About this topic
Summary Physicalism about the mind is the metaphysical view that all mental phenomena are ultimately physical phenomena, or necessitated by physical phenomena. There are various mental-physical relations proposed by physicalists to account for their claim. One relation is identity. Identity based physicalism about the mind takes two forms: token physicalism (which asserts that all token mental states are identical to a physical or neural state), and type physicalism (according to which all types of mental states are identical to types of physical or neural states). Another proposed relation is supervenience. Supervenience based physicalism about the mind is a form of type physicalism and it takes two main forms: a priori physicalism (the view that mental truths are a priori deducible from the totality of physical truths) and a posteriori physicalism (the view that mental truths are a posteriori or empirically necessitated by the totality of physical truths).
Key works Identity based physicalism was first proposed by Place 1956, Feigl 1958, and Smart 1959. Token identity based physicalism is taken to originate with Davidson 1963. Explicitly type identity based physicalist approaches are to be found in Lewis 1966 and in Armstrong 1968. An account of the distinction between a priori and a posteriori supervenience based physicalism is given in Chalmers 1996 and in Stoljar 2000. Particular a priori physicalist approaches are to be found in Dennett 1991Dretske 1995Lewis 1990Rey 1995. Particular a posteriroi physicalist approaches appear in Loar 1990Papineau 1993Tye 1995Hill 1997Balog 1999Block & Stalnaker 1999Balog 2012.
Introductions Stoljar 2001
Related categories

1963 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 1963
Material to categorize
  1. Antireductionist Interventionism.Reuben Stern & Benjamin Eva - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Kim’s causal exclusion argument purports to demonstrate that the non-reductive physicalist must treat mental properties (and macro-level properties in general) as causally inert. A number of authors have attempted to resist Kim’s conclusion by utilizing the conceptual resources of Woodward’s (2005) interventionist conception of causation. The viability of these responses has been challenged by Gebharter (2017a), who argues that the causal exclusion argument is vindicated by the theory of causal Bayesian networks (CBNs). Since the interventionist conception of causation relies crucially (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Externalism.Robert A. Wilson - 2003 - In Lynn Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. London: pp. 92-97.
    Introduction to externalism in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Phenomenal Knowledge Why: The Explanatory Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism.Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2019 - In Sam Coleman (ed.), The Knowledge Argument. Cambridge University Press.
    Phenomenal knowledge is knowledge of what it is like to be in conscious states, such as seeing red or being in pain. According to the knowledge argument (Jackson 1982, 1986), phenomenal knowledge is knowledge that, i.e., knowledge of phenomenal facts. According to the ability hypothesis (Nemirow 1979; Lewis 1983), phenomenal knowledge is mere practical knowledge how, i.e., the mere possession of abilities. However, some phenomenal knowledge also seems to be knowledge why, i.e., knowledge of explanatory facts. For example, someone who (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  4. Emergentism and Sadra’s Psychology; a Common Physicalistic Challenge.Mahdi Homazadeh - 2019 - Asian Philosophy 29 (3):221-230.
    This paper first explores in detail a regenerated theory in philosophy of mind, known among contemporary philosophers as ‘emergentism’. By distinguishing strong and weak versions of the theory, I explain two important explanatory challenges presented by physicalists against this theory. In the following, I provide a brief overview of Sadr al-Muta’allihin’s theory of the incipience and degrees of the soul, examining similarities and differences between this theory and strong emergentism. Then, underlining the main aspects of similarity between the two theories, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Taking Emergentism Seriously.Lei Zhong - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):31-46.
    The Exclusion Argument has afflicted non-reductionists for decades. In this article, I attempt to show that emergentism—the view that mental entities can downwardly cause physical entities in a non-overdetermining way—is the most plausible approach to solving the exclusion problem. The emergentist approach is largely absent in contemporary philosophy of mind, because emergentism rejects the Causal Closure of Physics, a doctrine embraced by almost all physicalists. This article, however, challenges the consensus on causal closure and defends a physicalist version of emergentism. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  6. Christian Materialism and Demonic Temptation.Matthew J. Hart - 2018 - Philosophia Christi 20 (2):481–496.
    Demons have the power to cause temptations in us, and Christian materialism implies the supervenience of temptations on brain states. This in turn implies that demons bring about temptations by causally interfering with our brains. But if they have such an ability to affect the physical world, it is mysterious why they do not wreak more havoc than they do both to our brains and in the world more generally. Substance dualism provides an elegant solution: demonic temptation is not a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Why Incompatibilism About Mental Causation is Incompatible with Non-Reductive Physicalism.Jonas Christensen & Umut Baysan - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-23.
    The exclusion problem is meant to show that non-reductive physicalism leads to epiphenomenalism: if mental properties are not identical with physical properties, then they are not causally efficacious. Defenders of a difference-making account of causation suggest that the exclusion problem can be solved because mental properties can be difference-making causes of physical effects. Here, we focus on what we dub an incompatibilist implementation of this general strategy and argue against it from a non-reductive physicalist perspective. Specifically, we argue that incompatibilism (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism.Jonathan J. Loose, Angus John Louis Menuge & J. P. Moreland - 2018 - Oxford, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell.
  9. Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. Christopher S. Hill.Edward Wilson Averill - 1994 - Philosophy of Science 61 (2):319-321.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. Logic Without Metaphysics: And Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. Ernest Nagel.Henry Veatch - 1958 - Philosophy of Science 25 (4):295-297.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. O Livre-Arbítrio em John R. Searle: Uma Contraposição do Naturalismo Biológico ao Fisicalismo e ao Funcionalismo.Daniel P. Nunes - 2014 - Dissertation, UNIVERSIDADE DE CAXIAS DO SUL
    This dissertation aims to examine whether John Searle’s biological naturalism is a more viable alternative to current physicalist and functionalist positions in dealing with the issue of free will. Thus, my strategy is to identify the assumptions of these lines of thought and their philosophical consequences. In order to accomplish this goal the concept of intrinsic intentionality is taken as a guide. I begin by defining what is meant by free will and go on to broadly characterize physicalist and functionalist (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Neural Correlates of Consciousness and the Nature of the Mind.Matthew Owen - 2019 - In Mihretu P. Guta (ed.), Consciousness and the Ontology of Properties. New York: Routledge. pp. 241-260.
    It is often thought that contemporary neuroscience provides strong evidence for physicalism that nullifies dualism. The principal data is neural correlates of consciousness (for brevity NCC). In this chapter I argue that NCC are neutral vis- à-vis physicalist and dualist views of the mind. First I clarify what NCC are and how neuroscientists identify them. Subsequently I discuss what NCC entail and highlight the need for philosophical argumentation in order to conclude that physicalism is true by appealing to NCC. Lastly, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13. The Natural Worlds of Robert Kirk: Fairies, Beasts, Landscapes and Lychnobious Liminalities.Lizanne Henderson - unknown
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Davidson's Identity Crisis.Daniel D. Hum - 1998 - Dialectica 52 (1):45-61.
    Professor Davidson's anomalous monism has been subject to the criticism that, despite advertisements to the contrary, if it were true mental properties would be epiphenomenal. To this Davidson has replied that his critics have misunderstood his views concerning the extensional nature of causal relations and the intensional character of causal explanations. I call this his ‘extension reply’. This paper argues that there are two ways to read Davidson's ‘extension reply’; one weaker and one stronger. But the dilemma is that: the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. A Materialist Theory of the Mind.Alvin I. Goldman - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (22):812-818.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   263 citations  
  16. Smart, Materialism and Occam's Razor.Peter Glassen - 1976 - Philosophy 51:349.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Beyond Dualism and Monism: Bergson's Slanted Being.Messay Kebede - 2016 - Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy 24 (2):106-130.
    There is an old but still unresolved debate pertaining to the question of Bergsonian monism or dualism. Scholars who think that Bergson is ultimately monist clash with those who claim that he has consistently maintained a dualist position. Others speak of contradiction and point out his failure to reconcile dualism with monism. What feeds on the debate is Bergson’s undeniable change of direction: while his first book is flagrantly dualist, his second book takes a sharp turn toward monism. Without denying (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  18. Physicalism; the Philosophical Foundations.Keith Campbell - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):223-226.
  19. An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method.Henry Bradford Smith - 1934 - Philosophy of Science 1 (4):488-491.
  20. Wittgenstein and Physicalism.Rudolf Haller - 1989 - Critica 21 (63):17-32.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  21. Making Things Simple.John Heil - 1979 - Critica 11 (31):3-33.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  22. Physicalism: From Supervenience to Elimination.Andrew Melnyk - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (3):573-587.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  23. From Reduction to Type-Type Identity.Frank Jackson - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):644-647.
    I argue, first, that there is a problem for his account of reduction as it stands; second, that the change that needs to be made is relatively clear ; but, third, that when the needed change is made, his claim that the best form of physicalism is a reductive one amounts to the claim that the best form of physicalism is the ‘Australian’ type-type identity version. I do not see this as an objection—far from it.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  24. A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism. [REVIEW]John Bickle - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):262-264.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  25. What to Do If You Want to Defend a Theory You Cannot Prove: A Method of "Physical Speculation".Peter Achinstein - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (1):35-56.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  26. The Illusory Riches of Sober's Monism.Philip Kitcher, Kim Sterelny & C. Kenneth Waters - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):158-161.
  27. The Laws of Philosophy: A Contemporary Viewpoint.Vladimir N. Dubrovsky - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 40:39-45.
    Since there is a hierarchy in levels of the organization of the world there is a plurality of aspects of scientific philosophy, each of which takes its bearings from this or that level of the organization of the world. This means that when speaking about the laws of philosophy, it is necessary to specify which aspect is being spoken about. In the course of my argument my guideline is the highest, or cosmic world, but I shall also use examples from (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. Materialism as Metaphysics? Hobbes’ Rationalist Materialism.Richard A. Lee Jr - 2005 - Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 26 (2):137-155.
    “Whatever is, is matter.” Is this all there is to materialism? Is it really nothing more than the result of a kind of metaphysical census? “We have looked around, and all we find is matter. The reports of souls and angels, God and separated intelligences, ideas and essences have all proven false. Whatever is, is matter.” Yet how would I ever come to know such a thing? The issue is not only that I cannot possibly take such a census. More (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. Physicalism and Neo-Lockeanism About Persons.Joungbin Lim - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (8):1229-1240.
    The central objection to neo-Lockeanism about persons is the too many thinkers problem: NLP ends up with an absurd multiplication of thinkers. Sydney Shoemaker attempts to solve this problem by arguing that the person and the animal do not share all of the same physical properties. This, according to him, leads to the idea that mental properties are realized in the person’s physical properties only. The project of this paper is to reject Shoemaker’s physicalist solution to the too many thinkers (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. A Reductive Physicalist Account of the Autonomy of Psychology.Orly R. Shenker - unknown
    The appearance of multiple realization of the special sciences kinds by physical kinds can be fully explained within a type-identity reductive physicalist framework, based on recent findings in the foundations of statistical mechanics. This has been shown in Hemmo and Shenker. However, while this account is available for special sciences like biology and thermodynamics, it is unavailable for psychology. Therefore the only coherent physicalist account of psychology is a type-type identity account. The so-called “non reductive” physicalism turns out to be (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. Quandaries of Mind, Brain, and Cosmos.Robert M. Anderson Jr - 1978 - International Philosophical Quarterly 18 (2):215-222.
  32. Adversary Metaphysics.George S. Pappas - 1983 - Philosophy Research Archives 9:571-585.
    Berkeley construes his own immaterialist philosophy as facing a serious competitor, namely, what he often termed ‘materialism.’ He tries on several grounds to eliminate materialism from the competition, thus leaving immaterialism as the most plausible metaphysical theory of perception and the external world. In this paper these grounds are explored, and it is found that Berkeley’s method for rational choice between materialism and immaterialism involves consideration of a host of criteria for choice between competitive theories.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. The Significance of Emergence.Tim Crane - 2001 - In Barry Loewer & Grant Gillett (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
    This paper is an attempt to understand the content of, and motivation for, a popular form of physicalism, which I call ‘non-reductive physicalism’. Non-reductive physicalism claims although the mind is physical (in some sense), mental properties are nonetheless not identical to (or reducible to) physical properties. This suggests that mental properties are, in earlier terminology, ‘emergent properties’ of physical entities. Yet many non-reductive physicalists have denied this. In what follows, I examine their denial, and I argue that on a plausible (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  34. Scientific Representation, Materialism and New Facts: A Response to David Hodgson.Elizabeth Schier - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (1-2):189-194.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism.Frank Jackson - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):614.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   156 citations  
  36. Physicalism.Geoffrey Hellman - 1980 - Philosophical Review 89 (4):625.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  37. In Contact With the Physical World.Robert A. Jaeger - 1973 - Philosophical Review 82 (4):534.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. The Nature of the Physical World.Arthur E. Murphy - 1930 - Philosophical Review 39 (5):502.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   61 citations  
  39. Functionalism, Superduperfunctionalism, and Physicalism: Lessons From Supervenience.Ronald Endicott - 2016 - Synthese 193 (7):2205-2235.
    Philosophers almost universally believe that concepts of supervenience fail to satisfy the standards for physicalism because they offer mere property correlations that are left unexplained. They are thus compatible with non-physicalist accounts of those relations. Moreover, many philosophers not only prefer some kind of functional-role theory as a physically acceptable account of mind-body and other inter-level relations, but they use it as a form of “superdupervenience” to explain supervenience in a physically acceptable way. But I reject a central part of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  40. Non-Reductive Physicalism and the Teleo-Pragmatic Theory of Mind.Robert Van Gulick - 2011 - Philosophia Naturalis 48 (1):103-124.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. The Natures of Types and Tokens: On the Metaphysical Commitments of Non-Reductive Physicalism.Raphael van Riel - 2014 - Metaphysica 15 (1).
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. Physicalism and the Evolution of Consciousness.Roland Puccetti - 1975 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5 (sup2):171-183.
  43. A Materialist's Misgivings About Eliminative Materialism.Jeffrey Foss - 1985 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15 (sup1):105-133.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. Materialism and the First Person.Geoffrey Madell - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53:123-139.
    Here are some sentences from Fred Dretske's book Naturalising the Mind:For a materialist there are no facts that are accessible to only one person … If the subjective life of another being, what it is like to be that creature, seems inaccessible, this must be because we fail to understand what we are talking about when we talk about its subjective states. If S feels some way, and its feeling some way is a material state, how can it be impossible (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  45. Eliminative Materialism and Propositional Attitudes.Paul M. Churchland - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):67-90.
  46. What's Wrong with Anomalous Monism?Norman Melchert - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (5):265.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  47. After Materialism--What?H. T. C. & Richard Clifford Tute - 1945 - Journal of Philosophy 42 (15):418.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. A Contribution to Chjristian Materialism.John Allcock - 1970 - New Blackfriars 51 (607):560-571.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. Mental States, Natural Kinds and Psychophysical Laws.Colin McGinn & James Hopkins - 1978 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 52 (1):195-236.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  50. I–David Papineau.David Papineau - 1999 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):17-43.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
1 — 50 / 1963