Philosophy of Mind

Edited by David Chalmers and David Bourget
Assistant editor: Chang Liu (University of Western Ontario)
192 found
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1 — 50 / 192
  1. added 2017-05-26
    In Defense of Best-Explanation Debunking Arguments in Moral Philosophy.Jonathon Hricko & Derek Leben - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-18.
    We aim to develop a form of debunking argument according to which an agent’s belief is undermined if the reasons she gives in support of her belief are best explained as rationalizations. This approach is a more sophisticated form of what Shaun Nichols has called best-explanation debunking, which he contrasts with process debunking, i.e., debunking by means of showing that a belief has been generated by an epistemically defective process. In order to develop our approach, we identify an example of (...)
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  2. added 2017-05-26
    Three Kinds of Nonconceptual Seeing-As.Christopher Gauker - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-17.
    It is commonly supposed that perceptual representations in some way embed concepts and that this embedding accounts for the phenomenon of seeing-as. But there are good reasons, which will be reviewed here, to doubt that perceptions embed concepts. The alternative is to suppose that perceptions are marks in a perceptual similarity space that map into locations in an objective quality space. From this point of view, there are at least three sorts of seeing-as. First, in cases of ambiguity resolution, the (...)
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  3. added 2017-05-25
    Review of Imants Barusš & Julia Mossbridge, *Transcendent Mind: Rethinking the Science of Consciousness*. [REVIEW]Gregory Nixon - forthcoming - Journal of Consciousness Studies.
    This book arrives with a reputation. Apparently, it is the first book on psi and other anomalous human experiences to be published by the rather traditionalist APA (American Psychological Association). If this is true, this is likely due to the fact that much of the book relies on carefully monitored and repeated experiments to demonstrate the statistical veracity of such things as precognition, remote viewing, clairvoyance, mental telepathy, and even psychokinesis. This is the key to the authors’ claim of empirical (...)
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  4. added 2017-05-25
    Practical Knowledge and Perception.Evgenia Mylonaki - 2016 - In Mark Alznauer & Jose Torralba (eds.), Theories of Action and Morality: Perspectives from Philosophy and Social Theory. Hildesheim, Germany: Georg Olms Verlag. pp. 241-265.
    In this paper I examine the relation between intentional action and morality from the perspective of practical epistemology. In other words I study the relation between Elizabeth Anscombe's knowledge of one’s own intentional actions (knowledge in action) and Iris Murdoch's knowledge of what is good to do or what one ought to do in particular circumstances (knowledge in the circumstances). If practical knowledge in the former sense (knowledge in action) and practical knowledge in the latter sense (knowledge in the circumstances) (...)
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  5. added 2017-05-24
    The Narrative Self, Distributed Memory, and Evocative Objects.Richard Heersmink - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    In this article, I outline various ways in which artifacts are interwoven with autobiographical memory systems and conceptualize what this implies for the self. I first sketch the narrative approach to the self, arguing that who we are as persons is essentially our (unfolding) life story, which, in turn, determines our present beliefs and desires, but also directs our future goals and actions. I then argue that our autobiographical memory is partly anchored in our embodied interactions with an ecology of (...)
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  6. added 2017-05-24
    Consciousness and Intentionality.David Bourget - forthcoming - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Consciousness. New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
    Philosophers traditionally recognize two main features of mental states: intentionality and phenomenal consciousness. To a first approximation, intentionality is the aboutness of mental states, and phenomenal consciousness is the felt, experiential, qualitative, or "what it'€™s like" aspect of mental states. In the past few decades, these features have been widely assumed to be distinct and independent. But several philosophers have recently challenged this assumption, arguing that intentionality and consciousness are importantly related. This article overviews the key views on the relationship (...)
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  7. added 2017-05-24
    Review of The Multiple Realization Book by Thomas W. Polger & Lawrence A. Shapiro (Oxford: Oxford University Press). [REVIEW]Tuomas K. Pernu - 2017 - Metapsychology Online Reviews 21.
  8. added 2017-05-23
    Field Creativity and Post-Anthropocentrism.Stanislav Roudavski - 2016 - Digital Creativity 27 (1):7-23.
    Can matter, things, nonhuman organisms, technologies, tools and machines, biota or institutions be seen as creative? How does such creativity reposition the visionary activities of humans? This article is an elaboration of such questions as well as an attempt at a partial response. It was written as an editorial for the special issue of the Digital Creativity journal that interrogates the conception of Post-Anthropocentric Creativity. However, the text below is a rather unconventional editorial. It does not attempt to provide an (...)
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  9. added 2017-05-22
    ‘LEARNING (NOT) TO’ AND PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE.Christos Douskos - forthcoming - Grazer Philosophische Studien.
    I raise objections to the intellectualist analysis of knowing-how on the basis of certain features of ‘learning to’ ascriptions. I start by observing that ‘learning to’ ascriptions can only have a first-personal reading. Since embedded questions make the generic reading available, this suggests that ‘learning to’ ascriptions are not embedded question configurations. Then I locate an ambiguity in ‘learning to’ ascriptions. They can be used to ascribe either the acquisition of practical knowledge, or the acquisition of a behavioural disposition—a habit—of (...)
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  10. added 2017-05-22
    Social Media and Self-Control: The Vices and Virtues of Attention.Juan Pablo Bermúdez - 2017 - In C. G. Prado (ed.), Social Media and Your Brain: Web-Based Communication Is Changing How We Think and Express Ourselves. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger. pp. 57-74.
    Self-control, the capacity to resist temptations and pursue longer-term goals over immediate gratifications, is crucial in determining the overall shape of our lives, and thereby in our ability to shape our identities. As it turns out, this capacity is intimately linked with our ability to control the direction of our attention. This raises the worry that perhaps social media are making us more easily distracted people, and therefore less able to exercise self-control. Is this so? And is it necessarily a (...)
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  11. added 2017-05-22
    Consciousness (Key Concepts in Philosophy).Josh Weisberg - 2014 - Cambridge, UK:
    Each of us, right now, is having a unique conscious experience. Nothing is more basic to our lives as thinking beings and nothing, it seems, is better known to us. But the ever-expanding reach of natural science suggests that everything in our world is ultimately physical. The challenge of fitting consciousness into our modern scientific worldview, of taking the subjective “feel” of conscious experience and showing that it is just neural activity in the brain, is among the most intriguing explanatory (...)
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  12. added 2017-05-19
    The Normativity of Doxastic Correctness.Tsung-Hsing Ho - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly.
    [ARTICLE REQUEST IS WELCOME] -/- It is widely maintained that doxastic norms that govern how people should believe can be explained by the truism that belief is governed by the correctness norm: believing p is correct if and only if p. This approach fails because it confuses two kinds of correctness norm: (1) It is correct for S to believe p if and only p; and (2) believing p is correct qua belief if and only if p. Only can (2) (...)
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  13. added 2017-05-19
    Presentism and Temporal Experience.Akiko Frischhut - 2017 - In Ian B. Phillips (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Temporal Experience. Routledge.
    Abstract- Presentism And Temporal Experience Intuitively, we all believe that we experience change and the passage of time. Presentism prides itself as the most intuitive theory of time. However, a closer look at how we would experience temporality if presentism was true reveals that this is far from obvious. For if presentism was really so intuitive, then it would do justice to these intuitions. In the course of this article I examine how presentism fares when combined with various leading theories (...)
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  14. added 2017-05-19
    The Experience of Temporal Passage.Akiko Frischhut - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Geneva and University of Glasgow
  15. added 2017-05-18
    Temporal Experience and Metaphysics.Graham Peebles - 2017 - Manuscrito 40 (1):145-182.
    The well-known phenomenological argument draws metaphysical conclusions about time, specifically about change through time and the resulting passage or flow of time, from our temporal experience. The argument begins with the phenomenological premise that there is a class of properties which underlies our experience of time and change through time, and its conclusion is that these properties are not merely experienced but exemplified. I argue that the phenomenological argument is best served by the adoption of a representational theory of perception. (...)
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  16. added 2017-05-17
    Is Emergent Anomalous Panpsychism Viable?David Bourget - forthcoming - In William Seager (ed.), The Handbook of Panpsychism. Routledge.
    We can classify theories of consciousness along two dimensions. The first dimension is a theory's answer to the question of whether consciousness is "something over and above" the physical. Physicalism, dualism, and Russellian monism are the three possible positions on this dimension. The second dimension is a theory's answer to the question of how conscious states causally interact with physical states. The three possible answers to this question are nomism (the two interact through laws or necessary principles), acausalism (they do (...)
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  17. added 2017-05-17
    The Rational Role of Experience.David Bourget - forthcoming - Inquiry.
    If there is content that we reason on, cognitive content, it is in the head and accessible to reasoning mechanisms. This paper discusses the phenomenal theory of cognitive content, according to which cognitive contents are the contents of phenomenal consciousness. I begin by distinguishing cognitive content from the closely associated notion of narrow content. I then argue, drawing on prior work, that the phenomenal theory can plausibly account for the cognitive contents of many relatively simple mental states. My main focus (...)
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  18. added 2017-05-17
    Inference and Consciousness.Timothy Chan & Anders Nes (eds.) - forthcoming - Routledge.
  19. added 2017-05-16
    Memory: Irreducible, Basic, and Primary Source of Knowledge.Aviezer Tucker - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-16.
    I argue against preservationism, the epistemic claim that memories can at most preserve knowledge generated by other basic types of sources. I show how memories can and do generate knowledge that is irreducible to other basic sources of knowledge. In some epistemic contexts, memories are primary basic sources of knowledge; they can generate knowledge by themselves or with trivial assistance from other types of basic sources of knowledge. I outline an ontology of information transmission from events to memory as an (...)
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  20. added 2017-05-16
    Perceptual Consciousness as a Mental Activity.Susanna Schellenberg - forthcoming - Noûs.
    I argue that perceptual consciousness is constituted by a mental activity. The mental activity in question is the activity of employing perceptual capacities, such as discriminatory, selective capacities. This is a radical view, but I hope to make it plausible. In arguing for this mental activist view, I reject orthodox views on which perceptual consciousness is analyzed in terms of (sensory awareness relations to) peculiar entities, such as, phenomenal properties, external mind-independent properties, propositions, sense-data, qualia, or intentional objects.
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  21. added 2017-05-16
    The Passage of Time and its Enemies: An Introduction to Time and Reality II.Emiliano Boccardi - 2017 - Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 40 (1):5-41.
    This essay is a critical introduction to the second part of the special issue Time and Reality. The volume contains responses to papers appeared in the first part, as well as many original articles. The aim of this introduction is to frame these works within the general arena of the philosophy of time, highlighting a number of recurrent themes. A central theme that emerges is a difficulty in pinning down the ontological structure underlying dynamicity and passage without postulating a primitive (...)
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  22. added 2017-05-15
    Immunity to Error Through Misidentification and Non-Attributive Self-Reference.Lougheed Ted - unknown
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  23. added 2017-05-13
    Secondary Belief Content, What is It Good For?Alexander Sandgren - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-10.
    Some use the need to explain communication, agreement, and disagreement to argue for two-dimensional conceptions of belief content. One prominent defender of an account of this sort is David Chalmers. Chalmers claims that beliefs have two kinds of content. The second dimension of belief content, which is tied to what beliefs pick out in the actual world, is supposed to help explain communication, agreement, and dis agreement. I argue that it does not. Since the need to explain these phenomena is (...)
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  24. added 2017-05-13
    Thisness and Visual Objects.Błażej Skrzypulec - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-16.
    According to the traditional view, visual objects can be characterized as bundles of features and locations. This initially plausible idea is contested within the contemporary psychology and philosophy of perception, where it is claimed that the visual system can represent objects as merely ‘this’ or ‘that’, in abstraction from their qualities. In this paper, I consider whether philosophical and psychological arguments connected with the rejection of the ‘bundle’ view of visual objects show that it is needed to postulate an additional, (...)
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  25. added 2017-05-11
    Dignāga’s Argument for the Awareness Principle: An Analytic Refinement.Uriah Kriegel - forthcoming - Philosophy East and West 69 (2).
    Contemporary theories of consciousness can be divided along several major faultlines, but one of the most prominent concerns the question of whether they accept the principle that a mental state’s being conscious involves essentially its subject being aware of it. Call this the awareness principle: -/- (Awareness) For any mental state M of a subject S (at a time t), M is conscious (at t) only if S is aware of M (at t). -/- Although analytic philosophers divide sharply on (...)
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  26. added 2017-05-11
    Can Representationism Explain How Attention Affects Appearances?Sebastian Watzl - forthcoming - In Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Themes from Block. Boston, USA: The MIT Press.
    Recent psychological research shows that attention affects appearances. An “attended item looks bigger, faster, earlier, more saturated, stripier.” (Block 2010, p. 41). What is the significance of these findings? Ned Block has argued that they undermine representationism, roughly the view that the phenomenal character of perception is determined by its representational content. My first goal in this paper is to show that Block’s argument has the structure of a Problem of Arbitrary Phenomenal Variation and that it improves on other instances (...)
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  27. added 2017-05-11
    Is Attention a Non-Propositional Attitude?Sebastian Watzl - forthcoming - In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
    I argue first that attention is a (maybe the) paradigmatic case of an object-directed, non-propositional intentional mental episode. In addition attention cannot be reduced to any other (propositional or non-propositional) mental episodes. Yet, second, attention is not a non-propositional mental attitude. It might appear puzzling how one could hold both of these claims. I show how to combine them, and how that combination shows how propositionality and non-propositionality can co-exist in a mental life. The crucial move is one away from (...)
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  28. added 2017-05-11
    Structuring Mind. The Nature of Attention and How It Shapes Consciousness.Sebastian Watzl - 2017 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    What is attention? How does attention shape consciousness? In an approach that engages with foundational topics in the philosophy of mind, the theory of action, psychology, and the neurosciences this book provides a unified and comprehensive answer to both questions. Sebastian Watzl shows that attention is a central structural feature of the mind. The first half of the book provides an account of the nature of attention. Attention is prioritizing, it consists in regulating priority structures. Attention is not another element (...)
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  29. added 2017-05-09
    Introduction. Reconsidering Some Dogmas About Desire.Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna - 2017 - In Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.), The Nature of Desire. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Desire has not been at the center of recent preoccupations in the philosophy of mind. Consequently, the literature settled into several dogmas. The first part of this introduction presents these dogmas and invites readers to scrutinize them. The main dogma is that desires are motivational states. This approach contrasts with the other dominant conception: desires are positive evaluations. But there are at least four other dogmas: the world should conform to our desires (world-to-mind direction of fit), desires involve a positive (...)
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  30. added 2017-05-09
    "L'oeil du devoir-être". La conception déontique de l'intentionnalité du désir et les modes intentionnels.Federico Lauria - 2017 - Studia Philosophica 75:67-80.
    Desires matter. How are we to understand their intentionality? According to the main dogma, a desire is a disposition to act. In this article, I propose an alternative to this functionalist picture, which is inspired by the phenomenological tradition. On this approach, desire involves a specific manner of representing the world: deontic mode. Desiring a state of affairs, I propose, is representing it as what ought to be or, if one prefers, as what should be. Firstly, I present three principles (...)
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  31. added 2017-05-09
    The Nature of Desire.Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna - 2017 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Desires matter. What are desires? Many believe that desire is a motivational state: desiring is being disposed to act. This conception aligns with the functionalist approach to desire and the standard account of desire's role in explaining action. According to a second influential approach, however, desire is first and foremost an evaluation: desiring is representing something as good. After all, we seem to desire things under the guise of the good. Which understanding of desire is more accurate? Is the guise (...)
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  32. added 2017-05-09
    Désir (GP).Federico Lauria - 2017 - L'Encyclopédie Philosophique.
    Les désirs sont centraux pour agir et être heureux. Qu’est-ce qu’un désir et en quoi sont-ils importants ? Dans cette entrée, nous tenterons de mettre les mots sur cette expérience si familière. Nous présenterons les principales conceptions du désir en philosophie occidentale, en particulier la théorie motivationnelle (désirer est être motivé à agir) et la théorie évaluative (désirer est faire l’expérience du bien). Dans un deuxième temps, nous examinerons la thèse selon laquelle le bonheur consiste en la satisfaction de nos (...)
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  33. added 2017-05-09
    The "Guise of the Ought-to-Be". A Deontic View of the Intentionality of Desire.Federico Lauria - 2017 - In Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.), The Nature of Desire. New York: Oxford University Press.
    How are we to understand the intentionality of desire? According to the two classical views, desire is either a positive evaluation or a disposition to act. This essay examines these conceptions of desire and argues for a deontic alternative, namely the view that desiring is representing a state of affairs as what ought to be. Three lines of criticism of the classical pictures of desire are provided. The first concerns desire’s direction of fit, i.e. the intuition that the world should (...)
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  34. added 2017-05-09
    Self-Deception as Affective Coping. An Empirical Perspective on Philosophical Issues.Federico Lauria, Delphine Preissmann & Fabrice Clément - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 41:119-134.
    In the philosophical literature, self-deception is mainly approached through the analysis of paradoxes. Yet, it is agreed that self-deception is motivated by protection from distress. In this paper, we argue, with the help of findings from cognitive neuroscience and psychology, that self-deception is a type of affective coping. First, we criticize the main solutions to the paradoxes of self-deception. We then present a new approach to self-deception. Self-deception, we argue, involves three appraisals of the distressing evidence: (a) appraisal of the (...)
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  35. added 2017-05-09
    "The Logic of the Liver". A Deontic View of the Intentionality of Desire.Federico Lauria - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Geneva
    Desires matter. How are we to understand the intentionality of desire? According to the two classical views, desire is either a positive evaluation or a disposition to act: to desire a state is to positively evaluate it or to be disposed to act to realize it. This Ph.D. Dissertation examines these conceptions of desire and proposes a deontic alternative inspired by Meinong. On this view, desiring is representing a state of affairs as what ought to be or, if one prefers, (...)
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  36. added 2017-05-08
    What is Integrated Information Theory a Theory Of?Adam Pautz - manuscript
    It's not clear what integrated information theorists (Koch, Tononi) are saying. And their view lacks the resources to explain even very rudimentary facts about experiences.
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  37. added 2017-05-07
    Occurrent States.Gary Bartlett - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
    The distinction between occurrent and non-occurrent mental states is frequently appealed to by contemporary philosophers, but it has never been explicated in any significant detail. In the literature, two accounts of the distinction are commonly presupposed. One is that occurrent states are conscious states. The other is that non-occurrent states are dispositional states, and thus that occurrent states are manifestations of dispositions. I argue that neither of these accounts is adequate, and therefore that another account is needed. I propose that (...)
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  38. added 2017-05-07
    Somatoparaphrenia, the Body Swap Illusion, and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Shao-Pu Kang - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (9):463-471.
    Sydney Shoemaker argues that a certain class of self-ascriptions is immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronouns. In their “Self-Consciousness and Immunity,” Timothy Lane and Caleb Liang question Shoemaker’s view. Lang and Liang present a clinical case and an experiment and argue that they are counterexamples to Shoemaker’s view. This paper is a response to Lane and Liang’s challenge. I identify the desiderata that a counterexample to Shoemaker’s view must meet and show that somatoparaphrenia and the Body (...)
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  39. added 2017-05-06
    A New Argument From Interpersonal Variation to Subjectivism About Color: A Response to Gómez‐Torrente.Nat Hansen - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):421-428.
    I describe a new, comparative, version of the argument from interpersonal variation to subjectivism about color. The comparative version undermines a recent objectivist response to standard versions of that argument.
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  40. added 2017-05-04
    Psychology, Personal and Subpersonal.Zoe Drayson - 2017 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Explanations in psychology are described as personal when they attribute psychological phenomena to the person, as when we attribute beliefs and thought processes to each other, for example. By contrast, explanations in psychology are described as subpersonal when they attribute psychological phenomena below the level of the person, as occurs when scientists describe parts of the brain as representing or evaluating, for example. The practice of subpersonal psychology raises a number of philosophical issues: whether it is acceptable to attribute psychological (...)
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  41. added 2017-05-04
    Dos Criterios Para la Presencia de Estados Mentales: Descartes y Turing.Rodrigo González - 2016 - Cinta de Moebio 56:159-171.
    En este artículo examino dos criterios para la existencia de estados mentales, el de Descartes y el de Turing. Mientras que el primero plantea que las máquinas no pueden pensar en principio, el segundo defiende la inteligencia de máquina. Pese a esto, ambos parecen coincidir en que la decisión sobre la presencia de estados mentales es tomada por alguien que juzga internamente la misma. Si bien ello es esperable del racionalismo cartesiano, en el funcionalismo de Turing es sorprendente. En efecto, (...)
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  42. added 2017-05-04
    The Philosophy of Phenomenal Consciousness.Zoe Drayson - 2015 - In The Constitution of Phenomenal Consciousness. Amsterdam: pp. 273-292.
    A primer on the philosophical issues relating to phenomenal consciousness, part of a collection of new papers by scientists and philosophers on the constitution of consciousness.
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  43. added 2017-05-03
    From Color, to Consciousness, Toward Strong AI.Xinyuan Gu - manuscript
    This article is divided into three parts. Empirical evidence in cognitive science questions our perception of color. Some believe perceived color vary from person to person and color is mind-dependent. The first part of this article shows that the physical color is not dependent on the human mind, while the color we see is. Despite the color we see is mind-dependent, we largely share our perception of color not only among human beings but also potentially among species. Moreover, our color (...)
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  44. added 2017-05-03
    Assertion, Belief, and Context.Roger Clarke - 2017 - Synthese:1-27.
    This paper argues for a treatment of belief as essentially sensitive to certain features of context. The first part gives an argument that we must take belief to be context-sensitive in the same way that assertion is, if we are to preserve appealing principles tying belief to sincere assertion. In particular, whether an agent counts as believing that p in a context depends on the space of alternative possibilities the agent is considering in that context. One and the same doxastic (...)
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  45. added 2017-05-03
    Entries on 'Memory and Knowledge' and on 'Causal Theories of Memory'.Christoph Hoerl - 2013 - In Harold Pashler (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Mind. SAGE Publications.
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  46. added 2017-05-03
    Review: Recreative Minds: Imagination in Philosophy and Psychology, by Gregory Currie and Ian Ravenscroft. [REVIEW]Christoph Hoerl - 2005 - Mind & Language 20:559-564.
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  47. added 2017-05-03
    Memory and Temporal Perspective: The Role of Temporal Frameworks in Memory Development.Teresa McCormack & Christoph Hoerl - 1999 - Developmental Review 19:154-182.
    An account of the development of temporal understanding is proposed which links such understanding with the development of episodic memory. We distinguish between different ways of representing time in terms of the kinds of temporal frameworks they involve. Distinctions are made between frameworks that are perspectival or nonperspectival and those that represent recurrent sequences or particular times. Even primitive temporal understanding integrates both perspectival and nonperspectival components. However, since early frameworks are event-based and localized, they are not yet sufficient for (...)
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  48. added 2017-05-02
    Marking the Perception–Cognition Boundary: The Criterion of Stimulus-Dependence.Jacob Beck - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-16.
    Philosophy, scientific psychology, and common sense all distinguish perception from cognition. While there is little agreement about how the perception–cognition boundary ought to be drawn, one prominent idea is that perceptual states are dependent on a stimulus, or stimulus-dependent, in a way that cognitive states are not. This paper seeks to develop this idea in a way that can accommodate two apparent counterexamples: hallucinations, which are prima facie perceptual yet stimulus-independent; and demonstrative thoughts, which are prima facie cognitive yet stimulus-dependent. (...)
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  49. added 2017-05-02
    Must Strong Emergence Collapse?Umut Baysan & Jessica Wilson - forthcoming - Philosophica.
    Some claim that the notion of strong emergence as involving ontological or causal novelty makes no sense, on grounds that any purportedly strongly emergent features or associated powers 'collapse', one way or another, into the lower-level base features upon which they depend. Here we argue that there are several independently motivated and defensible means of preventing the collapse of strongly emergent features or powers into their lower-level bases, as directed against a conception of strongly emergent features as having fundamentally novel (...)
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  50. added 2017-05-02
    Modularity and the Predictive Mind.Zoe Drayson - 2017 - T. Metzinger and W. Weise, (Eds), Philosophy and Predictive Processing.
    Modular approaches to the architecture of the mind claim that some mental mechanisms, such as sensory input processes, operate in special-purpose subsystems that are functionally independent from the rest of the mind. This assumption of modularity seems to be in tension with recent claims that the mind has a predictive architecture. Predictive approaches propose that both sensory processing and higher-level processing are part of the same Bayesian information-processing hierarchy, with no clear boundary between perception and cognition. Furthermore, it is not (...)
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