About this topic
Summary Philosophy of Psychiatry and Psychopathology occurs at the intersection of general philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, and ethics. It aims to develop answers to a set of theoretical and practical questions pertaining to the nature of mental disorders, mental health research, and practice.
Key works [BROKEN REFERENCE: RADDAEw]#MURPIT Radden 2004 Graham 2002 Fulford 2006 Poland 2011 Thornton 2007 Sadler 2004 Hacking 1995 Flanagan 1999 Schaffner 1993
Introductions Fulford & Sadler 2009 [BROKEN REFERENCE: NATTNPw]#MARPN
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  1. Postcolonialism and Psychiatry: On Hearing Voices and Ghostwriting.Sarah R. Kamens - forthcoming - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology.
  2. Achieving Cumulative Progress In Understanding Crime: Some Insights From the Philosophy of Science.Jacqueline Anne Sullivan - forthcoming - Psychology, Crime and Law.
    Crime is a serious social problem, but its causes are not exclusively social. There is growing consensus that explaining and preventing it requires interdisciplinary research efforts. Indeed, the landscape of contemporary criminology includes a variety of theoretical models that incorporate psychological, biological and sociological factors. These multi-disciplinary approaches, however, have yet to radically advance scientific understandings of crime and shed light on how to manage it. In this paper, using conceptual tools on offer in the philosophy of science in combination (...)
  3. Why Construing Theories of Depression as Lakatos' Research Programs Might Spell Trouble for Their Proponents.Dien Ho - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (4):305-307.
    In his "Let the drugs lead the way! On the unfolding of a research program in psychiatry," Shai Mulinari nicely lays out the evolution of theories of depression since the late 1950s; that is, understanding depression as ultimately a brain disorder centering on the functioning of monoamine neurotransmitters. Moreover, the emergence of various psychotropic drug treatments have provided researchers with a "pharmacological bridge" to gain a more precise understanding of depression by observing the effects of these drugs on patients' monoamines (...)
  4. Explaining Biological Depression Theories.Shai Mulinari - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (4):309-310.
    I am grateful to Dien Ho and James Phillips for their comments on my article. Although they approach the topic from different perspectives, they both seem to find my account of the evolution of monoamine theories into neuroplasticity theories to be compelling. They especially seem to find my principal argument to be persuasive: Until quite recently, the use of drugs to generate and test pathophysiological hypotheses—the pharmacological bridge—has been a paramount driving force in psychiatric research.In his thoughtful commentary, Phillips is (...)
  5. Let The Drugs Lead The Way! On the Unfolding of a Research Program in Psychiatry.Shai Mulinari - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (4):289-302.
    Recent years have witnessed an intensification of historical and philosophical research on the link between psychotropic drugs and psychiatric theories. For example, Kendler and Schaffner detailed how the dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia was intimately linked to the dopamine theory of antipsychotic drug action. Here, a related case is explored: the use of antidepressants' neurochemical effects to speculate about the pathophysiology of depression.This rationale was central to American psychiatrist Schildkraut's landmark article on the catecholamine hypothesis of affective disorders. Accordingly, the paper's (...)
  6. Explaining Depression.James Phillips - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (4):303-304.
    The author has reviewed the history of biological theories of depression with a fascinating account of how researchers have argued backward, starting with the neurochemical effects of antidepressants on the monoamine system in the brain, and ending with etiological theories that place the biological cause of depression in disturbances of the monoamine system. He explains how further work in biological etiology has followed the same backward path. In carrying out this task, he has done such an excellent job that I (...)
  7. Why Philosophy?Anastasia Philippa Scrutton - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (4):285-287.
    My thanks go to Marcia Webb and Warren Kinghorn for their thoughtful and stimulating commentaries, one drawing attention to clinical studies of religion and depression and neuroscientific studies of determinism and free will, and the other making a case for a theological rather than philosophical argument against Christian voluntarism. In combination, the commentaries raise an important question about what a philosophical approach might valuably bring to the topics surrounding this paper, Kinghorn's by raising an explicit challenge to this end and (...)
  8. Meeting Christian Voluntarism on its Own Terms.Warren Kinghorn - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (4):275-278.
    Anastasia Philippa Scrutton renders helpful service to philosophers and mental health clinicians by highlighting strongly voluntarist approaches to depression within some present-day Christian writers and communities, particularly Pentecostal and Evangelical Christian communities in the United States and the United Kingdom. Drawing on a number of evangelical Christian books and online resources, she argues that these resources are "voluntaristic because they emphasize the role of libertarian free will and choice in the attitudes and behaviors of people with depression, such that depression (...)
  9. Psychological Disadvantage and a Welfarist Approach to Psychiatry.Rebecca Roache & Julian Savulescu - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (4):245-259.
    There is an apparent epidemic of mental illness. At the end of 2011, untreated mental disorders accounted for 13% of the total global burden of disease, and for 25.3% and 33.5% of all years lived with a disability in low-and middle-income countries, respectively. Depression affects 350 million people globally and is the leading cause of disability. One in five U.S. adults takes psychiatric medication. One study found that by age 32, 50% of people surveyed qualified for an anxiety disorder, more (...)
  10. Is Depression A Sin? A Philosophical Examination Of Christian Voluntarism.Anastasia Philippa Scrutton - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (4):261-274.
    Christian interpretations of what psychiatry terms "depression" vary widely. Although liberal forms of Christianity regard depression as both a form of mental illness and a catalyst for moral and spiritual transformation, some Catholic theology regards some forms depression not as pathological but as a Dark Night of the Soul. Nonliberal Protestant forms of Christianity tend to view depression more as a sign of spiritual illness than spiritual health: an indication of demonic possession in some Charismatic and syncretistic/indigenous forms of Christianity, (...)
  11. Contextualism as a Solution to Paternalism in Psychiatric Practice.Natalia Washington - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (4):235-243.
    Self-knowledge is a difficult thing. Many have had the experience of knowing that a friend or partner is in a bad mood before she herself realizes it. Similarly, with mental illness it seems that a person may be sick without realizing it, or even while denying it outright. Anosognosia, the lack of awareness that one is mentally ill, is most visible in cases of dementia or brain damage, but recent insights in psychology have shown that healthy human beings too generally (...)
  12. Depression and Christian Voluntarism Examining Freedom From The Perspective of Psychological Science.Marcia Webb - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (4):279-283.
    In her article, "Is Depression Sin? A Philosophical Examination of Christian Voluntarism," Anastasia Phillippa Scrutton has offered a thoughtful contribution to the philosophical literature regarding depression and freedom of the will. Her analysis provides a careful and well-organized review of the position, prevalent in some Christian literature, that depression is within the individual's control and is thus a sin. She describes various components of this view, which she labels Christian voluntarism, and distinguishes it from more moderate versions of free will, (...)
  13. Melancholy as Disease: Learning About Depression as Disease From Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy.Jennifer Radden - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (4):225-234.
    Psychiatry has a habit of ignoring its past. This omission is understandable: Many earlier claims and findings are fundamentally incompatible with present day theory and practice. But in some instances, a mistake. Because mood disorders such as depression and anxiety are not yet fully understood and consistent, and fail-safe treatments for them remain elusive, it is premature to entirely disregard the long canon of writing about melancholy as disorder, however ostensibly implausible its claims to being medical science, and despite the (...)
  14. Ought-Onomy and Mental Health Ethics: From "Respect for Personal Autonomy" to "Preservation of Person-in-Community" in African Ethics.Samuel J. Ujewe - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (4):45-59.
    Those whom the gods wish to destroy, they first make mad, says a Nigerian proverb. These words of wisdom re-echo in traditional approaches to mental health ethics in sub-Saharan Africa. Among many cultures in Nigeria, it is customary to subject persons with mental health illness, especially those who present with violent behavior, to physical restraint and beatings. The belief is that such subjugation could restore mental health in the early stages of madness. Physical restraint and beatings only form a part (...)
  15. Deleuze e la psicologia. Per una scienza dell'ecceità. [REVIEW]Fabio Vergine - 2018 - Doppiozero 1.
    Discussione a partire dal libro di M. NICHTERLEIN e J. R. MORSS, Deleuze e la psicologia, a cura di Pietro Barbetta ed Enrico Valtellina, Raffaello Cortina, Milano 2017.
  16. Mindfulness and Personal Identity in the Western Cultural Context.Antoine Panaïoti - 2015 - Journal of Transcultural Psychiatry 4 (52):501-523.
    In the psychological sciences, mindfulness practices are increasingly being used, studied, and theorized, but their indigenous theoretical foundations in Buddhist accounts of the dynamics and psychology of personal identity tend to be overlooked. This situation is mirrored in the discipline of philosophy: here, Buddhist views on personal identity are beginning to draw attention, but almost invariably in a way which entirely blanks out the role of mindfulness practices in cultivating Buddhist insights on selfhood. The aggregate result is a failure, in (...)
  17. Phenomenological Approaches to Psychiatric Classification.Anthony Vincent Fernandez - forthcoming - In Giovanni Stanghellini, Matthew Broome, Anthony Vincent Fernandez, Paolo Fusar-Poli, Andrea Raballo & René Rosfort (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychopathology. Oxford, UK:
    In this chapter, I provide an overview of phenomenological approaches to psychiatric classification. My aim is to encourage and facilitate philosophical debate over the best ways to classify psychiatric disorders. First, I articulate phenomenological critiques of the dominant approach to classification and diagnosis—i.e., the operational approach employed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) and the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10). Second, I describe the type or typification approach to psychiatric classification, which I distinguish into three different (...)
  18. Personality Disorders and Thick Concepts.Konrad Banicki - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (3):209-221.
    'Cruel' simply ignores the supposed fact/value dichotomy and cheerfully allows itself to be used sometimes for a normative purpose and sometimes as a descriptive term.Personality disorders have always attracted considerable attention within the philosophy of psychiatry. It was not until two papers written by Louis Charland, however, that they simulated a wider and lively debate. The importance and, at least partly, the strength of Charland's analyses lie in the fact that they are relatively particular and focused in their...
  19. Why Does the Diagnosis of Schizophrenia Persist?Huw Green - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (3):197-207.
    The diagnosis of schizophrenia causes no end of contention. Controversial for almost as long as it has been classified, schizophrenia has been called "the sacred symbol of psychiatry", "the sublime object of psychiatry", and simply a "scientific delusion". Calls have been made to "reconstruct" schizophrenia, "reconceive" schizophrenia, and simply dispense with the term altogether.Meanwhile, high-profile psychiatrists promote the view that schizophrenia is a brain disease, although neither of these...
  20. Technical Delusions in Schizophrenia: A Philosophical Interpretation.Stefan Kristensen - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (3):173-181.
    Technical Delusions in Schizophrenia: productivity and Limits of an AnalogyIn the debates on psychosis, the cases of "technical delusions" or "influencing machines" are regularly coming back, both in phenomenological and psychoanalytical psychiatry. As Alfred Kraus points out in the 1990s, "Even if such delusions do not represent the most frequent content in schizophrenia, they receive relatively high consideration for the diagnosis of schizophrenia". And more recently, he notes that, "It is not by chance that people with schizophrenia so often use (...)
  21. Auditory Verbal Hallucination and the Sense of Ownership.Michelle Maiese - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (3):183-196.
    About 75% of subjects diagnosed with schizophrenia experience auditory-verbal hallucination and report "hearing voices" that are not actually present. One notable feature of AVH is that it seems involuntary and not directly in the subject's control. With regard to content, these represented voices make utterances, typically commands and evaluations, and either are directed to the patient or speak about her in the third person. Voices may echo the subject's thoughts or comment on the subject's behavior and, in some cases, the (...)
  22. Mirror Synesthesia and the Limits of Misidentification.Michael Young - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (3):169-172.
    In Possibilities of Misidentification, Ashwell contends that the immunity principle developed and defended in my Pathologies of Thought and First Person Authority "doesn't show us anything about introspection or the first person—which should make us wonder whether it really captures that's at stake in discussions of IEM". Ashwell's argument hinges on two claims: IP turns on features that are not unique to introspection, to the first person, or to "subject matter that is thought to have IEM", and IP does not (...)
  23. Possibilities of Misidentification.Lauren Ashwell - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (3):161-164.
    We seem to have a special, seemingly direct, relationship to our own thoughts that we do not have to the thoughts of others; I can become aware of my thoughts in a way that I cannot become aware of yours: through introspection. Those who have delusions of thought-insertion, however, claim not only to be aware of another's thoughts, but to have another's thoughts in their own mind. These thoughts, of course, cannot actually be someone else's thoughts. However, if we take (...)
  24. Privileged Access and the Agent in the Thought-Insertion.Clara S. Humpston - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (3):165-167.
    In his paper, Young has eloquently put forward a novel account of how and why the phenomenon of thought-insertion seen in patients with schizophrenia does not contradict the immunity principle. He argues that, in TI, the problem lies not in misidentification but in mispredication: the individual with TI does not ascribe the right predicate to the wrong subject, but has misdetected the predicate in the first place. The author points out that an inconsistently formulated immunity principle could risk confusing the (...)
  25. The Importance of Self-Narration in Recovery From Addiction.Doug McConnell & Anke Snoek - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (3):31-44.
    Addiction involves a chronic deficit in self-governance that treatment aims to restore. We draw on our interviews with addicted people to argue that addiction is, in part, a problem of self-narrative change. Over time, agents come to strongly identify with the aspects of their self-narratives that are consistently verified by others. When addiction self-narratives become established, they shape the addicted person’s experience, plans, and expectations so that pathways to recovery appear implausible and feel alien. Therefore, the agent may prefer to (...)
  26. Pathologies of Thought and First-Person Authority.Michael Young - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (3):151-159.
    Insofar as psychiatrists and neurologists tend to the cognitive well-being of others, their work is interwoven with philosophical concerns and theoretical assumptions about the nature of the mind, its myriad functions, and the conditions governing its multiform pathologies. That the mind figures so prominently in their ordinary language attests to the wealth of insights that stands to be gained through a dialogue with philosophy. In one of the earliest efforts to taxonomize psychiatric medicine, Allgemeine Psychopathologie, Jaspers incisively remarks that "the (...)
  27. Don’T Blame the Model: Reconsidering the Network Approach to Psychopathology.Laura F. Bringmann & Markus I. Eronen - 2018 - Psychological Review 125 (4):606-615.
    The network approach to psychopathology is becoming increasingly popular. The motivation for this approach is to provide a replacement for the problematic common cause perspective and the associated latent variable model, where symptoms are taken to be mere effects of a common cause (the disorder itself). The idea is that the latent variable model is plausible for medical diseases, but unrealistic for mental disorders, which should rather be conceptualized as networks of directly interacting symptoms. We argue that this rationale for (...)
  28. Moral Experience and the Unconscious.Steven Groarke - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (2):137-142.
    In a fascinating paper, where the stakes are a good deal higher than the modesty of its tone might suggest, Edward Harcourt requires us to think again about the ethics of psychoanalysis. We should not allow ourselves to be misled by Harcourt's tendency to downplay the ambitious reach of his argument. Indeed, Lacan demonstrated what is at stake here by drawing attention to the "originality of the Freudian position in ethical matters". Lacan may be relied on, more obviously than anyone (...)
  29. Madness, Badness and Immaturity: Some Conceptual Issues in Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy.Edward Harcourt - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (2):123-136.
    In the background of this paper lies the idea that the developmental thinking characteristic of psychoanalysis and, more broadly, psychodynamic psychotherapy is all of a piece with a philosophical tradition going back to Plato and Aristotle, which focuses on the connections between human nature, human excellence and the good life for human beings. That is, psychoanalysis is to be understood in part as belonging to a Platonic-Aristotelian tradition in moral philosophy, or to what has become known—unfortunately - as 'virtue ethics'.The (...)
  30. Psychoanalysis, the Good Life, and Human Development.Edward Harcourt - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (2):143-147.
    I am grateful to Steven Groarke for his thoughtful and thought-provoking comments. I think there are some real disagreements between us, but also some misunderstandings, so if I can clear up even the latter, that will be something.In my paper, I focused on the 'dual roles claim,' the claim that some concepts central to at least certain versions of psychoanalysis classify people in respect both of their degree of mental health and of their degree of psychological maturity. I argued that (...)
  31. Understanding Projective Identification.Louise Braddock - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (2):65-79.
    How exactly does a patient succeed in imposing a phantasy and its corresponding affect upon his analyst in order to deny it in himself is a most interesting problem… In the analytic situation, a peculiarity of communication[s] of this kind is that, at first sight, they do not seem as if they had been made by the patient at all. The analyst experiences the affect as being his own response to something. The effort involved is in differentiating the patient's contribution (...)
  32. You Can Get Here From There.Louise Braddock - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (2):89-94.
    This reply is only/largely to the first, main part of Leite's response to my paper. A reply to the second, which criticizes the use of the imagination in the account, has to be left aside for reasons of space. What more, following Wollheim, I have to say about the imagination and its relation to identification, can be found in Braddock.Originally, my paper was organized around the above title, my meaning being that, on the one hand, the paper showed how to (...)
  33. Psychoanalysis: Science of the Mind?Richard G. T. Gipps - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (2):113-118.
    In his paper on 'The Science of Psychoanalysis,' Lacewing helpfully distinguishes a central psychodynamic model of the mind, elaborated in the clinical theory of psychoanalysis, from certain of its metapsychological and etiological theories. Critics who view psychoanalysis as unscientific have tended to focus on the lack of evidential support for certain of its developmental claims or the lack of reliability and validity in its theoretical posits. Lacewing claims, however, that the model contained in the clinical theory is much more scientifically (...)
  34. Evidence, Inference and Causal Explanation in Psychoanalysis.Michael Lacewing - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (2):119-122.
    In my paper, 'The science of psychoanalysis,' I make two assumptions. First, I assume that a 'hermeneutic science' is not a contradiction in terms. Second, I assume that explanations of why someone behaved as they did in terms of motives are a form of causal explanation, and therefore that inferring what someone's motives are from their behavior is a form of causal inference. In his commentary, Gipps objects to both of these assumptions, and this gives me the opportunity to clarify (...)
  35. The Science of Psychoanalysis.Michael Lacewing - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (2):95-111.
    Can psychoanalysis take its place in the science that is psychology? I want, for now, to put aside the therapy, and ask about the theory, its evidence and generation. For at the heart of psychoanalysis as theory and therapy is a theory about the nature, development, and functioning of the human mind, especially in relation to motives. There are a number of features of this theory, in particular the role and nature of unconscious mental states and processes, that makes it (...)
  36. Projective Identification, Clinical Context, and Philosophical Elucidation.Adam Leite - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (2):81-87.
    The clinical concept of projective identification encompasses both unconscious fantasies of putting aspects of oneself into another person, as well as interpersonal processes aimed at evoking a corresponding response in another person, all for purposes of defensive evacuation, control and/or communication.1 In thinking about this complex situation, we need to consider its interpersonal dimensions as well as the intrapsychic processes that take place in each party. Louise Braddock's paper is thought provoking, far-reaching, and important in its use of concepts from (...)
  37. Searching for a Sign: Listening, Looking, Touching, Way-Finding.William Buse - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (2):13-29.
    This is an account of the psychotherapeutic treatment of a sign-maker. The treatment posed a special challenge owing to the patient's idiosyncratic blend of sexual, artistic, and spiritual interests, all of which informed his own notion of the sign/way-finding relationship. Way-finding came to connote more than its usual pedestrian meaning; it came to represent a spiritual quest and a personal exploration of the sacred. Conceptualizing this treatment, first for myself, then the patient, and now for you the reader, led me (...)
  38. Dialectical Virtue and the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis.Richard G. T. Gipps - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (2):61-63.
    Philosophical engagements with psychoanalysis have taken several forms. Some have offered a philosophical re-vision of psychoanalytical understandings of human nature. Thus, we have Boss, Binswanger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty offering us existential-phenomenological; Ricoeur hermeneutic; Lacan structuralist; and Heaton, Elder, and Fingarette Wittgensteinian, readings of unconscious life and of therapeutic action. Such philosophical elaborations of the most apt reflective and the most fruitful revisionary understanding of dynamic unconsciousness also involve parallel critique of such aspects of psychoanalytical psychology's immanent self-understanding as...
  39. Beyond Classificatory Realism: A Deflationary Perspective on Psychiatric Nosology.Georg Repnikov - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Sydney
    Classificatory realism is the view that nature divides herself up into classes, or “natural kinds”, and claims that it is the goal of scientific classification systems to correctly identify, name, and describe these classes. On this view, the legitimacy of a classification is independent of us and our needs, and instead depends entirely on how well the structure of the classification “matches” the natural kind structure of reality. Progress with respect to classification consists in finding classifications that better match reality. (...)
  40. The Making of DSM-III: A Diagnostic Manual’s Conquest of American Psychiatry by Hannah S. Decker. [REVIEW]Georg Repnikov - 2015 - Journal of the History of the Neurosciences 24:208-2011.
  41. Saving the Explananda.Georg Repnikov - 2017 - In Kenneth S. Kendler & Joseph Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry IV: Psychiatric Nosology. Oxford, UK: pp. 274-281.
    Do our diagnostic terms refer? If they do not, what implications does this have for our understanding of the practice of validation in psychiatry? These are the questions raised and addressed in the main part of John Campbell’s contribution to this volume, and the ones we will focus on in our reply. While we are sympathetic to Campbell’s contentions that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) style of validation needs reassessment, and that causality should play a more (...)
  42. Le concept de psychopathie est-il cohérent ? Bases cérébrales et responsabilité morale.Andreas Wilmes - 2014 - Psychiatrie, Sciences Humaines, Neurosciences 12 (1):31-49.
    Although many psychiatrists regard psychopathy as a coherent scientific construction, some clinicians and philosophers regard it as irrelevant. According to the latter, psychopathy is nothing more than a means of social control. The present study focuses on the issues of the neurological bases and moral responsibility related to psychopathy. While neuroscience aims to identify dysfunctions in psychopaths, action theory and ethics tend to vindicate the hypothesis of the moral irresponsibility of the psychopath. However, rather than reinforcing the concept of psychopathy, (...)
  43. Phenomenology, Mental Illness, and the Intersubjective Constitution of the Lifeworld.Anthony Vincent Fernandez - 2016 - In S. West Gurley & Geoffrey Pfeifer (eds.), Phenomenology and the Political. Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 199-214.
  44. A Consideration of Both Means and Ends: Values-Based Medicine and the Problem of Changing Values.Jonathan Epstein, Frances Griffiths & Jane Gunn - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (1):33-43.
    Perhaps nothing so radically changes one’s value perspective as psychosis. In a moving article, writer Mark Lukach describes his wife Giulia’s struggle with an illness presumed to be bipolar disorder. A woman with a “concrete life plan … to become a director of marketing at a fashion company and have three kids by the time she turned 35”, Gulia’s acute psychosis resulted in her ranting “unintelligible babble about heaven, hell, angels, and the devil”. For her husband, Gulia had become a (...)
  45. Acquired Brain Injury, Mental Illness, and the Subtleties of Competence Assessment.John McMillan - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (1):25-27.
    Owen, Freyenhagen, and Martin should be lauded for bringing the complexities of competence assessment and acquired brain injury to light. This discussion is often a difficult and vexed exercise for an array of conditions including ABI, and is usually a judgment that is critically important for determining whether or not a patient has the right to make their own decisions. There are a number of themes in their article that chime with ideas developed by Fulford about the nature of illness, (...)
  46. Authenticity, Insight and Impaired Decision-Making Capacity in Acquired Brain Injury.Gareth S. Owen, Fabian Freyenhagen & Wayne Martin - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (1):29-32.
    Thanks to Barton Palmer and John McMillan for these thoughtful commentaries. We found much to agree with and it is striking how so many of the issues relating to decision-making capacity assessment find resonances outside of an English jurisdiction. California and New Zealand are clearly grappling with a very similar set of issues and the commentaries speak to the international nature of these discussions.We will pick up on some main points the commentaries raise.As Palmer notes, DMC law is vulnerable to (...)
  47. Self-Knowledge in Psychotherapy: Adopting a Dual Perspective on One's Own Mental States.Derek Strijbos & Fleur Jongepier - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (1):45-58.
    The development of self-knowledge or self-insight is a well-recognized therapeutic factor in psychotherapy. In some way or other, all evidence-based therapies seek to reframe and enrich patients’ own understanding of themselves. In this article, we focus on self-knowledge with respect to mental states, in particular those states that cause patients to seek treatment.As an example, imagine a person who enrolls in psychotherapy because he finds himself unable to commit himself to intimate relationships. During the first session, he tells his therapist (...)
  48. 'Early Stage' Instrumental Irrationality: Lessons From Apathy.Annemarie Kalis & Stefan Kaiser - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (1):1-12.
    As we all know, people often do not do what would be the rational thing to do. Both psychologists and philosophers have long been interested in explaining this aspect of the human condition. Also, the relation between everyday irrationality and pathological breakdowns of rationality is a familiar topic of discussion in psychiatry. It is not merely the failures themselves that present interesting questions; there is also the hope that, by understanding when and why we violate rational norms, we might get (...)
  49. Assessing Decision-Making Capacity After Brain Injury: A Phenomenological Approach.Gareth S. Owen, Fabian Freyenhagen & Wayne Martin - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (1):1-19.
    Patients with acquired brain injury present special challenges in the assessment of decision-making capacity or “competence.” Herein, we are particularly concerned with the subset of patients with ABI who have suffered damage to the frontal lobe and acquired the clinical syndrome of “organic personality disorder” sometimes referred to as “the frontal lobe syndrome” and made famous by the case of Phineas Gage. Patients with OPD undergo significant alterations of the habitual patterns of premorbid behavior and the question often arises as (...)
  50. Executive Dysfunction as a Barrier to Authenticity in Decision Making.Barton W. Palmer - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (1):21-24.
    Owen, Freyenhagen, and Martin present a novel discussion of the meaning of decision-making capacity. They frame their discussion in the context of deficits in executive function after traumatic brain injury, but their observations and suggestions for expansion of how DMC is appropriately assessed have potential implications for people with other disorders that can potentially affect executive functioning, including those with certain forms of neurodegenerative conditions and some of those with serious mental illnesses such as schizophrenia or bipolar disorder....
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