Philosophy of Social Science, Miscellaneous

This study developed an instrument that measures the attitude of Filipino high school students towards mathematics, with reliable predictors and factors. Using the responses of 300 high school students from Zamboanga Sibugay, the validity and reliability of the Mathematics Attitude Scale (MAS) was tested using Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) and reliability analyses. The EFA showed that four-factor structures of the instrument, regarding the mathematics attitude for high school students, explained 27.48% of the variance in the pattern of relationships among the (...) items. The Average Variance Extracted (AVE), Composite Reliability, and Cronbach’s Alpha coefficients were reported. They proved that the extracted constructs have obtained and satisfied convergent validity. Thirty-three items remained in the final questionnaire after deleting the twenty-seven items with factor loadings of less than 0.4 (Students’ Perceived Motivation and Support in Learning Mathematics: twelve items; Students’ Perceived Anxiety in Learning Mathematics: ten items; Students’ Perceived Self-Efficacy in Learning Mathematics: six items; and Teachers and Parents’ Influences to Students in Learning Mathematics: five items). This study has confirmed the four-factor structure of the MAS. Educators and researchers can use the MAS to better understand the attitudes of Filipino high school students towards mathematics. (shrink)

In everyday life, as members of larger or smaller groups, we hold each other accountable with respect to social norms. For this practice to be intelligible, we must arguably by and large be justified in demanding that other group members comply with these norms. Other things being equal, it seems that we have a group membership-based pro tanto reason to comply with the social norms of our group. In this chapter, I examine how such demands and reasons for compliance can (...) be explained and made intelligible. I do this by first presenting and discussing Raimo Tuomela’s individualistic account of social norms from The Importance of Us (1995). I argue that this and similar individualistic accounts fail to make sense of how our practice of holding each other accountable with respect to social norms can be justified. This provides a reason to try some holistic medicine. I therefore discuss Tuomela’s later irreducibly collectivistic “we-mode” account of social norms from The Philosophy of Sociality (2007). This account promises to make sense of social-norm accountability, but it also carries with it some philosophical baggage. (shrink)

Darwin diceva che le specie si trasformavano per poter sopravvivere: arriva un terremoto, un’inondazione e solo chi sa correre rapidamente o chi sa nuotare vive. Ok, ma cosa ci dice questa teoria sui cambiamenti che non portano a migliori possibilità di sopravvivere o di riprodursi? Ben poco. Perché nel corso dei secoli i denti molari dell’uomo si sono ridotti di dimensioni, così come le dita dei piedi? Certo non per sopravvivere e riprodursi meglio. Gli autori riportano nel corso di questa (...) rassegna vari esempi che la teoria di Darwin non riesce a spiegare e delle possibili spiegazioni alternative, asseverate da esperimenti scientifici validati e consacrati dalla comunità scientifica. Darwin aveva torto? Certamente no! Ma come tutte le opere della scienza richiede revisioni e miglioramenti. (shrink)

Les modèles basés sur des agents en interactions, constituent des systèmes sociaux complexes, qui peuvent être simulés par informatiques. Ils se répandent dans les sciences économiques et sociales - comme dans la plupart des sciences des systèmes complexes. Des énigmes épistémologiques (ré)apparaissent. On a souvent opposé modèles et investigations empiriques : d’un côté, on considère les sciences empiriques fondées sur une observation méthodique (enquêtes, expériences) tandis que de l’autre, on conçoit les approches théoriques et la modélisation comme s’appuyant sur une (...) approche conceptuelle ou hypothético-déductive. la simulation a de son coté souvent été comparée à une forme d’expérience ou à une méthode intermédiaire entre la théorie et l’expérience. Tesfatsion a parlé de « laboratoire computationnel » comme d’une manière d’étudier « les comportements des systèmes complexes au moyen d’expériences sous contrôle qu’on peut répéter (réplicable)» et Axelrod a proclamé que la simulation serait « une troisième manière de pratiquer la science dans les sciences sociales », entre l’induction et la déduction. Nous introduisons de nouveaux concepts épistémologiques afin de montrer dans quelle mesure les auteurs ont raison lorsqu'ils se concentrent sur une signification empirique, instrumentale ou conceptuelle de leur modèle ou simulation. La première partie du chapitre discute plus particulièrement de l'épistémologie des modèles économiques à partir des travaux d’Hausman, Guala, Mäki, Sugden, Schelling etc. pour expliquer les divergences entre modèles et simulations. En distinguant entre modèles et simulations, comme entre entre types de modèles, types de simulations informatiques et types d'empiricité obtenue par une simulation, la seconde partie donne la possibilité de comprendre plus précisément - et ensuite de justifier - la diversité des positions épistémologiques présentées dans la première partie. En utilisant les notion de sous-symbolisation (due à Smolensky) et, de hiérarchie dénotationnelle (due à Goodman), une attention particulière est accordée à la multiplicité des pouvoirs dénotationnels des symboles en jeu dans les modèles complexes et les simulations informatiques. Selon cette grille d'analyse, on peut déterminer, dans chaque cas particulier son statut épistémique et la crédibilité qui peut y être associée. -/- Ce chapitre est une traduction (par Gilles Campagnolo) réviséee et augmentée par les auteurs de : Agent-Based Models and Simulations in Economics and Social Sciences: From Conceptual Exploration to Distinct Ways of Experimenting, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 13 (1) 5 DOI: 10.18564/jasss.1532. (shrink)

Cosmos+Taxis published a special issue with a symposium discussing Robert Vinten's book Wittgenstein and the Social Sciences. The symposium was edited by Richard Eldridge and it contains contributions from Paul Roth (Distinguished Professor, UC Santa Cruz), Daniel Little (Professor, University of Michigan, Dearborn), Rafael Azize (Associate Professor, Federal University of Bahia), Richard Raatzsch (Professor, EBS Universität), and Rupert Read (Associate Professor, UEA) - with a response by Robert Vinten ('Response to Critics). Within the issue the papers compare Wittgenstein's philosophy to (...) art, compare Wittgenstein to Brecht, and examine the nature of the social sciences. (shrink)

Según la concepción «clásica», el fin de la medicina era el de ayudar a conservar y recuperar la salud, entendida como un bienestar físico, emocional y vital, al cual contribuían acciones materiales, influjos sobrenaturales y cosmológicos. Con el Renacimiento, la ciencia moderna ofrece sus conocimientos a la medicina, en la cual desaparece la consideración de influjos sobrenaturales y cósmicos. Además, la concepción dualista cartesiana reducía la medicina a ocuparse exclusivamente del cuerpo del hombre, interpretado como una máquina según modelos propuestos (...) con base en diferentes ciencias. Esta perspectiva fisicalista y analítica ha permitido logros importantes. Sin embargo, la enfermedad implica, en cuanto experiencia vivida por el paciente, aspectos de malestar existencial, fragilidad, dependencia, pérdida de identidad que, a menudo, la medicina piensa no deber considerar en cuanto subjetivos. Hay que eliminar este error, complementando la competencia médica con las varias fuentes ofrecidas por la filosofía, artes, religión, de modo que permitan al enfermo encontrar en su interioridad los sustentos para darle un sentido y valor a su existencia en sus reales condiciones. (shrink)

Experimental philosophers often seem to ignore or downplay the significance of demographic variation in philosophically relevant judgments. This article confirms this impression, discusses why demographic research is overlooked in experimental philosophy, and argues that variation is philosophically significant.

The debate concerning the scientific or unscientific status of the social sciences and the question of the (in) applicability of the methods of research in the natural sciences to social investigations are still unsettled in Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Some of the questions which are often asked concerning these issues include: are the social sciences really scientific? Do they merit the name science? Can we apply the same methods used in the natural research to social research? Are the objects (...) of inquiry in both areas the same? Attempts to answer these questions and numerous related others, have polarized Philosophers of the social sciences into two different ideological camps. Those who answer the questions affirmatively are regarded as the naturalists while those who answer negatively are regarded as the anti-naturalists or humanists. However, using the methods of critical argumentation and conceptual clarification, we intend to argue in this paper for a complementary ground between the two. Consequently, we contend that though the methods of the natural and the social sciences are different due to the fact that their respective objects of investigations are not the same, methods of the two fields are imperative to inquiries that would promote human knowledge and aid their intellectual development. This is necessary in order to foster interdisciplinary research and de-compartmentalisation of disciplines. We also intend to argue that the view that the social sciences are not scientific arose from a narrow conception of the term “science.” Our submission, therefore, is that the social sciences, legitimately, are sciences in their own right. (shrink)

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to present the conceptual model of an innovative methodology (SAT) to assess the social acceptance of technology, especially focusing on artificial intelligence (AI)-based technology. -/- Design/methodology/approach After a review of the literature, this paper presents the main lines by which SAT stands out from current methods, namely, a four-bubble approach and a mix of qualitative and quantitative techniques that offer assessments that look at technology as a socio-technical system. Each bubble determines the social (...) variability of a cluster of values: User-Experience Acceptance, Social Disruptiveness, Value Impact and Trust. -/- Findings The methodology is still in development, requiring further developments, specifications and validation. Accordingly, the findings of this paper refer to the realm of the research discussion, that is, highlighting the importance of preventively assessing and forecasting the acceptance of technology and building the best design strategies to boost sustainable and ethical technology adoption. -/- Social implications Once SAT method will be validated, it could constitute a useful tool, with societal implications, for helping users, markets and institutions to appraise and determine the co-implications of technology and socio-cultural contexts. -/- Originality/value New AI applications flood today’s users and markets, often without a clear understanding of risks and impacts. In the European context, regulations (EU AI Act) and rules (EU Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy) try to fill this normative gap. The SAT method seeks to integrate the risk-based assessment of AI with an assessment of the perceptive-psychological and socio-behavioural aspects of its social acceptability. (shrink)

In a recent paper, María Pía Méndez (2022) offers an epistemic critique of epistocracy according to which the sort of politically well-informed but homogenous groups of citizens that would be empowered under epistocracy would lack reliable access to information about the preferences of less informed citizens. Specifically, they would lack access to such citizens’ preferences regarding the form that policies ought to take—that is, how these policies ought to be implemented. Arguing that this so-called Information Gap Problem militates against epistocracy, (...) Méndez instead recommends that we respond to problems created by widespread voter ignorance by improving the flow of information between political actors by adopting some participatory democratic institutions. In this paper I argue that the severity of the Information Gap Problem for epistocracy is overstated. After first sketching some background (Section 1), I argue that it is hard to see why information about citizens’ preferences for the form that policies ought to take is important enough that the expected costs of epistocracy outweigh its expected benefits if it selectively empowers people who lack access to such information (Section 2). Moreover, different forms of epistocracy are less threatened by the Information Gap Problem, assuming it is indeed a problem. For some forms of epistocracy, it may be no problem whatsoever. However, I conclude by suggesting that Méndez touches upon some more serious problems for epistocracy (Section 3). First, even setting aside the Information Gap Problem, there are open questions about the possible epistemic inferiority of epistocracy relative to democracy. Second, more comprehensive accounts of political competence that move beyond the possession of sufficient levels of political information are much harder to reliably test for, thus complicating the task of devising effective epistocratic selection mechanisms. Lastly, epistocracy arguably creates a serious risk of abuse that may outweigh any other benefits it brings. More research is needed to determine how (and whether) epistocrats can respond to such challenges. (shrink)

The shooting bias hypothesis aims to explain the disproportionate number of minorities killed by police. We present the evidence mounting in support of the existence of shooting bias and then focus on two dissenting studies. We examine these studies in light of Biddle and Leuschner’s “inductive risk account of epistemically detrimental dissent” and conclude that, although they meet this account only partially, the studies are in fact epistemically and socially detrimental as they contribute to racism in society and to a (...) social atmosphere that is hostile to science as scholars working on issues of racism come under attack. We emphasize this final point via recourse to Kitcher’s “Millian argument against the freedom of research.”. (shrink)

Extrapolating causal effects is becoming an increasingly important kind of inference in Evidence-Based Policy, development economics, and microeconometrics more generally. While several strategies have been proposed to aid with extrapolation, the existing methodological literature has left our understanding of what extrapolation consists of and what constitutes successful extrapolation underdeveloped. This paper addresses this lack in understanding by offering a novel account of successful extrapolation. Building on existing contributions pertaining to the challenges involved in extrapolation, this more nuanced and comprehensive account (...) seeks to provide tools that facilitate the scrutiny of specific extrapolative inferences and general strategies for extrapolation. Offering such resources is important especially in view of the increasing amounts of real-world decision-making in policy, development, and beyond that involve extrapolation. (shrink)

The article discusses some aspects of the narrative explanation, and its nature and role in explaining the historical entities. The author defends possibility of formulating status of narrative explanation as scientific and adequate for all historical sciences, here defined as sciences concerned with the spatio-temporally restricted entities. lie suggests that uniqueness and particularity of historical objects are not in contradiction with the claims based on the classical model of explanation in the way of logical inferring. Results of discussion are that (...) undeveloped explanations, like explanation sketches, could be adopt, not just in accordance with pragmatic reasons, but also as the step toward full-fledged or complete explanation trough mediation of developing the scientific research programs on which they are based. (shrink)

The book deals with the changing nature and with the history of the concept of scientific determinism from the classical mechanics until the time immediately preceding quantum mechanics: such a historical-philosophical reconstruction is aimed at (1) signalizing and overcoming the deficiencies of the received opinion on the topic and (2) understanding better a concept which has influenced science from the beginning. -/- Before dealing with historical matters I develop in the first Chapter a kind of new, three-dimensional “measurement system” for (...) analyzing any concept of scientific determinism: many different concepts have been developed in the course of history, and we need a classification system which, on the one hand, is inclusive and broad enough to deal with different concepts; on the other hand, which makes possible to differentiate with some precision between them. My “measurement system” has three dimension or parameter: the “strength” (of the determining link between different states of the physical system), the “depth” (depending on how strong the ontological commitment of the particular concept of scientific determinism is), and the breadth (referring to the domain or the object, to which a deterministic evolution is ascribed). -/- In the second chapter I discuss briefly some main shortcomings of the received opinion about scientific determinism. Then I try to identify the “core” of scientific determinism at its origins while at the same time embedding it in the broader historical-cultural context especially of the Renaissance. On the one hand I show how the core of scientific determinism was mathematical, and this distinguished it from other related concepts, as mechanism, the principle of sufficient reason, and the aristotelic conception of science. On the other hand, precisely the support which these related concepts provided to scientific determinism, together with its mathematical nature, endowed it with an incredible resistance against empirical classification. -/- In the following three chapters I analyze the historic-philosophical development of scientific determinism along the three parameter of my measurement system. -/- In the third Chapter I reconstruct the weakening of scientific determinism with respect to its depth: the starting point is the question about the extent in which the deterministic mathematical descriptions do refer. In the development of mechanics into analytical mechanics the more and more formal character of its mathematical descriptions became evident and it became less obvious that these formal, deterministic structures also have an immediate material truth. Parallel developments within epistemology, starting with Kantian philosophy (which I deal with quite in detail), let the deterministic structures (principle, laws, equations, causal relations) appear less absolute and real and more as a product of reason, as conventions, or as models. A brief consideration of the interpretation of mechanics and its principles by Jacobi, Hertz, Mach and Poincaré shows the implications of these developments. -/- The fourth chapter reconstructs the weakening of scientific determinism with respect to the strength of the determining link: here my work deepens the track which has been opened by Ian Hacking, who interpreted the so-called “probabilistic revolution” in the 19th Century as the main reason for the erosion of determinism. The increasing pervasiveness of statistical methods in the social and natural sciences in the course of the 19th Century gave rise to a conception of scientific laws which could dispense with strict determinism. A new, empirical interpretation of probability (Frequentism) and the statistical explanation of thermodynamic phenomena in physics even suggested chance phenomena to be a necessary condition for the emergence of natural laws. -/- The last part of my work (Ch. 5, 6 and 7) considers the period (2nd half of the 19th century until ca. 1920) in which the concept of scientific determinism became explicit and was discussed as a world-picture or a world-view – that is, in its maximal breadth. I argue that there were two main reasons for the emergence of an explicit and ideological opposition “determinism vs. indeterminism” at that time: the first was the successful application of the deterministic paradigm to sociology, history, physiology and psychology in the course of the 19th Century, which provided scientific determinism with ethical implications (in particular with respect to the problem of free will, which scientific determinism seemed to deny). The second, related reason is that in the 19th Century natural scientists became public men, science was increasingly popularized and scientific issues were increasingly related to life-issues, to worldview-questions, and even to politics. In Chapter 6 I reconstruct the debates on the issue “determinism vs. indeterminism” in such a public, ideological and sometimes even political context. Among the discussants were Fechner, Du Bois-Reymond, Helmholtz, Bernard, Ostwald, Haeckel, Boussinesq, Maxwell, Boutroux, Poincaré, Renouvier, James und Peirce. Also in Vienna the debate on the issue of determinism was fervid and took ideological and political connotations: Michael Stöltzner and Deborah Coen have pointed to a particular tradition of “Vienna Indeterminism” (Stöltzner), or Viennese liberal probabilism (Coen), which was characterized by a strongly empirical conception of science and by the full acceptance and appreciation of statistical thinking in science. In the last Chapter of my work I focus on the early philosophy of Edgar Zilsel, a philosopher who stood near to the Vienna Circle and who has been much neglected in the literature by now, and I suggest considering it as part of the “Vienna Indeterminism”. First, I show how he gave an indeterministic foundation both to statistical and causal knowledge as well as to irreversibility in physics. Second, I inquire into his philosophy of probability and show how it developed in parallel to the ones of Hans Reichenbach and Richard von Mises. Finally, Zilsel happens to be a further, relevant case-study for pointing to the ideological and political side of the issue of determinism. -/- At the end of this reconstruction it should have become clear how no physical theory, no empirical evidence and no experimental confirmation can support or contradict scientific determinism in its non-trivial formulations. The validity of any such formulation depends strongly not only (from the systematical point of view) from the definition of other concepts (like time, physical state, causality etc.), but also from the particular conception of science which more or less implicitly constitutes its background, and which is subjected to historical change. -/- (ISBN: 9783495491034). (shrink)

Understanding Institutions proposes a new unified theory of social institutions that combines the best insights of philosophers and social scientists who have written on this topic. Francesco Guala presents a theory that combines the features of three influential views of institutions: as equilibria of strategic games, as regulative rules, and as constitutive rules. -/- Guala explains key institutions like money, private property, and marriage, and develops a much-needed unification of equilibrium- and rules-based approaches. Although he uses game theory concepts, the (...) theory is presented in a simple, clear style that is accessible to a wide audience of scholars working in different fields. Outlining and discussing various implications of the unified theory, Guala addresses venerable issues such as reflexivity, realism, Verstehen, and fallibilism in the social sciences. He also critically analyses the theory of “looping effects” and “interactive kinds” defended by Ian Hacking, and asks whether it is possible to draw a demarcation between social and natural science using the criteria of causal and ontological dependence. Focusing on current debates about the definition of marriage, Guala shows how these abstract philosophical issues have important practical and political consequences. -/- Moving beyond specific cases to general models and principles, Understanding Institutions offers new perspectives on what institutions are, how they work, and what they can do for us. (shrink)

This article argues that it is far from trivial to convert social science concepts into accurate categories on which algorithms work best. The literature raises this concern in a general way; for example, Deeks notes that legal concepts, such as proportionality, cannot be easily converted into code noting that ‘The meaning and application of these concepts is hotly debated, even among lawyers who share common vocabularies and experiences’ (Deeks in Va Law Rev 104, pp. 1529–1593, 2018). The example discussed here (...) is recidivism prediction, where the factors that are of interest are difficult to capture adequately through questionnaires because survey responses do not necessarily indicate whether the behaviour that is of interest is present. There is room for improvement in how questions are phrased, in the selection of variables, and by encouraging practitioners to consider whether a particular variable is the sort of thing that can be measured by questionnaires at all. (shrink)

Stephen Grimm defends the idea that for understanding people, we need to think of understanding not only in terms of grasp of structure but also in terms of a notion of understanding-as-taking-to-be-good. In this paper, I critically examine this idea. First, I argue that in some cases, understanding-as-taking-to-be-good can be explained in terms of understanding-as-grasp-of-structure. Then, I consider one further way in which understanding-as-taking-to-be-good could be obtained through something which is not a form of grasp of structure, which narrows and (...) refines Grimm’s understanding-as-taking-to-be-good concept. (shrink)

This commentary continues an exchange on eugenics in Monash Bioethics Review between Anomaly (2018), Wilson (2019), and Veit, Anomaly, Agar, Singer, Fleischman, and Minerva (2021). The eponymous question, “Can ‘Eugenics’ be Defended?”, is multiply ambiguous and does not receive a clear answer from Veit et al.. Despite their stated desire to move beyond mere semantics to matters of substance, Veit et al. concentrate on several uses of the term “eugenics” that pull in opposite directions. I argue, first, that Veit et (...) al. (2021) makes much the same error as does Anomaly (2018) in characterizing eugenics; second, that the paper misunderstands the relationship between eugenics and enhancement; and third, that it distorts the views expressed in my “Eugenics Undefended”. (shrink)

Gender bias is a recalcitrant problem in academia and society. However, dissent has been created on this issue. We focus on dissenting studies by Stephen J. Ceci and Wendy M. Williams, arguing that they reach conclusions that are unwarranted on the basis of the available evidence and that they ignore fundamental objections to their methodological decisions. Drawing on discussions from other contexts, particularly on manufactured dissent concerning anthropogenic climate change, we conclude that dissent on gender bias substantially contributes to the (...) exacerbation of biases in society and an increasing number of attacks on researchers, making it both epistemically and socially problematic. (shrink)

The interventionist theory of causation has been advertised as an empirically informed and more nuanced approach to causality than the competing theories. However, previous literature has not yet analyzed the regression discontinuity (hereafter, RD) and the difference-in-differences (hereafter, DD) within an interventionist framework. In this paper, I point out several drawbacks of using the interventionist methodology for justifying the DD and RD designs. However, I argue that the first step towards enhancing our understanding of the DD and RD designs from (...) an interventionist perspective is to take advantage of the assumptions of common trend and continuity. (shrink)

Instructional material is an integral part of teaching and learning process. Validating instructional materials is imperative to ensure quality before widespread utilization. This study validated the developed Gamified Instructional Material (GIM) in genetics for grade 12 STEM students. It employed the descriptive-developmental research design involving 41 STEM students and 11 Biology education experts chosen through purposive sampling. Findings revealed that students and experts strongly agreed that the GIM satisfied the criteria for a sound and valid instructional material. Further, the significant (...) change in the pretest and posttest scores of students indicated an improvement of their knowledge in genetics. It is recommended that the GIM be used as supplementary instructional material in teaching genetics. (shrink)

The current study was conducted to assess the attitude of higher education students. The current study sample consists of 600 students selected from the Dire Dawa University. The Student Attitude Inventory (SAI) was developed using 6 subsidies given to sample subjects for data collection purposes. The researcher used the most widely accepted and widely used mathematical methods to analyze and interpret data including mean, SD and t‐test. The results showed that male students had a better and more positive attitude towards (...) the learning process and its affiliates. In addition, these results also showed that urban students had a better learning environment than in rural areas. (shrink)

Обсъден е преходът към пазарна икономика в Русия: от края на СССР до първия мандат на Путин, както и песпективите за социално-икономическо и политическо развитие.

Статията обсъжда текста на Леви-Строс "Мит и значение" в качеството на интерпретативен ключ към най-новата българска история след промените през 1989 година.

В средата на 80-те години съветското общество не е в криза, а в изчерпаност. До криза довежда тъкмо опитът да се преодолее тази изчерпаност. Дотогава, макар в последните години на Брежнев все по-бавно, икономиката и обществото се развиват за сметка сметка на екстензивни фактори. Това, което се опитва да направи Горбачов е да· прехвърли развитието на интензивни релси. Възможно ли е изобщо обаче интензивно развитие в рамките на егалитаристка и колективитека менталност или в икономика, която може да си позволи да (...) не се съобразява с разходите? "Социализмът е до немай къде приспособен към стратегия за оцеляване въобще, а особено в условията на "чрезвичайщина" и доколкото "мы за ценой не постоим", удържа по този път много победи, в т.ч. и икономически";,Проблемът за неефективността на съветския стопански модел продължава да се изостря". Изоставането от икономиката на САЩ непрекъснато се увеличава. Структурата на икономиката е силно деформирана в съответствие с марксизма (и особено - със сталинизма). (shrink)

Les sciences humaines se distinguent les unes des autres par leurs méthodes et leurs objets privilégiés. En élaborant des procédures d’enquête spécifiques, elles s’efforcent de comprendre la vie psychique ou les pratiques collectives, la distribution des populations ou les rapports entre groupes, les idéaux sociaux ou les échanges matériels. Leur fin commune est toutefois d’éclairer de leurs lumières croisées une même réalité humaine et sociale. Leurs objets ont donc vocation à se rejoindre, leurs méthodes à se compléter. En interrogeant leur (...) pluralité sans la reconduire à une illusoire unité, la philosophie peut éclairer l’espace conceptuel et problématique qu’elles ont en commun. Elle ne ressort toutefois pas indemne d’une telle étude : ses propres questionnements, épistémologiques et politiques, se trouvent radicalement altérés par leur confrontation à ces disciplines. Les contributions réunies dans le second tome de cet ouvrage analysent, dans cette perspective neuf concepts essentiels : la population, le psychisme, la pratique, les classes, le genre, la comparaison, les statistiques, le public et la critique. -/- Ont contribué à ce volume : Ét. Bimbenet, J. Christ, I. Drouet, R. Fanciullacci, S. Ferrando, Ch. Girard, F. Hulak, A. Le Goff, L. Paltrinieri, L. Perreau. (shrink)

Reactivity, or the phenomenon by which subjects tend to modify their behavior in virtue of their being studied upon, is often cited as one of the most important difficulties involved in social scientific experiments, and yet, there is to date a persistent conceptual muddle when dealing with the many dimensions of reactivity. This paper offers a conceptual framework for reactivity that draws on an interventionist approach to causality. The framework allows us to offer an unambiguous definition of reactivity and distinguishes (...) it from placebo effects. Further, it allows us to distinguish between benign and malignant forms of the phenomenon, depending on whether reactivity constitutes a danger to the validity of the causal inferences drawn from experimental data. (shrink)

American philosopher Wilfrid Sellars (1962) once said that “the aim of philosophy, abstractly formulated, is to understand how things in the broadest possible sense hang together in the broadest possible sense.” My main question is this: within the context of contemporary sustainability science, how does the concept of ‘sustainability’ in the broadest possible sense of the concept hang together in the broadest possible sense? I will answer this question by advancing two new explicative definitions of sustainability that jointly constitute a (...) unifying concept of sustainability. This meta-level concept accommodates most of the central meanings conventionally assigned to ‘sustainability’ by sustainability scientists and scholars, offers a useful division of labor between scientists and scholars, and makes explicit value judgements commonly associated with the concept of sustainability. (shrink)

The viruses coexist for approx. 300 million years with the humans. Sometimes viruses can infect people on a large scale. But how was the current pandemic possible? Global warming is causing extreme weather events that have led to an increase in infectious diseases. The new climate can support epidemiological vectors for longer periods of time, creating more favorable conditions for replication and the emergence of new vectors. In the case of emerging infectious diseases, it is considered that there is a (...) border that has already been crossed. Viruses normally have a native area (their "reservoir") from which they should not be pushed out. This creates a dangerous intimacy, with "hotspots" that include locations such as markets, which become real hotbeds of epidemics. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.26974.87364 . (shrink)

Given the endowment effect, the role of attention in decision-making, and the framing effect, most behavioral economists agree that it would be a mistake to accept the satisfaction of revealed preferences as the normative criterion of choice. Some have suggested that what makes agents better off is not the satisfaction of revealed preferences, but ‘true’ preferences, which may not always be observed through choice. While such preferences may appear to be an improvement over revealed preferences, some philosophers of economics have (...) argued that they face insurmountable epistemological, normative, and methodological challenges. This article introduces a new kind of true preference – values-based preferences – that blunts these challenges. Agents express values-based preferences when they choose in a manner that is compatible with a consumption plan grounded in a value commitment that is normative, affective, and stable for the agent who has one. Agents who choose according to their plans are resolute choosers. My claim is that while values-based preferences do not apply to every choice situation, this kind of preference provides a rigorous way for thinking about classic choice situations that have long interested behavioral economists and philosophers of economics, such as ‘Joe-in-the-cafeteria.’. (shrink)

A short discussion of the history and main issues of the philosophy of the social sciences.

Vinten looks at the relationship between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and the social sciences as well as at the ideological implications of Wittgenstein’s philosophy and applications of Wittgenstein’s philosophy to problems in social science. He examines and assesses the work of thinkers like Richard Rorty, Perry Anderson, and Chantal Mouffe. -/- “Robert Vinten has produced an impressively meticulous and wide-ranging discussion of how Wittgenstein’s mature philosophy can revitalize the social sciences. There is insight and scholarship on every page. This important book will (...) open up new possibilities for both philosophers and social scientists.” —Leonidas Tsilipakos, Lecturer, University of Bristol, UK. (shrink)

Recent conversation has blurred two very different social epistemic phenomena: echo chambers and epistemic bubbles. Members of epistemic bubbles merely lack exposure to relevant information and arguments. Members of echo chambers, on the other hand, have been brought to systematically distrust all outside sources. In epistemic bubbles, other voices are not heard; in echo chambers, other voices are actively undermined. It is crucial to keep these phenomena distinct. First, echo chambers can explain the post-truth phenomena in a way that epistemic (...) bubbles cannot. Second, each type of structure requires a distinct intervention. Mere exposure to evidence can shatter an epistemic bubble, but may actually reinforce an echo chamber. Finally, echo chambers are much harder to escape. Once in their grip, an agent may act with epistemic virtue, but social context will pervert those actions. Escape from an echo chamber may require a radical rebooting of one's belief system. (shrink)

Jung's interpretative "matrix" seems to offer us the possibility to frame the social phenomenology concerning the loss of sense, with the consequent load of experience of widespread awkwardness, in a context of epoch-making, progressive, "one-dimensional" reduction of the symbolic. -/- This seems to us the fundamental matrix of the disastrous, schizoid conflict of the present day society: on one side a literalism in keeping with the logics of power and control, disheartening any possibility of individual and collective development and wellbeing; (...) on the other side the absolute impossibility to keep together the fragments of this vision of the world, anachronistic as it appears by now, in an epoch-making realizing of what could be defined as the violence of the "monotheism" of the reason. -/- The pervasive social influence we are subjected to and we suffer even in the ephemeral shelter of our privacy speaks the language of literalism, rejects the oxygenating receptiveness to the metaphor, prefers the poor inclusive significance of the meaning to the deeper (and potentially enlivening source of psychic welfare) but embarrassing liberty of the sense. (shrink)

A kind of academic inquiry rationally devoted to helping to promote human welfare would give intellectual priority to the tasks of (1) articulating, and improving the articulating of, problems of living, and (2) proposing and critically assessing possible solutions - possible actions, policies, political programmes, ways of living. The pursuit of knowledge and technological know-how would be important but secondary. If such a genuinely rigorous kind of academic inquiry had been in place in our universities at the beginning of the (...) year, many nations would have dealt with Covid-19 far better than they have, and thousands of lives would have been saved. (shrink)

During the 1930s, while both movements were fleeing from persecution by the Nazis, the Vienna Circle and the Frankfurt School planned to collaborate. The plan failed, and in its stead Horkheimer published a critique of the Vienna Circle in “The Latest Attack on Metaphysics” (written in collaboration with Adorno, though he is not credited as an author). This paper will analyse Horkheimer’s (and Adorno’s) article, and the ensuing dialogue with Neurath. The Frankfurt School’s critical stance towards the Vienna Circle can (...) be traced back to Adorno’s earlier objections to the ‘positivist’ myth of the given. In response to Carnap’s attack on Heidegger, Horkheimer (and Adorno) criticized both metaphysics and its ‘scientistic’ overcoming. Their critique employs a number of overgeneralisations about ‘logical positivism’. Neurath’s unpublished reply proposes corrections to the Frankfurt School’s portrayal of ‘positivism’, pointing towards a partly conciliatory direction within the framework of Unified Science. The attempted collaboration between the Vienna Circle and the Frankfurt School ended when Horkheimer refused to publish Neurath's reply to his article in the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Horkheimer subsequently made anti-positivism a central concern for critical theory, setting the tone of subsequent polemics in the Positivismusstreit of the 1960s. (shrink)

ABSTRACTR. G. Collingwood is mostly remembered for his theory that historical understanding consists in re-enacting the thoughts of the historical figure whom one is studying. His first recognizable expression of this view followed from an argument about the emptiness of psychological interpretations of religion, and throughout his career Collingwood offered history as re-enactment as an alternative to psychology. Over time, his argument that the psychology of religion could not be relevant to the veracity of religious beliefs was supplanted by the (...) argument that psychology is self-undermining because the psychologist’s procedure of attributing beliefs to blind psychic needs could apply just as easily to the psychologist him- or herself. As an alternative to what he took to be the self-defeating psychological position, Collingwood put forward the study of the development of beliefs as the motivations for actions, which led him to his views that “all history is the history of thought” and that, in order to understand an historical event, we must mentally re-enact the thoughts that stood behind it. (shrink)

In fact, humans have always been closely related to others. This relationship can be meant to encounter ethical counselor-counselee which is based on an attitude of responsibility. The concept of Levinas’s responsibility can be laid at the foundation for the ethical relationship of counselor-counselee to contribute and strengthen the concept of responsibility in the literature of guidance and counseling, as well as in counseling practices. Based on the literature review and critical analysis, we found the following results: 1) The helping (...) profession is to be interpreted in the framework of thinking responsibility, and the responsibility of counselor-counselee should be able to be realized in concrete actions and patterned being-for so that it becomes I-for-You (asymmetrical), should not be reversed into a being-with so that it becomes You-to-I (reciprocity/mutuality); 2) Responsibility in the context of multicultural counseling is seen in phenomenological by pointing at reality in awareness counselor (intentionality); 3) Empathy as a major component of the counselor in the basic attitude of its existence takes responsibility for substitution (one-in-the-place-of-another). The responsibility of substitution is the unique and the total responsibility of the counselor-counselee; and 4) Reconciliation as the main goal of responsibility. (shrink)

This paper is a critical analysis towardcritical pedagogy in education using the concept of the pedagogy of shalom. Critical analysis is undertakennot to imply that critical pedagogy as formulated by Giroux is a wrong conceptbut this paper aims to recover the fragility and refining that has not been perfect through the values of the divine pedagogy of shalom. Critical pedagogy and shalom pedagogy struggle to question and challenge the mindset and lifestyle underlying the pedagogy of neoliberal that emphasisses market fundamentalism (...) and ultimately create oppression, social injustice and revokedemocracy. Based on this orientation, pedagogy of shalomis introduced to reinforce the foundations and basic theories of critical pedagogy so it doesnnot merely align to activism, withoutreconciliation and to avoid arrogant of social movements and the criticism to power but without theestablishmentof love. The main objective is to achieve social and political changes to thebetter so that public can live injust, free, prosperous and equitablesociety.This article further seeks possibility to apply the concept of the pedagogy of shalom in the context of Christian education in Indonesia. (shrink)

The social sciences are often thought to be inferior to the natural sciences because they do not have laws. Bohman writes that “the social sciences have never achieved much in the way of predictive general laws—the hallmark of naturalistic knowledge—and so have often been denied the honorific status of ‘sciences’” (1994, pg. vii). Philosophers have suggested a number of reasons for the dearth of laws in the social sciences, including the frequent use of ceteris paribus conditions in the social sciences, (...) reflexivity, and the use of ‘odd’ concepts. This thesis argues that the scarcity of laws in the social sciences is primarily due to the concepts that social scientists often work with. These concepts are described as Nomadic and are characterised by disagreement about what can reasonably be included within the scope of a concept. The second half of the thesis explores the implications of this analysis. It argues firstly, that counterfactual analysis is problematic when using Nomadic concepts. Secondly, it argues that taking an intentional perspective on behaviour often involves the use of Nomadic concepts so, if social scientists do hope to formulate laws, then they are more likely to succeed if they focus on behaviour that is not intentional. (shrink)

This volume collects twenty original essays on the philosophy of film. It uniquely brings together scholars working across a range of philosophical traditions and academic disciplines to broaden and advance debates on film and philosophy. The book includes contributions from a number of prominent philosophers of film including Noël Carroll, Chris Falzon, Deborah Knight, Paisley Livingston, Robert Sinnerbrink, Malcolm Turvey, and Thomas Wartenberg. While the topics explored by the contributors are diverse, there are a number of thematic threads that connect (...) them. Overall, the book seeks to bridge analytic and continental approaches to philosophy of film in fruitful ways. Moving to the individual essays, the first two sections offer novel takes on the philosophical value and the nature of film. The next section focuses on the film-as-philosophy debate. Section IV covers cinematic experience, while Section V includes interpretations of individual films that touch on questions of artificial intelligence, race and film, and cinema's biopolitical potential. Finally, the last section proposes new avenues for future research on the moving image beyond film. This book will appeal to a broad range of scholars working in film studies, theory, and philosophy. (shrink)

In this ambitious book composed of the author’s published articles, he develops practical and theoretical frameworks for social work in disability issues. He explores practical strategies for promoting social and economic participation of disabled people from the perspective of developmental social work, whilst examining the situation of their socioeconomic participation in rural Sri Lanka. Based on these theoretical and practical frameworks, together with policy analysis of community-based rehabilitation (CBR), the field research was undertaken collaboratively with local stakeholders in three districts. (...) The findings suggest that developmental social work practices, including an indigenous approach, social investment, and a multi-sectoral approach, could address the vicious cycle of inadequate education, poverty, and marginalisation. This book also explores the implications of these findings for policy and practice in other contexts. (shrink)

In recent work, Atran, Henrich, Norenzayan and colleagues developed an account of religion that reconciles insights from the ‘by-product’ accounts and the adaptive accounts. According to their synthesis, the process of cultural group selection driven by group competition has recruited our proclivity to adopt and spread religious beliefs and engage in religious practices to increase within group solidarity, harmony and cooperation. While their account has much merit, I believe it only tells us half the story of how institutional religions have (...) evolved. Their cultural evolutionary account of religion only looks at the cultural dynamics arising from competition between groups, not at the dynamics arising from within the group. Drawing from game-theoretic analyses of the emergence and cultural evolution of social institutions, I outline two sets of important ‘within-group’ dynamics that shape institutional religions. The first follow from the necessity to keep the interaction of the participants in an equilibrium state in order to maintain the social institution. The second arise from the competition of institutional features for traction within the group. Bringing these dynamics into account enables us to explain prominent features of institutional religions that cannot be satisfactorily explained by the current model of the cultural evolution of religions. (shrink)

There is considerable correspondence between theories and models used in biology and the social sciences. One type of model that is in use in both biology and the social sciences is the fitness landscape model. The properties of the fitness landscape model have been applied rather freely in the social domain. This is partly due to the versatility of the model, but it is also due to the difficulties of transferring a model to another domain. We will demonstrate that in (...) order to transfer the biological fitness landscape model to the social science it needs to be substantially modified. We argue that the syntactic structure of the model can remain unaltered, whilst the semantic dimension requires considerable modification in order to fit the specific phenomena in the social sciences. We will first discuss the origin as well as the basic properties of the model. Subsequently, we will demonstrate the considerations and modifications pertaining to such a transfer by showing how and why we altered the model to analyse collective decision-making processes. We will demonstrate that the properties of the target domain allow for a transfer of the syntactic structure but don’t tolerate the semantic transfer. (shrink)