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  1. On Non-Inferential Structure of Perceptual Judgment.Milos Bogdanovic - manuscript
    This paper deals with Peirce’s understanding of perceptual judgment, relating it to the conditions for the use of language defined by Michael Dummett. Namely, drawing on Dummett’s requirement for harmony between descriptive and evaluative aspects of our linguistic practice, we will try to give an interpretation of Peirce’s view of perception that implies rejecting the idea that the formation of a perceptual judgment has an inferential structure. On the other hand, since it is, in Peirce’s opinion, the structure of abductive (...)
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  2. A New Objection to Representationalist Direct Realism.Paul H. Griffiths - manuscript
    Representationalism (aka intentionalism) has been the most significant weapon in the late twentieth century defence of direct realism. However, although the representationalist objection to the Phenomenal Principle might provide an effective response to the arguments from illusion and hallucination, plausible representationalist theories of perception are, when fleshed-out, incompatible with metaphysical direct realism’s directness-claim. Indeed within cognitive science, direct perception is the avowedly-radical anti-representationalist heterodoxy. Drawing on both the philosophy and cognitive science, we develop a robust argument against representationalist direct realism (...)
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  3. The Case Against Direct Realism.Paul H. Griffiths - manuscript
    Analytic philosophy took a wrong turn when it rehabilitated direct realism. From the perspective of cognitive science, it seems that we can have the directness-claim or the realism-claim but not both together. Up until the mid-1900s the vast majority of philosophers dismissed direct realism as hopelessly naïve, but by the close of the century it had become the orthodoxy within analytic philosophy. In contrast, mainstream cognitive science has remained constant in its opposition to the directness-claim, and when the directness-claim is (...)
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  4. Transparency, Revelation and Sensory Knowledge. Gauging the Explananda to a Theory of Phenomenal Presence.Carlos Muñoz-Suárez - manuscript
    There are two arguments in contemporary philosophy of consciousness and perception with which every theory of sensory awareness and phenomenal presence must deal: the Argument from Transparency and the Argument from Revelation. The first one is about the intentionality of sensations or conscious sensory states and the second one is about their epistemic role. These both arguments depend, on the one hand, on specific interpretations of ‘transparency’ and ‘revelation’ and, on the other hand, on specifying the formal structures that they (...)
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  5. Comments on Susanna Siegel's The Contents of Visual Experience.Susanna Schellenberg - manuscript
  6. Avner Baz on Aspects and Concepts: A Critique.Reshef Agam-Segal - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-33.
    ABSTRACTI defend the view that aspect-perception – seeing as a duck, or a face as courageous – typically involves concept-application. Seemingly obvious, this is contested by Avner Baz: ‘aspects ma...
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  7. Analog Mental Representation.Jacob Beck - forthcoming - WIREs Cognitive Science.
    Over the past 50 years, philosophers and psychologists have perennially argued for the existence of analog mental representations of one type or another. This study critically reviews a number of these arguments as they pertain to three different types of mental representation: perceptual representations, imagery representations, and numerosity representations. Along the way, careful consideration is given to the meaning of “analog” presupposed by these arguments for analog mental representation, and to open avenues for future research.
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  8. High-Level Perception and Multimodal Perception.Dan Cavedon-Taylor - forthcoming - In Heather Logue & Louise Richardson (eds.), Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    What is the correct procedure for determining the contents of perception? Philosophers tackling this question increasingly rely on empirically-oriented procedures in order to reach an answer. I argue that this constitutes an improvement over the armchair methodology constitutive of phenomenal contrast cases, but that there is a crucial respect in which current empirical procedures remain limited: they are unimodal in nature, wrongly treating the senses as isolatable faculties. I thus have two aims: first, to motivate a reorientation of the admissible (...)
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  9. Sensory Substitution and Perceptual Learning.Kevin Connolly - forthcoming - In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), Sensory Substitution and Augmentation. Oxford University Press.
    When a user integrates a sensory substitution device into her life, the process involves perceptual learning, that is, ‘relatively long-lasting changes to an organism’s perceptual system that improve its ability to respond to its environment’ (Goldstone 1998: 585). In this paper, I explore ways in which the extensive literature on perceptual learning can be applied to help improve sensory substitution devices. I then use these findings to answer a philosophical question. Much of the philosophical debate surrounding sensory substitution devices concerns (...)
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  10. Disambiguating the Perception Assumption.Jennifer Corns - forthcoming - In Sensory Substitution and Augmentation. Oxford University Press.
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  11. A Puzzle About the Experience of Left and Right.Brian Cutter - forthcoming - Noûs.
    Imagine your mirror-inverted counterpart on Mirror Earth, a perfect mirror image of Earth. Would her experiences be the same as yours, or would they be phenomenally mirror-inverted? I argue, first, that her experiences would be phenomenally the same as yours. I then show that this conclusion gives rise to a puzzle, one that I believe pushes us toward some surprising and philosophically significant conclusions about the nature of perception. When you have a typical visual experience as of something to your (...)
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  12. Unknowable Color Facts.Brian Cutter - forthcoming - Mind.
    It is common for an object to present different color appearances to different perceivers, even when the perceivers and viewing conditions are normal. For example, a Munsell chip might look unique green to you and yellowish green to me in normal viewing conditions. In such cases, there are three possibilities. Ecumenism: Both experiences are veridical. Nihilism: Both experiences are non-veridical. Inegalitarianism: One experience is veridical and the other is non-veridical. Perhaps the most important objection to inegalitarianism is the ignorance objection, (...)
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  13. Not So Phenomenal!Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & John Hawthorne - forthcoming - The Philosophical Review.
    Our main aims in this paper is to discuss and criticise the core thesis of a position that has become known as phenomenal conservatism. According to this thesis, its seeming to one that p provides enough justification for a belief in p to be prima facie justified (a thesis we label Standard Phenomenal Conservatism). This thesis captures the special kind of epistemic import that seemings are claimed to have. To get clearer on this thesis, we embed it, first, in a (...)
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  14. The Perception of Virtue.Jennifer J. Matey - forthcoming - In Berit Brogaard & D. Gratzia (eds.), The Epistemology of Non-visual Perception. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.
    In this paper, I put forward an argument for the view that emotional responses of esteem to perceived demonstrations of good character represent the perceived character traits as valuable, and hence, as virtues. These esteeming experiences are analogous to perceptual representations in other modalities in their epistemic role as causing, providing content for and justifying beliefs regarding the value of the traits they represent. I also discuss the role that the perceiver’s own character plays in their ability to recognize and (...)
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  15. Perceiving Properties Versus Perceiving Objects.Boyd Millar - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    The fact that you see some particular object seems to be due to the causal relation between your visual experience and that object, rather than to your experiences’ phenomenal character. On the one hand, whenever some phenomenal element of your experience stands in the right sort of causal relation to some object, your experience presents that object (your experience’s phenomenology doesn’t need to match that object). On the other hand, you can’t have a perceptual experience that presents some object unless (...)
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  16. Against Hearing Phonemes - A Note on O’Callaghan.Naomi Osorio-Kupferblum - forthcoming - In Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau & Friedrich Stadler (eds.), Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft.
    Casey O’Callaghan has argued that rather than hearing meanings, we hear phonemes. In this note I argue that valuable though they are in an account of speech perception – depending on how we define ‘hearing’ – phonemes either don’t explain enough or they go too far. So, they are not the right tool for his criticism of the semantic perceptual account (SPA).
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  17. What’s so Naïve About Naïve Realism?Carlo Raineri - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    Naïve Realism claims that veridical perceptual experiences essentially consist in genuine relations between perceivers and mind-independent objects and their features. The contemporary debate in the philosophy of perception has devoted little attention to assessing one of the main motivations to endorse Naïve Realism–namely, that it is the only view which articulates our ‘intuitive’ conception of perception. In this paper, I first clarify in which sense Naïve Realism is supposed to be ‘naïve’. In this respect, I argue that it is put (...)
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  18. The Nature of Perceptual Constancies.Peter Schulte - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Perceptual constancies have been studied by psychologists for decades, but in recent years, they have also become a major topic in the philosophy of mind. One reason for this surge of interest is Tyler Burge’s (2010) influential claim that constancy mechanisms mark the difference between perception and mere sensitivity, and thereby also the difference between organisms with genuine representational capacities and ‘mindless’ beings. Burge’s claim has been the subject of intense debate. It is becoming increasingly clear, however, that we cannot (...)
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  19. Can Experiences Be Rational?Susanna Siegel - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
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  20. Thinking and Perceiving: On the Malleability of the Mind.Dustin Stokes - forthcoming - London: Routledge.
    [File is the introduction to the forthcoming monograph] -/- Abstract to monograph -/- How and whether thinking affects perceiving is a deeply important question. Of course it is of scientific interest: to understand the human mind is to understand how we best distinguish its processes, how those processes interact, and what this implies for how and what we may know about the world. And so in the philosopher’s terms, this book is one on both mental architecture and the epistemology of (...)
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  21. Other Minds Are Neither Seen Nor Inferred.Mason Westfall - forthcoming - Synthese:1-21.
    How do we know about other minds on the basis of perception? The two most common answers to this question are that we literally perceive others' mental states, or that we infer their mental states on the basis of perceiving something else. In this paper, I argue for a different answer. On my view, we don't perceive mental states, and yet perceptual experiences often immediately justify mental state attributions. In a slogan: other minds are neither seen nor inferred. I argue (...)
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  22. Theoretical Perspective on Smell.Benjamin D. Young & Andreas Keller (eds.) - forthcoming - Routledge Press.
    Theoretical Perspective on Smell will be the first collection of its kind devoted exclusively to philosophical research on olfaction. The contributed essays bring together leading theorists working on smell in a format that allows for inclusive engagement with the emerging field, while also providing those new to the philosophy of smell with a resource to begin their journey . The collection builds upon an international-workshop on the philosophy of smell with the world’s leading theorists, as well as up and coming (...)
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  23. Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour.Derek Brown & Fiona Macpherson (eds.) - 2021 - Routledge.
  24. An Ecological Approach to Disjunctivism.Eros Moreira de Carvalho - 2021 - Synthese 198 (Radical Views on Cognition):285–306.
    In this paper I claim that perceptual discriminatory skills rely on a suitable type of environment as an enabling condition for their exercise. This is because of the constitutive connection between environment and perceptual discriminatory skills, inasmuch as such connection is construed from an ecological approach. The exercise of a discriminatory skill yields knowledge of affordances of objects, properties, or events in the surrounding environment. This is practical knowledge in the first-person perspective. An organism learns to perceive an object by (...)
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  25. Perception.Adam Pautz - 2021 - Routledge.
    Perception is one of the most pervasive and puzzling problems in philosophy, generating a great deal of attention and controversy in philosophy of mind, psychology and metaphysics. If perceptual illusion and hallucination are possible, how can perception be what it intuitively seems to be, a direct and immediate access to reality? How can perception be both internally dependent and externally directed? Perception is an outstanding introduction to this fundamental topic, covering both the perennial and recent work on the problem. Adam (...)
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  26. On Experiencing Moral Properties.Indrek Reiland - 2021 - Synthese 198 (1):315-325.
    Do we perceptually experience moral properties like rightness and wrongness? For example, as in Gilbert Harman’s classic case, when we see a group of young hoodlums pour gasoline on a cat and ignite it, can we, in the same robust sense, see the action’s wrongness?. Many philosophers have recently discussed this question, argued for a positive answer and/or discussed its epistemological implications. This paper presents a new case for a negative answer by, first, getting much clearer on how such experience (...)
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  27. On Perceptual Expertise.Dustin Stokes - 2021 - Mind and Language 36 (2):241-263.
    Expertise is a cognitive achievement that clearly involves experience and learning, and often requires explicit, time-consuming training specific to the relevant domain. It is also intuitive that this kind of achievement is, in a rich sense, genuinely perceptual. Many experts—be they radiologists, bird watchers, or fingerprint examiners—are better perceivers in the domain(s) of their expertise. The goal of this paper is to motivate three related claims, by substantial appeal to recent empirical research on perceptual expertise: Perceptual expertise is genuinely perceptual (...)
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  28. Sintonizando com o mundo: uma abordagem ecológica das habilidades sensoriomotoras.Eros Carvalho - 2020 - In Giovanni Rolla & Gerson Araújo Neto (eds.), Ciência e Conhecimento. Teresina: pp. 81-108.
    In this chapter, I put forward and sustain an articulation of the notion of bodily skill based on ecological psychology, and I show how it is relevant for the debate between Dreyfus and McDowell about the skillful coping and also for the debate about whether know-how is reducible or not to propositional knowledge. The right metaphor to understand bodily skills is not the computer metaphor but the radio metaphor. These skills results from a process of organism attunement to its environment.
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  29. Social Affordance.Eros Carvalho - 2020 - Encyclopedia of Animal Cognition and Behavior.
    A short entry on social affordance. Social affordances are possibilities for social interaction or possibilities for action that are shaped by social practices and norms.
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  30. Review of Perception and Reality in Kant, Husserl, and McDowell. [REVIEW]Tony Cheng - 2020 - Phenomenological Reviews 6.
  31. Emotional Perception.Matthew Fulkerson - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):16-30.
    Some perceptual experiences seem to have an emotional element that makes both an affective and motivational difference in the content and character of the experience. I offer a novel account of the...
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  32. Two Functions of Perception in Kant.Hemmo Laiho - 2020 - Con-Textos Kantianos 1 (11):272-290.
    Kant uses terms translatable as ‘synthesis’ and ‘perception’ in different ways in different contexts, which suggests that there are different kinds of synthesis and perception. I propose that there are two main basic functions of perception according to Kant: that of singling out a thing and that of getting perceptually informed about the configuration of the thing’s perceptible features. I argue that the first function is not dependent on the kinds of syntheses Kant analyzes in the Critique of Pure Reason (...)
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  33. Mental Structures.Kevin J. Lande - 2020 - Noûs.
    An ongoing philosophical discussion concerns how various types of mental states fall within broad representational genera—for example, whether perceptual states are “iconic” or “sentential,” “analog” or “digital,” and so on. Here, I examine the grounds for making much more specific claims about how mental states are structured from constituent parts. For example, the state I am in when I perceive the shape of a mountain ridge may have as constituent parts my representations of the shapes of each peak and saddle (...)
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  34. Unconscious Inference Theories of Cognitive Acheivement.Kirk Ludwig & Wade Munroe - 2020 - In Anders Nes & Timothy Chan (eds.), Inference and Consciousness. New York: Routledge. pp. 15-39.
    This chapter argues that the only tenable unconscious inferences theories of cognitive achievement are ones that employ a theory internal technical notion of representation, but that once we give cash-value definitions of the relevant notions of representation and inference, there is little left of the ordinary notion of representation. We suggest that the real value of talk of unconscious inferences lies in (a) their heuristic utility in helping us to make fruitful predictions, such as about illusions, and (b) their providing (...)
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  35. Sustained Representation of Perspectival Shape.Jorge Morales, Axel Bax & Chaz Firestone - 2020 - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 117 (26):14873–14882.
    Arguably the most foundational principle in perception research is that our experience of the world goes beyond the retinal image; we perceive the distal environment itself, not the proximal stimulation it causes. Shape may be the paradigm case of such “unconscious inference”: When a coin is rotated in depth, we infer the circular object it truly is, discarding the perspectival ellipse projected on our eyes. But is this really the fate of such perspectival shapes? Or does a tilted coin retain (...)
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  36. Where is the Fundamental Disagreement Between Naive Realism and Intentionalism?Takuya Niikawa - 2020 - Metaphilosophy 51 (4):593-610.
  37. Attention and Encapsulation.Jake Quilty‐Dunn - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (3):335-349.
    The question of whether perception is encapsulated from cognition has been a major topic in the study of perception in the past decade. One locus of debate concerns the role of attention. Some theorists argue that attention is a vehicle for widespread violations of encapsulation; others argue that certain forms of cognitively driven attention are compatible with encapsulation, especially if attention only modulates inputs. This paper argues for an extreme thesis: no effect of attention, whether on the inputs to perception (...)
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  38. Science, substance and spatial appearances.Thomas Raleigh - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2097-2114.
    According to a certain kind of naïve or folk understanding of physical matter, everyday ‘solid’ objects are composed of a homogeneous, gap-less substance, with sharply defined boundaries, which wholly fills the space they occupy. A further claim is that our perceptual experience of the environment represents or indicates that the objects around us conform to this sort of conception of physical matter. Were this further claim correct, it would mean that the way that the world appears to us in experience (...)
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  39. Talking About Appearances: The Roles of Evaluation and Experience in Disagreement.Rachel Etta Rudolph - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (1):197-217.
    Faultless disagreement and faultless retraction have been taken to motivate relativism for predicates of personal taste, like ‘tasty’. Less attention has been devoted to the question of what aspect of their meaning underlies this relativist behavior. This paper illustrates these same phenomena with a new category of expressions: appearance predicates, like ‘tastes vegan’ and ‘looks blue’. Appearance predicates and predicates of personal taste both fall into the broader category of experiential predicates. Approaching predicates of personal taste from this angle suggests (...)
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  40. A Tale of Two Williams: James, Stern, and the Specious Present.Jack Shardlow - 2020 - Philosophical Explorations 23 (2):79-94.
    As a typical subject, you experience a variety of paradigmatically temporal phenomena. Looking out of the window in the English summer, you can see leaves swaying in the breeze and hear the pitter-patter of raindrops steadily increasing against the window. In discussions of temporal experience, and through reflecting on examples such as those offered, two phenomenological claims are widely – though not unequivocally – accepted: firstly, you perceptually experience motion and change; secondly, while more than a momentary state of affairs (...)
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  41. Skill and Expertise in Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2020 - In Ellen Fridland & Carlotta Pavese (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Skill and Expertise, 2020. Routledge. pp. 306-313.
    Entry in Routledge handbook of skill and expertise. Discusses social perception, perceptual expertise, knowing what things look like, and a bit about about aesthetics at the end.
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  42. 我们的自动无意识行为揭示了我们真实的自我和隐藏的宇宙真相吗?-- 大卫·霍金斯的《权力与力量——人类行为的隐藏决定因素——作者的官方权威版》412p(2012年)(原版1995年)(2019年修订版) (Do our automated unconscious behaviors reveal our real selves and hidden truths about the universe? -- A review of David Hawkins ‘Power vs Force--the hidden determinants of human behavior –author’s official authoritative edition’ 412p(2012)(original edition 1995)).Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - In 欢迎来到地球上的地狱: 婴儿,气候变化,比特币,卡特尔,中国,民主,多样性,养成基因,平等,黑客,人权,伊斯兰教,自由主义,繁荣,网络,混乱。饥饿,疾病,暴力,人工智能,战争. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 225-228.
    我已经习惯了奇怪的书和特殊的人,但霍金斯脱颖而出,因为他使用一个简单的技术来测试肌肉张力作为关键,任何种类的陈述的"真相"-即,不只是被测试的人是否相信它,但它是否真的是真的!众所 周知,人们会表现出自动的、无意识的生理和心理反应,就像他们接触到的任何东西——图像、声音、触觉、气味、想法、人。所以,肌肉阅读,找出他们的真实感受是一点也不激进,不像用它作为一个沉思的棍子(更多的肌肉 阅读)做"超自然科学"。 霍金斯描述了在认知负荷增加时使用降低手臂肌肉的张力,从而导致手臂在手指持续压力下下降。他似乎没有意识到,在社会心理学方面,有一个长期而庞大的持续研究,被诸如"隐性认知"、" ;自动性"等短语所指,而他使用"运动学"只是一小部分。除了肌肉张力(不常使用)外,社会心理学家还测量脑电图、电光皮肤反应,以及最常见的言语反应、句子、图像或情况,有时从刺 激后几秒钟到几个月不等。许多,如巴格和韦格纳,认为结果意味着我们是自动机,学习和行动在很大程度上没有意识通过S1(自动化系统1)和许多其他,如基尔斯特罗姆和尚克斯说,这些研究是有缺陷的,我们是S2的生 物(审议系统2)。虽然霍金斯似乎并不知道,就像在高阶思维的描述性心理学的其他领域一样,"自动性"的情况仍然像维特根斯坦描述心理学无菌和贫瘠的原因时一样混乱。在30年代。然而,这本书 是一个容易阅读,一些治疗师和精神教师可能会发现它使用。 那些希望从现代两个系统的观点来看为人类行为建立一个全面的最新框架的人,可以查阅我的书《路德维希的哲学、心理学、Min d和语言的逻辑结构》维特根斯坦和约翰·西尔的《第二部》(2019年)。那些对我更多的作品感兴趣的人可能会看到《会说话的猴子——一个末日星球上的哲学、心理学、科学、宗教和政治——文章和评论2006-20 19年第3次(2019年)和自杀乌托邦幻想21篇世纪4日 (2019) .
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  43. Revisão de 'Seeing Things as They Are: a Theory of Perception' (Vendo as Coisas como são: uma Teoria da Percepção) (2015) (revisão revisada 2019).Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - In Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política, Economia, História e Literatura - Artigos e Avaliações 2006-2019. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 56-92.
    Como tantas vezes na filosofia, o título não só estabelece a linha de batalha, mas expõe os preconceitos e erros do autor, pois se podemos ou não entender o jogo de linguagem 'Ver as coisas como elas são' e se é possível ter uma "teoria filosófica" de percepção" (que é Pode ser sobre como a linguagem da percepção funciona), ao contrário de uma científica, que é uma teoria sobre como o cérebro funciona, são exatamente os problemas. Este é o Searle (...)
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  44. Perceptual Skills.Dustin Stokes & Bence Nanay - 2020 - In Ellen Fridland & Carlotta Pavese (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Skill and Expertise. London: Routledge.
    This chapter has four parts. I distinguishes some types of perceptual skills and highlights their importance in everyday perception. II identifies a well-studied class of perceptual skills: cases of perceptual expertise. III discusses a less studied possible instance of perceptual skill: picture perception. Finally, IV outlines some important mechanisms underlying perceptual skills, with special emphasis on attention and mental imagery.
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  45. On Perceiving Continuity: The Role of Memory in the Perception of the Continuity of the Same Things.Mika Suojanen - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (5):1979-1995.
    Theories of philosophy of perception are too simplifying. Direct realism and representationalism, for example, are philosophical theories of perception about the nature of the perceived object and its location. It is common sense to say that we directly perceive, through our senses, physical objects together with their properties. However, if perceptual experience is representational, it only appears that we directly perceive the represented physical objects. Despite psychological studies concerning the role of memory in perception, what these two philosophical theories do (...)
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  46. Do We See Facts?Alfredo Vernazzani - 2020 - Mind and Language.
    Philosophers of perception frequently assume that we see actual states of affairs, or facts. Call this claim factualism. In his book, William Fish suggests that factualism is supported by phenomenological observation as well as by experimental studies on multiple object tracking and dynamic feature-object integration. In this paper, I examine the alleged evidence for factualism, focusing mainly on object detection and tracking. I argue that there is no scientific evidence for factualism. This conclusion has implications for studies on the phenomenology (...)
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  47. Smell's Puzzling Discrepancy: Gifted Discrimination, yet Pitiful Identification.Benjamin D. Young - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (1):90-114.
  48. Revisiting Amodal Completion and Knowledge.Haicheng Zhao - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (2):847-856.
    In a recent paper, Helton and Nanay, 415–423, 2019) present a new argument against two modal accounts of knowledge—safety and sensitivity. Their argument is based on the phenomenon of amodal completion. According to them, amodal completion experience can ground knowledge; but in some instances, such knowledge is neither sensitive nor safe. Thus, they conclude that neither sensitivity nor safety is a necessary condition for knowledge. This paper pushes back. In particular, I defend the following three theses. First, Helton and Nanay’s (...)
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  49. Social Enactivism About Perception—Reply to McGann.Alejandro Arango - 2019 - Adaptive Behavior 27 (2):161-162.
    In his comment, McGann argues that in my “From Sensorimotor Dependencies to Perceptual Practices: Making Enactivism Social,” I have overlooked a group of enactivist theories that can be grouped under the participatory sense-making label. In this reply, I explain that the omission is due to the fact that such theories are not accounts of perception. It is argued that, unlike participatory sense-making, the approach of the “From Sensorimotor Dependencies to Perceptual Practices” article does not focus on the perceptual aspects of (...)
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  50. Is the Experience of Pain Transparent? Introspecting Phenomenal Qualities.Murat Aydede - 2019 - Synthese 196 (2):677-708.
    I distinguish between two claims of transparency of experiences. One claim is weaker and supported by phenomenological evidence. This I call the transparency datum. Introspection of standard perceptual experiences as well as bodily sensations is consistent with, indeed supported by, the transparency datum. I formulate a stronger transparency thesis that is entailed by representationalism about experiential phenomenology. I point out some empirical consequences of strong transparency in the context of representationalism. I argue that pain experiences, as well as some other (...)
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