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Introductions Stoljar 2010: Physicalism
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  1. Physical and Nonphysical Aspects of Nature.Moorad Alexanian - 2002 - Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith 54 (4):287-288.
  2. Logical Positivism.A. J. Ayer (ed.) - 1959 - Greenwood Press.
    Edited by a leading exponent of the school, this book offers--in the words of the movement's founders--logical positivism's revolutionary theories on meaning and metaphysics, the nature of logic and mathematics, the foundations of knowledge ...
  3. Physical Being.Brian Baxter - 1993 - Philosophical Books 34 (3):156-157.
  4. The Idea of Matter as the Ground of All Phenomena of the Universe.K. Th Bayrhoffer & Mrs Ella S. Morgan - 1876 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 10 (1):69 - 88.
  5. The Self-Consciousness Argument : Functionalism and the Corruption of Intentional Content.George Bealer - 2010 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    In this chapter I argue that there is such a barrier created by self-conscious intentional states—conscious intentional states that are about one’s own conscious intentional states. As we will see, however, this result is entirely compatible with a scientific theory of mind, and, in fact, there is an elegant non-reductive framework in which just such a theory may be pursued.
  6. A Vitalist Stopover on the Way to a New Materialism.Jane Bennett - 2010 - In Diana H. Coole & Samantha Frost (eds.), New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics. Duke University Press. pp. 47--69.
  7. Physical Science and Man's Position.Niels Bohr - 1957 - Philosophy Today 1 (1):65-69.
  8. The Control of Attitude in Psycho-Physical Experiments.E. G. Boring - 1920 - Psychological Review 27 (6):440-452.
  9. Mental Causation: Compulsion by Reason.Bill Brewer - 1995 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 69 (69):237-253.
    The standard paradigm for mental causation is a person’s acting for a reason. Something happens - she intentionally φ’s - the occurrence of which we explain by citing a relevant belief or desire. In the present context, I simply take for granted the following two conditions on the appropriateness of this explanation. First, the agent φ’s _because_ she believes/desires what we say she does, where this is expressive of a _causal_ dependence.1 Second, her believing/desiring this gives her a _reason_ for (...)
  10. Physikalismus und evolutionäre Erklärungen.Godehard Brüntrup - 2011 - In Marcus Knaup, Tobias Müller & Patrick Spät (eds.), Post-Physikalismus. Karl Alber. pp. 331-351.
    Article on physicalism and evolutionary explanations.
  11. Physicalism and the Problem of Mental Causation.R. Philip Buckley - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Research 26 (January):155-174.
    In this paper I argue that the problem of mental causation can be solved by distinguishing between classificatory mental properties, like being a pain, and instances of those properties.Antireductive physicalism allows only that the former be irreducibly mental. Consequently, properties like being a pain cannot have causal commerce with the physical without violating causal closure. But instances of painfulness, according to the token identity thesis, are identical with various physical tokens and can therefore have causal efficacy in the physical world. (...)
  12. An Essay on Metaphysics.R. G. Collingwood - 1940 - Oxford University Press.
    One of the great Oxford philosopher's finest works, Essay on Metaphysics considers the nature of philosophy, and puts forward Collingwood's original and influential theories of causation, presuppositions, and the logic of question and answer. This new edition includes three fascinating unpublished pieces that illuminate and amplify the Essay.
  13. Is There Just One Possible World? Contingency Vs the Bootstrap.James T. Cushing - 1985 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 16 (1):31-48.
  14. Do Object-Dependent Properties Threaten Physicalism?Chris Daly & David Liggins - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (11):610-614.
    Thomas Hofweber argues that the thesis of direct reference is incompatible with physicalism, the claim that the nonphysical supervenes on the physical. According to Hofweber, direct reference implies that some physical objects have object-dependent properties, such as being Jones’s brother, which depend on particular objects for their existence and identity. Hofweber contends that if some physical objects have object-dependent properties, then Local-Local Supervenience (the physicalist doctrine on which he concentrates) fails. In this note, we argue that Hofweber has failed to (...)
  15. Review Essay / Making Up Our Minds: Can Law Survive Cognitive Science?Rebecca Dresser - 1991 - Criminal Justice Ethics 10 (1):27-40.
    Lynne Rudder Baker, Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987, xii + 177 pp. Daniel C. Dennett, The Intentional Stance Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987, xi + 388 pp. Paul M. Churchland, Matter and Consciousness Cambridge: MIT Press, revised edition, 1988, xii + 184 pp.
  16. A Recipe for Thought.Fred Dretske - 2002 - In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Minds and Machines. Oup Usa.
  17. Physicalism and the Fallacy of Composition.Crawford L. Elder - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (200):332-43.
    A mutation alters the hemoglobin in some members of a species of antelope, and as a result the members fare better at high altitudes than their conspecifics do; so high-altitude foraging areas become open to them that are closed to their conspecifics; they thrive, reproduce at a greater rate, and the gene for altered hemoglobin spreads further through the gene pool of the species. That sounds like a classic example (owed to Karen Neander, 1995) of a causal chain traced by (...)
  18. A Defence of Speculative Metaphysics.Peter Ells - 2011 - Oxford Philosophical Society Review 33:111-116.
    Metaphysics has been rejected as nonsense by some philosophers (notably Hume and Ayer) because metaphysical systems cannot be tested empirically. This paper argues that these systems can still usefully be compared by using such criteria as: 1) Scope; 2) Not denying basic data; 3) Plausibility; 4) The minimum number of brute facts needed; 5) Engagement with and consistency with current science; 6) Lack of ‘promissory notes’; 7) Elegance and simplicity; 8) Clarity versus fudge. Berkeley’s Idealism and Physicalism (in both qualia (...)
  19. The Physical Sciences and Natural Theology.Paul Ewart - 2013 - In J. H. Brooke, F. Watts & R. R. Manning (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Natural Theology. Oxford Up. pp. 419.
    This chapter demonstrates how natural theology is both encouraged and challenged by the findings of the physical sciences. The scientific method is committed to finding naturalistic explanations, yet the vision that it gives suggests there is more to it than meets this particular eye: the universe seems to be permeated with signs of ‘mind’. The mysterious quantum world has shown us that new ways of thinking are required to deal with material ‘reality’. Quantum theory has also revealed new forms of (...)
  20. A Physicalist Theory of Scientific Theoretical Explanation.Gilbert Bruce Fargen - 1982 - Dissertation, The University of Western Ontario (Canada)
    Physicalist theories of science, theories of science that is which take physics to be the one basic science and which hold all other sciences to be reducible to physics, have thus far failed to provide a defensible account of cause, state, natural law and explanation. Physicalism has so far been confined to using traditional empiricist concepts of these features of theories. ;This dissertation formally constructs new concepts of scientific explanation by a theory, law of a theory and state description of (...)
  21. Historical Materialism and Supervenience.Colin Farrelly - 2005 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (4):420-446.
    In this article I put forth a new interpretation of historical materialism titled the supervenient interpretation . Drawing on the insights of analytical Marxism and utilizing the concept of supervenience, I advance two central claims. First, that Marx's synchronic materialism maintains that the superstructure supervenes naturally on the economic structure. Second, that diachronic materialism maintains that the relations of production supervene naturally on the forces of production. Taken together, these two theses help bring to the fore the central tenets of (...)
  22. The New Materialism.James Kern Feibleman - 1970 - The Hague: M. Nijhoff.
  23. Language, Logic, & God.Frederick Ferré - 1961 - University of Chicago Press.
  24. Language, Logic, and God.Frederick Ferré - 1961 - Greenwood Press.
  25. 2 Special Sciences.Jerry A. Fodor - 1995 - In Paul K. Moser & J. D. Trout (eds.), Contemporary Materialism: A Reader. Routledge. pp. 51.
  26. The Percept and Vector Function Theories of the Brain.Jeffrey E. Foss - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (December):511-537.
    Physicalism is an empirical theory of the mind and its place in nature. So the physicalist must show that current neuroscience does not falsify physicalism, but instead supports it. Current neuroscience shows that a nervous system is what I call a vector function system. I provide a brief outline of the resources that empirical research has made available within the constraints of the vector function approach. Then I argue that these resources are sufficient, indeed apt, for the physicalist enterprise, by (...)
  27. The Problem of Extras and the Contingency of Physicalism.Robert Francescotti - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):241-254.
    Perhaps all concrete phenomena obtain solely in virtue of physical phenomena. Even so, it seems that the world could have been otherwise. It seems that physicalism, if true, is contingently true. In fact, many believe that the actual truth of physicalism allows metaphysically possible worlds duplicating the actual world in all physical respects while containing immaterial extras, e.g. ghosts, spirits, or Cartesian souls, that no physicalist would believe actually exist. Here I focus on physicalism regarding mentality and argue that the (...)
  28. Dialectical Materialism: A Friendly Interpretation.Hans Freistadt - 1956 - Philosophy of Science 23 (2):97-110.
  29. Completeness in Science. [REVIEW]P. K. H. - 1969 - Review of Metaphysics 22 (4):765-765.
  30. Logical Positivism.Oswald Hanfling - 1981 - Columbia University Press.
  31. The Challenges of Energy—Response to Moody-Stuart.John Houghton - forthcoming - Ethics in Science and Environmental Politics.
  32. Language, Logic and Criterion.Hubertus Gezinus Hubbeling - 1971 - Amsterdam: Born N.V..
  33. What's Wrong with Microphysicalism?Andreas Huttemann - 2015 - Routledge.
    'Microphysicalism', the view that whole objects behave the way they do in virtue of the behaviour of their constituent parts, is an influential contemporary view with a long philosophical and scientific heritage. In _What's Wrong With Microphysicalism?_ Andreas Hüttemann offers a fresh challenge to this view. Hüttemann agrees with the microphysicalists that we can explain compound systems by explaining their parts, but claims that this does not entail a fundamentalism that gives hegemony to the micro-level. At most, it shows that (...)
  34. Materialism and Supervenience.Andrew Jack - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (4):426-444.
  35. The Development of Logical Empiricism.Jørgen Jørgensen - 1951 - New York: Johnson Reprint.
  36. How Can My Mind Move My Limbs? Mental Causation From Descartes to Contemporary Physicalism.Jaegwon Kim - 2000 - Philosophic Exchange 30 (1):5-16.
    Mental events enter into causal relations with bodily events. The philosophical task is to explain how this is possible. Descartes’ dualism of mental and material substances ultimately founders on the impossibility of pairing mental events with physical events as causes and effects. This is what I have called “the pairing problem.” Many contemporary views also fail to explain mental causation. In the end, we are left with a dilemma. If mental phenomena are irreducible to physical phenomena, then mental phenomena lose (...)
  37. Physicalism and Panexperientialism: Response to David Ray Griffin.Jaegwon Kim - 1999 - Process Studies 28 (1-2):28-34.
  38. History and Physical.Edward R. Levy - 1989 - Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 33 (1):143-144.
  39. Occasionalism and Non-Reductive Physicalism: Another Look at the Continuous Creation Argument.Daniel Lim - 2014 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75 (1):39-57.
    Malebranche’s so-called conservation is continuous creation (CCC) argument has been celebrated as a powerful and persuasive argument for Occasionalism—the claim that only God has and exercises causal powers. In this paper I want to examine the CCC argument for Occasionalism by comparing it to Jaegwon Kim’s so-called Supervenience argument against non-reductive physicalism. Because the arguments have deep similarities it is interesting and fruitful to consider them in tandem. First I argue that both the CCC argument and the Supervenience argument turn (...)
  40. Is Really Something Wrong with Microphysicalism? Andreas Hüttemann, “What's Wrong with Microphysicalism?”.Holger Lyre - 2008 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 39 (1):167-171.
  41. Fine-Grained Supervenience, Cognitive Neuroscience, and the Future of Functionalism.Pete Mandik - manuscript
    The majority of contemporary philosophers of mind are physicalists. The majority of physicalists, however, are non-reductive physicalists. As nonreductive physicalists, these philosophers hold that a system's mental properties are different from a system's physical properties, that is, they hold that the sum total of mental facts about some system is a different set of facts than the sum total of physical facts about the same system. As physicalists, however, these nonreductivists hold that mental facts are nonetheless determined by physical facts, (...)
  42. Supervenience and Neuroscience.Pete Mandik - 2011 - Synthese 180 (3):443 - 463.
    The philosophical technical term "supervenience" is frequently used in the philosophy of mind as a concise way of characterizing the core idea of physicalism in a manner that is neutral with respect to debates between reductive physicalists and nonreductive physicalists. I argue against this alleged neutrality and side with reductive physicalists. I am especially interested here in debates between psychoneural reductionists and nonreductive functionalist physicalists. Central to my arguments will be considerations concerning how best to articulate the spirit of the (...)
  43. Mental Causation: Unnaturalized but Not Unnatural.Eric Marcus - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):57-83.
    If a woman in the audience at a presentation raises her hand, we would take this as evidence that she intends to ask a question. In normal circumstances, we would be right to say that she raises her hand because she intends to ask a question. We also expect that there could, in principle, be a causal explanation of her hand’s rising in purely physiological terms. Ordinarily, we take the existence and compatibility of both kinds of causes for granted. But (...)
  44. Supervenience? No Chance! Reply to Menuge.D. H. Mellor - 1993 - Analysis 53 (4):236-239.
  45. Przez filozofię do świadomego umysłu [David Chalmers, Świadomy umysł].Paweł Michałowski - 2012 - Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia.
  46. Holisme, Référence Et Irréductibilité du Mental.Martin Montminy - 2005 - Dialogue 44 (3):419-437.
    J’examine en détail l’argument vaguement suggéré par Davidson selon lequel le holisme entraînerait l’irreductibilité du mental. Je défends cet argument contre deux objections souvent faites contre des arguments visant à dériver des thèses métaphysiques à partir de prémisses portant sur nos critères ordinaires d’application de nos termes. J’invoque la sémantique bidimensionnelle pour expliquer les liensentre ces critères et les questions touchant la référence et la réduction. Je montre comment l’irréductibilité du mental dérive du caractère holiste et flexible des critères d’attribution (...)
  47. Russellian Physicalism, Bare Structure, and Swapped Inscrutables.Kevin Morris - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (9-10):180-198.
    This paper discusses and evaluates a recent argument for the conclusion that an attractive variety of Russellian monism ought to be regarded as a form of physicalism. According to this line of thought, if the Russellian’s “inscrutable” properties are held to ground not only experience, but also the physical structure of the world—and in this sense are not “experience-specific”—they thereby have an unproblematic place in physicalist metaphysics. I argue, in contrast, that there can be a sense in which the Russellian’s (...)
  48. Physicalism and Global Supervenience.Paul K. Moser - 1992 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):71-82.
    This paper examines a nonreductive supervenience relation central to a philosophically popular version of nonreductive physicalism inspired by Donald Davidson. The paper argues that this global supervenience relation faces a serious epistemological problem that blocks its being superior to weaker, less general supervenience relations.
  49. Problems with the Physical in Physicalism.Phila Msimang - 2015 - South African Journal of Philosophy 34 (3):336-345.
    Hempel’s Dilemma is a challenge that has to be met by any formulation of physicalism that specifies the physical by reference to a particular physical theory. It poses the problem that if one’s specification of the physical is ‘current’ physical theory, then the physicalism which depends on it is false because current physics is false; and if the specification of the physical is a future or an ideal physics, the physicalism based on it would be trivial as it would be (...)
  50. John Heil the Universe as We Find It. [REVIEW]Alyssa Ney - 2014 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (4):881-886.
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