possible to combine Leibniz's theory of monads with modern biology and physics. His response is affirmative. I will start with some general points about his article, and then I will introduce it in details.

El presente estudio sirve de Prefacio a nuestra traducción del libro de Jean-Luc Marion: Cuestiones cartesianas. Método y Metafísica, Buenos Aires, Prometeo, 2012, pp. 9-40 (ISBN 978-987-574-463-9). Presentamos aquí el primer volumen de las Cuestiones Cartesianas, publicado por primera vez en 1991, y dedicado, como lo indica su subtítulo, a la relación, o mejor, a las sucesivas relaciones, a lo largo del corpus cartesiano, entre método y metafísica. Aunque se presentan como una recopilación de estudios autónomos, y son tales, la (...) significación de estas cuestiones, y la radicalidad del cuestionamiento que ellas plantean, deben entenderse por el lugar que ellas ocupan en la totalidad de la obra que J.-L. Marion dedicara a la filosofía de Descartes, esto es, en una doble continuidad. En primer lugar, estas cuestiones no se acaban aquí y se continúan en otro volumen, publicado cinco años después, bajo el mismo título y dedicado a los dos entes, ego y Dios, que se erigen, alternativamente, en principios de la metafísica cartesiana. A su vez, el conjunto de las cuestiones cartesianas continúan, sin perder su autonomía, la densa trilogía que las antecede, en la cual sus dos pares de problemas, método y metafísica, ego y Dios, y sus distintas articulaciones, se plantean desde el primer momento de una larga investigación en la que las sucesivas interpretaciones aspiran a una interpretación global y nunca definitiva, dirigida a la ardua (re)constitución de la metafísica que Descartes lleva a cabo, o mejor, y en sentido más general, a la situación historial de la metafísica de Descartes. En lo que sigue, exponemos las tesis principales de esos tres libros, a saber: Sur l’ontologie grise de Descartes. Science cartésienne et savoir aritotélicien dans les Regulae, Paris, Vrin, 1975, 1981, 1992, 2000; Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes. Analogie, création des vérités éternelles, fondement, Paris, PUF, 1981, 1991; Sur le prisme métaphysique de Descartes. Constitution et limites de l’onto-théo-logie cartésienne, Paris, PUF, 1986, 2000. (Hay traducciones al español y al inglés). Luego, exponemos crìticamente los estudios contendis en el libro que introducimos, Cuestiones Cartsianas. Mètodo y Metafìsica para finalmente discutir el lugar que la exègesis cartesiana ocupa en la obra filosófica general de Jean-Luc Marion. (shrink)

There is a close relationship between the developments of personal identity and consciousness throughout life. Underlying both is a fundamental question for each of us: Who am I? However, this relationship has mainly been studied in certain socio-cultural contexts. Moreover, previous studies that have integrated pre-personality and trans-personality as natural extensions of personal identity do not offer a critical, philosophical and humanistic analysis informed by the latest advances in neuroscience. I distinguish five basic identities: biological, social, autotelic, universal, and presential. (...) Narrative identity is characterized as the major impediment to the discovery of the other identities. The possible existence of an authentic identity beyond any identification is discussed. Parallels between motivation for action and the developments of identity and consciousness are also highlighted. It is proposed to combine the multidimensional and hierarchical perspectives in order to obtain a more realistic, integrative and logically structured view of the different individual pathways. Finally, I establish connections with lines of humanism, philosophy, psychology, and theology not usually linked to the study of identity, to offer a global and integrative vision. (shrink)

This article introduces the mathematical models of the thinking laws in the internal structure of consciousness, the spatial and temporal features of the thinking laws, and the phenomenon of resonance as a general feature of the cognitive process. The article will focus on the logical order and space-time existence of the thinking laws, by interrelating such mathematical concepts as Boolessche Algebra, Set theory, Crowd round of Abel, and ordinal number. Finally, the article discusses how thinking laws can a naturalized theory (...) of consciousness, and how they, together with established principles of consciousness, can play important roles in the process of cognition. (shrink)

In this work, we introduce what we believe to be a more sensitive variation of the Metaproblem of consciousness, structured by philosopher Keith Frankish (2017): the Illusion Problem. To do so, we explore the process that leads us to treat each and every quale as an illusion, in addition to showing how qualia are present in most supposedly physicalist theories, which we will later call “Closeted Dualism”. We also emphasize that the illusionist theory is already widely used or considered by (...) philosophers who seek a scientifically plausible way out of the problems of consciousness. Once done, the reader will be ready for the more “technical” part of this article, in which we explore and defend the main concepts and mechanisms of Illusionism. (shrink)

لم نعد بحاجة إلى فانوس سحري نمسح عليه بأصابعنا لكي يخرج منه المارد القادر على خدمتنا وتلبية بعض أهم مطالبنا الحياتية، ولم نعد بحاجة إلى تعويذات نلج بها في عالم السحر والخيال؛ لقد خرج المارد بالفعل من قمقمه الحاسوبي؛ من جوف مختبرات البرمجة والذكاء الاصطناعي، بتعويذات (أكواد) رياضية رمزية سرعان ما تمكن من التهامها وهضمها، ليبيت قادرًا على إنتاج تعويذات أخرى مماثلة، وربما أفضل منها! خرج «المُحول التوليدي المدرب مُسبقًا»، المعروف اختصارًا باسم «جي بي تي»، ملوحًا بإمكانات بحثية وخدمية وإنتاجية (...) هائلة، ومهددًا بتصفية قطاعات بأسرها من المهن والوظائف، وبتجريف مهارات البحث العلمي لدى طلاب المدارس والجامعات! (shrink)

الذكاء الاصطناعي العاطفي»، ويُعرف أيضًا باسم «الحوسبة العاطفية»، و«الذكاء الاصطناعي المتمركز حول الإنسان»، و«الذكاء الاصطناعي الاجتماعي»، مفهوم جديد نسبيًا (ما زالت تقنياته في طور التطوير)، وهو أحد مجالات علوم الحاسوب الهادفة إلى تطوير آلات قادرة على فهم المشاعر البشرية. يشير المفهوم ببساطة إلى اكتشاف وبرمجة المشاعر الإنسانية بُغية تحسين الذكاء الاصطناعي، وتوسيع نطاق استخدامه، بحيث لا يقتصر أداء الروبوتات على تحليل الجوانب المعرفية (المنطقية) والتفاعل معها فحسب، بل والامتداد بالتحليل والتفاعل إلى الجوانب العاطفية للتواصل البشري.

Contemplative scholarship has reoriented attention towards the neuroscientific study of the soteriological ambition of Buddhist practice, awakening. This article evaluates the project of seeking neural correlates for awakening. We identify key definitional and operational issues demonstrating that: the nature of awakening is highly contested both within and across Buddhist traditions; the meaning of awakening is both context- and concept-dependent; and awakening may be non-conceptual and ineffable. We demonstrate that operationalised secular conceptions of awakening, divorced from soteriological and cultural factors, have (...) little relationship to traditional Buddhist construct(s) of awakening. We identify methodological issues for secular conceptions of awakening concerning introspection and neuroimaging, yet identify the value of recent advancements in empirical first-person phenomenology for attenuating introspective bias. Overall, we identify the problems with decontextualising awakening and placing it within a scientific naturalistic framework. Careful attention to the definitional, operational and methodological neuroscientific obstacles identified herein, is required in the responsible approach to the investigation of awakening states. (shrink)

The work of Gregory Bateson offers a metaphysical basis for a “process psychology,” that is, a view of psychological practice and research guided by an ontology of becoming—identifying change, difference, and relationship as the basic elements of a foundational metaphysics. This article explores the relevance of Bateson's recursive epistemology, his re-conception of the Great Chain of Being, a first-principles approach to defining the nature of mind, and understandings of interaction and difference, pattern and symmetry, interpretation and context. Bateson's philosophical contributions (...) will be drawn into relationship with Wittgenstein's philosophy of language as use, Melnyk's theory of causal levels of explanation, Korzybski's account of map and territory, the rejection of the heuristic rigidity of substantialist ontologies, and a cybernetics communication science-informed approach to contextual bi-directionality of causality. We thereby arrive at an understanding of Bateson's process psychology that, given its ecological-systemic nature, is explanatorily applicable across the mind sciences. This process psychology equips us to answer the question: What is mind? Not by explanatory appeal to substantial entities contained within mind, but instead by recourse to the contextually relevant patterns for understanding mind to a particular purpose. We have thereby attended to the gulf between heuristics and fundamentals, between psychological models and an onto-epistemic account of reality. Insufficient attention has been given to characterising the vital nature of Bateson's philosophical oeuvre to psychological practice. This article draws out Bateson's relevance to establishing foundational principles for a process psychology capable of reinvigorating psychological thought. (shrink)

This précis summarizes the main topics, arguments and conclusions of the book. Many interesting arguments and critiques have, of course, been omitted in order to make this summary appropriately brief.

Thinking is a fundamental activity of our species – those that give names to other creatures and call themselves humans. Textbooks tell us that there is about 1.2 kg of matter called the brain inside the human body. It sounds small but actually is proportionally the biggest among all animals on Earth. -/- I became more aware of thinking at around 5th grade upon hearing about an ancient paradox. It can be summarized as follows. -/- ¤ -/- Once upon a (...) time, there was a stupid king. In his kingdom lived a sage who was highly respected for his intelligence. The King did not appreciate this fact. Maybe the Sage made fun of the King’s intellect, but I am not so sure. Anyway, one day, the King summoned the Sage, intending to kill him. -/- The King said, “Wise man, I heard you earn a living by thinking and arguing. Now I give you two options to die.” -/- The Sage said, “Please tell me the choices, Your Majesty.” -/- The King continued, “You live by your tongue, so I will let you say one sentence before you die. If what you say is true, you will die by hanging. If what you say is false, you will die by beheading.” -/- Little did the King know that this was a stupid order. After a short while, the Sage confidently spoke his “last words”, which actually were what saved his life: -/- “Your Majesty, I am about to be beheaded!” -/- ¤ -/- As a “wild animal” going out into life from a young age, my brain spent a lot of time and energy looking for food. Now that I have become older, my body no longer needs so much sustenance. However, my mind craves a different type of nourishment: food for thought. -/- Food for thought can directly lead to food (on the table). My main job as a scientist exemplifies what I have just stated. Maybe we were wrong. Maybe it has been “thought for food” all along, like in such a sequence as TFFTTTFTFFTTFFFT... -/- In the hyper-chaotic infosphere today, we are surrounded by the noises of information, not only as wavy shores or waterfalls but also mega-tsunamis, through Twitter, Facebook, Tiktok, Instagram, Youtube, etc. More than ever, tranquility and calmness are necessary. Like what you have seen in wilderness video clips, predators such as lions, bears, and alligators act lightning-fast when catching prey. But when food is served, the natural world returns to its peaceful, soothing silence. -/- This short book is in its own tidy infosphere, where each little story is also brief and self-contained. Despite this small appearance, I hope the content inside carries the value of tranquility and life observation. The book is petite, but pretty sure not malnourished. A not-too-small detail is that the way the content was shaped and distilled reflects some innovations of mine and my research team: the mindsponge theory, a new theory of serendipity, the bayesvl R package, the BMF analytics, as well as other experiences from working in the field of science. After all, scientific works were my main source of food (before this book sells well – if it does). -/- Much of the content, seemingly fragmented, has reflected our lab’s essential cultural values, which have led to mindsponge theory, BMF analytics and related works. Thus, under the analytical paradigm of these closely-connected concepts, the pieces come together as bits and pieces of one whole thing. I think it is a bit unfair to tell about things in a house without mentioning the house itself. -/- Welcome to the priceless sober moments – with a chicken-burger price tag! -/- I hope this book will bring readers some moments of calmness, peaceful smiles, and maybe a couple of good laughs too. (shrink)

This chapter explores the early phenomenological accounts of Ressentiment provided by Else Voigtländer, Max Scheler, and Adolf Reinach. In particular, it examines the self-deceptive processes that lead to the “inversion of values” inherent to Ressentiment, i.e., how an object previously felt as valuable is denuded of its worth when the subject realizes that she cannot achieve it. For the comparative analysis of the three accounts, attention is paid to three crucial issues: 1) the origins of Ressentiment (etiology); 2) its place (...) in the taxonomy of the affective mind (ontology); and 3) the psychological mechanisms responsible for the inversion of value (psychology). The early phenomenological accounts are then analyzed in the light of recent accounts of Ressentiment elaborated by authors close to the phenomenological tradition. It is argued that the early phenomenological accounts provide central insights on the interrelation between affectivity and value. (shrink)