Philosophy of Religion, General Works

The universe may disguise what is most precious and essential to us—what holds the key to unlocking the mysteries of love, life, and higher consciousness. The divine feminine is woven into the fabric of our existence like a thread of gold glittering through ever so slightly and holding firm the stitches of human genius. If we, as a species, were to honor, care for, and recognize this aspect, it could open the universe to a state of incredible completeness and harmony, (...) leading us toward a rebirth of virtue and a deeper understanding of what we are and what we could become. -/- Identifying the original forces that conspired to suppress the feminine and label it as weak, incapable, or unworthy of individual brilliance is challenging. Such suppression raises questions about the insecurities within the masculine that led to feelings of threat and fear and the compulsive desire to hinder the feminine from developing naturally. This hindrance has contributed to a world beset by poor leadership, doubt, war-mongering, and an inflated ego that continuously undermines itself. -/- I want to highlight two literary works that bring the divine feminine to the forefront: Clarissa Pinkola Estés’ Women Who Run with the Wolves (1996) and the portrayal of archetypes such as Mary Magdalene, also presented as Miryam the Migdalah in The Gospel of the Beloved Companion (2011), translated by Jehanne De Quillan. I will explore the intuitive feminine, which has been dismissed throughout history as an obstruction to development, suppressed to the point of near extinction. The failure to embrace feminine manifestations has resulted in a world unbalanced in values and insights where now we find ourselves yearning for meaning, care, and purpose. -/- In our pursuit of progress, we have often exploited our planet and lost touch with our inherent intuitive powers. This oppression has led to a narrow understanding of reality and confusion as we navigate through states of paranoia and uncertainty. We must first recognize the value of what we have lost and admit to the mistakes that have been made. It is essential for us to unite and rekindle the feminine fire, allowing it to warm and guide us out of the shadows. (shrink)

Abstract: With all the obstacles and challenges it has suffered, the modern religion is an integral part of our society. Are the religions and the new technical developments in any form of reasonable harmony? There is nothing greater than infinity, nothing more mysterious than the infinite space or time, and nothing more mysterious than the Creator. In this way, it seems that there is a symbolic correlation connecting the concept of infinity and the transcendental vision of the mighty Creator. Is (...) the God’s inspired word from a sacred book vulnerable to the “deconstruction” prejudice so elegantly exposed by Jacques Derrida? These are some topics this essay tries to consider. Feedback: [email protected]. (shrink)

It is evident from studies of Proverbs that the book has a number of authors and was compiled over an extended period of time. Bible scholars differ in their opinions concerning the authorship and date of compilation of the book. There are a number of critics who believe that references to the names of some authors of Proverbs are symbolic. There are others who believe that the final compilation date of the book was around the 2nd century B.C. On the (...) other hand, there are those who believe that the names of the authors in question are literal and denote actual persons who really existed. There are also some who refute the 2nd century date of final compilation and instead advocate a final compilation date of around the 7th century B.C. Evidence would favour literal names for the authors in question and an earlier final compilation date of around 7th century B.C as opposed to symbolic names and final compilation date of the 2nd century. It is the purpose of this paper to present evidence to support literal names and final compilation date in the 7th century. (shrink)

A short book meant to take honest and determined seekers to the Ultimate Truth.The reality about (our) ‘presence’ is that it is the becoming of the Ultimate Truth it self. -/- .

Contents: - positioning Pound’s contributions to theory – aesthetic organicism - Emerson, Pound, and the aim of language - Confucian philosophy and Pound’s tradition.

Anti-intellectualism involves general mistrust of scholars, academics, and ex- perts, often as pretentious or power-motivated. While scholars have described currents of anti-intellectualism in American public life, evangelical Christianity, in responses to COVID, and rural identity, to my knowledge none have looked at how anti-intellectualism specifically manifests in the New Atheism movement. In this work, we explore the way anti-intellectualism is commonly found and expressed in New Atheism and the modern Skeptical Movement, including scientific skepticism more generally.

على الأرجح لا يوجد إله ... الآن، دع القلق واستمتع بالحياة ... إنه شعار الملحدين الجُدد! لا أعني بذلك أولئك الرويبضات الذين يُظهرون غير ما يبطنون، ويتخذون من تطورات العلم وقشور الفلسفة أداةً براقة لجذب الشباب وإغوائهم بالإلحاد، ويعمدون إلى الصلاة في معابد الشيطان من أجل النفس التواقة إلى إشباع شهواتها بغير ضابط ولا رابط. هؤلاء تجدهم وأتباعهم في الغرب إفرازًا طبيعيًا للخواء الروحي وهيمنة رأس المال، وتجدهم ومريديهم في الشرق نبتًا عفنًا للاستبداد السياسي والتفسخ الاجتماعي والمظهرية الحضارية الكاذبة بكافة (...) أشكالها، لاسيما الدينية منها! إنما أعنى بالأحرى نفرًا من الفلاسفة والعلماء الذين يُشكلون منذ سنة 2006 تقريبًا ما اصطلح على تسميتها «النزعة الإلحادية الجديدة»، من أمثال البيولوجي الإنجليزي «كلينتون ريتشارد داوكينز»، والفيلسوف وعالم الأعصاب الأمريكي «صمويل بنيامين سام هاريس»، والصحافي والكاتب والناقد الديني الأمريكي «كريستوفر إريك هيتشنز»، وفيلسوف العلم الأمريكي، وقد سُمي هؤلاء الأربعة «الفرسان الأربعة» (في مقابل فرسان رؤيا يوحنا الأربعة في الكتاب المقدس المسيحي)، بعد لقائهم في الثلاثين من سبتمبر سنة 2007 في مقر إقامة «هيتشنز» في العاصمة الأمريكية واشنطن. فما هذه النزعة؟ وما أهم أفكارها؟ . (shrink)

Epicurus asked: “Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil? Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?” This Socratic dialogue explores a popular version of the Argument From Evil. Suitable as an introduction to the topic.

Abstract: Under traditional Jewish Law (halacha), assessment of human reproductive cloning (HRC) has been formulated along four lines of inquiry, which I discussed in Part I of this paper. Therein I also analyze five relevant doctrines of Talmudic Law, concluding that under with a risk-benefit analysis HRC fails to fulfill the obligation ‘to be fruitful and multiply’ and should be strictly prohibited. Here, I review of the topic from an exigetical Biblical and Kabbalistic perspective, beginning with exploring comments of the (...) Ramban (Nachmanides) which suggest Kabbalistic insights very much in keeping with current biology. In this Part II of the paper, I expand and annotate statements of the Ramban on the interrelationship of the reproductive faculties of an organism and its soul by examining the development of the spiritual states of plant, animal and human and noting the commensurate evolution with its reproductive facilities. Speculating that the reproductive mechanism of each species is indelibly related to its soul-state, I suggest that interfering with human sexual reproduction by HRC has the same effect the Ramban argues is the result of Kilayim (interbreeding), i.e., wrecking havoc with the Universe. In Part III, I postulate a biologic explanation for warnings found in the Golemic Literature and suggest that these allude to the importance of maintaining human genetic diversity through sexual reproduction. The conclusions I reached after evaluating the propriety of HRC under a Kabbalistic/metaphysical index comports with those I reached using a traditional legal /halachic inquiry in Part I. Thus, both systems arrive at the conclusion that HRC is in violation of the divine and natural order and constitute a distinct biological threat to the survival of the human species, a conclusions in accord with current scientific thinking. (shrink)

In his article ‘Divine Hiddenness and the Demographics of Theism’ Stephen Maitzen (2006) develops a permutation of the argument from divine hiddenness which focuses on the uneven distribution of theistic belief around the globe. Max Baker-Hytch (2016) responds to this argument by providing a theodicy which appeals to the fact that humans are epistemically interdependent. In this article I argue that Baker-Hytch's response is at best incomplete and at worst relies on a faulty modal judgement. After exploring some ways Baker-Hytch (...) might salvage his theodicy and maintaining their failure, I conclude with the success of Maitzen's argument. (shrink)

I begin by retracing an argument from Aristotle for final causes in science. Then, I advance this ancient thought, and defend an argument for a stronger conclusion: that no scientific explanation can succeed, if Naturalism is true. The argument goes like this: (1) Any scientific explanation can be successful only if it crucially involves a natural regularity. Next, I argue that (2) any explanation can be successful only if it crucially involves no element that calls out for explanation but lacks (...) one. From (1) and (2) it follows that (3) a scientific explanation can be successful only if it crucially involves a natural regularity, and this regularity does not call out for explanation while lacking one. I then argue that (4) if Naturalism is true, then all natural regularities call out for explanation but lack them. From (3) and (4) it follows that (5) if Naturalism is true, then no scientific explanation can be successful. If you believe that scientific explanation can be (indeed, often has been) successful, as I do, then this is a reason to reject Naturalism. (shrink)

It is commonly argued that the fact that our universe is fine-tuned for life favors both a design hypothesis as well as a non-teleological multiverse hypothesis. The claim that the fine-tuning of this universe supports a non-teleological multiverse hypothesis has been forcefully challenged however by Ian Hacking and Roger White. In this paper we take this challenge even further by arguing that if it succeeds, then not only does the fine-tuning of this universe fail to support a multiverse hypothesis, but (...) it tends to favor a single-universe hypothesis instead. (shrink)

Throughout history, humans have sought spiritual experiences to find meaning, solace, or answers to life’s complexities. In religious settings, particularly in charismatic gatherings, phenomena such as people falling to the ground, rolling over, or convulsing after being touched or waved at by religious figures have been reported across many traditions. While believers may interpret these occurrences as signs of divine intervention, the underlying reasons behind these phenomena could be deeply rooted in psychological, neurological, and social factors.

In recent years, several prominent authors have criticized fine-tuning arguments for failing to show that the universe’s purported fine-tuning for intelligent life calls for explanation. In this paper, I provide a systematic categorization and a detailed evaluation of the proffered critiques. I argue that these critiques cast doubt on various instances of fine-tuning reasoning, but fail to undermine fine-tuning arguments’ conclusion that the universe’s purported fine-tuning for intelligent life can be justifiably taken to call for explanation. I then explicate the (...) implications of this result for the ongoing philosophical debate concerning the merits of fine-tuning arguments and the conditions under which specific events or states of affairs are justifiably taken to call for explanation. (shrink)

The style, tone and tenor of the New Testament writers are unique and exceptional. Jesus of Nazareth, Hebraic roots, Old Testament literature, oral tradition, Hellenistic influence, Roman governance, 1st century socio-politics, and multifarious linguistic elements combined to immortalize their literary records and make them indelible in the minds of contemplative readers. This book acknowledges previous work and seeks to connect the thoughts gleaned from them to seminal ideas that have their locus in the inquiry of how language can influence thought (...) and vice-versa. The information has been sourced from the fields of religion, biblical studies, linguistics, English literature, grammar learning, geo-politics, philology, psychology, philosophy, and artificial intelligence as they have to do with thought, language, and society. The carefully quoted and paraphrased opinions of writers from the related disciplines since the fourth century BCE are presented here. However, the volume reflects the very marked influence of 20th century thinkers who have had the benefit of perusing the work of their predecessors and 21st century pioneers who have at their disposal ultra-modern technology, computing power, and easy access to a global community to which the ideas may be applied for comparative analysis. (shrink)

That something may be ‘present’ or ‘located’ at or in every place is a view that many thinkers, past and present, have held. Typically omnipresence is thought to be a divine attribute, but the question as to how some thing can be omnipresent has not been historically confined to the status of a divine being. This book offers an insight into historical accounts of omnipresence and its developments in Ancient, Medieval, Modern, and Contemporary thought. It further widens the study of (...) omnipresence by including less widely studied strand of thought on this topic from mystical, process theological, feminist theological, and phenomenological perspectives. Additionally, whilst the study of omnipresence has typically focused on Christian thinkers, the volume broadens the range of voices on this attribute further, through including Jewish, Islamic, Buddhist, Sanskrit, and Donghak accounts. The volume also includes chapters outlying different views of location, of interest for but also beyond our understanding of omnipresence. Overall, the Handbook provides an introduction to the main facets of omnipresence, both historical and contemporary, and opens up new avenues for research that are yet to be fully explored. (shrink)

McNabb and Baldwin have recently argued that Classical Theism and Buddhism can be rendered in a logically consistent way. That is, one could theoretically endorse the theses of Classical Theism and the metaphysical theses of what they call mere Buddhism. One criticism of their project goes like this: McNabb and Baldwin’s project, typical to analytic philosophy, is ahistorical. While McNabb and Baldwin’s argument might go through with respect to some very generalized form of Buddhism, McNabb and Baldwin don’t show that (...) actual Buddhists who belong to robust Buddhist traditions can adhere to theism. In this paper, I put forward the hypothesis that the Shentong tradition shows promise as an actual Buddhist tradition that is consistent with Classical Theism. (shrink)

The research has three objectives: 1) to study the concept of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, 2) to study the concept of reality and knowledge in Buddhist philosophy, and 3) to analyze the concept of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle in Buddhist philosophical perspective. This is documentary research. In this research, it was found that Heisenberg's uncertainty principle refers to the experiment of thought while studying physical reality on smaller particles than atoms where at the present no theory of Physics can clearly explain such (...) properties. In this respect, the mentioned principle is utilized to predict the pairs of a certain attribute of physics, position, and momentum, for instance. The accuracy of position, however, cannot be precisely yielded in advance by such a principle. In other words, it is impossible to measure the position and momentum of a quantum particle at the same time. In the study of the ultimate reality on the matter in the Buddhist philosophy, it showed that corporeality in nature is conditioned by cause and effect and thereby falling under the three common characteristics: 1) impermanence, 2) state of suffering, and 3) state of non-substantiality. In the study of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle in the Buddhist philosophical perspective, this research was found that the processes in acquiring certain knowledge of Heisenberg and Buddhist philosophy are by one another in the sense that such knowledge is methodologically acquired through experience, rationality, and intuition because both see the Reality in the same manners, that is, the physical reality is viewed by Heisenberg as the thing that goes under changing state of wave-particle all the times, and the matter is seen by Buddhist philosophy as the impermanence and change depending upon its factors involved and thereby is not-self. However, in the different aspect, on the one hand, Buddhist philosophy utilizes the knowledge on the matter to develop the morality and ethics by which the cessation of suffering could be respectively made, but on the other hand, Heisenberg somehow applies the certain knowledge on physical objects into quantum technology to accommodate the physical comfortability in living life. Suggestions in the application of knowledge gained from this research into benefit were that while Buddhist philosophy can make use of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle to provide certain help at the time of explanation of three common characteristics being done through the scientific method, science also can utilize knowledge gained from Buddhist philosophy to expand the framework of scientific knowledge which is aimed at studying only the physical objects to be able to study the mental objects through the integration of three epistemological methods as well. (shrink)

Moralising accounts of depression include the idea that depression is a sin or the result of sin, and/or that it is the result of demonic possession which has occurred because of moral or spiritual failure. Increasingly some Christian communities, understandably concerned about the debilitating effects these views have on people with depression, have adopted secular folk psychiatry’s ‘medicalising’ campaign, emphasising that depression is an illness for which, like (so-called) physical illnesses, experients should not be held responsible. This paper argues that (...) both moralising and medicalising models of depression are intellectually and practically (pastorally and therapeutically) problematic, gesturing towards more promising emphases. (shrink)

Paul Draper argues that given theism we should not expect the amount of pain and suffering we observe in the world. And since the prevalence of such evils is not surprising from a non-theistic perspective, we should reject the theistic hypothesis. But not all surprising observations are necessarily a demerit when it comes to the assessment of a given theoretical perspective. I propose that on Christian theism the prevalence of evil is a surprising feature that contributes to the overall aesthetic (...) merit of the theistic hypothesis. This element of surprise in the world, when considered as a divine drama, sets the stage for an even more surprising dramatic upswing where the work of God solves the central narrative riddle of human history, namely evil and how it can be conquered. (shrink)

The once popular thesis that non-Christians who are inculpably ignorant of the gospel can be saved through ‘implicit faith’ in Christ has fallen on hard times. In this paper, we consider objections raised against this position by a range of Catholic critics including Thomas Crean, Augustine DiNoia, Gavin D’Costa, and Stephen Bullivant. In our judgment, criticisms of ‘implicit faith’ often suffer from a lack of clarity about the nature of such faith, although admittedly this ambiguity was present even in original (...) Scholastic uses of the term. However, in the past few decades analytic philosophers have explored many forms of belief which one might call ‘implicit’. Accordingly, we draw on both Scholastic and analytic epistemology to arrive at a more attractive characterisation of implicit faith. We argue that once implicit faith is understood in this way, recent objections to the claim that non-Christians can be saved through implicit faith are soluble. `. (shrink)

The problem of religious disagreement between epistemic peers is a potential threat to the epistemic justification of one’s theistic belief. In this paper, I develop a response to this problem which draws on the central epistemological thesis of skeptical theism concerning our inability to make proper judgements about God’s reasons for permitting evil. I suggest that this thesis may extend over to our judgements about God’s reasons for self-revealing, and that when it does so, it can enable theists to remain (...) steadfast amid disagreement with epistemic peers who hold a contrary theistic belief (i.e., atheistic belief). For if we’re unable to make proper judgements about God’s reasons for self-revealing, then for all we know, God has some reason for not revealing Himself to our apparent epistemic peer. Thus, their epistemic credentials needn’t provide reason to reduce one’s confidence to such a degree as to no longer uphold one’s theistic belief. (shrink)

In this essay, I challenge the traditional understanding of resurrection as a one-time event, proposing instead that it is a dynamic and transformative process initiated by Christ’s resurrection. This process is captured in Romans 5:10, highlighting reconciliation and salvation through Christ’s sacrifice, and evolves into an ongoing transformation within the "already but not yet" Kingdom of God. This perspective encourages believers to view the resurrection as an active, continuous participation in God's unfolding work, fostering hope and engagement with our faith (...) as we anticipate the full realization of God's Kingdom. (shrink)

In this essay, I challenge the traditional understanding of resurrection as a one-time event, proposing instead that it is a dynamic and transformative process initiated by Christ’s resurrection. This process is captured in Romans 5:10, highlighting reconciliation and salvation through Christ’s sacrifice, and evolves into an ongoing transformation within the "already but not yet" Kingdom of God. This perspective encourages believers to view the resurrection as an active, continuous participation in God's unfolding work, fostering hope and engagement with our faith (...) as we anticipate the full realization of God's Kingdom. (shrink)

This paper discusses the project of a globalised philosophy of religion as proposed recently by Yujin Nagasawa, Victoria Harrison, and others. While this project is a laudable attempt to overcome the strict focus on theistic forms of religion in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion, it is argued that current proposals for a globalised philosophy of religion have ignored the important role of theism for giving the discipline its structure. Therefore, any viable global approach to philosophy of religion needs to delineate (...) a concept of religion that doesn’t draw on the concept of a theistic god. The paper argues that the best choice for this is a cluster concept of religion so that, even if the phenomena covered by the term ‘religion’ have no common core, the term isn’t meaningless, and philosophy of religion can still be a meaningful academic project. (shrink)

Kant’s rational religion has been described as a failure because his idea of redemption contains contradictory appeals to human responsibility and divine assistance. For example, John Hare has argued that Kant cannot explain how human beings can bridge a moral gap between an ideal state of virtue and an imperfect disposition. In this paper, I defend Kant from this criticism, arguing that his rational religion is coherent: human agency and divine assistance may each contribute to redemption without inconsistency. I argue (...) that divine grace may be operative for Kant through the gradual process of character formation, in addition to the instantaneous change of heart, providing an alternative explanation of how the moral gap may be bridged. I compare this account with Erasmus’s account of free will and divine grace, arguing that each account employs a similar strategy and structure to explain the operation of grace. Though Kant’s position is not identical with historical (orthodox) Christianity, he holds that reason is necessarily religious in orientation and must remain open to the possibility that divine grace is necessary for moral improvement. (shrink)

This book is a fascinating exploration of how God speaks to humanity and how Muslims engage with Divine discourse. Produced by the International Foundation for Muslim Theology (IFMT), this multi-disciplinary volume brings together Muslim scholars from diverse backgrounds to examine revelation, prophethood, and the role of angels as mediators of Divine self-disclosure. More than an abstract theological discussion, this book is the first in a planned series aimed at reinvigorating ‘God-talk’ among Muslims—both academics and laypeople—by grounding theological inquiry in the (...) lived reality of faith. With a focus on Islam’s six principles of belief, the IFMT’s “God-talk project” addresses the challenges of secularization and the marginalization of theology in both academia and daily life. Divine Revelation and Communication marks a vital first step in reviving Muslim theology as a meaningful, dynamic discourse that speaks to the spiritual and existential concerns of modern believers. (shrink)

This chapter makes the case for a new way of doing natural theology, which sets its sight on a more religiously interesting form of theistic belief than traditional approaches to natural theology.

The main question of this study is whether God has a personality. We show what the question means, why it matters, and that good sense can be made of an affirmative answer to it. A God with personality — complete with particular, sometimes peculiar, and even seemingly unexplainable druthers — is not at war with maximal perfection, nor is the idea irredeemably anthropomorphic. And the hypothesis of divine personality is fruitful, with substantive consequences that span philosophical theology. But problems arise (...) here too, and new perspectives on inquiry itself. Our cosmos is blessed with weirdness aplenty. To come to know it is nothing less than to encounter a strange and untamed God. (shrink)

This article examines the subtle interconnection between the sanctity of life and individual autonomy within the context of assisted dying, as seen through the lens of Orthodox Christianity. It seeks to unravel the complex theological, ethical, and pastoral considerations that inform the Orthodox stance on end-of-life issues, particularly the nuanced understanding of suffering, death, and the redemptive potential encapsulated within them. Orthodox theology, with its profound veneration for life as a divine gift, offers a counter-narrative to contemporary discourses that often (...) prioritize personal autonomy and the alleviation of suffering above all. This tradition emphasizes the transformative power of suffering when united with Christ’s own redemptive suffering, proposing a vision of end-of-life care that is rooted in compassion, dignity, and hope for resurrection. The exploration begins with a historical and theological examination of the Orthodox perspective on life’s sanctity, engaging with the teachings of Church Fathers and contemporary theological and bioethical discussions. It highlights the foundational concepts of Orthodox anthropology, which perceives human beings as an indivisible unity of body and soul, reflecting the imago Dei. This anthropological understanding challenges reductionist views of human existence and informs the Orthodox approach to medical ethics, palliative care, and the spiritual accompaniment of the dying. By critically evaluating arguments for and against assisted dying, the article presents a balanced discourse that respects the depth of individual suffering while upholding the intrinsic value of life. It argues that Orthodox Christianity, through its rich theological heritage and pastoral practice, provides a compassionate and ethically nuanced framework for navigating the moral complexities of assisted dying. This framework advocates for an end-of-life care that honors the fullness of the human person, supports the spiritual journey toward eternal life, and fosters a communal embrace of life’s sacred threshold, offering a dignified passage that aligns with the faith’s deepest convictions about human destiny and divine grace. (shrink)

Contemporary scholarship is divided over whether Anselm maintains a version of Eudaemonism. The debate centers on the question of whether the will for justice only moderates the will for happiness or, instead, provides a distinct end for which to act. Because of two key passages, various scholars hold that Anselm maintained elements of medieval Eudaemonism. In this article, I argue that Anselm separates morality from happiness, and I provide a sketch of his alternative view. First, I argue against some recent (...) perspectives that Anselm maintained Eudaemonism. To do so, I provide a non-Eudaemonist reading of the two key passages and show how Eudaemonist readings are lacking in different respects. Second, I examine what this argument means for Anselm’s understanding of happiness and moral obligation. While there are some Eudaemonist themes in Anselm’s thinking, he flatly denies and revises aspects of the system. (shrink)

[ Selected abstract text only ] Can philosophy of religion enter the globalised, twenty-first-century world? If so, how? These questions arose from the Global-Critical Philosophy of Religion project and served as a springboard for Loewen and Rostalska as they present potential answers in this engaging and wide-reaching volume. Organised into two sections, ‘Critiques and Methods’ and ‘Case Studies’, contributing authors from across the globe (experts both within and outside philosophy of religion) present their views on how to diversify the field. (...) One of the recurring themes across much of the first section is that of postcolonialism, namely how it is possible to ‘comprehend religion in a global way, if by “global” we mean “total”’, since it seems clear ‘[a]ny such “total” philosophy will have been produced from a particular intellectual and lived perspective’ (40). Irvine and Bilimoria lead off the collection with their take on postcolonialism and the question of global-critical philosophy of religion, which serves not only as an introduction to this core theme but as a model of the approach taken throughout the volume. To get a sense of the sorts of issues at hand and the general methodological approaches applied in developing a way forward, this is a great starting point. (shrink)

Enhanced agency theodicy is a new afterlife-centred solution to the problem of evil which I show has greater explanatory power than two influential rivals, the soul-making and redemptive suffering theodicies of John Hick and Eleanore Stump. Derived solely from the concept of an omniperfect God, enhanced agency theodicy is also potentially compatible with concepts of God, human nature and the afterlife in Islam. I suggest that a formulation of Islamic theism that incorporates the theodicy might be a good candidate for (...) a Graham Oppy-type inference to the best explanation evaluation of naturalism and theism as worldviews. -/- Central to this solution is a good-maximising view of God’s purpose and an analysis of the kind of ideal world such a God might be expected to create: a realm of enhanced agency that fully realises the scope for agency of self-aware embodied beings with freedom and goodness of will. An earthly life with the freedom to set our wills towards good or evil is created to test our capacity to flourish in this dynamic afterlife where neuro-physical flexibility and a durably good will is needed to thrive. A human nature that is innately good yet potentially bad depending on how we use free will and an ungovernable natural order that constrains the power of organised human evil to corrupt this nature are two features of earthly life that contribute to bringing as many as possible into a realm of enhanced agency, and so maximise its goodness. This account of human nature and our freedom to preserve or corrupt its essential goodness combines a neuroscientific theory of free will with dualistic holism, where the immaterial dimension of being is the source of our goodness of will, moral sense and desire for truth. -/- Enhanced agency theodicy is contrasted with the solutions of Hick and Stump with respect to four main difficulties concerning the role of the afterlife in explanations of evil: 1) the normatively relativised logical argument from evil challenges how a heavenly divine-human union could be supremely good as a personal relationship when God both contrives the conditions of our earthly suffering and rescues us from these conditions by means of and for the sake of personal relationship with God; 2) the problem of heavenly freedom argues that free will theodicies that rely on a good afterlife to outweigh or defeat earthly evils are inconsistent when they claim that freedom with respect to good and evil choices is a great good while also maintaining that a heaven with no freedom or opportunities to make such choices is supremely valuable; 3) problems of hell and post-mortem suffering focus on whether belief in a perfectly good God is compatible with the continuation of suffering in forms of afterlife outside of heaven; 4) the fate of creatures without free will concerns the post-mortem existence of young children, the severely cognitively disabled and animals in theodicies that make free will central to achieving a good afterlife. Hick and Stump fail to evade these problems due to their reliance on Christian concepts of divine love, human fallenness and heavenly redemption through union with God, while enhanced agency theodicy’s construction outside this framework of ideas provides for coherent answers to each of these challenges. -/- The study endorses Graham Oppy’s proposal to progress the debate on God and evil within an inference to the best explanation comparison of naturalism and theism as rival worldviews. To minimise epistemic bias Oppy’s methodology is amended to ensure no particular worldview is presupposed when explanations are evaluated. To prepare future work to incorporate enhanced agency theodicy into a wider formulation of theism for comparison with naturalism, further research is needed to investigate its potential compatibility with Islamic conceptions of divinity, human nature and the afterlife. (shrink)

"Faithful to the original Danish text and eminently readable, Jech's translation of Fear and Trembling admirably communicates the literary qualities of Kierkegaard's text, as well as his occasional fits of inspiration. Jech displays an unusual sensitivity not only to the literary/linguistic qualities of Kierkegaard’s prose, but also to his (often realized) aspirations to philosophical precision. As presented by Jech, Kierkegaard is not simply a gifted writer and speculative theologian dabbling in philosophy, but a philosopher concerned to limn the optimal role (...) of philosophical reflection, and to do so experimentally, especially with respect to matters of morality and faith. The translation is furthermore supplemented by very helpful explanatory notes that convey Kierkegaard’s own erudition and the multiple influences upon his thinking. The Historical Glossary will become a valuable reference tool for students and scholars of Kierkegaard’s writings. It is likely to play a welcome role in encouraging an improved understanding of what Kierkegaard means when he employs his idiosyncratic categories, allusions, and vocabulary." —Daniel Conway, Professor of Philosophy and Humanities, Texas A&M University. (shrink)

The limitations of logic in the pursuit of a deeper understanding of the nature of reality has been encountered by philosophers, mathematicians, scientists, theologians, psychologists, and by people from any field of study, or walk of life, no matter their religious, political, or intellectual affiliation or belief. Any curious and thinking person who engages with abstract thought, the material world, the nature of the cosmos, other people, or any pursuit of the mind will inevitably run up against the limitations with (...) which reason and logic alone can explain, interact with, and understand the mysteries of the universe. Drawing on Kurt Gödel's (1906-1978) application of the 'Paradox of Undecidability' from his Incompleteness Theorems (1931), The Destruction of Logic from Within will also expand on G.W. Leibniz's (1646-1716) concept of the 'incompossible' and apply both to a spiritual understanding of the limits of logic. This volume will propose that the use of logic can be surpassed by its own definition as a finite tool of understanding. This will be done by exploring the idea that the internal breakdown of logic itself will by extension, have logically useful implications and applications as a way to seek individual spiritual growth. It will be argued that when logic reaches its point of breakdown and internal contradiction, an opportunity arises to find meaning in a greater awareness of humanity's limits of understanding. This, despite many scientific advancements and improvements to material well-being. The book is part philosophy and part theology. One of the objectives of this book to show that logic and faith are compatible and complementary, despite the prevailing and reflexive assumption often found in the Western world to the contrary. Meanwhile, the book sets course by telling the story of how spiritual freedom of conscience led to improved well-being for people who sought out new beginnings in North America. The Destruction of Logic from Within will also examine the biblical basis of freedom of conscience, and for the rationalist skeptic, it will put biblical coherence under a microscope. A supplemental glossary in the volume clarifies the way in which many terms and concepts found inside are used. Each chapter builds on the previous to present a strong argument that it is a sound and logical choice to accept the enduring Christian message of God's love. (shrink)

A premise of the Leibnizian cosmological argument from contingency says that no contingent fact can explain why there are any contingent facts at all. David Hume and Paul Edwards famously denied this premise, arguing that if every fact has an explanation in terms of further facts ad infinitum, then they all do. This is known as the Hume–Edwards Principle (HEP). In this paper, I examine the cosmological argument from contingency within a framework of metaphysical explanation or ground and defend a (...) ground-theoretic version of HEP which says, roughly, that the plurality of contingent facts is grounded in its members. (shrink)

We argue that there is an incompatibility between the two basic principles of Molinism, i.e., God’s middle knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, and divine immutability. To this end, firstly, we set out the difference between strong and weak immutability: according to the latter only God’s essential attributes remain unchanged, while the former affirms that God cannot change in any way. Our next step is to argue that Molinism ascribes strong immutability to God. However, according to Molinism, some counterfactuals of (...) freedom need to be actualized by divine will. We argue that this claim does entail a change in God because it attributes a knowledge to God that involves moving from possibility to actuality through divine will. Therefore, claiming God knows counterfactuals of freedom leads us to reject the strong sense of divine immutability. Further, we argue that assuming God’s knowledge encompasses counterfactuals of freedom cannot be consistent even with weak immutability because, according to Molinism, a change in God’s knowledge requires a change in His essence. We conclude that Molinism is incoherent. (shrink)

The focus of this paper is a suite of Latin papers from 1685, some of which are still unpublished, in which Leibniz writes in the guise of a Catholic in order to defend Catholicism and counter Protestant objections, and this despite him being a lifelong Lutheran. After providing an overview of these writings (which I refer to as Leibniz’s “Catholic” writings) and the grounds for dating them to May–June 1685, I consider their purpose, arguing against the claim that they were (...) intended to support Church reunion and suggesting instead that they were apologetic in nature, intended as a reactivation or reimagining of Leibniz’s earlier “Catholic Demonstrations” project. I identify the patron Leibniz had in mind for these writings as Landgrave Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels and support this by a detailed comparison of the “Catholic” writings with the Leibniz-Landgrave correspondence and the Landgrave’s still-unpublished essays. This reveals that the Protestant arguments Leibniz uses in the “Catholic” writings are the very ones that he himself used when writing to the Landgrave, and that the responses Leibniz gives to these arguments are the very ones that the Landgrave used. I also consider the context of the writings, suggesting they were crafted during a period of personal uncertainty for Leibniz and possibly aimed at securing a position under the Landgrave. (shrink)

The publication entitled Josef Zvěřina and Theology of Agape involves texts of the foremost disciples of the greatest of Czech theologians of the 20th century and those who have been dealing with the theology of agape in subsequent generations of Czech theology. The three main thematic units of the publication gradually bring insight into the life and work of Josef Zvěřina (1913–1990).

Light is a symbol of deep meaning in many philosophical traditions and cultures. Often the sacred is associated with light, and the worldly and profane with darkness. Light was not always easily accessible, and therefore sometimes had mystical significance for different societies. Later it began to be used as a symbol. In human nature, such a concept has historically been entrenched as an archetype. During primitive society, leaders, priests and warriors were associated with the Sun, the divine light. They could (...) also differ in clothing or color on the face and body, clothing. Color has symbolic meaning for various cultures and peoples. Currently, some nations and religions have their own color tradition. Color associations are important in everyday life. The philosophy of Sufism also has a concept of light, darkness and color symbolism. In the works of Sufi philosophers one can find interpretations of various colors. In the tariqa of Kubrawiya there is a whole system of color sequence of the spiritual path. In addition, followers of tariqas can be distinguished by the shape and color scheme of everyday and ritual clothing. This article will examine the symbol of light in various religious traditions and philosophies, including the practice of light photisms of the Kubraviya tariqat. (shrink)

In Meditations on First Philosophy, René Descartes argues that one cannot trust one’s senses since they are not a reliable source of obtaining knowledge of the world. One of Descartes’s main contentions to support such an argument is from his explanation of dreams, where one can feel one is awake but instead one is dreaming. Native Americans, however, may argue that the experiences one has in dreams are real and are a source of knowledge of the real world. Although Descartes (...) uses dreams to support his argument, some Native Americans have a different take on dreams. Dreams for Native Americans are a source of knowledge as well as a source for obtaining one’s identity. Gregory Cajete, in American Indian Thought, notes that “Dreams and Visions are a natural means for accessing knowledge and establishing relationship to the world. They are encouraged and facilitated.” In other words, it is through dreams that individuals are guided, destined, and informed. Therefore, dreams as understood by some Native Americans are an extension of reality that anticipate events that will happen or can happen. The focus of this paper is an exploration of the philosophical and religious epistemology pertaining to Native Americans as described in their accounts of dreams. (shrink)

In this article, we develop the intersection of Shīʿī Islamic philosophy and extraterrestrial life. We explain the view of Ḥukamā (Islamic Philosophers) and what implications it holds for asserting a plurality of worlds and life forms. In addition to this, we bring Shīʿī hadīth sources which also suggest the existence of other life forms outside the earth. Combining the philosophical and textual evidence, we argue that the Shīʿī school not only suggests the existence of extraterrestrial life but also provides a (...) potential framework for possible human-extraterrestrial interactions. (shrink)

The problem of evil is the philosophical question regarding how to reconcile the existence of an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and omniscient God with the pain and suffering in the world. The Hypothesis of Indifference is Paul Draper’s proposal considering that question. His claim is that the pain and pleasure we experience in our lifetimes has nothing to do with God or some other supernatural force acting as an agent of good or evil. In this paper, I argue that Draper’s Hypothesis of (...) Indifference is a better explanation for why we experience pain and pleasure than theism is and that it survives major contemporary criticisms posed by Peter van Inwagen and William Alston. (shrink)

Analytic theology is often described as something like the application of analytic philosophy's tools to theological studies, but what this means can be unclear. In this paper, I offer a primer on analytic theology which clarifies this common description of the field. Particularly, following Sarah Coakley, I sketch an account of analytic theology on which it consists of a relation of familial resemblance. That is, analytic theologians are those who investigate theological loci in ways akin to those seen in contemporary (...) analytic philosophy. In so doing, I also briefly describe how analytic theology is conceptually distinct from both philosophical theology and analytic philosophy of religion. I then provide a threefold typology for understanding analytic theology's literary landscape whereby its practitioners can generally be understood to produce works which are either philosophically-inclined, theologically-inclined, or mixed in their inclination. Finally, I offer a brief survey of new frontiers being explored by analytic theologians. (shrink)

This chapter aims to lay out a map of the diverse epistemological perspectives within the Islamic theological tradition, in the conceptual framework of contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. In order achieve that goal, it aims to consider epistemological views in light of their historic context, while at the same time seeking to “translate” those broadly medieval perspectives into contemporary philosophical language. In doing so, the chapter offers a succinct overview of the main epistemic trends within the Islamic theological tradition concerning (...) religious epistemology. The chapter is divided into two main sections designated for discussions of differing accounts found in distinct trends of the tradition, namely the Rationalist and Traditionalist trends. The discussion concerning the Rationalist trend focuses on the philosophical-theologians of the dominant Mu’tazilite, Ash’arite, and Maturidite schools. The section on Islamic Traditionalism focuses on the Atharite scripturalism of Ibn Qudāma, and in particular the thought of Ibn Taymiyya. In order to map out these historic positions in light of contemporary religious epistemology, reference is made to a threefold typology of current views in the literature: (1) theistic evidentialism, (2) reformed epistemology, and (3) fideism. As such, the remainder of the chapter will attempt to outline the different approaches toward religious epistemology in the Islamic theological tradition with this threefold typology in mind. (shrink)

Les guerres, passées ou actuelles en Ukraine et ailleurs dans le monde, les pandémies, de la peste à la Covid-19, les drames humains comme l'explosion du port de Beyrouth... confrontés de tous temps à des situations tragiques, croyants, athées ou agnostiques font émerger des questions existentielles sur l'origine de l'Homme, sa raison d'être, sa finitude... Donner un sens à sa vie est une réponse possible dont la source serait à trouver dans la croyance et l'espérance. Conscient ou inconscient, volontaire ou (...) non, religieux ou politique... quelles que soient les formes que le croire peut prendre, celui-ci s' avère essentiel et universel. Est-il donc un besoin? Un besoin ne peut être négligé puisqu'il est vital: pouvons-nous mourir du fait de ne pas croire? Cet ouvrage, fruit d'une recherche en philosophie de la religion, porte ainsi sur le besoin de croire que l'autrice cherche à traiter, non seulement à travers les ouvrages de philosophie mais aussi en s' appuyant sur les concepts développés par des penseurs issus des autres disciplines comme la théologie, les religions, la psychologie, la sociologie, les neurosciences et les sciences politiques. (shrink)

That Descartes’ God is not a deceiver is amongst the canonical claims of early modern philosophy. The significance of this (purported) fact to the coherence of Descartes’ system is likewise canonical, infused in how we teach and think about the Meditations. Though prevalent, both ends of this narrative are suspect. We argue that Descartes’ color eliminativism, when coupled with his analysis of the cognitive structure of our sensory systems, entails that God is a deceiver. It’s doubtful that Descartes recognized this, (...) given his insistence that God is not a deceiver, and the role this plays in his system. But this is a concession Descartes can grant if we are careful about the kind of deception at play—a kind Descartes does recognize, albeit not without some ambiguity. On our story, Descartes’ metaphysics and epistemology are not driven by concerns about deception per se, but by concerns about God’s benevolence. (shrink)