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  1. Perception.Isaac Aaronson - 1914 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 11 (2):37-46.
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  2. Philosophical Perspectives on Depiction.C. Abell & K. Bantinaki (eds.) - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    This volume of specially written essays by leading philosophers offers to set the agenda for the philosophy of depiction.
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  3. Perspectival Thought: A Plea for Moderate Relativism. [REVIEW]Jonas Åkerman - 2009 - Review of Metaphysics 62 (4).
  4. A Phenomenology of Critical-Ethical Vision: Merleau-Ponty, Bergson, and the Question of Seeing Differently.Alia Al-Saji - 2009 - Chiasmi International 11:375-398.
    Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s “Eye and Mind” and Bergson’s Matière et mémoire and “La perception du changement,” I ask what resources are available in vision for interrupting objectifying habits of seeing. While both Bergson and Merleau-Ponty locate the possibility of seeing differently in the figure of the painter, I develop by means of their texts, and in dialogue with Iris Marion Young’s work, a more general phenomenology of hesitation that grounds what I am calling “critical-ethical vision.” Hesitation, I argue, stems from (...)
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  5. Vision, Mirror and Expression: The Genesis of the Ethical Body in Merleau-Ponty’s Later Works.Alia Al-Saji - 2006 - In James Hatley, Janice McLane & Christian Diehm (eds.), Interrogating Ethics: Embodying the Good in Merleau-Ponty. Duquesne University Press.
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  6. La Vision dans le Miroir: L’intercorporéité comme commencement d’une éthique dans L’œil et l’esprit.Alia Al-Saji - 2005 - Chiasmi International 6:253-271.
  7. The Complex Experience of Touching Metallic, Damp, and Slimy Things.Mary Jean Amon & Luis H. Favela - 2015 - Theory and Psychology 25:543-545.
    The importance of touch to mammalian survival and well-being cannot be overstated. The capacity for action depends on the sense of touch, which is a necessary feature of an animal’s being-in-the-world (O’Shaughnessy, 1989, pp. 38–39). Interpersonal touch has been shown to be an important part of human welfare, including disease prevention and treatment (see Field, 2001 for review). Throughout a mammal’s lifespan, social relation- ships are also mediated by touch behavior (see Thayer, 1986 for review). Given these facts, the sense (...)
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  8. Review of Roy Sorensen's Seeing Dark Things. The Philosophy of Shadows[REVIEW]István Aranyosi - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):513-515.
  9. The Nature of Perception.Gavin Ardley - 1958 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 36 (December):189-200.
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  10. Perception And The Physical World.David M. Armstrong - 1961 - Humanities Press.
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  11. Handbook of Epistemology.Robert N. Audi - 2004 - Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.
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  12. Perception and Consciousness.Robert N. Audi - 2004 - In Ilkka Niiniluoto, Matti Sintonen & Jan Wolenski (eds.), Handbook of Epistemology. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic. pp. 57--108.
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  13. Is the Experience of Pain Transparent? Introspecting Phenomenal Qualities.Murat Aydede - 2017 - Synthese:1-32.
    I distinguish between two claims of transparency of experiences. One claim is weaker and supported by phenomenological evidence. This I call the Transparency Datum. Introspection of standard perceptual experiences as well as bodily sensations is consistent with, indeed supported by, the Transparency Datum. I formulate a stronger transparency thesis that is entailed by (strong) representationalism about experiential phenomenology. I point out some empirical consequences of strong transparency in the context of representationalism. I argue that pain experiences, as well as some (...)
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  14. Affect: Representationalists' Headache.Murat Aydede & Matthew Fulkerson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):175-198.
    Representationalism is the view that the phenomenal character of experiences is identical to their representational content of a certain sort. This view requires a strong transparency condition on phenomenally conscious experiences. We argue that affective qualities such as experienced pleasantness or unpleasantness are counter-examples to the transparency thesis and thus to the sort of representationalism that implies it.
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  15. McDowell and the Presentation of Pains.David Bain - 2009 - Philosophical Topics 37 (1):1-24.
    It can seem natural to say that, when in pain, we undergo experiences which present to us certain experience-dependent particulars, namely pains. As part of his wider approach to mind and world, John McDowell has elaborated an interesting but neglected version of this account of pain. Here I set out McDowell’s account at length, and place it in context. I argue that his subjectivist conception of the objects of pain experience is incompatible with his requirement that such experience be presentational, (...)
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  16. The Transcendental Nature of Mind and World.Bryan Baird - 2006 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (3):381-398.
    Critics of John McDowell’s Mind and World have by and large failed to take sufficient notice of the transcendental context within whichMcDowell situates his work—a failure that has adversely affected their criticisms. In this paper, I make clear this transcendental context and show how it figures in the transcendental argument I see McDowell offering in Mind and World. Interpreting McDowell’s argument in this way, I further argue, helps to answer some of the most pressing objections to what he is doing (...)
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  17. Reabilitarea fenomenologică a olfacţiei. Cu nările larg deschise. [REVIEW]Elena Baltuta - 2008 - Hermenia 8:95-97.
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  18. Review of Fiona Macpherson and Dimitris Platchias (Eds.), Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. [REVIEW]Clare Batty - 2015 - Notre Dame Philosophical Review.
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  19. Olfactory Objects.Clare Batty - 2014 - In S. Biggs, D. Stokes & M. Matthen (eds.), Perception and its Modalities. Oxford University Press. pp. 222-245.
    Much of the philosophical work on perception has focused on vision. Recently, however, philosophers have begun to correct this ‘tunnel vision’ by considering other modalities. Nevertheless, relatively little has been written about the chemical senses—olfaction and gustation. The focus of this paper is olfaction. In light of new physiological and psychophysical research on olfaction, I consider whether olfactory experience is object-based. In particular, I explore the claim that “odor objects” constitute sensory individuals. It isn’t obvious—at least at the outset—whether they (...)
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  20. The Illusion Confusion.Clare Batty - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5:1-11.
    In "What the Nose Doesn't Know", I argue that there are no olfactory illusions. Central to the traditional notions of illusion and hallucination is a notion of object-failure—the failure of an experience to represent particular objects. Because there are no presented objects in the case of olfactory experience, I argue that the traditional ways of categorizing non-veridical experience do not apply to the olfactory case. In their place, I propose a novel notion of non-veridical experience for the olfactory case. In (...)
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  21. Perception.Charles A. Baylis - 1966 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):117-122.
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  22. Professor Chisholm on Perceiving.Charles A. Baylis - 1959 - Journal of Philosophy 56 (September):773-790.
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  23. Marking the Perception–Cognition Boundary: The Criterion of Stimulus-Dependence.Jacob Beck - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-16.
    Philosophy, scientific psychology, and common sense all distinguish perception from cognition. While there is little agreement about how the perception–cognition boundary ought to be drawn, one prominent idea is that perceptual states are dependent on a stimulus, or stimulus-dependent, in a way that cognitive states are not. This paper seeks to develop this idea in a way that can accommodate two apparent counterexamples: hallucinations, which are prima facie perceptual yet stimulus-independent; and demonstrative thoughts, which are prima facie cognitive yet stimulus-dependent. (...)
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  24. The Perceptual System: A Philosophical and Psychological Perspective.Aaron Ben-Ze'ev - 1993 - New York: Lang.
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  25. The Dualistic Approach to Perception.Aaron Ben-Zeev & Michael Strauss - 1984 - Man and World 17 (1):3-18.
  26. Motor Imagery and Merleau-Pontyian Accounts of Skilled Action.J. C. Berendzen - 2014 - Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy 1:169-198.
    Maurice Merleau-Ponty is often interpreted as claiming that opportunities for action are directly present in perceptual experience. However, he does not provide much evidence for how or why this would occur, and one can doubt that this is an appropriate interpretation of his phenomenological descriptions. In particular, it could be argued the Merleau-Pontyian descriptions mistakenly attribute pre-perceptual or post-perceptual elements such as allocation of attention or judgment to the perceptual experience itself. This paper argues for the Merleau-Pontyian idea that opportunities (...)
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  27. Review of Modest Nonconceptualism: Epistemology, Phenomenology, and Content by Eva Schmidt. [REVIEW]Jacob Berger - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (4):600-606.
  28. Relationalism and Unconscious Perception.Jacob Berger & Bence Nanay - 2016 - Analysis 76 (4):426-433.
    Relationalism holds that perceptual experiences are relations between subjects and perceived objects. But much evidence suggests that perceptual states can be unconscious. We argue here that unconscious perception raises difficulties for relationalism. Relationalists would seem to have three options. First, they may deny that there is unconscious perception or question whether we have sufficient evidence to posit it. Second, they may allow for unconscious perception but deny that the relationalist analysis applies to it. Third, they may offer a relationalist explanation (...)
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  29. Is Low-Level Visual Experience Cognitively Penetrable?Dávid Bitter - 2014 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 9 (1):1-26.
    Philosophers and psychologists alike have argued recently that relatively abstract beliefs or cognitive categories like those regarding race can influence the perceptual experience of relatively low-level visual features like color or lightness. Some of the proposed best empirical evidence for this claim comes from a series of experiments in which White faces were consistently judged as lighter than equiluminant Black faces, even for racially ambiguous faces that were labeled ‘White’ as opposed to ‘Black’ (Levin and Banaji 2006). The latter result (...)
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  30. No Impediment to Solidity as Impediment.Stephan Blatti - 2006 - Metaphysica 7 (1):35-41.
    ABSTRACT: Quassim Cassam (1997) accepts the standard account of solidity, according to which, if S feels x as solid, then S feels x as an imediment to his movement. Recently, Martin Fricke and Paul Snowdon (2003) have presented a battery of counter-examples designed to show that S may feel x as solid and as exerting a pressure that supports or facilitates his movement. In this note, I defend the standard account against Fricke and Snowdon’s attack. Integral to this defense is (...)
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  31. The Status of Mental Images in Sartre's Theory of Consciousness.Philip Blosser - 1986 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):163-172.
    Sartre attacks the "illusion" that mental images are "immanent" in consciousness. After comparing sartre with husserl, I develop his view that mental images are non-Perceptual phenomena involving a relationship with something non-Present. From the impoverished, Unworldly view that results, I suggest that sartre's own view is still too attached to the perceptual analogy and conclude with the richer, Alternative view of ricoeur that imaginal fiction has a constructive role in shaping reality.
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  32. Attention and the Evolution of Intentional Communication.Ingar Brinck - 2001 - Pragmatics and Cognition 9 (2):259-277.
    Intentional communication is perceptually based and about attentional objects. Three attention mechanisms are distinguished: scanning, attention attraction, and attention-focusing. Attention-focusing directs the subject towards attentional objects. Attention-focusing is goal-governed (controlled by stimulus) or goal-intended (under the control of the subject). Attentional objects are perceptually categorised functional entities that emerge in the interaction between subjects and environment. Joint attention allows for focusing on the same attentional object simultaneously (mutual object-focused attention), provided that the subjects have focused on each other beforehand (subject-subject (...)
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  33. The Aesthetic Stance - on the Conditions and Consequences of Becoming a Beholder.Maria Brincker - 2015 - In Alfonsina Scarinzi (ed.), Aesthetics and the Embodied Mind: Beyond Art Theory and the Cartesian Mind-Body Dichotomy. Springer. pp. 117-138.
    What does it mean to be an aesthetic beholder? Is it different than simply being a perceiver? Most theories of aesthetic perception focus on 1) features of the perceived object and its presentation or 2) on psychological evaluative or emotional responses and intentions of perceiver and artist. In this chapter I propose that we need to look at the process of engaged perception itself, and further that this temporal process of be- coming a beholder must be understood in its embodied, (...)
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  34. Depiction, Pictorial Experience, and Vision Science.Robert Briscoe - 2016 - Philosophical Topics 44 (2):43-81.
    Pictures are 2D surfaces designed to elicit 3D-scene-representing experiences from their viewers. In this essay, I argue that philosophers have tended to underestimate the relevance of research in vision science to understanding the nature of pictorial experience. Both the deeply entrenched methodology of virtual psychophysics as well as empirical studies of pictorial space perception provide compelling support for the view that pictorial experience and seeing face-to-face are experiences of the same psychological, explanatory kind. I also show that an empirically informed (...)
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  35. Review of Christopher Gauker, Words and Images: An Essay on the Origin of Ideas, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. [REVIEW]Robert Briscoe - 2014 - Mind 123 (491):902-096.
  36. Time and Time Perception.Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia - 2015 - Topoi 34 (1):257-263.
    There is little doubt that we perceive the world as tensed—that is, as consisting of a past, present and future each with a different ontological status—and transient—that is, as involving a passage of time. We also have the ability to execute precisely timed behaviors that appear to depend upon making correct temporal judgments about which changes are truly present and which are not. A common claim made by scientists and philosophers is that our experiences of entities enduring through transient changes (...)
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  37. A Study in Deflated Acquaintance Knowledge: Sense-Datum Theory and Perceptual Constancy.Derek H. Brown - 2016 - In Sorin Costreie (ed.), Early Analytic Philosophy: New Perspectives on the Tradition. Springer. pp. 99-125.
    We perceive the objective world through a subjective perceptual veil. Various perceived properties, particularly “secondary qualities” like colours and tastes, are mind-dependent. Although mind-dependent, our knowledge of many facts about the perceptual veil is immediate and secure. These are well-known facets of sense-datum theory. My aim is to carve out a conception of sense-datum theory that does not require the immediate and secure knowledge of a wealth of facts about experienced sense-data (§1). Such a theory is of value on its (...)
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  38. Locke's Answer to Molyneux's Thought Experiment.Mike Bruno & Eric Mandelbaum - 2010 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 27 (2):165-80.
    Philosophical discussions of Molyneux's problem within contemporary philosophy of mind tend to characterize the problem as primarily concerned with the role innately known principles, amodal spatial concepts, and rational cognitive faculties play in our perceptual lives. Indeed, for broadly similar reasons, rationalists have generally advocated an affirmative answer, while empiricists have generally advocated a negative one, to the question Molyneux posed after presenting his famous thought experiment. This historical characterization of the dialectic, however, somewhat obscures the role Molyneux's problem has (...)
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  39. Perception.Tyler Burge - 2003 - International Journal of Psychoanalysis 84 (1):157-167.
    The article is an overview of some central philosophical problems associated with perception. It discusses what distinguishes perception from other sensory capacities and from conception. It discusses anti-individualism, a view according to which the nature of a perceptual state is dependent not just causally but for its identity or 'essence' on relations to a normal environment in which systems containing that state were formed. It discusses different views about epistemic warrant. By emphasising the deep ways in which human and animal (...)
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  40. Cartesian Error and the Objectivity of Perception.Tyler Burge - 1986 - In Philip Pettit & John McDowell (eds.), Subject, Thought, And Context. Clarendon Press.
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  41. Ecological Psychology in Context: James Gibson, Roger Barker, and the Legacy of William James's Radical Empiricism. [REVIEW]Tom Burke - 2004 - Newsletter of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy 32 (99):54-57.
  42. Nonconceptual Apprehension and the Reason-Giving Character of Perception.Arnon Cahen - forthcoming - Synthese:1-29.
    I argue that the debate about the reason-giving character of perception, and, derivatively, the contemporary debate about the nature of the conceptual content of perception, is best viewed as a confrontation with refined versions of the following three independently plausible, yet mutually inconsistent, propositions:Perceptual apprehension Some perceptions provide reasons directlyExclusivity Only beliefs provide reasons directlyBifurcation No perception is a belief I begin with an evaluation and refinement of each proposition so as to crystallize the source of the difficulties that dominate (...)
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  43. Experimental Phenomenology in Contemporary Perception Science.Carmelo Calì - 2008 - Teorie E Modelli 13 (1/2).
    Some issues heavily debated in perception sciences are presented: the explanatory gap and the experience measurement problem. The experimental phenomenology is said to provide substantive contribution to settle controversy over the phenome- nological adequacy of perception theory and models. An interpretation of experi- mental phenomenology as explanation of the perceptual manifold, and definition of relation varieties to eventually map onto other perception sciences’ domains is sketched.
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  44. Sfondo e figura.Roberto Casati & Achille C. Varzi - 2003 - Rivista di Estetica 43 (24):38-40.
    A dialogue between a figure and its background, illustrating that the perceptual conditions that determine which is which are not as clear as standard Gestalt theory dictates.
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  45. Naive Realism and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.Dan Cavedon-Taylor - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    Perceptual experience has representational content. My argument for this claim is an inference to the best explanation. The explanandum is cognitive penetration. In cognitive penetration, perceptual experiences are either causally influenced, or else are partially constituted, by mental states that are representational, including: mental imagery, beliefs, concepts and memories. If perceptual experiences have representational content, then there is a background condition for cognitive penetration that renders the phenomenon prima facie intelligible. Naïve realist or purely relational accounts of perception leave cognitive (...)
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  46. Perceptual Content and Sensorimotor Expectations.Dan Cavedon-Taylor - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):383-391.
    I distinguish between two kinds of sensorimotor expectations: agent- and object-active ones. Alva Noë's answer to the problem of how perception acquires volumetric content illicitly privileges agent-active expectations over object-active expectations, though the two are explanatorily on a par. Considerations which Noë draws upon concerning how organisms may ‘off-load’ internal processes onto the environment do not support his view that volumetric content depends on our embodiment; rather, they support a view of experience which is restrictive of the body's role in (...)
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  47. Cognitive Penetration, Perceptual Learning and Neural Plasticity.Ariel S. Cecchi - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (1):63-95.
    Cognitive penetration of perception, broadly understood, is the influence that the cognitive system has on a perceptual system. The paper shows a form of cognitive penetration in the visual system which I call ‘architectural’. Architectural cognitive penetration is the process whereby the behaviour or the structure of the perceptual system is influenced by the cognitive system, which consequently may have an impact on the content of the perceptual experience. I scrutinize a study in perceptual learning that provides empirical evidence that (...)
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  48. Imaginatively-Colored Perception.Alon Chasid - forthcoming - Southern Journal of Philosophy.
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  49. Pictorial Experience and Intentionalism.Alon Chasid - 2014 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 72 (4):405-416.
    This article examines the compatibility of intentionalism (also called ‘representationalism’) in the philosophy of perception with the thesis that we can visually experience an object by looking at a picture of that object (the pictorial experience thesis, or PET). I begin by presenting three theses associated with intentionalism and various accounts of depiction that uphold PET. Next, I show that pictures sometimes depict an object indeterminately, thereby rendering the alleged visual experience of the depicted object partly nonintentional. I then argue (...)
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  50. Attention, Fixation, and Change Blindness.Tony Cheng - 2017 - Philosophical Inquiries 5 (1):19-26.
    The topic of this paper is the complex interaction between attention, fixation, and one species of change blindness. The two main interpretations of the target phenomenon are the ‘blindness’ interpretation and the ‘inaccessibility’ interpretation. These correspond to the sparse view (Dennett 1991; Tye, 2007) and the rich view (Dretske 2007; Block, 2007a, 2007b) of visual consciousness respectively. Here I focus on the debate between Fred Dretske and Michael Tye. Section 1 describes the target phenomenon and the dialectics it entails. Section (...)
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