Philosophy of Physical Science

We formalize the notion of isolated objects, and we build a consistent theory to describe their evolution and interaction. We further introduce a notion of indistinguishability of distinct spacetime paths of a unit, for which the evolution of the state variables of the unit is the same, and a generalization of the equivalence principle based on indistinguishability. Under a time reversal condition on the whole set of indistinguishable paths of a unit, we show that the quantization of motion of spinless (...) elementary particles in a general potential field can be derived in this framework, in the limiting case of weak fields and low velocities. Extrapolating this approach to include weak relativistic effects, we explore possible experimental consequences. We conclude by suggesting a primitive ontology for the theory of isolated objects. (shrink)

We propose a new interpretation of the equation ????=????????² in special relativity by generalizing ideas of ontological emergence to fundamental physics. This allows us to propose that mass, as a property, can be considered to emerge from energy, using a well-known definition of weak ontological emergence. Einstein’s famous equation gains in this way a clearer philosophical interpretation, one that avoids the problems of previous attempts, and is fully consistent with the kinematic properties of special relativity, while yielding fresh insights concerning (...) the nature of mass. (shrink)

Occam’s razor – that is, the methodological principle of parsimony that advocates for the hypothesis with the fewest assumptions possible – is largely considered to be a sound epistemological practice. Indeed, it was and remains a valuable tool for scientific and philosophical inquiry. However, we argue that a too rigid application and, in some instances, an almost obsessive mandatory use, has frequently turned away from a reasonable and sound heuristic approach, making of it an unwarranted and ineffective epistemological method. Some (...) words of caution are necessary to clarify how, contrary to common belief, a too strict adherence to such a principle does not guarantee scientific rigor, rather it can obstruct further progress. (shrink)

The gravitational equations were derived in general relativity using the assumption of their covariance relative to arbitrary transformations of coordinates. It has been repeatedly expressed an opinion over the past century that such equality of all coordinate systems may not correspond to reality. Nevertheless, no actual verification of the necessity of this assumption has been made to date. The paper proposes a theory of gravity with a constraint, the degenerate variants of which are general relativity and the unimodular theory of (...) gravity. This constraint is interpreted from a physical point of view as a sufficient condition for the adiabaticity of the process of the evolution of the space–time metric. The original equations of the theory of gravity with the constraint are formulated. On this basis, a unified model of the evolution of the modern, early, and very early Universe is constructed that is consistent with the observational astronomical data but does not require the hypotheses of the existence of dark energy, dark matter or inflatons. It is claimed that: physical time is anisotropic, the gravitational field is the main source of energy of the Universe, the maximum global energy density in the Universe was 64 orders of magnitude smaller the Planckian one, and the entropy density is 18 orders of magnitude higher the value predicted by GR. The value of the relative density of neutrinos at the present time and the maximum temperature of matter in the early Universe are calculated. The wave equation of the gravitational field is formulated, its solution is found, and the nonstationary wave function of the very early Universe is constructed. It is shown that the birth of the Universe was random. (shrink)

A wide range of problems of the relationship between consciousness and matter are discussed. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of the structure and properties of consciousness in the framework of information evolution. The role of specific (non-computational) properties of consciousness in the procedure of classical and quantum measurements is analyzed. In particular, the issue of "cloning" of consciousness (the possibility of copying its properties onto a new material carrier) is discussed in detail. We hope that the generalized principle (...) of complementarity formulated by us will open up new ways for studying the problems of consciousness within the framework of the fundamental physical picture of the world. (shrink)

The earliest formulation of the Higgs naturalness argument has been criticized on the grounds that it relies on a particular cutoff-based regularization scheme. One response to this criticism has been to circumvent the worry by reformulating the naturalness argument in terms of a renormalized, regulator-independent parametrization. An alternative response is to deny that regulator dependence poses a problem for the naturalness argument, because nature itself furnishes a particular, physically correct regulator for any effective field theory in the form of that (...) EFT’s physical cutoff, together with an associated set of bare parameters that constitute the unique physically preferred “fundamental parameters” of the EFT. Here, I argue that both lines of defense against the initial worry about regulator dependence are flawed. I argue that reformulation of the naturalness argument in terms of renormalized parameters simply trades dependence on a particular regularization scheme for dependence on a particular renormalization scheme, and that one or another form of scheme dependence afflicts all formulations of the Higgs naturalness argument. Concerning the second response, I argue that the grounds for suspending the principle of regularization or renormalization scheme independence in favor of a physically preferred parametrization are thin; the assumption of a physically preferred parametrization, whether in the form of bare “fundamental parameters” or renormalized “physical parameters,” constitutes a theoretical idle wheel in generating the confirmed predictions of established EFTs, which are invariably scheme-independent. I highlight certain features of the alternative understanding of EFTs, and the EFT-based approach to understanding the foundations of QFT, that emerges when one abandons the assumption of a physically preferred parametrization. I explain how this understanding departs from several dogmas concerning the mathematical formulation and physical interpretation of EFTs in high-energy physics. (shrink)

We show that the exterior algebra bundle over a curved spacetime can be used as framework in which both the Dirac and the Einstein equations can be obtained. These equations and their coupling follow from the variational principle applied to a Lagrangian constructed from natural geometric invariants. We also briefly indicate how other forces can potentially be incorporated within this geometric framework.

The scientific community takes for granted a view of science that may be called standard empiricism. This holds that the basic intellectual aim of science is truth, nothing being presupposed about the truth, the basic method being to assess theories with respect to evidence. A basic tenet of the view is that science must not accept any thesis about the world as a part of scientific knowledge independent of evidence, let alone in violation of evidence. But physics only accepts unified (...) theories, and persistently rejects infinitely many ad hoc rivals that fit the phenomena even better. In persistently rejecting these infinitely many empirically more successful rival theories, physics thereby makes a substantial assumption about the universe – it is such that all ad hoc theories are false – an assumption that is accepted implicitly independently of evidence, even in a sense against the evidence. That contradicts standard empiricism. The scientific community needs to adopt a new conception of science that represents the assumption of physics as a hierarchy of assumptions, thus facilitating the improvement of the assumption that is made, as science proceeds. (shrink)

Current theories of massless free particle assume unitary space inversion and anti-unitary time reversal operators. In so doing robust classes of possible theories are discarded. In the present work theories of massless systems are derived through a strictly deductive development from the principle of relativistic invariance, so that a kind of space inversion or time reversal operator is ruled out only if it causes inconsistencies. As results, new classes of consistent theories for massless isolated systems are explicitly determined. On the (...) other hand, the approach determines definite constraints implied by the invariance principle; they were ignored by some past investigations that, as a consequence, turn out to be not consistent with the invariance principle. Also the problem of the localizability for massless systems is reconsidered within the new theoretical framework, obtaining a generalization and a deeper detailing of previous results. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to shed some fresh light on the long-standing conceptual question of the origin of the well-known Poisson bracket structure of the constraints that govern the canonical dynamics of generally relativistic field theories, i.e. geometrodynamics. This structure has long been known to be the same for a wide class of fields that inhabit the space-time, namely those with non-differential coupling to gravity. It has also been noticed that an identical bracket structure can be derived independently (...) of any dynamical theory, by purely geometrical considerations in Lorentzian geometry. Here we attempt to provide the missing link between the dynamics and geometry, which we understand to be the reason for this structure to be of the specific kind. We achieve this by a careful analysis of the geometrodynamical approach, which allows us to derive the structure in question and understand it as a consistency requirement for any such theory. In order to stay close to the classical literature on the subject we stick to the metric formulation of general relativity, but the reasoning should carry over to any other formulation as long as the non-metricity tensor vanishes. The discussion section is devoted to derive some interesting consequences of the presented result in the context of reconstructing the Arnowitt–Deser–Misner framework, thus providing a precise sense to the inevitability of the Einstein’s theory under minimal assumptions. (shrink)

We study a regularized version of Van Hove’s 1952 model, in which a quantum field interacts linearly with sources of finite width lying at fixed positions. We show that the central result of Van Hove’s 1952 paper on the foundations of Quantum Field Theory, the orthogonality between the spaces of state vectors which correspond to different values of the parameters of the theory, disappears when a well-defined model is considered. We comment on the implications of our results for the contemporary (...) relevance of Van Hove’s article. (shrink)

I assess various proposals for the source of the intuition that there is something problematic about contextuality, ultimately concluding that contextuality is best thought of in terms of fine-tuning. I then argue that as with other fine-tuning problems in quantum mechanics, this behaviour can be understood as a manifestation of teleological features of physics. Finally I discuss several formal mathematical frameworks that have been used to analyse contextuality and consider how their results should be interpreted by scientific realists. In the (...) course of this discussion I obtain several new mathematical results—I demonstrate that preparation contextuality is a form of fine-tuning, I show that measurement contextuality can be explained by appeal to a global constraint forbidding closed causal loops, and I demonstrate how negative probabilities can arise from a classical ontological model together with an epistemic restriction. (shrink)

A 2015 experiment by Hanson and Delft colleagues provided further confirmation that the quantum world violates the Bell inequalities, being the first Bell test to close two known experimental loopholes simultaneously. The experiment was also taken to provide new evidence of ‘spooky action at a distance’. Here we argue for caution about the latter claim. The Delft experiment relies on entanglement swapping, and our main claim is that this geometry introduces an additional loophole in the argument from violation of the (...) Bell inequalities to action at a distance: the apparent action at a distance may be an artifact of ‘collider bias’. In the absence of retrocausality, the sensitivity of such experiments to this ‘Collider Loophole’ depends on the temporal relation between the entanglement swapping measurement C and the two measurements A and B between which we seek to infer a causal connection. CL looms large if the C is in the future of A and B, but not if C is in the past. The Delft experiment itself is the intermediate case, in which the separation is spacelike. We argue that this leaves it vulnerable to CL, unable to establish conclusively that it avoids it. (shrink)

The proposal made 50 years ago by Schulman :1558–1569, 1968), Laidlaw and Morette-DeWitt :1375–1378, 1971) and Dowker to decompose the propagator according to the homotopy classes of paths was a major breakthrough: it showed how Feynman functional integrals opened a direct window on quantum properties of topological origin in the configuration space. This paper casts a critical look at the arguments brought by this series of papers and its numerous followers in an attempt to clarify the reason why the emergence (...) of the unitary linear representation of the first homotopy group is not only sufficient but also necessary. (shrink)

The question of what should be meant by a measurement is tackled from a mathematical perspective whose physical interpretation is that a measurement is a fundamental process via which a finite amount of classical information is produced. This translates into an algebraic and topological definition of measurement space that caters for the distinction between quantum and classical measurements and allows a notion of observer to be derived.

The electric field of an orbiting charge or electron observed in the rotating frame takes on a circular trajectory with a maximum radius of \. The resultant extended electromagnetic structure is used to derive the spin–orbit energy of the orbiting electron. A surprising result of the derived expression is that the orbital velocity has a specific value ) in close agreement ) with the experimentally determined value for the fine structure constant ). Furthermore, the derived spin–orbit expression does not include (...) a g-factor ) which means that the Larmor and Thomas precessions are equal and opposite, resulting in zero net precession in the lab frame. These results suggest that the quantised fine structure constant and by extension Planck’s constant, are a natural extension of classical electromagnetism and conservation of energy in a rotating frame. (shrink)

In QBism the wave function does not represent an element of physical reality external to the agent, but represent an agent’s personal probability assignments, reflecting his subjective degrees of belief about the future content of his experience. In this paper, I argue that this view of the wave function is not consistent with protective measurements. The argument does not rely on the realist assumption of the ψ-ontology theorems, namely the existence of the underlying ontic state of a quantum system.

In the past several years, observational entropy has been developed as both a quantum generalization of Boltzmann entropy, and as a rather general framework to encompass classical and quantum equilibrium and non-equilibrium coarse-grained entropy. In this paper we review the construction, interpretation, most important properties, and some applications of this framework. The treatment is self-contained and relatively pedagogical, aimed at a broad class of researchers.

A model of spontaneous collapse of fermionic degrees of freedom in a quantum field is presented which has the advantages that it explicitly maintains energy conservation and gives results in agreement with an existing numerical method for calculating quantum state evolution, namely the quantum trajectories model.

We continue to explore the consequences of Thermal Relativity Theory to the physics of black holes. The thermal analog of Lorentz transformations in the tangent space of the thermodynamic manifold are studied in connection to the Hawking evaporation of Schwarzschild black holes and one finds that there is no bound to the thermal analog of proper accelerations despite the maximal bound on the thermal analog of velocity given by the Planck temperature. The proper entropic infinitesimal interval corresponding to the Kerr–Newman (...) black hole involves a \ non-Hessian metric with diagonal and off-diagonal terms of the form \^2 = g_{ ab } d Z^a dZ^b\), where \ are the mass, charge and angular momentum, respectively. Since the computation of the scalar curvature associated to this metric is very elaborate, to simplify matters, we focused on the singularities of the metric and found that they correspond to the extremal Kerr–Newman black hole case \ with vanishing temperature. Black holes in asymptotically Anti de Sitter spacetimes are more subtle to study since the mass turns out to be related to the enthalpy rather that the internal energy. We finalize with some remarks about the thermal-relativistic analog of proper force, the need to extend our analysis of Gibbs-Boltzmann entropy to the case of Reny and Tsallis entropies, and to complexify spacetime. (shrink)

It was recently shown that the Madelung equations, that is, a hydrodynamic form of the Schrödinger equation, can be derived from a canonical ensemble of neural networks where the quantum phase was identified with the free energy of hidden variables. We consider instead a grand canonical ensemble of neural networks, by allowing an exchange of neurons with an auxiliary subsystem, to show that the free energy must also be multivalued. By imposing the multivaluedness condition on the free energy we derive (...) the Schrödinger equation with “Planck’s constant” determined by the chemical potential of hidden variables. This shows that quantum mechanics provides a correct statistical description of the dynamics of the grand canonical ensemble of neural networks at the learning equilibrium. We also discuss implications of the results for machine learning, fundamental physics and, in a more speculative way, evolutionary biology. (shrink)

The D-CTC condition, introduced by David Deutsch as a condition to be fulfilled by analogues for processes of quantum systems in the presence of closed timelike curves, is investigated for classical statistical bi-partite systems. It is shown that the D-CTC condition can generically be fulfilled in classical statistical systems, under very general, model-independent conditions. The central property used is the convexity and completeness of the state space that allows it to generalize Deutsch’s original proof for q-bit systems to more general (...) classes of statistically described systems. The results demonstrate that the D-CTC condition, or the conditions under which it can be fulfilled, is not characteristic of, or dependent on, the quantum nature of a bi-partite system. (shrink)

Beyond their conventional concepts as some outcome of the system dynamics, Patterns and their Formation are regarded here as some substantial parts in description of the dynamics and flow of information in systems. Approach to a typical geometrical problem, for instance, comprises some sequential steps where the observed information of the system is rearranged, reorganized and reformulated to reach the final result. An algebra is introduced here to begin a systematic framework for sequential approaches to geometrical problems. The type of (...) the objects suitable for different kinds of the problems, the way the objects successively match to get a more detailed description of the problem, and the summation operator which combines simultaneous segments of the information of the system are discussed. Based on such abstract clarification for the sequential description of systems, we then switch to reformulate practical examples in various fields from network dynamics to molecular decomposition, relativity and embryogenesis, and demonstrate how different sequential implementation of symmetry could lead to proper description for the dynamics in each of these examples. (shrink)

It is commonly argued that an undesirable feature of a theoretical or phenomenological model is that salient observables are sensitive to values of parameters in the model. But in what sense is it undesirable to have such ‘fine-tuning’ of observables? In this paper, we argue that the fine-tuning can be interpreted as a shortcoming of the explanatory capacity of the model: in particular it signals a lack of a particular type of explanatory depth. The aspect of depth that we probe (...) relates most closely to a lack of sensitivity to changes in parameters associated with such models. In support of this argument, we develop a schema—for models that arise broadly in physical settings—that quantitatively relates fine-tuning of observables to a lack of depth of explanations based on these models. We apply our schema in two different settings in which, within each setting, we compare the depth of two competing explanations. The first setting involves explanations for the Euclidean nature of spatial slices of the universe today: in particular, we compare an explanation provided by the big-bang model of the early 1970s with an explanation provided by a general model of cosmic inflation. The second setting has a more phenomenological character, where the goal is to infer from a limited sequence of data points, using maximum entropy techniques, the underlying probability distribution from which these data are drawn. In both of these settings we find that our analysis favors the model that intuitively provides the deeper explanation of the observable of interest. We thus provide an account that relates two ‘theoretical virtues’ of models used broadly in physical settings—namely, a lack of fine-tuning and explanatory depth—and argue that finely tuned models sacrifice explanatory depth. (shrink)

This paper presents an in-depth analysis of the anatomy of both thermodynamics and statistical mechanics, together with the relationships between their constituent parts. Based on this analysis, using the renormalization group and finite-size scaling, we give a definition of a large but finite system and argue that phase transitions are represented correctly, as incipient singularities in such systems. We describe the role of the thermodynamic limit. And we explore the implications of this picture of critical phenomena for the questions of (...) reduction and emergence. (shrink)

This chapter explores how science and technology studies (STS) have evolved over the past generation. It surveys the contrasting perspectives of philosophers, sociologists, scholars of the humanities, wider publics, and scientists themselves. It describes contrasting views about the practice and purpose for studying the history of science. -/- ISBN 978-1-85168-681-0.

Contemporary theoretical physics is divided into diversified theories of different phenomena. These are characteristically frameworks for giving mathematical descriptions of perceptions, in the absence of understandable explanations or a unified worldview. This is not an optimal state of affairs, for people by nature desire to understand; this sets a major obstacle for an optimal progress rate of physics, for understandable explanations are more prolific of new predictions and applications than non-understandable explanations. Disunification in physics can be remedied only by discovering (...) an understandable ontology and applying it as the basis of unifying explanations of phenomena that were earlier explained by different theories. Due to disunified physics and the nature of traditional analysis in philosophy, there is no consensus about central concepts such as time, possibility and truth. It is suggested that philosophical analysis would be more prolific of understandable and applicable concepts, were it complemented by a method of unification. (shrink)

Thought experiments provide a conspicuous case study for epistemologists of the imagination. Galileo’s famous thought experiment about falling stones is a central example in the debate about how thought experiments in science work. According to a standard interpretation, the thought experiment poses a challenge to an Aristotelian principle about falling bodies that conceives of bodies in an extremely liberal way. This chapter argues that this interpretation is implausible and then shows how the thought experiment might present a challenge to a (...) principle that conceives of bodies in a less permissive, more plausible way. The new interpretation of the thought experiment relies on a distinction between two ways of imagining Galileo’s experiment, one of which requires Aristotelians to temporarily ignore their belief in the principle under challenge. It is suggested that the distinction tracks an increasingly familiar distinction among dual-process theories in psychology: ‘intuitive’ and ‘reflective’ imagination. In order for Aristotelians to appreciate the thought experiment’s challenge to their theory, they are expected to use their intuitive imagination and not just their reflective imagination. (shrink)

We investigate in detail the electromagnetic fields of a uniformly accelerated charge, in order to ascertain whether such a charge does ‘emit’ radiation, especially in view of the Poynting flow computed at large distances and taken as an evidence of radiation emitted by the charge. In this context, certain important aspects of the fields need to be taken into account. First and foremost is the fact that in the case of a uniformly accelerated charge, one cannot ignore the velocity fields. (...) This then leads to other equally vital points. The net field energy turns out to be exactly the same as that of a non-accelerated charge having a uniform velocity equal to the instantaneous velocity of the uniformly accelerated charge. Further, the Poynting vector, seen with respect to the ’present’ location of the uniformly accelerated charge, during the deceleration phase, possesses everywhere a radial component pointing inward toward the charge, becoming nil when the charge becomes momentarily stationary, and during the acceleration phase, points away from the charge position. Last, but not least, when the leading spherical front of the relativistically beamed Poynting flux, advances forward at a large time t to a far-off distance \, the charge too is not lagging far behind. In fact, these relativistically beamed fields, increasingly resemble fields of a charge moving in an inertial frame with a uniform velocity \, with a convective flow of fields in that frame along with the movement of the charge. There is no other Poynting flow in the far-zones that could be termed as radiation emitted by the charge which, in turn, is fully consistent with the absence of radiation reaction and is also fully conversant with the strong principle of equivalence. (shrink)

The question of existence of reality beyond physical realm is an old question. This cannot be solved by science due to its nature and method of operation of science. Though some conclusions about it can be made logically and rationally. It has been showed that the claim made by materialists is equivalent to the one made by anthropocentric theists.

According to a popular narrative, in 1932 von Neumann introduced a theorem that intended to be a proof of the impossibility of hidden variables in quantum mechanics. However, the narrative goes, Bell later spotted a flaw that allegedly shows its irrelevance. Bell’s widely accepted criticism has been challenged by Bub and Dieks: they claim that the proof shows that viable hidden variables theories cannot be theories in Hilbert space. Bub’s and Dieks’ reassessment has been in turn challenged by Mermin and (...) Schack. Hereby I critically assess their reply, with the aim of bringing further clarification concerning the meaning, scope and relevance of von Neumann’s theorem. I show that despite Mermin and Schack’s response, Bub’s and Dieks’ reassessment is quite correct, and that this reading gets strongly reinforced when we carefully consider the connection between von Neumann’s proof and Gleason’s theorem. (shrink)