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Philosophy of Mind

Edited by David Bourget and David Chalmers
Assistant editor: Chang Liu (University of Western Ontario)
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  1. added 2017-01-16
    Arvid Båve (2016). Self-Consciousness and Reductive Functionalism. Philosophical Quarterly 67 (266):1-21.
    It is argued that although George Bealer's influential ‘Self-Consciousness argument’ refutes standard versions of reductive functionalism (RF), it fails to generalize in the way Bealer supposes. To wit, he presupposes that any version of RF must take the content of ‘pain’ to be the property of being in pain (and so on), which is expressly rejected in independently motivated versions of conceptual role semantics (CRS). Accordingly, there are independently motivated versions of RF, incorporating CRS, which avoid Bealer's main type of (...)
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  2. added 2017-01-16
    Arvid Båve (2016). Self-Consciousness and Reductive Functionalism. Philosophical Quarterly 67 (266):1-21.
    It is argued that although George Bealer's influential ‘Self-Consciousness argument’ refutes standard versions of reductive functionalism (RF), it fails to generalize in the way Bealer supposes. To wit, he presupposes that any version of RF must take the content of ‘pain’ to be the property of being in pain (and so on), which is expressly rejected in independently motivated versions of conceptual role semantics (CRS). Accordingly, there are independently motivated versions of RF, incorporating CRS, which avoid Bealer's main type of (...)
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  3. added 2017-01-16
    Arvid Båve (2016). Self-Consciousness and Reductive Functionalism. Philosophical Quarterly 67 (266):1-21.
    It is argued that although George Bealer's influential ‘Self-Consciousness argument’ refutes standard versions of reductive functionalism (RF), it fails to generalize in the way Bealer supposes. To wit, he presupposes that any version of RF must take the content of ‘pain’ to be the property of being in pain (and so on), which is expressly rejected in independently motivated versions of conceptual role semantics (CRS). Accordingly, there are independently motivated versions of RF, incorporating CRS, which avoid Bealer's main type of (...)
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  4. added 2017-01-16
    Fernando Broncano-Berrocal (2016). Well-Founded Belief and Perceptual Justification. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (3):367-377.
    According to Alan Millar, justified beliefs are well-founded beliefs. Millar cashes out the notion of well-foundedness in terms of having an adequate reason to believe something and believing it for that reason. To make his account of justified belief compatible with perceptual justification he appeals to the notion of recognitional ability. It is argued that, due to the fact that Millar’s is a knowledge-first view, his appeal to recognitional abilities fails to offer an explanatory account of familiar cases in the (...)
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  5. added 2017-01-16
    Arvid Båve (2016). Self-Consciousness and Reductive Functionalism. Philosophical Quarterly 67 (266):1-21.
    It is argued that although George Bealer's influential ‘Self-Consciousness argument’ refutes standard versions of reductive functionalism (RF), it fails to generalize in the way Bealer supposes. To wit, he presupposes that any version of RF must take the content of ‘pain’ to be the property of being in pain (and so on), which is expressly rejected in independently motivated versions of conceptual role semantics (CRS). Accordingly, there are independently motivated versions of RF, incorporating CRS, which avoid Bealer's main type of (...)
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  6. added 2017-01-16
    Layer Paul Gottlob (2009). Über Freiheiten des Menschen: Mit dem Gehirn zur Welt- und dann zur Gotterkenntnis. In Georg Souvignier, Ulrich Lüke, Jürgen Schnakenberg & Hubert Meisinger (eds.), Gottesbilder - an der Grenze zwischen Naturwissenschaft und Theologie. Darmstadt: WBG. pp. 144-160.
    Der 1. Teil dieses Aufsatzes befasst sich mit der Tatsache, dass neben der Stammesgeschichte des Menschen (Phylogenese) und seiner je individuellen genetischen Ausstattung für seine Persönlichkeitsentwicklung besonders wichtig ist, dass sein Gehirn bei der Geburt noch unausgereift ist. In dieser Phase kommen Umwelteinflüsse (Lernen jeglicher Art) besonders stark zum Tragen, so daß die „Freiheit des Menschen“ hier wesentlich begründet wird. Soviel uns das Studium der Frühentwicklung des Gehirns (Ontogenese) über seine Organisation und seine Funktionen hat verstehen lassen, bleibt doch fraglich, (...)
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  7. added 2017-01-16
    Siewert Charles (2004). Phenomenality and Intentionality---Which Explains Which?: Reply to Gertler. Journal of Experimental Psychology 10 (2).
    In Chapter 7 I argue that we are assessable for accuracy in virtue of having phenomenal features. According to Gertler, my claim needs, but does not receive from me, a defence against the allegedly rival thesis that phenomenal features are explained by intentional ones. I maintain that this criticism involves a misunderstanding of my view’s implications. In my book I oppose the “rival” thesis only to this extent: where my conception of consciousness conflicts with broad ways of trying to explain (...)
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  8. added 2017-01-15
    Bruno R. Bocanegra (forthcoming). Troubling Anomalies and Exciting Conjectures: A Bipolar Model of Scientific Discovery. Emotion Review:175407391561902.
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  9. added 2017-01-15
    Jennifer K. MacCormack & Kristen A. Lindquist (2017). Bodily Contributions to Emotion: Schachter’s Legacy for a Psychological Constructionist View on Emotion. Emotion Review 9 (1):36-45.
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  10. added 2017-01-15
    Rainer Reisenzein (2017). The Legacy of Cognition-Arousal Theory: Introduction to a Special Section of Emotion Review. Emotion Review 9 (1):3-6.
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  11. added 2017-01-15
    Daniel Shargel (2017). Appraisals, Emotions, and Inherited Intentional Objects. Emotion Review 9 (1):46-54.
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  12. added 2017-01-15
    Heli Tissari (2017). Current Emotion Research in English Linguistics: Words for Emotions in the History of English. Emotion Review 9 (1):86-94.
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  13. added 2017-01-15
    Otniel E. Dror (2017). Deconstructing the “Two Factors”: The Historical Origins of the Schachter–Singer Theory of Emotions. Emotion Review 9 (1):7-16.
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  14. added 2017-01-15
    Rainer Reisenzein (2017). Varieties of Cognition-Arousal Theory. Emotion Review 9 (1):17-26.
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  15. added 2017-01-15
    Adi Shaked & Gerald L. Clore (2017). Breaking the World to Make It Whole Again: Attribution in the Construction of Emotion. Emotion Review 9 (1):27-35.
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  16. added 2017-01-15
    June Gruber & Marc Bekoff (2017). A Cross-Species Comparative Approach to Positive Emotion Disturbance. Emotion Review 9 (1):72-78.
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  17. added 2017-01-15
    Masashi Kasaki & Kengo Miyazono (2016). Book Review: Knowledge Through Imagination. Amy Kind and Peter Kung (Editors). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. [REVIEW] Journal of Mind and Behavior 37 (2):175-181.
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  18. added 2017-01-15
    Julian Jaynes & William R. Woodward (1974). In the Shadow of the Enlightenment. I. Reimarus Against the Epicureans. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 10:3-15.
  19. added 2017-01-15
    Juian Jaynes & William R. Woodward (1974). In the Shadow of the Enlightenment: II. Reimarus and His Theory of Drives. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 10:144-159.
  20. added 2017-01-14
    Aydede Murat, Critical Notice of Colin Klein's What The Body Commands: The Imperative Theory of Pain (MIT 2015).
    This is a slightly more polished version of a presentation I wrote for the Author-Meets-Critics session on Colin's book at the Eastern APA session on Jan 4, 2017, in Baltimore. I’ve decided to post this commentary online pretty much as is, rather than rewrite it to produce a shortened, more structured and polished version as a critical notice suitable for a journal -- I am afraid I won’t have time for it. I hope the reader will find it helpful. At (...)
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  21. added 2017-01-13
    Peter W. Ross (forthcoming). What the Mind-Independence of Color Requires. In How Colours Matter to Philosophy. Springer.
    The early modern distinction between primary and secondary qualities continues to have a significant impact on the debate about the nature of color. An aspect of this distinction that is still influential is the idea that the mind-independence of color requires that it is a primary quality. Thus, using shape as a paradigm example of a primary quality, a longstanding strategy for determining whether color is mind-independent is to consider whether it is sufficiently similar to shape to be a primary (...)
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  22. added 2017-01-13
    White Ben (forthcoming). Conservation Laws and Interactionist Dualism. Philosophical Quarterly.
    The Exclusion Argument for physicalism maintains that since (1) every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause, and (2) cases of causal overdetermination are rare, it follows that if (3) mental events cause physical events as frequently as they seem to, then (4) mental events must be physical in nature. In defence of (1), it is sometimes said that (1) is supported if not entailed by conservation laws. Against this, I argue that conservation laws do not lend sufficient support to (...)
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  23. added 2017-01-13
    Ben White (forthcoming). Metaphysical Necessity Dualism. Synthese:1-20.
    A popular response to the Exclusion Argument for physicalism maintains that mental events depend on their physical bases in such a way that the causation of a physical effect by a mental event and its physical base needn’t generate any problematic form of causal overdetermination, even if mental events are numerically distinct from and irreducible to their physical bases. This paper presents and defends a form of dualism that implements this response by using a dispositional essentialist view of properties to (...)
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  24. added 2017-01-13
    Peter W. Ross (forthcoming). Phenomenal Externalism's Explanatory Power. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    I argue that phenomenal externalism is preferable to phenomenal internalism on the basis of externalism’s explanatory power with respect to qualitative character. I argue that external qualities, namely, external physical properties that are qualitative independent of consciousness, are necessary to explain qualitative character, and that phenomenal externalism is best understood as accepting external qualities while phenomenal internalism is best understood as rejecting them. I build support for the claim that external qualities are necessary to explain qualitative character on the basis (...)
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  25. added 2017-01-13
    Steven Swartzer (forthcoming). A Challenge for Humean Externalism. Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    Humean externalism is the view that moral motivation must be explained in terms of desires that are “external” to an agent’s motivationally-inert moral judgments. A standard argument in favor of Humean externalism appeals to the possibility of amoral or morally cynical agents—agents for whom moral considerations gain no motivational traction. The possibility of such agents seems to provide evidence for both the claim that moral judgments are themselves motivationally inert, and the claim that moral motivation has its source in desires (...)
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  26. added 2017-01-13
    Michael Starks (ed.) (2017). Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization -- Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 by Michael Starks 2nd Ed. 674p (2017). Henderson: michael starks.
    This collection of articles was written over the last 10 years and the most important and longest within the last year. Also I have edited them to bring them up to date (2017). The copyright page has the date of this first edition and new editions will be noted there as I edit old articles or add new ones. All the articles are about human behavior (as are all articles by anyone about anything), and so about the limitations of having (...)
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  27. added 2017-01-13
    Kevin Temple (2016). Intentionality and the Myths of the Given: Between Pragmatism and Phenomenology. [REVIEW] Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 37 (1):194-198.
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  28. added 2017-01-13
    Pablo Fernández-Berrocal & Natalio Extremera (2016). Ability Emotional Intelligence, Depression, and Well-Being. Emotion Review 8 (4):311-315.
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  29. added 2017-01-13
    Nathanson Lori, E. Rivers Susan, M. Flynn Lisa & A. Brackett Marc (2016). Creating Emotionally Intelligent Schools With RULER. Emotion Review 8 (4):305-310.
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  30. added 2017-01-13
    Richard D. Roberts, Carolyn MacCann, Rocío Guil & José M. Mestre (2016). Reimagining Emotional Intelligence: A Healthy, Much Needed, and Important Progression for the Field. Emotion Review 8 (4):334-334.
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  31. added 2017-01-13
    David J. Hughes & Thomas Rhys Evans (2016). Comment: Trait EI Moderates the Relationship Between Ability EI and Emotion Regulation. Emotion Review 8 (4):331-332.
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  32. added 2017-01-13
    Peter J. Legree, Heather M. Mullins & Joseph Psotka (2016). Comment: The Ability Model of Emotional Intelligence: Consistency With Intelligence Theory. Emotion Review 8 (4):301-302.
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  33. added 2017-01-13
    D. Mayer John, R. Caruso David & Salovey Peter (2016). The Ability Model of Emotional Intelligence: Principles and Updates. Emotion Review 8 (4):290-300.
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  34. added 2017-01-13
    Kimberly A. Barchard, Marc A. Brackett & José M. Mestre (2016). Taking Stock and Moving Forward: 25 Years of Emotional Intelligence Research. Emotion Review 8 (4):289-289.
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  35. added 2017-01-13
    Johnny R. J. Fontaine (2016). Comment: Redefining Emotional Intelligence Based on the Componential Emotion Approach. Emotion Review 8 (4):332-333.
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  36. added 2017-01-13
    Sylvain Laborde & Mark S. Allen (2016). Comment: Measurement and the Interpretation of Trait EI Research. Emotion Review 8 (4):342-343.
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  37. added 2017-01-13
    K. V. Petrides, Moïra Mikolajczak, Stella Mavroveli, Maria-Jose Sanchez-Ruiz, Adrian Furnham & Juan-Carlos Pérez-González (2016). Developments in Trait Emotional Intelligence Research. Emotion Review 8 (4):335-341.
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  38. added 2017-01-13
    Schlegel Katja (2016). Comment: Looking Beyond the Ability EI Model Facilitates the Development of New Performance-Based Tests. Emotion Review 8 (4):302-303.
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  39. added 2017-01-13
    Paulo N. Lopes (2016). Emotional Intelligence in Organizations: Bridging Research and Practice. Emotion Review 8 (4):316-321.
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  40. added 2017-01-13
    José M. Mestre, Carolyn MacCann, Rocío Guil & Richard D. Roberts (2016). Models of Cognitive Ability and Emotion Can Better Inform Contemporary Emotional Intelligence Frameworks. Emotion Review 8 (4):322-330.
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  41. added 2017-01-13
    John D. Mayer, David R. Caruso & Peter Salovey (2016). Measuring Emotional Intelligence: Responses to Schlegel and to Legree, Mullins and Psotka. Emotion Review 8 (4):304-304.
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  42. added 2017-01-13
    K. V. Petrides (2016). Four Thoughts on Trait Emotional Intelligence. Emotion Review 8 (4):345-345.
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  43. added 2017-01-13
    S. Schutte Nicola & M. Malouff John (2016). Comment on Developments in Trait Emotional Intelligence Research: A Broad Perspective on Trait Emotional Intelligence. Emotion Review 8 (4):343-344.
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  44. added 2017-01-13
    Shin Sakuragi (2013). Propositional Memory and Knowledge. Logos and Episteme 4 (1):69-83.
    According to the epistemic theory of propositional memory, to remember that p is simply to retain the knowledge that p. Despite the apparent plausibility of thistheory, many putative counterexamples have been raised against it. In this paper, I argue that no clear-cut counterexample to the claim can be proposed since any such attempt is confronted with an insurmountable problem. If there is to be a clear-cut counterexample to the claim, it must be either a case in which one does not (...)
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  45. added 2017-01-13
    Klaskow Tyler (2011). “Looking” for Intentionality with Heidegger. Symposium 15 (1):94-109.
    Phenomenologists find themselves in the unusual position of attempting to describe non-sensuously phenomenal phenomena. Intentionality is one such oddity. It is not sensuously phenomenal, yet Husserl and Heidegger both purport to be able to “read off” its necessary features. Both were well aware that such an enterprise has its difficulties. The primary difficulty is how to make intentionality into an “object.” To do so, a method for directing our “phenomenological vision” is necessary. Heidegger, however, is unable to utilise Husserl’s methods (...)
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  46. added 2017-01-13
    Remis Ramos Carreño (2010). Conceptos: Desde la Filosofía de la mente a la Psicología Cognitiva. PRAXIS Revista de Psicología (18):125-148.
    Concepto es una palabra que refiere a un constructo problemático en la psicología cognitiva y en la filosofía de la mente, el cual indistintamente refiere a cierto tipo de representaciones mentales, a entidades extramentales e incluso a habilidades psicológicas. Lo cierto es que las teorías de conceptos emblemáticas al interior de la filosofía y la psicología, como la Teoría Clásica de conceptos (entendidos como definiciones aristotélicas), o como la Teoría de Prototipos de Rosch (entendidos como estructuras estadísticas de datos), no (...)
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  47. added 2017-01-13
    Remis Ramos Carreño (2010). Conceptos: Desde la Filosofía de la mente a la Psicología Cognitiva. PRAXIS Revista de Psicología (18):125-148.
    Concepto es una palabra que refiere a un constructo problemático en la psicología cognitiva y en la filosofía de la mente, el cual indistintamente refiere a cierto tipo de representaciones mentales, a entidades extramentales e incluso a habilidades psicológicas. Lo cierto es que las teorías de conceptos emblemáticas al interior de la filosofía y la psicología, como la Teoría Clásica de conceptos (entendidos como definiciones aristotélicas), o como la Teoría de Prototipos de Rosch (entendidos como estructuras estadísticas de datos), no (...)
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  48. added 2017-01-13
    Mario Bunge (2004). 12. Functional Convergence: The Case of Mental Functions. In Emergence and Convergence: Qualitative Novelty and the Unity of Knowledge. University of Toronto Press. pp. 179-195.
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  49. added 2017-01-13
    Millikan Ruth Garrett (2000). Naturalizing Intentionality. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 9:83-90.
    “Intentionality,” as introduced to modern philosophy by Brentano, denotes the property that distinguishes the mental from all other things. As such, intentionality has been related to purposiveness. I suggest, however, that there are many kinds of purposes that are not mental nor derived from anything mental, such as the purpose of one’s stomach to digest food or the purpose of one’s protective eye blink reflex to keep out the sand. These purposes help us to understand intentionality in a naturalistic way. (...)
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  50. added 2017-01-13
    Ezquerro Jesús & Vicente Agustín (2000). Explanatory Exclusion, Over-Determination, and the Mind-Body Problem. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 9:13-21.
    Taking into account the difficulties that all attempts at a solution of the problem of causal-explanatory exclusion have experienced, we analyze in this paper the chances that mind-body causation is a case of overdetermination, a line of attack that has scarcely been explored. Our conclusion is that claiming that behaviors are causally overdetermined cannot solve the problem of causal-explanatory exclusion. The reason is the problem of massive coincidence, that can only be avoided by establishing a relation between mind and body; (...)
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