Philosophy of Religion, Miscellaneous

Prof. Luiz Carlos Mariano da Rosa unterstreicht, dass die Evokation der Ereignisse, die ab origine stattgefunden haben, gemäß der mythisch-religiösen Perspektive für die Manifestation der heiligen Kräfte konvergiert. Auf der Grundlage der historisch-komparativen Methode von Mircea Eliade schreibt Prof. Luiz Carlos Mariano da Rosa dem Gebet die Bedingung zu, die heilige Kraft in einem Prozess zu erwecken, der in der Lage ist, einen übernatürlichen Einfluss auszuüben und die Vertiefungen des Bewusstseins zu erreichen, wie Marcel Mauss feststellt. Auf diese Weise überlagert (...) das charakteristische Gebet des Monotheismus Israels die magisch-religiösen Praktiken und liturgisch-rituellen Abläufe des Polytheismus und markiert nach der biblisch-theologischen Veteranenperspektive eine friedliche Beziehung und ein Bündnis, das Jahwe und die in seinen Attributen implizierten moralischen Forderungen, nämlich Gerechtigkeit, Treue und Güte, für das Leben in seiner historischen Fülle zusammenführt. Schließlich zeigt Prof. Luiz Carlos Mariano da Rosa, dass das Gebet nach der biblisch-theologischen neotestheologischen Perspektive den Ausdruck der eschatologischen Existenz zwischen Kontingenz und Transzendenz bei Bultmann, die Schließung der direktiven Kreativität Gottes bei Tillich und die Überwindung des Zustands der existentiellen Entfremdung impliziert. (shrink)

Se a pregação de Jesus consiste no pressuposto da teologia neotestamentária, segundo o pensamento de Bultmann, a análise do seu conteúdo emerge como fundamental para a compreensão do querigma cristão e da construção literário-teológica da comunidade primitiva. Dessa forma, o artigo se detém na pregação ético-escatológica de Jesus, que anuncia o reino de Deus e o tempo da decisão e o chamado à decisão, que converge para a radicalidade e exige a obediência escatológica enquanto realização da vontade de Deus. Assim, (...) escapando à condição de um dever que converge para a formação do caráter e ao princípio de determinação da comunhão humana, o artigo assinala que é a exigência do amor que se impõe à pregação escatológica de Jesus e a sua pregação ética e ao conhecimento da vontade de Deus, que implica o dever-ser e o poder-fazer envolvendo o bem incondicional em uma construção teórico-conceitual e subjetivo-existencial que envolve a consciência da situação-limite da existência e a necessidade de uma decisão existencial. (shrink)

The thesis attempts to provide a real definition of religion and argues that this is less problematic than is often assumed. It begins with a brief introduction which outlines why it is attractive to subject the attempt to define religion to a philosophical investigation. It is argued that defining religion is interesting because it is something which appears difficult to do, which scholars of religion often oppose, and which has practical implications. In addition, defining religion provides an opportunity to address (...) fundamental philosophical issues (such as defining, social kinds, and theories of concepts) and theoretical questions concerning the study of religion. The introduction also mentions the difficulties these kinds of interdisciplinary enterprises are bound to meet because of differences in terminology and academic traditions. -/- Part I is concerned with the philosophical, historical, and methodological issues in discussions necessary to pave the way for the attempt to provide a definition of religion. The first chapter addresses some fundamental philosophical issues concerning defining as a philosophical activity. It is argued that the traditional focus on natural kind concepts in discussions about defining needs to be supplemented with considerations about domain specificity and differences between social kinds. It is also argued that empirical findings from cognitive psychology are relevant to conceptual analysis and that two-dimensional semantics provides a productive approach to an analysis of the concept of religion. The chapter concludes with describing an approach to defining religion. -/- The second chapter is also concerned with methodological questions and considers the potential contributions empirical studies of the concept of religion could make to the study. Some outlines of potentially useful studies are suggested, and pros and cons for including them in the present study are weighed up. The chapter concludes with drawing a distinction between essential and non-essential elements and assessing their relative importance in a definition. -/- The third chapter offers, first, an overview of historical issues: the history of the term ‘religion’, the problem of determining the content of historical philosophical concepts of religion, and the history of the discussion about defining religion within the study of religion. The major conclusions of these sections are that the term ‘religion’ is likely to be a homonym and that several theoretical discussions have been intertwined in the historical debates about definitions of religion. The second part of the chapter discusses traditional fundamental issues in the study of religion in order to disentangle the discussion about definition from related discussions (about e.g. methods and religious (anti-)realism). It is concluded that an essentialist view on defining religion is not necessarily a return to apologetic approaches to religion. -/- The fourth chapter offers an overview of positions for and against realism concerning religion and the possibility of providing a definition of religion. Important distinctions are drawn between two kinds of conceptual essentialism (related to definition) and two kinds of ontological essentialism (related to theories). A discussion of the various forms of essentialism concludes that a ‘soft essentialist’ approach to defining religion is preferable. It is also concluded that constructivist and other anti-realist objections to providing a real definition of religion are less obvious than is often assumed because they fail to offer a detailed account of the supposed ‘construction’ that is free of realist assumptions. They also appear to rely on controversial philosophical assumptions. -/- The second part of the thesis is concerned with providing a definition of religion. It begins in chapter five with an overview of some multifactorial, or ‘soft essentialist’, approaches to defining religion. The purpose of this is to prepare the ground for the conceptual analysis, which opens with a discussion of various aspects of religion. Ten possible candidates for necessary and/or sufficient conditions for religion are discussed in order to determine their importance in a definition of religion. It is concluded that although many aspects are typical and/or relevant, only certain cognitive, normative, and practical aspects are necessary conditions for religion. It is also concluded that the necessary conditions for a religious cognitive aspect is supernatural and normative content of a certain scope combined with a certain attitudinal character. The chapter ends with a model of the working definition based on these intermediate conclusions. -/- Chapter six contains the second step in the conceptual analysis. It confronts the working definition with various cases of more or less contested examples of religion or other systems of beliefs and practices in order to assess whether the definition needs revisions. The following discussions of special cases of beginning and ceasing of religious traditions, persons, and objects serve the same purpose. It is concluded that a revision of the working definition is unnecessary. Chapter seven concludes part II by tying up a few loose ends concerning the definition, some methodological aspects, and theories of concepts. -/- The third and last part of the thesis contains, first, a brief discussion of practical implications of definitions of religion. Chapter eight illustrates the practical importance of a definition of religion by addressing the issue of the so-called ‘politics of defining religion’. It argues that scholars of religion as such are not unjustified in entering the debate about definitions, and it recommends efforts are made to separate discussions about defining religion from discussions about using definitions of religion as political tools. The final chapter of the thesis sums up important findings and insights of the study and points to some natural limitations. I warn that this study is only a rough outline of how a definition can be provided and which theoretical discussions lie behind such an attempt. Yet I also conclude that defining religion is a rewarding case study because it offers an opportunity to discuss fundamental questions in both philosophy and the study of religion while at the same addressing an interesting issue with immediate practical implications. (shrink)

El presente trabajo se ocupa del lugar de la religión en la última etapa de la obra de Habermas. En la primera parte se muestran las diferentes aristas de la cuestión de la religión, poniendo énfasis en los aspectos filosófico-políticos, sobre todo el que concierne a la “traducción” del lenguaje religioso al secular como un “requisito” de acceso a la esfera pública. En la segunda parte, se reconstruye, señalando sus límites o dificultades, el concepto de “traducción” en Habermas. Para ello, (...) se apela, además, a algunas categorías conceptuales propuestas por Jean-Marc Ferry. La traducción en este marco puede ser entendida en dos sentidos: como una reformulación semántica que apunta a ampliar el universo discursivo de origen (traducción como desencapsulamiento) y como una transformación de los géneros pre o para-argumentativos en argumentativos (traducción como cambio de género discursivo). (shrink)

The term ‘Augustinianism’ has been used by scholars for over a century to refer to trends in medieval philosophy, theology, and politics, which had a major effect on the transformations of European culture and society from the Middle Ages to the onset of modernity. Yet in each of these three disciplines ‘Augustinianism’ means something different, and the lack of clarity only increases when the debates over the relationship between a late medieval Augustinianism and Martin Luther are also considered. Based on (...) historical, philological, and iconographic analysis, this study adopts a hermeneutical approach drawn from philosophical hermeneutics, religious studies, and literary and sociological theory to argue for a historical, as distinct from a philosophical or theological referent for the term ‘Augustinianism’. The central argument of the book is that the interpretation of a late medieval Augustinianism can only be based historically on the newly created image of Augustine discerned in the writings of the Augustinian Hermits in the early fourteenth century, rather than on our own interpretations of Augustine himself. Recognizing the diverse dimensions of this created image is requisite to a historical understanding of Augustine’s late medieval reception and impact. As such, the book sets its sights beyond the later Middle Ages to encompass approaches to interpreting Augustine’s influence in general, for Augustine remains, today as in the later Middle Ages, a created saint. (shrink)

De scientia Dei (On God's Knowledge) is one of the few major texts by John Wyclif that has not already been published. According to John A. Robson, the De scientia Dei is 'in some way, the most important of all the treatises' of Wyclif's so-called Summa de ente. It was probably written in 1372, when the editorial project of the Summa de ente was in its final stages, and when Wyclif was at the peak of his academic career. In it (...) he deals with God's knowledge as a divine attribute, presents his peculiar view of God's knowledge as a relation of reason, distinguishes between God's knowledge of creatures in their intelligible being and in their actual existence, and argues in favor of a compatibilism between God's foreknowledge of future events and the liberty of human will. In this connection, a long section is also devoted to questions about the doctrine of salvation, and to the first elaborated exposition of Wyclif's doctrine of grace. The edition is preceded by a historical and doctrinal introduction, enabling the reader to situate the tract within the framework of Wyclif's own production and to appreciate the relevance of some of the topics faced in the text in the light of the development of Wyclif's theological and philosophical thought. (shrink)

The Russian philosopher Nikolai Onufrievich Lossky considered himself a Leibnizian of sorts. He accepted parts of Leibniz’s doctrine of monads, although he preferred to call them ‘substantival agents’ and rejected the thesis that they have neither doors nor windows. In Lossky’s own doctrine, monads have existed since the beginning of time, they are immortal, and can evolve or devolve depending on the goodness or badness of their behavior. Such evolution requires the possibility for monads to reincarnate into the bodies of (...) creatures of a higher level on the scala perfectionis. According to this theory, a monad can evolve by being progressively reincarnated multiple times through a sort of process of metamorphosis from the level of the most elementary particles all the way up to the level of human beings or even higher. Lossky argues that the works of Leibniz contain scattered elements of such a systematic doctrine of reincarnation. He attempts to reconstitute this doctrine in an article that appeared both in Russian and German in 1931. The Russian version, ‘Ученiе Лейбница о перевоплощенiи какъ метаморфозѣ’, was published in the Сборникъ Русскаго института въ Прагѣ, vol. 2, 1931, pp. 77–88. The German version appeared under the title ‘Leibniz’ Lehre von der Reinkarnation als Metamorphose,’ in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 40, n. 2, 1931, pp. 214–226. The content of the Russian and German versions is roughly the same, except for the omission, in the German version, of a mention of David Hume in the second sentence and of one paragraph and a half at the end of the article. The following is a translation of this article. I translated the text from the Russian version, which was in all appearances written first, but I also took the German version into account. The original pagination is added in angle brackets. Angle brackets are used wherever the additions are mine. — Frédéric Tremblay. (shrink)

The Russian philosopher Nikolai Onufrievich Lossky adhered to an evolutionary metaphysics of reincarnation according to which the world is constituted of immortal souls or monads, which he calls ‘substantival agents.’ These substantival agents can evolve or devolve depending on the goodness or badness of their behavior. Such evolution requires the possibility for monads to reincarnate into the bodies of creatures of a higher or of a lower level on the scala perfectionis. According to this theory, a substantival agent can evolve (...) by being gradually reincarnated multiple times through a sort of process of metamorphosis from the level of the most elementary particles all the way up to the level of human beings or even higher. In ‘Ученiе Лейбница о перевоплощенiи какъ метаморфозѣ’, Lossky argues that the works of Leibniz contain scattered elements of such a systematic evolutionary doctrine of reincarnation as metamorphosis and he attempts to reconstitute this doctrine. The present article is intended as an historical introduction to the translation of Lossky’s ‘Leibniz’s Doctrine of Reincarnation as Metamorphosis.’. (shrink)

In this article, author expressed the meaning of “belief”, possible effective factors in human life, and how these factors can be effective on person and/or communities. With this respect, the meaning of religion, the possible interaction and relation between religion and science evaluated. 42 past/present theories of religion and evaluation of the past/present works of the 87 philosophers of religion are explained. Author considered new synthesis (R-Synthesis), and also new era philosophy, new and re-constructed branches of philosophy, and some systems/constructions (...) to express the new perspective for philosophy of religion. Author applied 27(+) possible definitive/certain result cases of the synthesis for R-Religion discipline specifically, and did the followings under new perspective: (i) eliminated some religious subjects, (ii) unified some religious subjects, (iii) modified some religious subjects, (iv) united some religious subjects in upper phase, (v) separated some religious subject, (vi) defined all religious subjects under one framework, (vii) integrated all religious subjects, (viii) defined new religious subjects, (ix) re-defined some religious subjects, (x) removed some religious subjects and put new religious subjects instead, (xi) added some religious subjects, (xii) kept/protected some religious subjects, (xiii) proposed progression for religious subjects, (xiv) changed the priority of some religious subjects, (xv) increased the importance of some religious subjects, (xvi) strengthened the ethics, (xvii) integrated philosophy branches under one framework, (xviii) others. Some of the purposes of this article are: (i) to define new synthesis method, (ii) to define good and/or correct new perspective and structure for philosophy of religion, science of religion, theories of religion, and related subjects, (iii) to extend the definition/limits of philosophy of religion with new perspective, (iv) others. As result of the synthesis, new perspective for philosophy of religion explained by considering the following concepts/sections: (a) theories of religion, (b) 17 upper constructional philosophies and philosophy of religion, (c) eight complementary branches of philosophy of religion, (d) 14 lower constructional philosophies and philosophy of religion, (e) science of religion, (f) new theory of religion and its relations with other disciplines. Author defined New Era Theory, New Era Religion, New Era Belief, Progressive Religion and their relations with other religions, beliefs, religious/non-religious movements, and the relation with other theories of religion. Also, power authorities and functional position levels in the New Era Belief, and Religion of God, Knowledge of God/gods, Nature of God/gods concepts are explained generally/specifically. (shrink)

This paper draws on a number of parallels between Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations and St. Augustine’s Confessions to suggest that Wittgenstein’s relation to the text with which he opens the Investigations is less adversarial than is normally supposed. In particular, the paper draws attention to two important parallels: the difficulty both Philosophical Investigations and Confessions have with beginning and with arrogating to themselves the authority to begin, and the role of conversion in both texts. These parallels help us read the methodological (...) remarks of Philosophical Investigations §§89–133 as a conversion narrative of sorts. However, Wittgenstein’s conception of conversion runs counter to Augustine’s: where Augustine aspires to overcome the lusts of the physical world and and toward the purity of the divine, Wittgenstein turns away from the aspiration for purity toward a humbler acceptance of the ordinary. Augustine’s text is an exhortation to conversion, but not the kind of conversion Wittgenstein seeks, and this is the deeper provocation that Wittgenstein finds in Augustine’s text. (shrink)

In this critical notice of Clifford Williams’ Religion and the meaning of life, I focus on his argumentation in favour of the moderate supernaturalist position that, while a meaningful life would be possible in a purely physical world, a much greater meaning would be possible only in a world with God and an eternal afterlife spent close to God. I begin by expounding and evaluating Williams’ views of the physical sources of meaning, providing reason to doubt both that he has (...) captured all the central ones and that he has provided the right explanation of why we ought to care about them. Then I address Williams’ account of why God would greatly enhance the meaning of our lives, arguing that, if God could do so, then God could by the same token reduce their meaning as well, such that it is unclear that a world with God would offer a net gain in meaning. Finally, I take up Williams’ position that an eternal afterlife with God would greatly enhance the meaning of our lives, contending that, if it would do so, then it would to such an enormous degree as to make it hard to capture the intuition that a meaningful life would be possible in a purely physical world. (shrink)

This paper presents two versions of opposition relations for prophetical statements, the first one is an application of “Ockham’s thesis” in Classical propositional Logic. The second one is a reinterpretation of that thesis in the logic MRSP.

My assertion is that God’s biblical image may not reflect entirely His existence in itself as well as His revealed image. Even if God in Himself is both transcendent and immanent at the same time, and He is revealing accordingly in the history of humankind, still the image of God constructed in the writings of the Old Testament is merely the perspective made upon God by His followers to whom the He has revealed. That could be the reason why for (...) centuries God’s biblical image seems to emphasize more His immanence, starting with Pentateuch, where God cohabites with Adam on Earth, then He reveals Himself to Abraham and Moses and so on. Somewhere, after the Babylonian exile, the image suffers slightly differences tilting towards God’s transcendence. In a path already created and grounded by Israel’s ancestors, even this new color of transcendence bears the nuances of immanence. How can this be possible? Let’s take a look on the revelation received by Abraham from God and see how this can fit the profile. Instead of the transcendence of God regarded by others in the differentness of Yahweh appointed by Abraham in his walking out of Mesopotamia, I will prove otherwise, that Abraham is on the contrary proving God’s immanency in this very differentness of His in relation with other gods by providence and omnipresence, indwelling His creation. (shrink)

The paper offers a three-premise argument that a person with first-hand experience of possession and exorcism, such as an exorcist, can have a justified belief in the existence of demons. (1) “Exorcism involves a process by which the exorcist comes to believe that testimony is offered by a demon.” Cited for (1) are the Gospels, the Roman Ritual, some modern cases of exorcism, and exorcism practices in non-Christian contexts. (2) “If defeaters are absent, the exorcist may treat as reliable the (...) process by which he comes to believe that testimony is offered by a demon.” For (2) a case is offered that we have a reliable ability to identify when testimony is being offered and when it is being offered by particular types of agents, what is termed testifier-identification. (3) “In many cases of exorcism, defeaters are absent.” An inductive case is given for (3) by responding to possible defeaters, including several suggested recently by David Kyle Johnson. Therefore, in many cases of exorcism the exorcist may treat as reliable the processes by which he comes to believe that testimony is offered by a demon, and so can have a justified belief in the existence of demons. (shrink)

In this thesis, I argue that the Functional Monotheism model is not tri-theistic, but is a model of pro-Nicene Trinitarianism. In establishing this thesis, I focus on countering a specific objection prevalent in the Analytic Theology literature; the Tri-Theism Objection, which has charged the Functional Monotheism model with “tri-theism”. This objection, formulated by Kelly James Clark and Edward Feser, asserts that the Functional Monotheism model is tritheistic and thus should be rejected as a possible model of scriptural monotheism and “orthodox” (...) Trinitarianism. I argue against this objection by demonstrating that the Functional Monotheism model, once certain necessary philosophical clarifications and modifications are made, is not tri-theistic (in the classical sense of the term), but is in fact in line with “strict” (Second Temple) Jewish monotheism and “orthodox” (pro-Nicene) Trinitarianism. The Functional Monotheism model, contra the proponents of the objection, is therefore not subject to a charge of tri-theism, and thus should be taken as a viable model of “orthodox” Trinitarianism that can aid analytic theologians in their Trinitarian theorising. (shrink)

On the Rational Basis of Revelation in Rosenzweig’s Star of Redemption -/- Abraham Mounitz Zefat Academic College Israel -/- Abstract The present study focuses on ‘revelation,’ one of the three constitutive concepts, and possibly the most central such concept, in Rosenzweig’s philosophy. As opposed to its ostensibly religious meaning, the article offers a view of the rational element enfolded within this concept in Rosenzweig’s Star of Redemption. By employing a textual exegesis based on a close reading of Rosenzweig’s language, the (...) article seeks to show that Rosenzweig’s conception of revelation does not refer to an intuitive, Kabbalistic-mystical or esoteric concept. As a central pillar of Rosenzweig’s star-shaped method, revelation is the mediator between God’s love of people to a person’s love of others – which, in turn, is the basis for global redemption. The exposure of the rational-intellectual aspect of revelation thus advances the desired objective of Rosenzweig’s method, and accords with Rosenzweig’s own words when he suggested that “neither does it make the claim to be a philosophy of religion – how could it do that when the word ‘religion’ does not occur in it at all! Rather, it is merely a system of philosophy.” (see Franz Rosenzweig’s The New Thinking (1998), A. Udoff and B.E. Galli, eds., New York: Syracuse University Press, p. 69). (shrink)

This work presents an alternative reading of the respective works of Moses Maimonides and Baruch Spinoza. It argues that both thinkers are primarily concerned with the singular perfection of the complete human being rather than with attaining only rational knowledge. Complete perfection of a human being expresses the unique concord of concrete activities, such as ethics, politics, and psychology, with reason. The necessity of concrete historical activities in generating perfection entails that both thinkers are not primarily concerned with an “escape” (...) to a metaphysical realm of transcendent or universal truths via cognition. Instead, both are focused on developing and cultivating individuals’ concrete desires and activities to the potential benefit of all. This book argues that rather than solely focusing on individual enlightenment, both thinkers are primarily concerned with a political life and the improvement of fellow citizens’ capacities. A key theme throughout the text is that both Maimonides and Spinoza realize that an apolitical life undermines individual and social flourishing. (shrink)

Al-Māturīdī is seemingly the first medieval theologian who gives precedence to his theory of knowledge over other theological issues. 4 He opens his discourse with a chapter of invalidity of taqlid and continues with a discussion of means of knowledge. In that chapter, Al-Māturīdī offers two ways of knowing the divine will: reason (‘aql) and tradition (sam’). For him, tradition, as a source of knowledge, refers to knowledge of past events, names of things, distant countries, benefits and harms of a (...) thing. They are not self-evident nor are we able to witness their reality for ourselves by way of senses. In principle, Al-Māturīdī says, we acquire all our knowledge about external world by way of hearing. However, this kind of knowledge is not valid unless it is transmitted by uninterrupted chains of authority (mutawātir) or unless its validity is determined by sensual or rational channels of knowledge. 5 Thus, the reliable knowledge originated by tradition is of two kinds; one is that mutawātir, the other is that which can be validated by reason. Al-Māturīdī asserts that due to the rational signs demonstrating the truth of the message of prophets, their message richly deserves to be admitted as truth. (shrink)

It is argued that God cannot be a fitting target of prepositional gratitude. The first premise is that if someone cannot be benefited, then they cannot be a fitting target of prepositional gratitude. The second premise is that God cannot be benefited. Concerning the first premise, it is argued that a necessary component of prepositional gratitude is the desire to benefit one’s benefactor. Then it is argued that such a desire is fitting only if one’s benefactor can in fact be (...) benefited. Concerning the second premise, it is noted that classical theism widely attributes blessedness to God. It is argued that if God is blessed then God necessarily has as much well-being as it is possible for God to have, and hence God cannot be benefited. Also noted are some ways in which God’s blessedness is compatible with less orthodox ideas about God’s passibility. The argument is then defended against eight objections. (shrink)

Mystice videre: un modo particolare di vedere, sperimentato, lungo la storia dell’umanità, da coloro che hanno vissuto un’esperienza straordinaria di incontro con il sacro (termine che qui utilizzo nella sua accezione più ampia, di “ciò che è separato da” tutto ciò che è ordinario). Alludo ai mistici, ovviamente. Qualcuno, clinicamente parlando, potrebbe considerarli, con qualche ragione, individui patologici, ma sotto il profilo religioso si tratta di persone che hanno avuto la grazia di un incontro con il divino attraverso visioni profonde, (...) che, dalle tenebre del mistero, li hanno portati alla pienezza della luce interiore e hanno fatto sì che lo splendore che li ha illuminati si irradiasse all’esterno, dando un senso non solo al loro mondo interiore, ma anche al mondo che li circondava. Questo fecondo dinamismo tra “ciò che sta dentro” e “ciò che sta fuori” vale in tanti campi dell’esperienza umana, non solo nell’ambito del sacro, ma è in quest’ultimo che, elettivamente, l’attentio cordis determina l’irruzione nell’ombra di una luce che trasforma e permette di comprendere se stessi e l’intero cosmo. (shrink)

La recente pubblicazione in lingua italiana del Libro Rosso, che è stato definito l’inedito forse più importante nella storia della psicologia, è stata celebrata in numerosi convegni specialistici, compreso quello da cui originano i saggi che costituiscono questo libro. Il Libro Rosso è il libro segreto di Jung, quello sul quale egli trascrisse in parole e immagini, per oltre sedici anni, i sogni e le visioni che popolarono la sua autoanalisi. Negli ultimi anni di vita Jung lo definiva come il (...) nucleo vitale da cui erano sbocciate tutte le intuizioni che poi aveva elaborato nei suoi testi scientifici; malgrado ciò, fu sempre riluttante alla sua pubblicazione. Al massimo, permise che qualche copia circolasse tra gli amici più intimi; progettò anche di vincolarne la pubblicazione ad almeno cinquant’anni post mortem. (shrink)

The autobiographical essay, "Thirty-five Years of Research on Kant: a Retrospective Overview", is here translated into Portuguese by Henrique Azevedo. The English version has not been published, but can be provided to interested readers, upon request.

This is a Turkish translation (by by Necmettin Tan) of Stephen Palmquist, ‘Immanuel Kant: A Christian Philosopher?’, Faith and Philosophy 6:1 (January 1989), pp.65-75. For abstract, see the English version, located in the "Kant 2. Phil. of Religion articles" portion of this website.

¿Es el desideratum secularista de separación Iglesia-Estado capaz de enfrentar las consecuencias negativas de la revitalización política de los conservadurismos religiosos y la instrumentalización de la religiosidad popular para fines antiigualitarios? La respuesta negativa es la tesis de la que parto para analizar por qué los liberalismos secularistas y postsecularistas no pueden procesar ni en la teoría ni en la práctica la reordenación política de las iglesias cristianas conservadoras (católicas y evangélicas) en nuestra región. Esto no me conduce a abrazar (...) una teología política ni un relativismo abstencionista. Me interesa estudiar la plausibilidad de desarrollar una postura ético-política anticlerical que no desprecia la religiosidad popular ni el potencial emancipador en los fenómenos religiosos, en un mundo en el que no es ni moral ni históricamente viable soslayarlos insistiendo en colocarlos en la esfera inasible de lo privado o en un pasado sublimado en procesos de secularización. La hipótesis guía de este artículo es que la cuestión normativa y política básica sobre la que tratan la mayor parte de los debates sobre secularización en la actualidad es la participación de las iglesias en lo político por medio de la formación del juicio y la voluntad públicos. -/- . (shrink)

In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant famously includes immortality as one of the three “ideas” that give rise to “unavoidable problems of reason” (KrV, B7)1 and thereby constitute the basic subject-matter of metaphysics. Interpreters have paid a great deal of attention to the other two ideas, God and freedom; yet very few studies of Kantian immortality have ever been undertaken. This should come as no surprise, once we realize that Kant himself used the word “immortality” and its cognates only (...) 40 times in all three of his great Critiques. (By comparison, forms of the words “God” and “free(dom)” appear 119 and 509 times, respectively, in the three Critiques.) Kant’s theory of immortality – if he can be said to have one – is therefore exceedingly difficult to understand. For example, he says at one point (KrV, B395n): “Metaphysics has only three ideas as the proper purpose of its investigation: God, freedom, and immortality – and in such a way that the second concept, when combined with the first, is to lead to the third as a necessary conclusion.” How are we to understand this claim ? Does Kant really mean that combining the concept of freedom with the concept of God somehow gives rise to immortality as a necessary inference? In any case, why does Kant say so little about immortality, even though he portrays it as one of three ideas that constitute the “final aim” of all metaphysical speculation ? These and other puzzles raised by Kant’s occasional comments on immortality will be the focus of this paper. (shrink)

Habermas argues that religious reasons can enter the public sphere so long as they undergo a translation that meets the standards of public reason. I argue that such a translation may be either unnecessary or impossible. Habermas does not sufficiently consider the possibility that religious reasons are already publicly accessible such that there no translation is required. Moreover, Habermas entirely fails to consider the possibility that, if he is right about religious reasons not being publicly accessible, these reasons may be (...) of a kind such that they cannot be translated into a publicly accessible idiom as he supposes they can be. (shrink)

Is the very question ‘what is the meaning of life?’ harmful? Humans often fight and go to war over various answers offered by religions, prophets, gurus, economists and philosophers. Could the question of seeking a ‘life meaning’ be dangerous? This paper considers existential strains of philosophy in Ray Bradbury’s The Martian Chronicles, through the lens of Kierkegaard, Dostoyevsky, Albert Camus and Plato’s Allegory of the Chariot in order to argue that Western philosophy needs to ask whether the question of a (...) meaning to life is itself both dangerous and harmful to the human condition. (shrink)

This article examines two arguments that a worship-worthy agent cannot command worship. The first argument is based on the idea that any agent who commands worship is egotistical, and hence not worship-worthy. The second argument is based on Campbell Brown and Yujin Nagasawa's (2005) idea that people cannot comply with the command to worship because if people are offering genuine worship, they cannot be motivated by a command to do so. One might then argue that a worship-worthy agent would have (...) no reason to issue a command to worship. I argue that both these arguments fail. (shrink)

Humanity's toolkit for altering the world we live in now includes CRISPR. Through an evolutionary process, bacteria acquired a way to protect themselves from an invading virus, making their immediate future more secure. In human hands, this powerful genome‐editing tool offers the potential to impact, at a breathtaking rate, not only our own evolutionary future, but the future of other life on this planet. Ethical concerns about altering genomes are not new, but the birth of two CRISPR gene‐edited babies last (...) year created a renewed urgency around navigating the future and the lack of an agreed‐upon map to guide us is distressing. The goal of this article is not to provide that map but to suggest two essential questions, drawn from the context of events surrounding CRISPR to date, that should guide its drafting—“Who do we trust?” and “When is it time to act?”—and to consider what Unitarian Universalism might contribute to answering those questions. (shrink)

The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) has led to renewed ambitions of developing artificial general intelligence. Alongside this has been a resurgence in the development of virtual and augmented reality (V/AR) technologies, which are viewed as “disruptive” technologies and the computing platforms of the future. V/AR effectively bring the digital world of machines, robots, and artificial agents to our senses while entailing the transposition of human activity and presence into the digital world of artificial agents and machine forms of (...) intelligence. The intersection of humans and machines in this shared space brings humans and machines into ontological continuity as informational entities in a totalizing informational environment, which subsumes both cyber and physical space in an artificially constructed virtual world. The reconstruction of mind (through AI) and world (through V/AR) thus has significant epistemological, ontological, and anthropological implications, which constitute the underlying features in the artificialization of mind and world. (shrink)

“Anima naturaliter christiana” (Anima naturalmente cristiana) così si esprimeva per Tertulliano, e per Jung questo vale in senso psicologico, per noi occidentali: “Per lui (l’occidentale) l’uomo interiormente è infimo… cerca di propiziarsi quella grande potenza (Dio), mediante il timore, la penitenza, le promesse, la sottomissione, l’autoumiliazione… la grande potenza non è egli stesso, bensì… l’interamente altro, assolutamente perfetto ed esterno, l’unica realtà… (per l’orientale) La psiche è perciò la cosa più importante, è il respiro che tutto penetra… Tutta la vita (...) fluisce da lui e tutte le diverse forme apparenti si ridissolvono in lui… Anziché mandare a mente le tecniche spirituali dell’Oriente, sarebbe molto più importante scoprire se esiste nell’inconscio una tendenza introversa, simile al principio spirituale che domina in Oriente… Saremmo allora in condizione di edificare sul nostro suolo e con i nostri metodi. (shrink)

There is an ongoing tension between the spheres of religious education and of theological studies. It is somewhat evident in the academy, and often enough emerges when the inevitable university restructure places religious education and theology in the same school, or situates religious education within education at a remove from theology, or any range of permutations. The tension is also felt in discussions between clergy, with a theological education behind them, and classroom teachers and religious education coordinators, whose training is (...) in education itself, and whose immediate concern is the children in front of them. This article is an attempt to set out some of the parameters at play in the interaction between the two disciplines, and to offer some areas where collaboration is highly desired. (shrink)

In this volume, Joshua Eckhardt examines the religious texts and books that surrounded the poems, sermons, and inscriptions of the early modern poet and preacher John Donne. Focusing on the material realities legible in manuscripts and Sammelbände, bookshops and private libraries, Eckhardt uncovers the myriad ways in which Donne’s writings were received and presented, first by his contemporaries, and later by subsequent readers of his work. Eckhardt sheds light on the religious writings with which Donne’s work was linked during its (...) circulation, using a bibliographic approach that also informs our understanding of his work’s reception during the early modern period. He analyzes the religious implications of the placement of Donne’s poem “A Litany” in a library full of Roman Catholic and English prayer books, the relationship and physical proximity of Donne’s writings to figures such as Sir Thomas Egerton and Izaak Walton, and the movements in later centuries of Donne’s work from private owners to the major libraries that have made this study possible. Eckhardt’s detailed research reveals how Donne’s writings have circulated throughout history—and how religious readers, communities, and movements affected the distribution and reception of his body of work. Centered on a place in time when distinct methods of reproduction, preservation, and circulation were used to negotiate a complex and sometimes dangerous world of confessional division, Religion Around John Donne makes an original contribution to Donne studies, religious history, book history, and reception studies. (shrink)

Absorbing—being absorbed in—the vision of Robert Neville's Philosophical Theology recalled to me a lowly cartoon by much-beloved Australian cartoonist Michael Leunig.1 A small man carries a big briefcase on a smudgy street. With a look of—relief? regret? foreboding? anticipation?—the man beholds a sign on a wall that reads: "If you see anything mysterious or unusual just enjoy it while you can." Neville's vision is unusual, and the contemplation of mystery sounds as a basso continuo through each and all three opera (...) of his Philosophical Theology. I want to say: enjoy it while you can. For who can say whether its beauty is that of things ephemeral or something more perennial?It seems we might be coming to an end of... (shrink)