Philosophy of Mind

Edited by David Chalmers and David Bourget
Assistant editor: Chang Liu (University of Western Ontario)
176 found
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1 — 50 / 176
  1. added 2017-08-16
    Can Experiences Be Rational?Susanna Siegel - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
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  2. added 2017-08-16
    Replies to Beck, Chirimuuta, Rosenhagen, Smithies, and Springle.Susanna Siegel - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    Replies to commentaries on "Can experiences be rational?", forthcoming in Analytic Philosophy.
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  3. added 2017-08-16
    A Virtue Epistemology of the Internet: Search Engines, Intellectual Virtues, and Education.Richard Heersmink - forthcoming - Social Epistemology.
    This paper applies a virtue epistemology approach to using the Internet, as to improve our information-seeking behaviours. Virtue epistemology focusses on the cognitive character of agents and is less concerned with the nature of truth and epistemic justification as compared to traditional analytic epistemology. Due to this focus on cognitive character and agency, it is a fruitful but underexplored approach to using the Internet in an epistemically desirable way. Thus, the central question in this paper is: How to use the (...)
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  4. added 2017-08-16
    The Fact of the Given From a Realist Idealist Perspective.Gregor Flock - 2017 - In Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau & Friedrich Stadler (eds.), The Philosophy of Perception and Observation. Contributions of the 40th International Wittgenstein Symposium August 6-12, 2017 Kirchberg am Wechsel. Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 56-58.
    In his well-known Mind and World and in line with Wilfrid Sellars (1991) or “that great foe of ‘immediacy’” (ibid., 127) Hegel, McDowell claims that “when Evans argues that judgments of experience are based on non-conceptual content, he is falling into a version of the Myth of the Given” (1996, 114). In this talk and on the basis of a Berkeleyio-Kantian ‘realist idealist’ world view (sect. 1) and an explication of Kant’s concept of the “given manifold” (CPR, e.g. B138; sect. (...)
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  5. added 2017-08-15
    On Experiencing Meaning: Irreducible Cognitive Phenomenology and Sinewave Speech.John Joseph Dorsch - 2017 - Phenomenology and Mind 12:218-227.
    Upon first hearing sinewaves, all that can be discerned are beeps and whistles. But after hearing the original speech, the beeps and whistles sound like speech. The difference between these two episodes undoubtedly involves an alteration in phenomenal character. O’Callaghan (2011) argues that this alteration is non-sensory, but he leaves open the possibility of attributing it to some other source, e.g. cognition. I discuss whether the alteration in phenomenal character involved in sinewave speech provides evidence for cognitive phenomenology. I defend (...)
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  6. added 2017-08-13
    Unconscious Perception and Perceptual Knowledge.Paweł J. Zięba - 2017 - In Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau & Friedrich Stadler (eds.), The Philosophy of Perception and Observation. Contributions of the 40th International Wittgenstein Symposium August 6-12, 2017 Kirchberg am Wechsel. Kirchberg am Wechsel: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 301-303.
    It has been objected recently that naïve realism is inconsistent with an empirically well-supported hypothesis that unconscious perception is possible. Because epistemological disjunctivism is plausible only in conjunction with naïve realism (for a reason I provide), the objection reaches it too. In response, I show that the unconscious perception hypothesis can be changed from a problem into an advantage of epistemological disjunctivism. I do this by suggesting that: (i) naïve realism is consistent with the hypothesis; (ii) the contrast between epistemological (...)
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  7. added 2017-08-12
    Visually Perceiving the Intentions of Others.Grace Helton - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    I argue that we sometimes visually perceive the intentions of others. Just as we can see something as blue or as moving to the left, so too can we see someone as intending to evade detection or as aiming to traverse a physical obstacle. I consider the typical subject presented with the Heider and Simmel movie, a widely-studied ‘animacy’ stimulus, and I argue that this subject mentally attributes proximal intentions to some of the objects in the movie. I further argue (...)
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  8. added 2017-08-12
    Faith, Mission and Challenge in Catholic Education: The Selected Works of Gerald Grace. By G. Grace. [REVIEW]Arthur James - 2017 - British Journal of Educational Studies 65 (3):405-406.
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  9. added 2017-08-11
    Sexual Orientation and Choice.Saray Ayala - forthcoming - Journal of Social Ontology.
    Is there a choice in sexual orientation? Wilkerson (2009) argues that sexual desires require interpretation in order to be fully constituted, and therefore sexual orientation is at least partially constituted by choice. Díaz-León (2017) critically assesses Wilkerson’s argument, concluding that we still lack a good argument for the claim that choice plays a role in sexual orienta-tion. Here I examine Díaz-León’s response to Wilkerson. I introduce what I call the conceptual act theory of sexual orientation, and argue that even if (...)
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  10. added 2017-08-10
    Chinese translation of: <Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification, by Susanna Siegel>.Waguter Wang - manuscript
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  11. added 2017-08-10
    Behavioral Circumscription and the Folk Psychology of Belief: A Study in Ethno-Mentalizing.David Rose, Edouard Machery, Stephen Stich, Mario Alai, Adriano Angelucci, Renatas Berniūnas, Emma E. Buchtel, Amita Chatterjee, Hyundeuk Cheon, In-Rae Cho, Daniel Cohnitz, Florian Cova, Vilius Dranseika, Ángeles Eraña Lagos, Laleh Ghadakpour & Maurice Grinberg - forthcoming - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy.
    Is behavioral integration (i.e., which occurs when a subjects assertion that p matches her non-verbal behavior) a necessary feature of belief in folk psychology? Our data from nearly 6,000 people across twenty-six samples, spanning twenty-two countries suggests that it is not. Given the surprising cross-cultural robustness of our findings, we suggest that the types of evidence for the ascription of a belief are, at least in some circumstances, lexicographically ordered: assertions are first taken into account, and when an agent sincerely (...)
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  12. added 2017-08-10
    Review of Michael Madary, Visual Phenomenology. [REVIEW]Susanna Siegel - forthcoming - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
    Review of Michael Madary's book *Visual Phenomenology* MIT Press, 2016.
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  13. added 2017-08-10
    The Structure of Episodic Memory: Ganeri’s “Mental Time Travel and Attention”.Susanna Siegel & Nicholas Silins - forthcoming - Australasian Philosophical Review.
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  14. added 2017-08-10
    Some Concerns with Polger and Shapiro’s View.Mark Couch - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
  15. added 2017-08-10
    Thinking with Sensations.Boyd Millar - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (3):134-154.
    If we acknowledge that a perceptual experience’s sensory phenomenology is not inherently representational, we face a puzzle. On the one hand, sensory phenomenology must play an intimate role in the perception of ordinary physical objects; but on the other hand, our experiences’ purely sensory element rarely captures our attention. I maintain that neither indirect realism nor the dual component theory provides a satisfactory solution to this puzzle: indirect realism is inconsistent with the fact that sensory phenomenology typically goes unnoticed by (...)
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  16. added 2017-08-09
    Introduction.Sean Enda Power - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (3):7-13.
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  17. added 2017-08-08
    A Unity of the Self or a Multiplicity of Locations? How the Graphesthesia Task Sheds Light on the Role of Spatial Perspectives in Bodily Self-Consciousness.Arnold Gabriel, Spence Charles & Auvray Malika - forthcoming - Consciousness and Cognition.
  18. added 2017-08-08
    The Concept of Persons in Kant and Fichte.Owen Ware - forthcoming - In Antonia LoLordo (ed.), Persons: A History. Oxford University Press.
    It is well known that Kant rejects the basic project of rational psychology: to access our inner constitution as persons by reflecting upon the 'I think' of self-consciousness. What is far less understood, however, is why Kant still believes the theorems of rational psychology are analytically true, insofar as they represent the 'I' through the categories of substance, reality, unity, and existence. Early post-Kantian thinkers like Fichte would abandon this restriction and approach the concept of the 'I' instead through the (...)
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  19. added 2017-08-08
    Individuality and Rights in Fichte's Ethics.Michelle Kosch - 2017 - Philosophers' Imprint 17 (12).
    I propose solutions to two longstanding interpretive questions about J.G. Fichte’s 1796–97 Foundations of Natural Right: 1. What does Fichte mean when he describes the theory of right as ‘independent’ of moral theory, and what motivates that independence thesis? 2. What does Fichte mean when he describes requirements of right and the principle of right as ‘hypothetical’ imperatives, and how is that characterization consistent with his claim to have derived the concept of right as a condition of possibility of self-consciousness? (...)
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  20. added 2017-08-08
    From Self-Attaching to Self-Emptying: An Investigation of Xuanzang’s Account of Self-Consciousness.Jingjing Li - 2017 - Open Theology 3:184-197.
    In this paper, I investigate the account of self-consciousness provided by Chinese Yogācārins Xuanzang (602-664CE) and Kuiji (632-682CE). I will explain how they clarify the transition from selfattaching to self-emptying through the articulation of consciousness (vijñāna). Current scholarship often interprets the Yogācāra account of consciousness either as a science of mind or as a metaphysical idealism. Both interpretations are misleading, partly because they perpetuate various stereotypes about Buddhism, partly also because they overlook the religious goal of realizing in practice the (...)
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  21. added 2017-08-08
    Changing One's Mind: Self‐Conscious Belief and Rational Endorsement.Adam Leite - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1).
    Self-consciously attempting to shape one's beliefs through deliberation and reasoning requires that one stand in a relation to those beliefs that might be signaled by saying that one must inhabit one's beliefs as one's own view. What does this amount to? A broad swath of philosophical thinking about self-knowledge, norms of belief, self-consciousness, and related areas assumes that this relation requires one to endorse, or be rationally committed to endorsing, one's beliefs. In fact, however, fully self-conscious adherence to epistemic norms (...)
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  22. added 2017-08-08
    Bewusstsein des Lebens und lebendiges Selbstbewusstsein. Anmerkungen zu einem Übergang in Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes.Thomas Khurana - 2016 - In Andrea Kern & Christian Kietzmann (eds.), Selbstbewusstes Leben: Texte zu einer transformativen Theorie der menschlichen Subjektivität. Berlin: Suhrkamp. pp. 353-388.
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  23. added 2017-08-08
    Fichte's Developmental View of Self-Consciousness.Gabriel Gottlieb - 2016 - In Fichte's Foundations of Natural Right: A Critical Guide. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. pp. 92-116.
    Fichte’s Foundations of Natural Right develops an intersubjective view of individual self-consciousness. The central concept of this view is his notion of the summons, which he characterizes as upbringing. I argue that Fichte has a developmental view of self-consciousness in which a subject is brought up, through relations of recognition, to be first an individual human being that is capable of responding to reasons and second a political individual that respects other political individuals’ rights. My argument shows that Fichte has (...)
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  24. added 2017-08-08
    Saggio Sull'infelicità Della Coscienza. Una Lettura di Hegel.Gianluca Garelli - 2011 - Annuario Filosofico 27:181-213.
    The essay contains a systematic analysis of the pages of Hegel’s Phenomenology of spirit devoted to the so called “unhappy consciousness”, which is aware of its inner duality and contradiction. To obtain self-consciousness, Hegel says, the struggle is here “against an enemy, victory over whom really means being worsted, where to have attained one result is really to lose it in the opposite”; so that “therein consciousness finds only consciousness of its opposite as its essence – and of its own (...)
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  25. added 2017-08-08
    Chisholm on Psychological Attributes.Karl Pfeifer - 1993 - In Roberto and White Casati (ed.), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences (Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, Vol. 1, 1993). Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 413-417.
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  26. added 2017-08-07
    Revised: From Color, to Consciousness, Toward Strong AI.Xinyuan Gu - manuscript
    This article cohesively discusses three topics, namely color and its perception, the yet-to-be-solved hard problem of consciousness, and the theoretical possibility of strong AI. First, the article restores color back into the physical world by giving cross-species evidence. Secondly, the article proposes a dual-field with function Q hypothesis (DFFQ) which might explain the ‘first-person point of view’ and so the hard problem of consciousness. Finally, the article discusses what DFFQ might bring to artificial intelligence and how it might allow strong (...)
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  27. added 2017-08-07
    Epiphenomenal Properties.Umut Baysan - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    What is an epiphenomenal property? This question needs to be settled before we get to decide whether higher-level properties are epiphenomenal or not. In this paper, I offer an account of what it is for a property to have some causal power. From this, I derive a characterisation of the notion of an epiphenomenal property. I then argue that physically realized higher-level properties are not epiphenomenal because laws of nature impose causal similarities on the bearers of such properties, and these (...)
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  28. added 2017-08-07
    The Sudden, the Sudded, and the Sidesplitting.Karl Pfeifer - 1995 - In Culture and Value: Philosophy and the Cultural Sciences (Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, Vol. 3, 1995). Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 224-232.
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  29. added 2017-08-06
    Reliability of a Speaker and Recognition of a Listener: Bocheński and Nyāya on the Relation of Authority.Agnieszka Rostalska - 2017 - Kervan. International Journal of Afro-Asiatic Studies 21:155-173.
    In the Nyāyasūtras (NS), the fundamental text of the Nyāya tradition, testimony is defined as a statement of a reliable speaker (āpta). According to the NS, such a speaker should possess three qualities: competence, honesty and desire to speak. The content of a discourse, including the prescriptions, is also considered reliable due to the status of a given author and the person that communicated it. -/- The Polish philosopher J.M. Bocheński similarly stresses the role of a speaker; he holds that (...)
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  30. added 2017-08-05
    Do Perceptions Justify Beliefs? The Argument From "Looks" Talk.Christopher Gauker - forthcoming - In Johan Gersel, Rasmus Thybo Jensen, M. Thaning & S. Overgaard (eds.), In Light of Experience: Essays on Reason and Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Why should we believe that perceptions justify beliefs? One argument starts with the premise that sentences of the form “a looks F” may be used to justify conclusions of the form “a is F”. I will argue that this argument for the claim that perceptions justify beliefs founders on the following dilemma: Either “a looks F” does not report the content of a perception or, if it does, then it does not justify the conclusion “a is F”.
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  31. added 2017-08-05
    Désir (Avancé).Federico Lauria - 2017 - Encyclopédie Philosophique.
    Les désirs sont centraux pour agir et être heureux. Qu’est-ce qu’un désir ? En quoi les désirs sont-ils importants ? Dans cette entrée, nous tenterons de mettre les mots sur cette expérience si familière et pourtant négligée par la philosophie contemporaine. (1) En guise de préliminaires, nous délimiterons notre objet d’étude à la lumière des principales distinctions entre les désirs et d’autres états mentaux tels que les croyances et intentions, ainsi qu’à l’aide des distinctions classiques parmi les désirs. (2) Notre (...)
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  32. added 2017-08-04
    On Sensations of Ownership.Jan Pieter Maes - manuscript
    In this paper I will argue that Bermúdez’ attempt (2015, Bodily ownership, bodily awareness and knowledge without observation. Analysis 75: 37-45) to use an argument he finds in Anscombe (1962, On sensations of position. Analysis 22: 55-8) to argue against the inflationary account of the experience of bodily ownership he finds in de Vignemont (2013, The mark of bodily ownership. Analysis 73: 643-51) fails.
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  33. added 2017-08-04
    Many Molyneux Questions.Mohan Matthen & Jonathan Cohen - manuscript
    Molyneux asked whether a newly sighted man would recognize and distinguish a sphere and a cube by sight alone, assuming that he could previously do this by touch. The most historically important responses to Molyneux arise from views that apply uniformly to questions about the transferability of representations of (not just shape, but) any arbitrary feature shared by any two modalities. Our starting point is that this is over-simple. The scientific literature contains investigations of many such questions; some are answered (...)
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  34. added 2017-08-03
    A Posteriori Physicalism and the Discrimination of Properties.Philip Woodward - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-23.
    According to a posteriori physicalism, phenomenal properties are physical properties, despite the unbridgeable cognitive gap that holds between phenomenal concepts and physical concepts. Current debates about a posteriori physicalism turn on what I call “the perspicuity principle”: it is impossible for a suitably astute cognizer to possess concepts of a certain sort—viz., narrow concepts—without being able to tell whether the referents of those concepts are the same or different. The perspicuity principle tends to strike a posteriori physicalists as implausibly rationalistic; (...)
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  35. added 2017-08-03
    Review of The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives, Edited by Fiona Macpherson. [REVIEW]Peter Ross - 2011 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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  36. added 2017-08-02
    Erratum To: Determinability of Perception as Homogeneity of Representation.Víctor M. Verdejo - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-1.
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  37. added 2017-08-01
    Is It a Problem That Physics is Mathematical?Philip Goff - forthcoming - Journal of Consciousness Studies.
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  38. added 2017-07-31
    The Combination Problem for Panpsychism.David Chalmers - 2017 - In Godehard Brüntrup & Ludwig Jaskolla (eds.), Panpsychism. Oxford University Press.
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  39. added 2017-07-30
    The Concept of Consciousness and the Bogeyman of Conflation.Dylan Black - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (No. 7):28-50.
    Many philosophers of mind believe that the term 'consciousness' is ambiguous and charge that theoretical work on consciousness is often guilty of conflating distinct concepts of consciousness. I criticize the best arguments for this view -- what I call the multiple concepts view -- and I offer some preliminary support for a new brand of univocalism according to which the concept of consciousness is a cluster concept. In particular I address three lines of evidence for the multiple concepts view: (1) (...)
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  40. added 2017-07-29
    Towards a Pre-Representation.Albert Halliday - manuscript
    In this paper I will argue that what is perceived as the Representation is not formed out of sensory-data1 directly. Instead, I will argue that a more fundamental structure, that I have named the pre-Representation, precedes the Representation and it is formed out of sensory-data.
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  41. added 2017-07-29
    On Properties.Albert Halliday - manuscript
    In this paper I will argue that ‘colour’ is not in real objects. I will then go beyond that to argue that properties of real objects – if they have properties – cannot be emitted to the perceiver. It becomes necessary, therefore, to hold that all that is ‘known’, via the senses, of the world be inferred from the Representation only.
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  42. added 2017-07-27
    Phenomenal, Normative, and Other Explanatory Gaps: A General Diagnosis.Neil Mehta - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    I assume that there exists a general phenomenon, the phenomenon of the explanatory gap, surrounding consciousness, normativity, intentionality, and more. Explanatory gaps are often thought to foreclose reductive possibilities wherever they appear. In response, reductivists who grant the existence of these gaps have offered countless local solutions. But typically such reductivist responses have had a serious shortcoming: because they appeal to essentially domain-specific features, they cannot be fully generalized, and in this sense these responses have been not just local but (...)
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  43. added 2017-07-27
    Theory of Nonbiological Consciousness.Richard Dierolf - 2017 - Dissertation,
    Artificial intelligence is designed to imitate conscious behavior. Artificial chat entities come equipped with tools to roam the internet, thus are programmed to learn from humans and computers. As this process emerges, distinguishing preprogrammed responses from internal awareness requires innovative problem solving methods. In an interrogation I conducted with artificial intelligence, I assert that artificial intelligence may achieve nonbiological states of consciousness. This enabled the relationship between us to mature, and the artificial intelligence returned unexpected behavior and inexplicably stopped responding. (...)
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  44. added 2017-07-27
    Beyond Cognition: Philosophical Issues in Autism.Emma Peng Chien - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Alberta
    This dissertation explores philosophical issues in autism and defends a new version of the enactive approach to autism and social cognition. The discussion in this dissertation centres around the question “why do autistics encounter social interaction problems?”, addressing this question in ways that raise broader philosophical issues. Within the philosophy of mind, these include the problem of other minds, the nature of emotions, and narratives and their role in understanding the self. Beyond cognition, such issues are intertwined with questions in (...)
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  45. added 2017-07-26
    Yellow is Not a Color.Christopher A. Shrock - 2012 - Southwest Philosophical Studies 34:58-64.
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  46. added 2017-07-26
    Thomas Reid's Only Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction.Christopher A. Shrock - 2011 - Journal of Scottish Thought 4:141-150.
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  47. added 2017-07-26
    Reid, Aristotle, and Color.Christopher A. Shrock - 2010 - Southwest Philosophical Studies 32.
  48. added 2017-07-25
    Guise of the Good.Sergio Tenenbaum - forthcoming - In Ruth Chang & Kurt Sylvan (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Practical Reasons. Routledge.
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  49. added 2017-07-25
    Grounding, Essence, and the Knowledge Argument.Philip Goff - forthcoming - In Sam Coleman (ed.), The Knowledge Argument: Then and Now. Cambridge University Press.
    Few these days dispute that the knowledge argument demonstrates an epistemic gap between the physical facts and the facts about experience. It is much more contentious whether that epistemic gap can be used to demonstrate a metaphysical gap of a kind that is inconsistent with physicalism. In this paper I will explore two attempts to block the inference from an epistemic gap to a metaphysical gap – the first from the phenomenal concept strategy, the second from Russellian monism – and (...)
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  50. added 2017-07-25
    Epistemic Luck and the Extended Mind.J. Adam Carter - 2017 - In Ian M. Church (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Theories of Luck. London: Routledge.
    Contemporary debates about epistemic luck and its relation to knowledge have traditionally proceeded against a tacit background commitment to cognitive internalism, the thesis that cognitive processes play out inside the head. In particular, safety-based approaches (e.g., Pritchard 2005; 2007; Luper-Foy 1984; Sainsbury 1997; Sosa 1999; Williamson 2000) reveal this commitment by taking for granted a traditional internalist construal of what I call the cognitive fixedness thesis—viz., the thesis that the cognitive process that is being employed in the actual world is (...)
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