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  1. On non-inferential structure of perceptual judgment.Milos Bogdanovic - manuscript
    This paper deals with Peirce’s understanding of perceptual judgment, relating it to the conditions for the use of language defined by Michael Dummett. Namely, drawing on Dummett’s requirement for harmony between descriptive and evaluative aspects of our linguistic practice, we will try to give an interpretation of Peirce’s view of perception that implies rejecting the idea that the formation of a perceptual judgment has an inferential structure. On the other hand, since it is, in Peirce’s opinion, the structure of abductive (...)
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  2. Another Look at Husserl’s Treatment of the Thing in Itself.Matt Bower - manuscript
    It is a familiar story that, where Kant humbly draws a line beyond which cognition can’t reach, Husserl presses forward to show how we can cognize beyond that limit. Kant supposes that cognition is bound to sensibility and that what we experience in sensibility is mere appearance that does not inform us about the intrinsic nature of things in themselves. By contrast, for Husserl, it makes no sense to say we experience anything other than things in themselves when we enjoy (...)
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  3. A new objection to representationalist direct realism.Paul H. Griffiths - manuscript
    Representationalism (aka intentionalism) has been the most significant weapon in the late twentieth century defence of direct realism. However, although the representationalist objection to the Phenomenal Principle might provide an effective response to the arguments from illusion and hallucination, plausible representationalist theories of perception are, when fleshed-out, incompatible with metaphysical direct realism’s directness-claim. Indeed within cognitive science, direct perception is the avowedly-radical anti-representationalist heterodoxy. Drawing on both the philosophy and cognitive science, we develop a robust argument against representationalist direct realism (...)
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  4. The case against direct realism.Paul H. Griffiths - manuscript
    Analytic philosophy took a wrong turn when it rehabilitated direct realism. From the perspective of cognitive science, it seems that we can have the directness-claim or the realism-claim but not both together. Up until the mid-1900s the vast majority of philosophers dismissed direct realism as hopelessly naïve, but by the close of the century it had become the orthodoxy within analytic philosophy. In contrast, mainstream cognitive science has remained constant in its opposition to the directness-claim, and when the directness-claim is (...)
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  5. Anomalous Disjunctivism.Zhiwei Gu - manuscript
    This paper aims at offering a new disjunctivist solution – anomalous disjunctivism – to the screening-off problem. Anomalous disjunctivism focuses on the necessary causal conditions for perception and hallucination. It argues that the proximate cause is contingent on causing a particular kind of sensory experience that can either be perceptual or hallucinatory. It further shows that the perceived thing is a necessary causal condition for perceptual experience and the failure of perception is a necessary causal condition for the hallucinatory counterpart. (...)
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  6. On Perception and Light.A. Halliday - manuscript
    In this paper I argue that interest in light was, and is, an ongoing area of interest in the philosophy of visual perception. I then argue that 'light' is not a real entity, and that light rays are opaque. It should follow that the philosophy of direct perception of real objects is not sound.
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  7. Towards a pre-Representation.Albert Halliday - manuscript
    In this paper I will argue that what is perceived as the Representation is not formed out of sensory-data1 directly. Instead, I will argue that a more fundamental structure, that I have named the pre-Representation, precedes the Representation and it is formed out of sensory-data.
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  8. Transparency, Revelation and Sensory Knowledge. Gauging the Explananda to a Theory of Phenomenal Presence.Carlos Muñoz-Suárez - manuscript
    There are two arguments in contemporary philosophy of consciousness and perception with which every theory of sensory awareness and phenomenal presence must deal: the Argument from Transparency and the Argument from Revelation. The first one is about the intentionality of sensations or conscious sensory states and the second one is about their epistemic role. These both arguments depend, on the one hand, on specific interpretations of ‘transparency’ and ‘revelation’ and, on the other hand, on specifying the formal structures that they (...)
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  9. Comments on Susanna Siegel's The Contents of Visual Experience.Susanna Schellenberg - manuscript
  10. Analog Mental Representation.Jacob Beck - forthcoming - WIREs Cognitive Science.
    Over the past 50 years, philosophers and psychologists have perennially argued for the existence of analog mental representations of one type or another. This study critically reviews a number of these arguments as they pertain to three different types of mental representation: perceptual representations, imagery representations, and numerosity representations. Along the way, careful consideration is given to the meaning of “analog” presupposed by these arguments for analog mental representation, and to open avenues for future research.
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  11. Between Perception and Thought.Jacob Beck - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    In The Border between Seeing and Thinking, Ned Block argues that the distinction between perception and cognition should be grounded in representational format. I object that cognition is multifaceted, and includes representations with the same format as some perceptual representations. We can save Block’s view by interpreting it as concerning the border between one elite species of cognition—namely, propositional thought—and everything below it, including perception. But that leaves the border between perception and cognition in general unexplained. To fill this gap, (...)
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  12. Magic, Alief and Make-Believe.Dan Cavedon-Taylor - forthcoming - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism.
    Leddington (2016) remains the leading contemporary philosophical account of magic, one that has been relatively unchallenged. In this discussion piece, I have three aims; namely, to (i) criticise Leddington’s attempt to explain the experience of magic in terms of belief-discordant alief; (ii) explore the possibility that much, if not all, of the experience of magic can be explained by mundane belief-discordant perception; and (iii) argue that make-believe is crucial to successful performances of magic in ways Leddington at best overlooks and (...)
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  13. Reliable color misrepresentation and color vision (in print), Special Issue: Brogaard, B. and French, R. (Eds).Dimitria Gatzia - forthcoming - Synthese.
    Tracking theories of mental representation posit a privileged relation between color representations and the color properties of objects. Tracking theories of mental representation have been used to motivate color realism as they posit that the function of color vision is to represent the colors of objects. It has been argued that tracking theories have a major flaw, namely they cannot account for reliable misrepresentation. It has further been suggested that reliable color misrepresentation is a live possibility. In this chapter, I (...)
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  14. Sensory Modality and Perceptual Reasons.Alex Grzankowski & Mark Schroeder - forthcoming - Episteme:1-7.
    Perception can provide us with a privileged source of evidence about the external world – evidence that makes it rational to believe things about the world. In Reasons First, Mark Schroeder offers a new view on how perception does so. The central motivation behind Schroeder’s account is to offer an answer to what evidence perception equips us with according to which it is what he calls world-implicating but non-factive, and thereby to glean some of the key advantages of both externalism (...)
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  15. Compositionality in Perception: A Framework.Kevin J. Lande - forthcoming - WIREs Cognitive Science.
    Perception involves the processing of content or information about the world. In what form is this content represented? I argue that perception is widely compositional. The perceptual system represents many stimulus features (including shape, orientation, and motion) in terms of combinations of other features (such as shape parts, slant and tilt, common and residual motion vectors). But compositionality can take a variety of forms. The ways in which perceptual representations compose are markedly different from the ways in which sentences or (...)
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  16. Contours of Vision: Towards a Compositional Semantics of Perception.Kevin J. Lande - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Mental capacities for perceiving, remembering, thinking, and planning involve the processing of structured mental representations. A compositional semantics of such representations would explain how the content of any given representation is determined by the contents of its constituents and their mode of combination. While many have argued that semantic theories of mental representations would have broad value for understanding the mind, there have been few attempts to develop such theories in a systematic and empirically constrained way. This paper contributes to (...)
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  17. Not So Phenomenal!Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & John Hawthorne - forthcoming - The Philosophical Review.
    Our main aims in this paper is to discuss and criticise the core thesis of a position that has become known as phenomenal conservatism. According to this thesis, its seeming to one that p provides enough justification for a belief in p to be prima facie justified (a thesis we label Standard Phenomenal Conservatism). This thesis captures the special kind of epistemic import that seemings are claimed to have. To get clearer on this thesis, we embed it, first, in a (...)
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  18. Plants Sense. But Only Animals Perceive.Mohan Matthen - forthcoming - In Gabriele Ferretti, Peter Schulte & Markus Wild (eds.), Philosophy of Plant Cognition: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Routledge. pp. 101–125.
    All living things have sensory capacities. Plants, in particular, have sensory receptors, transduce the activations of these receptors, and process these outputs in order to manage actions that demand sensory integration. However, there is a kind of sensory function that plants cannot perform. They cannot sense something as other than themselves. Animals, by contrast, perceive. They experience two kinds of "othering impressions"—impressions of entities as located outside and available for interaction, and hence as distinct from the perceiving subject. First, they (...)
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  19. Against hearing phonemes - A note on O’Callaghan.Naomi Osorio-Kupferblum - forthcoming - In Limbeck-Lilienau Christoph & Stadler Friedrich (eds.), Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft.
    Casey O’Callaghan has argued that rather than hearing meanings, we hear phonemes. In this note I argue that valuable though they are in an account of speech perception – depending on how we define ‘hearing’ – phonemes either don’t explain enough or they go too far. So, they are not the right tool for his criticism of the semantic perceptual account (SPA).
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  20. Remnants of Perception: Comments on Block and the Function of Visual Working Memory.Jake Quilty-Dunn - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    This commentary critically examines the view of the relationship between perception and memory in Ned Block's *The Border Between Seeing and Thinking*. It argues that visual working memory often stores the outputs of perception without altering their formats, allowing online visual perception to access these memory representations in computations that unfold over longer timescales and across eye movements. Since Block concedes that visual working memory representations are not iconic, we should not think of perceptual representations as exclusively iconic either.
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  21. Representation, Attention, and Perceptual Learning.Madeleine Ransom - forthcoming - In Robert French & Berit Brogaard (eds.), The Roles of Representations in Visual Perception. Springer.
    What sorts of properties we perceive matters for understanding the nature of perception and the scope of perceptual justification. One way of arguing for the view that we can represent ‘high-level’ properties such as natural and artificial kinds is to appeal to Susanna Siegel’s method of phenomenal contrast, which contrasts the phenomenology of experts and novices. This argument can be strengthened by appealing to empirical work on perceptual learning and expertise that suggests the world really does look different to experts (...)
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  22. The phenomenal character of perceptual noise: epistemic misfire, sensory misfire, or perceptual disjoint?B. Vassilicos - forthcoming - In Basil Vassilicos, Guiseppe Torre & Fabio Tommy Pellizzer (eds.), The experience of noise. Macmillan.
    My interest lies in offering a phenomenological perspective on how noise is experienced, with particular attention to what may be common to different sorts of noise phenomena. As a counterpoint to the notion that noise is an empty or constructed notion, I argue for two desiderata of a phenomenological account of noise; accommodating a plurality of noise experiences, on the one hand, and clarifying their specific phenomenal character, on the other. I then pursue these desiderata by turning to an examination (...)
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  23. Hill on perceptual relativity and perceptual error.E. J. Green - 2024 - Mind and Language 39 (1):80-88.
    Christopher Hill's Perceptual experience is a must‐read for philosophers of mind and cognitive science. Here I consider Hill's representationalist account of spatial perception. I distinguish two theses defended in the book. The first is that perceptual experience does not represent the enduring, intrinsic properties of objects, such as intrinsic shape or size. The second is that perceptual experience does represent certain viewpoint‐dependent properties of objects—namely, Thouless properties. I argue that Hill's arguments do not establish the first thesis, and then I (...)
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  24. The Invalidity of the Argument from Illusion and the Argument from Appearance.Zhiwei Gu - 2024 - Acta Analytica 39 (2):273-294.
    One crucial premise in the argument from illusion is the Phenomenal Principle. It states that if there sensibly appears to be something that possesses a sensible quality, then there is something of which the subject is aware that has that sensible quality. The principle thus enables the inference from a mere appearance to an existence (usually a mental one). In the argument from appearance, a similar move is taken by some philosophers—they infer a content from a mere appearance. There are (...)
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  25. Bias in Perceptual Learning.Madeleine Ransom & Robert L. Goldstone - 2024 - WIREs Cognitive Science (online first):e1683.
    Perceptual learning is commonly understood as conferring some benefit to the learner, such as allowing for the extraction of more information from the environment. However, perceptual learning can be biased in several different ways, some of which do not appear to provide such a benefit. Here we outline a systematic framework for thinking about bias in perceptual learning and discuss how several cases fit into this framework. We argue these biases are compatible with an understanding in which perceptual learning is (...)
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  26. Kern, the Two-Capacity View, and Paradigmatic Exercises of Rationality.T. Raja Rosenhagen - 2024 - In Ori Beck & Miloš Vuletić (eds.), Empirical Reason and Sensory Experience. Springer. pp. 135-138.
    This is a short response piece to “The Knowledge View of Perception. Capacities, Opportunities and Hindrances for Perceptual Knowledge” - a paper given by Andrea Kern at the PEER conference 2021 in Pittsburgh. In it, I criticize Kern's argument against what she calls the Two-Capacity View (TCV). TCV is the view that generally, perception is a capacity that enables subjects to gain perceptual knowledge and that this capacity involves two sub-capacities: one for perception and one for judgment. In this piece, (...)
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  27. Theories of Perceptual Content and Cases of Reliable Spatial Misperception.Andrew Rubner - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (2):430-455.
    Perception is riddled with cases of reliable misperception. These are cases in which a perceptual state is tokened inaccurately any time it is tokened under normal conditions. On the face of it, this fact causes trouble for theories that provide an analysis of perceptual content in non-semantic, non-intentional, and non-phenomenal terms, such as those found in Millikan (1984), Fodor (1990), Neander (2017), and Schellenberg (2018). I show how such theories can be extended so that they cover such cases without giving (...)
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  28. Phenomenal realism and subjective-objective dichotomy.Manas Sahu - 2024 - Prometeica 29:164-176.
    The resolution of subjective-objective dichotomy is not lies in reduction rather grounded on the synthesis of phenomenal aspect and intentional-representational aspect of experience. We have to acknowledge the limits of both physical and mental objectivity and gradually transcend and expand the scope of physical as well as mental objectivity through neutral perspective. The Nagelian version of phenomenal realism has indicated for resolving the subjective-objective dichotomy by observing the interaction of subjective point of view and objective point of view about the (...)
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  29. The Phenomenal Public.Susanna Siegel - 2024 - Political Philosophy 1 (1).
    With what modes of mentality can we build a visceral, subjective sense of being in some specific mass-political society? Theorists and political cultivators standardly call upon the imagination – the kind prompted by symbols and rituals, for example. Could perception ever play such a role? I argue that it can, but that perceptions of mass-political publics come with costs of cruelty and illusion that neither democratic theorists nor participants should be willing to pay. The clearest examples of such perceptions are (...)
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  30. The epistemic insignificance of phenomenal force.Lu Teng - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (1):55-76.
    Does phenomenal force, the distinctive phenomenology attributed to perceptual experience, really form an integral part of the latter? If not, what implications does it have for perceptual justification? In this paper, I first argue for a metacognitive account, according to which phenomenal force constitutes a separate, metacognitive state. This account opens up a previously unexplored path for challenging phenomenal conservatism or dogmatism, which has been a prominent theory of perceptual justification over the past two decades. Moreover, I investigate several alternative (...)
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  31. Avner Baz on aspects and concepts: a critique.Reshef Agam-Segal - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (3):417-449.
    I defend the view that aspect-perception – seeing as a duck, or a face as courageous – typically involves concept-application. Seemingly obvious, this is contested by Avner Baz: ‘aspects may not aptly be identified with, or in terms of, empirical concepts […]’ – In opposition, I claim that they may. Indeed, in many cases there is no other way to identify aspects.I review the development in Baz’s view, from his early criticism of Stephen Mulhall, to his recent recruitment of the (...)
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  32. The Resistance of the Given.Andrea Altobrando - 2023 - Review of Metaphysics 76 (4):651-701.
    Abstract:It has convincingly been asserted that only what is conceptually formed can enter the space of reasons, and that only within the latter can we properly speak of knowledge in a way that is specific of human nature. The author purports to show (1) that, even if true, this does not mean that only what is intrinsically conceptual can have epistemic efficacy, (2) that we are able rationally to see nonconceptual contents, and (3) that the "vision" of nonconceptual content plays (...)
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  33. Merleau-Ponty and Contemporary Philosophy of Perception.Peter Antich - 2023 - New York, NY: Routledge.
    This book draws on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology to develop new and promising solutions to contemporary debates about perception. In providing an extension and defense of Merleau-Ponty’s account of perceptual content and of the relation between perception and the world, it demonstrates the enduring value of Merleau-Ponty’s insights for philosophy of perception today. -/- The author focuses on two main topics: the contents and the nature of perception. In the first half of this book, the author tackles debates about the content of (...)
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  34. Cognitive penetration and implicit cognition.Lucas Battich & Ophelia Deroy - 2023 - In J. Robert Thompson (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Implicit Cognition. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 144-152.
    Cognitive states, such as beliefs, desires and intentions, may influence how we perceive people and objects. If this is the case, are those influences worse when they occur implicitly rather than explicitly? Here we show that cognitive penetration in perception generally involves an implicit component. First, the process of influence is implicit, making us unaware that our perception is misrepresenting the world. This lack of awareness is the source of the epistemic threat raised by cognitive penetration. Second, the influencing state (...)
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  35. Review of Ned Block's The Border between Seeing and Thinking.Jacob Beck - 2023 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
    I summarize and critically review Block's book, focusing on his format-based account of the border between perception and cognition and his argument for the phenomenal overflow of color perception.
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  36. Contents and Vehicles in Analog Perception.Jacob Beck - 2023 - Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 55 (163):109–127.
    Building on Christopher Peacocke’s account of analog perceptual contentand my own account of analog perceptual vehicles, I defend three claims: that theperception of magnitudes often has analog contents; that the perception of magni-tudes often has analog vehicles; and that the first claim is true in virtue of the second—that is, the analog vehicles help to ground the analog contents.
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  37. Learning from experience and conditionalization.Peter Brössel - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2797-2823.
    Bayesianism can be characterized as the following twofold position: (i) rational credences obey the probability calculus; (ii) rational learning, i.e., the updating of credences, is regulated by some form of conditionalization. While the formal aspect of various forms of conditionalization has been explored in detail, the philosophical application to learning from experience is still deeply problematic. Some philosophers have proposed to revise the epistemology of perception; others have provided new formal accounts of conditionalization that are more in line with how (...)
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  38. Perception, Self, and Zen: On Iris Murdoch and the Taming of Simone Weil.Silvia Caprioglio Panizza - 2023 - Philosophies 8 (64):64.
    How do we see the world aright? This question is central to Iris Murdoch’s philosophy as well as to that of her great source of inspiration, Simone Weil. For both of them, not only our action, but the very quality of our being depends on the ability to see things as they are, where vision is both a metaphor for immediate understanding and a literal expression of the requirement to train our perception so as to get rid of illusions. For (...)
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  39. O disjuntivismo ecológico e o argumento causal.Eros Moreira de Carvalho - 2023 - Trans/Form/Ação (46):147-174.
    In this paper, I argue that the ecological approach to perception provides resources to overcome the causal argument against disjunctivism. According to the causal argument, since the brain states that proximally cause the perceptual experience and the corresponding hallucinatory one can be of the same type, there would be no good reason to reject that the perceptual experience and the corresponding hallucinatory experience have fundamentally the same nature. Disjunctivism concerning the nature of the experience would then be false. I identify (...)
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  40. Perceptual consciousness and intensional transitive verbs.Justin D’Ambrosio & Daniel Stoljar - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (12):3301-3322.
    There is good reason to think that, in every case of perceptual consciousness, there is something of which we are conscious; but there is also good reason to think that, in some cases of perceptual consciousness—for instance, hallucinations—there is nothing of which we are conscious. This paper resolves this inconsistency—which we call the presentation problem—by (a) arguing that ‘conscious of’ and related expressions function as intensional transitive verbs and (b) defending a particular semantic approach to such verbs, on which they (...)
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  41. Are Sounds Events? Materiality in Auditory Perception.Elia Gonnella - 2023 - Phenomenology and Mind 25 (25):226-240.
    Whilst arguing for sounds as repeatable objects does not seem suitable to our auditory experience, considering them as events can then help us understand some of their main features. In this sense, sounds are events happening to material objects; they have a beginning and an end; they are ephemeral entities that we cannot grasp as ordinary objects. Nevertheless, supporters of event theory usually focus on the autonomous status that sounds manifest from the things in the world. Conversely, when we hear (...)
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  42. Why is the Teleological Argument so Popular?Marcus W. Hunt - 2023 - Studia Humana 12 (4):1-12.
    Why are teleological arguments based on biological phenomena so popular? My explanation is that teleological properties are presented in our experiences of biological phenomena. I contrast this with the view that the attribution of teleological properties to biological phenomena takes place at an intellective level – via inference, and as belief or similar propositional attitude. I suggest five ways in which the experiential view is the better explanation for the popularity of such teleological arguments. Experiential attributions are more easy, impactful, (...)
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  43. The World of Screen Creatures.Bin Liu - 2023 - Constructivist Foundations 18 (3):387-396.
    Context: Some scholars have put forward constructivist world models in which the purported external world is constructed from experience (i.e., there is a constructive relation between them. However, scholars disagree about whether experience is generated by the brain and results from the perception of the purported external world (i.e., whether there are generative relations and perceptual relations. Problem: Do we need to maintain perceptual relations or generative relations in a constructivist world model? Method: I propose a world model where our (...)
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  44. Author’s Response: The Experiential World.Bin Liu - 2023 - Constructivist Foundations 18 (3):411-415.
    I explain the world of screen creatures by virtue of our familiar environment and the notion of the experiential world. My explanation is meant to strengthen the argument for the view that the constructivist world model does not need the perceptual relation. I also demonstrate that the experiential world is complete, meaning that every type of phenomenon can be explained within this realm.
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  45. Agency and the Successive Structure of Time-Consciousness.Camden Alexander McKenna - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (5):2013-2034.
    I argue for constraining the nomological possibility space of temporal experiences and endorsing the Succession Requirement for agents. The Succession Requirement holds that the basic structure of temporal experience must be successive for agentive subjects, at least in worlds that are law-like in the same way as ours. I aim to establish the Succession Requirement by showing non-successively experiencing agents are not possible for three main reasons, namely that they (1) fail to stand in the right sort of causal relationship (...)
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  46. Misperceiving properties.Boyd Millar - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (2):431-445.
    Recently, a number of philosophers have argued that property illusions—cases in which we perceive a property, but that property is not the property it seems to us to be in virtue of our perceptual experience—and veridical illusions—cases in which we veridically perceive an object’s properties, but our experience of some specific property is nonetheless unsuccessful or illusory—can occur. I defend the contrary view. First, I maintain that there are compelling reasons to conclude that property illusions and veridical illusions can’t occur; (...)
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  47. Stokes’s malleability thesis and the normative grounding of propositional attitudes.Christopher Mole - 2023 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 4:1-8.
    The position that Stokes’s Thinking and Perceiving aims to overthrow is committed to the idea that the facts about one’s propositional attitudes and the facts about one’s perceptual experiences are alike grounded in facts about representations (in various formats) that are being held in a short or long term memory store, so that computations can be performed upon them. Claims about modularity are claims about the distinctness of these memory stores, and of these representations. One way in which to reject (...)
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  48. Sensory Individuals: Unimodal and Multimodal Perspectives.Aleksandra Mroczko-Wrasowicz & Rick Grush (eds.) - 2023 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Sensory Individuals: Unimodal and Multimodal Perspectives provides an interdisciplinary, well-balanced, and comprehensive look at different aspects of unisensory and multisensory objects, using both nuanced philosophical analysis and informed empirical work. The research presented in this book represents the field's progression from treating neural sensory processes as primarily modality-specific towards its current state of the art, according to which perception, and its supporting neural processes, are multi-modal, modality-independent, meta-modal, and task-dependent. Even within such approaches sensory stimuli, properties, brain activations, and corresponding (...)
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  49. Perception needs modular stimulus-control.Anders Nes - 2023 - Synthese 201 (6):1-30.
    Perceptual processes differ from cognitive, this paper argues, in functioning to be causally controlled by proximal stimuli, and being modular, at least in a modest sense that excludes their being isotropic in Jerry Fodor's sense. This claim agrees with such theorists as Jacob Beck and Ben Phillips that a function of stimulus-control is needed for perceptual status. In support of this necessity claim, I argue, inter alia, that E.J. Green's recent architectural account misclassifies processes deploying knowledge of grammar as perceptual. (...)
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  50. Sensory binding without sensory individuals.Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2023 - In Aleksandra Mroczko-Wrasowicz & Rick Grush (eds.), Sensory Individuals: Unimodal and Multimodal Perspectives. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    The capacity for feature binding is typically explained in terms of the attribution model: a perceptual state selects an individual and attributes properties to it (Kahneman & Treisman 1984; Clark 2004; Burge 2010). Thus features are bound together in virtue of being attributed to the same individual. While the attribution model successfully explains some cases of binding in perception, not all binding need be understood as property attribution. This chapter argues that some forms of binding—those involving holistic iconic representations, which (...)
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