Related categories

175 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 175
  1. added 2020-05-09
    Self-Knowledge and a Refutation of the Immateriality of Human Nature: On an Epistemological Argument Reported by Razi.Pirooz Fatoorchi - 2020 - International Philosophical Quarterly 60 (2):189-199.
    The paper deals with an argument reported by Razi (d. 1210) that was used to attempt to refute the immateriality of human nature. This argument is based on an epistemic asymmetry between our self-knowledge and our knowledge of immaterial things. After some preliminary remarks, the paper analyzes the structure of the argument in four steps. From a methodological point of view, the argument is similar to a family of epistemological arguments (notably, the Cartesian argument from doubt) and is vulnerable to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. added 2020-04-13
    Materialism.Alan Tapper - 2006 - In Anthony Grayling, Andrew Pyle & Naomi Goulder (eds.), The Continuum Encyclopaedia of British Philosophy, Volume 3. London, UK, and New York, USA: Thoemmes Continuum. pp. 2105-2106.
    Full-bodied materialism is a rarity in British philosophy. In fact, notable British materialists before recent times seem to number only two: Thomas Hobbes in the seventeenth century, and Joseph Priestley in the eighteenth. Their materialisms were attempts to construct a scientific ontology, but there the similarity ends, since they had very different ideas of the nature of science. Hobbes took science to be the study of motion, using Galilean geometric method; Priestley worked with a Newtonian methodology and conceived of matter (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. added 2020-03-16
    Mind-Body Interaction and Modern Physics.Charis Anastopoulos - manuscript
    The idea that mind and body are distinct entities that interact is often claimed to be incompatible with physics. The aim of this paper is to disprove this claim. To this end, we construct a broad mathematical framework that describes theories with mind-body interaction (MBI) as an extension of current physical theories. We employ histories theory, i.e., a formulation of physical theories in which a physical system is described in terms of (i) a set of propositions about possible evolutions of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. added 2020-02-11
    A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism.A. Botterell - 2003 - Philosophical Review 114 (1):125-128.
    A review of Andrew Melnyk's _A Physicalist Manifesto_ (Cambridge: CUP, 2003).
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   81 citations  
  5. added 2020-02-11
    Causing Actions.Jennifer Hornsby - 2002 - Mind 111 (441):159-161.
    Some of the claims of Paul Petroski's _Causing Actions_ are discussed in this review of the book.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  6. added 2020-01-02
    Consciousness and Meaning: Selected Essays by Brian Loar.Katalin Balog & Stephanie Beardman - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    One of the most important problems of twentieth century analytic philosophy concern the place of the mind – and in particular, of consciousness and intentionality – in a physical universe. Brian Loar’s essays in the philosophy of mind in this volume include his major contributions in this area. His central concern was how to understand consciousness and intentionality from the subjective perspective, and especially, how to understand subjectivity in a physical universe. He was committed to the reality and reliability of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. added 2019-11-07
    The Ontology of Mind: Events, States and Processes.Daniel Stoljar & Helen Steward - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (3):418.
    The aim of this book is to argue that issues in metaphysics—in particular issues about the nature of states and causation—will have a significant impact in philosophy of mind. As Steward puts it: “the category of state has been so grossly misunderstood that some theories of mind which are supposed to encompass entities traditionally regarded as falling under the category, e.g., beliefs and desires, cannot so much as be sensibly formulated, once we are clearer about the nature of states”. According (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  8. added 2019-10-03
    Phenomenal Concepts and Physical Facts: A Dialogue with Mary.Tufan Kıymaz - forthcoming - Filozofia.
    This is a dialogue between an opponent of the phenomenal concept strategy and Mary from Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument. In this dialogue, Mary, who has complete physical knowledge about what it is like to see red, but has never seen red, is a physicalist and she defends the phenomenal concept strategy against her interlocutor’s objections. In the end, none of them is able to convince the other, but their conversation, through considerations of different versions of the knowledge argument and different (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. added 2019-10-03
    Consciousness and Causal Emergence: Śāntarakṣita Against Physicalism.Christian Coseru - 2017 - In Jonardon Ganeri (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Indian Philosophy. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 360–378.
    In challenging the physicalist conception of consciousness advanced by Cārvāka materialists such as Bṛhaspati, the Buddhist philosopher Śāntarakṣita addresses a series of key issues about the nature of causality and the basis of cognition. This chapter considers whether causal accounts of generation for material bodies are adequate in explaining how conscious awareness comes to have the structural features and phenomenal properties that it does. Arguments against reductive physicalism, it is claimed, can benefit from an understanding of the structure of phenomenal (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. added 2019-06-27
    The Realization of Qualia, Persons, and Artifacts.Ben White - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):182-204.
    This article argues that standard causal and functionalist definitions of realization fail to account for the realization of entities that cannot be individuated in causal or functional terms. By modifying such definitions to require that realizers also logically suffice for any historical properties of the entities they realize, one can provide for the realization of entities whose resistance to causal/functional individuation stems from their possession of individuative historical properties. But if qualia cannot be causally or functionally individuated, then qualia can (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. added 2019-06-06
    A Note on the Completeness of ‘Physics’.D. Spurrett & D. Papineau - 1999 - Analysis 59 (1):25-29.
  12. added 2019-06-06
    The Supervenience of Mental Content.Manuel García-Carpintero - 1993 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94:117.
    The paper discusses the criticism of externalist theories of content which, on the basis of "Twin Earth" considerations, claims that such theories cannot make intentional properties supervenient on basic, intrinsic properties of the organism -- while supervenience is a necessary condition for the causal efficacy of any macro-property. The paper accepts the supervenience requirement, understood as arising from a requirement that macro- properties should be explained by micro- properties. It points out, however, that as a consequence of this, the modality (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13. added 2019-06-06
    Consciousness and Causality. [REVIEW]Douglas C. Long - 1987 - Teaching Philosophy 10 (1):83-86.
    A debate between D. M. Armstrong and Norman Malcolm on the Mind-Body Problem. Physicalism vs. Wittgenstein.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. added 2019-04-24
    Other and Stranger in the structure of the human self (Buber, Levinas, Kristeva).Тaras Lyuty - 2018 - Наукові Записки Наукма. Філософія Та Релігієзнавство 1:20-28.
    In this article, the author examines the relationship between the human self and its two distinctive conditions – the Other, as any alternative form of being, and the Stranger, as hostility. -/- In the first part of the article, the author shows historical and cultural dimensions of Self and the Other in the European context. In this regard, anything that does not belong to a particular cultural area is deprived of ontological status and expelled. The Other has attributes of femininity (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. added 2019-03-21
    What Acquaintance Teaches.Alex Grzankowski & Michael Tye - forthcoming - In Thomas Raleigh & Jonathan Knowles (eds.), Acquaintance: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    In her black and white room, Mary doesn’t know what it is like to see red. Only after undergoing an experience as of something red and hence acquainting herself with red can Mary learn what it is like. But learning what it is like to see red requires more than simply becoming acquainted with it. To be acquainted with something is to know it, but such knowledge, as we argue, is object-knowledge rather than propositional-knowledge. To know what it is like (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. added 2019-03-10
    The Hidden Premiss in the Causal Argument for Physicalism.Robert C. Bishop - 2005 - Analysis 66 (1):44-52.
    The causal argument for physicalism is anayzed and it's key premise--the causal closure of physics--is found wanting. Therefore, a hidden premise must be added to the argument to gain its conclusion, but the hidden premise is indistinguishable from the conclusion of the causal argument. Therefore, it begs the question on physicalism.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  17. added 2019-02-05
    Projecting the Trees but Ignoring the Forest: A Brief Critique of Alfredo Pereira Jr.'s Target Essay.Gregory Michael Nixon - 2018 - Trans/Form/Ação 41 (s1):269-292.
    Pereira’s “The Projective Theory of Consciousness” is an experimental statement, drawing on many diverse sources, exploring how consciousness might be produced by a projective mechanism that results both in private selves and an experienced world. Unfortunately, pulling together so many unrelated sources and methods means none gets full attention. Furthermore, it seems to me that the uncomfortable breadth of this paper unnecessarily complicates his project; in fact it may hide what it seeks to reveal. If this conglomeration of diverse sources (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. added 2019-01-04
    La ricerca scientifica sugli effetti placebo e nocebo: criticità metodologiche, rilevanza filosofica e prospettive sull’elaborazione predittiva.Alessio Bucci - 2018 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 9 (3):280-285.
    ENG: In this brief commentary on Sara Palermo’s article, I highlight several methodological criticisms of the data analysis and hypotheses proposed by the author. I then focus on the relevance of nocebo/placebo studies for the contemporary debate on the mind/body problem. In particular, I show how these phenomena raise questions for dualistic and neurocentric approaches that are still prevalent in philosophy. Finally, I stress the role of expectations in nocebo/placebo models, with reference to a promising theoretical framework: the predictive brain. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. added 2018-08-20
    Cosmic Hermeneutics Vs. Emergence: The Challenge of the Explanatory Gap.Tim Crane - 2010 - In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Emergence in Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 22-34.
    Joseph Levine is generally credited with the invention of the term ‘explanatory gap’ to describe our ignorance about the relationship between consciousness and the physical structures which sustain it.¹ Levine’s account of the problem of the FN:1 explanatory gap in his book Purple Haze (2001) may be summarized in terms of three theses, which I will describe and name as follows...
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  20. added 2018-06-19
    The Physical Action Theory of Trying.David-Hillel Ruben - 2015 - Methode 4 (6).
    Metaphysically speaking, just what is trying? There appear to be two options: to place it on the side of the mind or on the side of the world. Volitionists, who think that to try is to engage in a mental act, perhaps identical to willing and perhaps not, take the mind-side option. The second, or world-side option identifies trying to do something with one of the more basic actions by which one tries to do that thing. The trying is then (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  21. added 2018-06-15
    Consciousness and Physicalism:A Defense of a Research Program.Andreas Elpidorou & Guy Dove - 2018 - New York, NY, USA: Routledge.
    Consciousness and Physicalism: A Defense of a Research Program explores the nature of consciousness and its place in the world, offering a revisionist account of what it means to say that consciousness is nothing over and above the physical. By synthesizing work in the philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and philosophy of science from the last twenty years and forging a dialogue with contemporary research in the empirical sciences of the mind, Andreas Elpidorou and Guy Dove advance and defend a novel (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  22. added 2018-06-15
    Grounding Causal Closure.Justin Tiehen - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3):501-522.
    What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered in every (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  23. added 2018-05-26
    The Chaology of Mind.Adam Morton - 1988 - Analysis 48 (3):135.
    I explore the possibility that mentality can be characterized as a level in between the functional and the neurological, namely as a physical system exhibiting a specific kind of chaos. The argument is meant to make a case for this kind of characterization rather than giving one in specific detail.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  24. added 2018-03-19
    Simple Mindedness: In Defense of Naive Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind.≪/Article-Title≫≪ Cont. [REVIEW]Katalin Balog & Jennifer Hornsby - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (4):562-565.
    Hornsby is a defender of a position in the philosophy of mind she calls “naïve naturalism”. She argues that current discussions of the mind-body problem have been informed by an overly scientistic view of nature and a futile attempt by scientific naturalists to see mental processes as part of the physical universe. In her view, if naïve naturalism were adopted, the mind-body problem would disappear. I argue that her brand of anti-physicalist naturalism runs into difficulties with the problem of mental (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   56 citations  
  25. added 2018-03-08
    Physicalism and the Mind.Robert Francescotti - 2014 - Dordrecht: Springer.
    This book addresses a tightly knit cluster of questions in the philosophy of mind. There is the question: Are mental properties identical with physical properties? An affirmative answer would seem to secure the truth of physicalism regarding the mind, i.e., the belief that all mental phenomena obtain solely in virtue of physical phenomena. If the answer is negative, then the question arises: Can this solely in virtue of relation be understood as some kind of dependence short of identity? And answering (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  26. added 2018-03-05
    The Metaphysics of Mind.Willem deVries - 1992 - Idealistic Studies 22 (3):236-238.
    The Metaphysics of Mind is metaphysics in the logical-reconstruction-of-language mode. Tye claims the assertions of ordinary folk psychology are frequently true and attacks the idea that there are any mental events, but he is not, on the whole, concerned with what kinds of theories are best able to handle the empirical evidence we have. Rather, Tye’s central focus is an argument that the ontological commitments of psychological discourse in general are very minimal: just “persons and other sentient creatures together with (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. added 2018-02-23
    Philosophy of Time and Perceptual Experience.Sean Enda Power - 2018 - New York, USA: Routledge.
    This book explores the important yet neglected relationship between the philosophy of time and the temporal structure of perceptual experience. It examines how time structures perceptual experience and, through that structuring, the ways in which time makes perceptual experience trustworthy or erroneous. -/- Sean Power argues that our understanding of time can determine our understanding of perceptual experience in relation to perceptual structure and perceptual error. He examines the general conditions under which an experience may be sorted into different kinds (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. added 2018-02-17
    Functionalism, Superduperfunctionalism, and Physicalism: Lessons From Supervenience.Ronald Endicott - 2016 - Synthese 193 (7):2205-2235.
    Philosophers almost universally believe that concepts of supervenience fail to satisfy the standards for physicalism because they offer mere property correlations that are left unexplained. They are thus compatible with non-physicalist accounts of those relations. Moreover, many philosophers not only prefer some kind of functional-role theory as a physically acceptable account of mind-body and other inter-level relations, but they use it as a form of “superdupervenience” to explain supervenience in a physically acceptable way. But I reject a central part of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  29. added 2018-02-17
    The Problem of Extras and the Contingency of Physicalism.Robert Francescotti - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):241-254.
    Perhaps all concrete phenomena obtain solely in virtue of physical phenomena. Even so, it seems that the world could have been otherwise. It seems that physicalism, if true, is contingently true. In fact, many believe that the actual truth of physicalism allows metaphysically possible worlds duplicating the actual world in all physical respects while containing immaterial extras, e.g. ghosts, spirits, or Cartesian souls, that no physicalist would believe actually exist. Here I focus on physicalism regarding mentality and argue that the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  30. added 2018-02-17
    What's Wrong with Microphysicalism?Andreas Huttemann - 2004 - Routledge.
    'Microphysicalism', the view that whole objects behave the way they do in virtue of the behaviour of their constituent parts, is an influential contemporary view with a long philosophical and scientific heritage. In _What's Wrong With Microphysicalism?_ Andreas Hüttemann offers a fresh challenge to this view. Hüttemann agrees with the microphysicalists that we can explain compound systems by explaining their parts, but claims that this does not entail a fundamentalism that gives hegemony to the micro-level. At most, it shows that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  31. added 2018-02-17
    The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy.Miranda Fricker & Jennifer Hornsby (eds.) - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.
    The thirteen specially-commissioned essays in this volume are written by philosophers at the forefront of feminist scholarship, and are designed to provide an accessible and stimulating guide to a philosophical literature that has seen massive expansion in recent years. Ranging from history of philosophy through metaphysics to philosophy of science, they encompass all the core subject areas commonly taught in anglophone undergraduate and graduate philosophy courses, offering both an overview of and a contribution to the relevant debates. Together they testify (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  32. added 2017-11-14
    The Mind/Brain Identity Theory: A Critical Appraisal.Leslie Allan - manuscript
    The materialist version of the mind/brain identity theory has met with considerable challenges from philosophers of mind. The author first dispenses with a popular objection to the theory based on the law of indiscernibility of identicals. By means of discussing the vexatious problem of phenomenal qualities, he explores how the debate may be advanced by seeing each dualist and monist ontology through the lens of an evolutionary epistemology. The author suggests that by regarding each ontology as the core of a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. added 2017-10-04
    Intuition and Counterfactual Scenarios.Scott Forschler - 2017 - Southwest Philosophy Review 33 (2):169-178.
    Gerald Harrison has argued that the readiness with which we have and agree to moral intuitions about the value of disembodied persons shows that persons are essentially non-material, for if we were essentially material we would not so easily be able to ascribe moral value to an impossible non-material person. To support this point, he advances a somewhat novel metaphor of intuitions as a "call" to a help desk which can answer our queries about counter-factual scenarios. I first point out (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. added 2017-09-15
    Is the Mind Conscious, Functional, or Both?Max Velmans - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):629-630.
    What, in essence, characterizes the mind? According to Searle, the potential to be conscious provides the only definitive criterion. Thus, conscious states are unquestionably "mental"; "shallow unconscious" states are also "mental" by virtue of their capacity to be conscious (at least in principle); but there are no "deep unconscious mental states" - i.e. those rules and procedures without access to consciousness, inferred by cognitive science to characterize the operations of the unconscious mind are not mental at all. Indeed, according to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   105 citations  
  35. added 2017-09-12
    A Posteriori Physicalism and Introspection.Andreas Elpidorou - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):474-500.
    Introspection presents our phenomenal states in a manner otherwise than physical. This observation is often thought to amount to an argument against physicalism: if introspection presents phenomenal states as they essentially are, then phenomenal states cannot be physical states, for we are not introspectively aware of phenomenal states as physical states. In this article, I examine whether this argument threatens a posteriori physicalism. I argue that as along as proponents of a posteriori physicalism maintain that phenomenal concepts present the nature (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  36. added 2017-09-01
    Physicalism Requires Functionalism: A New Formulation and Defense of the Via Negativa.Justin Tiehen - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):3-24.
    How should ‘the physical’ be defined for the purpose of formulating physicalism? In this paper I defend a version of the via negativa according to which a property is physical just in case it is neither fundamentally mental nor possibly realized by a fundamentally mental property. The guiding idea is that physicalism requires functionalism, and thus that being a type identity theorist requires being a realizer-functionalist. In §1 I motivate my approach partly by arguing against Jessica Wilson's no fundamental mentality (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  37. added 2017-08-24
    No Microphysical Causation? No Problem: Selective Causal Skepticism and the Structure of Completeness-Based Arguments for Physicalism.Matthew Haug - 2019 - Synthese 196 (3):1187-1208.
    A number of philosophers have argued that causation is not an objective feature of the microphysical world but rather is a perspectival phenomenon that holds only between “coarse-grained” entities such as those that figure in the special sciences. This view seems to pose a problem for arguments for physicalism that rely on the alleged causal completeness of physics. In this paper, I address this problem by arguing that the completeness of physics has two components, only one of which is causal. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. added 2017-04-29
    Physics of the Human Mind.Ihor Lubashevsky - 2017 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing AG.
    This book tackles the challenging question what mathematical formalisms and possibly new physical notions should be developed for quantitatively describing human cognition and behavior, in addition to the ones already developed in the physical and cognitive sciences. -/- Indeed, physics is widely used in modeling social systems, where, in particular, new branches of science such as sociophysics and econophysics have arisen. However, many if not most characteristic features of humans like willingness, emotions, memory, future prediction, and moral norms, to name (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. added 2017-03-14
    Worlds 3 Popper 0. [REVIEW]Ray Scott Percival - 1995 - New Scientist (19th May).
    THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM: A GUIDE TO THE CURRENT DEBATE (EDITED BY RICHARD WARNER AND TA D E U S Z SZUBKA) contains recent essays by the key players in the the field of the Mind-Body problem: Searle, Fodor, Problem Honderich, Nagel, McGinn, Stich, Rorty and others. But there are a few interesting exceptions, for example Edelman, Popper, Putnam and Dennett. Nevertheless, these thinkers do get a mention here and there, and nearly all the exciting topical issues are dealt with, including (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. added 2016-12-12
    Understanding the Dimensions of Realization.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (4):213-222.
    Carl Gillett has defended what he calls the “dimensioned” view of the realization relation, which he contrasts with the traditional “flat” view of realization (2003, 2007; see also Gillett 2002). Intuitively, the dimensioned approach characterizes realization in terms of composition whereas the flat approach views realization in terms of occupiers of functional roles. Elsewhere we have argued that the general view of realization and multiple realization that Gillett advances is not able to discharge the theoretical duties of those relations (Shapiro (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  41. added 2016-12-12
    The Cambridge Companion to Atheism.Michael Martin (ed.) - 2006 - Cambridge University Press.
    In this 2007 volume, eighteen of the world's leading scholars present original essays on various aspects of atheism: its history, both ancient and modern, defense and implications. The topic is examined in terms of its implications for a wide range of disciplines including philosophy, religion, feminism, postmodernism, sociology and psychology. In its defense, both classical and contemporary theistic arguments are criticized, and, the argument from evil, and impossibility arguments, along with a non religious basis for morality are defended. These essays (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  42. added 2016-12-12
    Physicalism and its Discontents.Carl Gillett & Barry Loewer (eds.) - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
    Physicalism, a topic that has been central to modern philosophy of mind and metaphysics, is the philosophical view that everything in the space-time world is ultimately physical. The physicalist will claim that all facts about the mind and the mental are physical facts and deny the existence of mental events and state insofar as these are thought of as independent of physical things, events and states. This collection of essays, first published in 2001, offers a series of perspectives on this (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  43. added 2016-12-08
    New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical.Simone Gozzano & Christopher S. Hill (eds.) - 2012 - Cambridge University Press.
    The type identity theory, according to which types of mental state are identical to types of physical state, fell out of favour for some years but is now being considered with renewed interest. Many philosophers are critically re-examining the arguments which were marshalled against it, finding in the type identity theory both resources to strengthen a comprehensive, physicalistic metaphysics and a useful tool in understanding the relationship between developments in psychology and new results in neuroscience. This volume brings together leading (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  44. added 2016-12-08
    Is Direct Reference Theory Incompatible with Physicalism?Mahrad Almotahari & Damien Rochford - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (5):255-268.
  45. added 2016-12-08
    Contemporary Materialism and Epistemological Values.Theodore Guleserian - 1971 - International Philosophical Quarterly 11 (3):403-426.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. added 2016-12-08
    Physics and Common Sense: A Critique of Physicalism.Nicholas Maxwell - 1966 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 16 (February):295-311.
    In this paper I set out to solve the problem of how the world as we experience it, full of colours and other sensory qualities, and our inner experiences, can be reconciled with physics. I discuss and reject the views of J. J. C. Smart and Rom Harré. I argue that physics is concerned only to describe a selected aspect of all that there is – the causal aspect which determines how events evolve. Colours and other sensory qualities, lacking causal (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  47. added 2016-10-18
    H2O, 'Water', and Transparent Reduction.Thomas W. Polger - 2008 - Erkenntnis 69 (1):109-130.
    Do facts about water have a priori, transparent, reductive explanations in terms of microphysics? Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker hold that they do not. David Chalmers and Frank Jackson hold that they do. In this paper I argue that Chalmers.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  48. added 2016-09-05
    Der Qualitative Charakter Bewusster Erlebnisse: Physikalismus Und Phänomenale Eigenschaften in der Analytischen Philosophie des Geistes.Jan G. Michel - 2010 - Dissertation, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster
    Zu den großen Rätseln der Philosophie des Geistes, ja der Philosophie überhaupt, gehört die folgende Frage: Wie lässt sich der qualitative oder phänomenale Charakter bewusster Erlebnisse beschreiben, erklären oder verstehen? Wie lässt sich beispielsweise erklären, wie es ist, eine Rose zu riechen? Einerseits erscheint angesichts der Erfolgsgeschichte der modernen Naturwissenschaften die Annahme plausibel, dass sich letztlich alles physikalisch erklären lässt, auch bewusste Erlebnisse. Bei dieser Annahme handelt es sich um die physikalistische Intuition, die in der analytischen Philosophie des Geistes die (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. added 2016-09-05
    Die Schlick-Feigl-Variante der Identitätstheorie aus heutiger Sicht: Eine Skizze.Jan G. Michel - 2010 - Schlickiana 5:303-338.
  50. added 2016-08-24
    Physicalism and Supervenience: A Case for a New Sense of Physical Duplication.Michael Roche - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (4):669-681.
    Physicalism is the view, roughly, that everything is physical. This thesis is often characterized in terms of a particular supervenience thesis. Central to this thesis is the idea of physical duplication. I argue that the standard way of understanding physical duplication leads—along with other claims—to a sub-optimal consequence for the physicalist. I block this consequence by shifting to an alternative sense of physical duplication. I then argue that physicalism is best characterized by a supervenience thesis that employs both the new (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 175