Pierre Gassendi

Pierre Gassend, or, as he is widely known, Gassendi, was a French materialist philosopher, physicist, astronomer, theologian and Catholic priest. He was the son of Antoine Gassend2 and Françoise Fabry, and was born on January 22nd in 1592 in Champtercier, a village of Provence, and died on October 24th in 1655 in Paris. He received his first education in the cities Digne and Riez and by the age of twelve he began his initiation to Catholicism. He belonged to the Franciscan (...) Order.3 The continuation of his formal education was supported by the Catholic Church as an aspect of his preparation for priesthood.4 He studied Aristotelian philosophy and Catholic theology for the next eight years at the College of Aix in Provence. Pierre Gassendi is typically remembered for introducing the ancient atomic philosophy of Epicurus in 17th century European thought. Gassendi aspired to articulate a new philosophy of nature, in order to replace Aristotelianism, which had been prominent in the context of scholastic thought for centuries, and had constituted the foundation of physics as well as moral philosophy. Gassendi was a priest and an ardent follower of the new scientific methodology of empiricism and of experimental trial. He devoted his life’s work to bringing together the Christian doctrines with the principles of the new science. Gassendi, along with Francis Bacon and Descartes, was one of the most significant figures who exerted influence on the development of science and mechanistic philosophy in the second half of the 17th century, especially in England. His views can be seen throughout the summary of Francois Bernier, a work that emphasizes the atomic views, and materialistic tendencies, of philosophical thought. Gassendi’s adapted Epicurean philosophy spread to Britain with Opera Omnia and the Abregé of Bernier, and also due to Walter Charleton, who published a modified English translation of parts of Animadversiones in 1648. There was also a group of enthusiastic empiricists, who belonged to the circle of Newcastle, as well as a small Epicurean club whose members were among others Kenelm Digby and Nathaniel Highmore. All of the above saw a deep and pervasive influence of Gassendi’s views on British thought. His influence is seen in the writings of major thinkers, such as Boyle, Locke, Hobbes, Newton, Hume, Reid, and in the early works of Leibniz. The multi-dimensional personality of Gassendi, as a pastor, humanist and physical philosopher, accords with a moral and the physical universe in which the Creator God of the Christian faith holds a prominent role. He has been characterized by many researchers as the founder of mechanical philosophy, and as the successor of humanistic historiography. He was a defender of atomic theory, which was flourishing in the second half of 17th century, and also inspired Locke, one of the major proponents of moral theory. Gassendi’s contribution in moral philosophy is unexceptionable; his notions of freedom and pleasure formed the basis of the liberal tradition of late 17th and 18th centuries. (shrink)

We look at some interesting and important episodes in the life of early modern Epicureanism, focusing on natural philosophy. We begin with two early moderns who had a great deal to say about ancient Epicureanism: Pierre Gassendi and Ralph Cudworth. Looking at how Gassendi and Cudworth conceived of Epicureanism gives us a sense of what the early moderns considered important in the ancient tradition. It also points us towards three main themes of early modern Epicureanism in natural philosophy, which we (...) then discuss at greater length: atomism, materialism about the mind or soul, and the denial of providence, which was often accompanied by deflationary explanations of religious belief. (shrink)

In this review of two books, Descartes: An Intellectual Biography, by Stephen Gaukroger, and Descartes and his Contemporaries: Meditations, Objections, and Replies, edited by Roger Ariew and Marjorie Grene, I consider arguments about the motivation of Descartes for writing the Meditations on First Philosophy. According to Gaukroger, Descartes wrote the Meditations simply to legitimate his natural philosophy, which he had already worked out, for an audience of theologians and Scholastic philosophers, whom he feared would condemn it (as Galileo had been (...) condemned by the Inquisition in 1633). If Gaukroger is right, it would explain something that is not mentioned in the collection edited by Ariew and Grene, namely, that five of the seven sets of objections are from theologians, and that the strong objections made by philosophers Gassendi and Hobbes are given relatively short shrift, whereas, the weak objections made by the Jesuit theologian Pierre Bourdin are responded to at great length. Gaukroger, however, has an extremely implausible interpretation of Descartes's position on animals, according to which Descartes held that animals had thoughts and experiences, just not thoughts and experiences like ours, and hence, that he did not think of animals as machines (the "bete machine" hypothesis). (shrink)

Aucune méthode d'hypothèse et de raisonnement hypothétique en science ne peut être examinée dc façon critique sans que soit résolue au préalable la question de ce qui sert d'hypothèse. D'un point de vue très général, des éléments très différents peuvent servir à constituer la partie hypothétique ou conjecturale de la science. Du temps de Gassendi, il était possible de recourir à des entités hypothétiques tels les tourbillons cartésiens, à de généralisations idéalisées de phénomènes telle la loi de la chute libre, (...) à des élaborations conjecturales comme l'image céleste de Ptolémée, à des modèles explicatifs et synthétiques comme la description par Harvey de la circulation sanguine ou à de modèles précurseurs comme celui de Kepler (orbites planétaires). Tous ces éléments de nature différente ont au moins un point commun : nous les acceptons comme tels avec la promesse de pouvoir justifier leur utilisation, plus tard, d'une façon ou d'une autre. La difficulté de cette acceptation préliminaire, selon une conception toute classique, réside dans le paradoxe qui consiste à profiter des avantages - de nature explicative, déductive ou illustrative, pour n'en citer que quelque-uns - offerts par l'emploi de tels éléments hypothétiques, même si nous manquons de preuves satisfaisantes à leur sujet, et cela pour approfondir notre compréhension de phénomènes pour lesquels nous disposons réellement de preuves. (shrink)

This look at Gassendi’s philosophy and science illuminates his contributions to early modern thought and to the broader history of philosophy of science. Two keys to his thought are his novel picture of acquiring and judging empirical belief, and his liberal account of criteria for counting empirical beliefs as parts of warranted physical theories. By viewing his philosophical and scientific pursuits as part of one and the same project, Gassendi’s arguments on behalf of atomism can be fruitfully explained as licensed (...) by his empiricism. (shrink)

The accepted view that Gassendi's ethics is a Christianized form of Epicureanism is incomplete: there is extensive and direct influence of Aristotle's works on the key concepts of Gassendi's ethics, while Epicurean ethics is itself largely informed by Aristotle's views. In the first part of this paper, the notion of freedom as choice informed by rational judgment is examined, and the foundation of Gassendi's intellectualist view of freedom is established in Aristotle's notion of prohairesis. In the second part, the nature (...) of happiness is examined, as well as the relationship between happiness and pleasure, and the contemplative as well as active components of happiness. The third part examines the significance of ethics as an ongoing activity of discernment and regulation of desires: the development of a "second nature" through habitual practice of virtues. The paper concludes with a brief consideration of Aristotle's influence on Gassendi's political philosophy. (shrink)

The 17th century's new science and new philosophy was roughly equally divided between Cartesians and Gassendists. Scholars agree that understanding Gassendi's metaphysics, epistemology and scientific method is crucial for understanding the development of modern philosophy, as Gassendis version of Epicureanism provides a third strand of influence on modern philosophy paralleling Cartesianism and scholasticism. Despite this, Gassendi is rather little understood today. I look at Gassendi in the context of his Objections and Counter-Objections to the Meditations, along with Descartes' Replies. This (...) context provides an explicit display of the opposition between two main strands of the new philosophy. I argue---contra a popular characterization of Gassendi's thought as primarily skeptical or even wholly unsystematic---that Gassendi's objections derive from a systematic psychology and cannot be well understood without a grasp of this psychology. ;I begin with a central methodological question in the dispute, the status of clear and distinct perception and what this tells us about proper procedure. This disagreement has it source in competing accounts of the cognitive faculties. Hence I go on to develop an account of Gassendi's theory of the cognitive faculties, and in particular perception, the acquisition of ideas, and reasoning. I then examine Gassendi's initially rather puzzling objections to the cogito, which act as a test-case for my interpretation of Gassendi's theory of cognition. I end with the dispute over the mind-body relationship. Gassendi objects that Descartes has failed to give any more than a nominal definition of the mind, having failed to make intelligible the modes of the mind in terms of its essence. Gassendi, in contrast, seeks an account of the operations of the mind in terms of the micro-level structure of the parts of the brain, and understands this micro-level structure as the genuine essence of the mind. This objection provides an excellent case for examining how Descartes and Gassendi's rival psychologies influenced two very different notions of scientific method. (shrink)

This book offers a comprehensive treatment of the philosophical system of the seventeenth-century philosopher Pierre Gassendi. Gassendi's importance is widely recognized and is essential for understanding early modern philosophers and scientists such as Locke, Leibniz and Newton. Offering a systematic overview of his contributions, LoLordo situates Gassendi's views within the context of sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century natural philosophy as represented by a variety of intellectual traditions, including scholastic Aristotelianism, Renaissance Neo-Platonism, and the emerging mechanical philosophy. LoLordo's work will be essential (...) reading for historians of early modern philosophy and science. (shrink)

In this account of the philosophical and scientific pursuits of Pierre Gassendi , I challenge a traditional view which says that the inspiration, motivation, and demonstrative grounds for his physical atomism consist not in his empiricism but in his historicist commitments. Indeed, Gassendi suggests that it's a consequence of our best theory of knowledge and sound scientific method that we get evidence which warrants his microphysical theory. ;The primary novelty of his theory of empirical knowledge is his proposal, against the (...) Stoics and Descartes, that it is not a necessary condition of our knowing some claim that we are certain of it. This move immediately broadens the scope of what we can know through the senses, as does his suggestion that we include among such knowledge claims those assertions about what is hidden to the senses which we legitimately infer from the evidence of the perceptually given. ;On the basis of these epistemological positions, Gassendi develops his views on scientific method according to which we attain and justify our best empirical claims by deduction yet, he believes, these claims are at root probabilistic, and we may maintain hypotheses as the basis of our scientific reasoning so long as there is some empirical evidence for them, however broadly construed. ;Hence Gassendi suggests that his atomism constitutes a 'most likely hypothesis' for which we have empirical evidence--which of necessity is found indirectly in 'indicative' signs, those surface level phenomena for which he takes the existence of atoms to be a sine qua non condition. Perhaps the paramount case of such evidence consists in those microscopic observations of crystalline formation and dissolution that he takes to demonstrate the molecular structure of matter--a key and innovative consequence of his atomism. ;The robust character of Gassendi's method emerges in his appeals to indirect evidence for claims about the unobservable and his willingness to count this as adequate empirical grounds for maintaining an atomist hypothesis. Remarkably, he stands at the dawn of the modern era with at least a proposal as to how to resolve one of empiricism's more vexing difficulties, still with us in some form today. (shrink)

In this study the natural philosophy of Pierre Gassendi has been examined in the light of the philosopher's goals. A new effort has been made to interpret Gassendi's almost completely neglected early manuscripts. Particular attention has been paid to the more significant developments and modifications of his philosophical positions that can be discerned by comparing the contents of the manuscripts with the later, published version of his philosophy. These changes, modifications and developments have been related to events and currents of (...) opinion in the wider intellectual and ecclesiastical milieu of the seventeenth century. ;The following topics were chosen for special study: Gassendi's anti-Aristotelianism and scepticism; his discipleship of Galileo Galilei; his adoption of Epicureanism; his ideological relationship with Marin Mersenne and his anti-Hermeticism. It was claimed that Gassendi's mature Epicurean philosophy developed homogeneously from the positions which he adopted and the presuppositions which he accepted when he was still a professor of Aristotelian philosophy. ;In particular, it was argued that Gassendi was essentially an anti-Aristotelian philosopher: he regarded it as his life's work to remove Aristotelianism from its position of dominance and to have Epicureanism accepted in its stead. It was this anti-Aristotelianism, it was argued, that almost completely explains why Gassendi was a sceptic, and also why he was a supporter of Galilean Copernicanism. Further, when he linked Aristotelianism with Hermeticism, Gassendi began to direct his Epicurean philosophy against Hermetic philosophy; hence, it was argued, his anti-Aristotelianism partly explains his anti-Hermeticism. ;In this thesis a new interpretation of Gassendi's philosophical work has been presented. Gassendi was not, it has been claimed as a conclusion of the study, a philosopher who made Epicureanism respectable; nor was he a materialist malgre lui; nor was he a collaborator with Mersenne in resisting a sceptical crisis; he was essentially an anti-Aristotelian promoter of Epicureanism, the philosophy which he deemed more suitable for the needs of the seventeenth century, both for supporting the Christian faith and for enabling philosophers to participate in and contribute to the progress of the new experimental and observational sciences. (shrink)

This is the first book to explore the ethical thought of Pierre Gassendi, the seventeenth-century French priest who rehabilitated Epicurean philosophy in the ...

Scholars in the early seventeenth century who studied ancient Greek scientific theories often drew upon philology and history to reconstruct a more general picture of the Greek past. Gassendi's training as a humanist historiographer enabled him to formulate a conception of the history of philosophy in which the rationality of scientific and philosophical inquiry depended on the historical justifications which he developed for his beliefs. Professor Joy examines this conception and analyzes the nature of Gassendi's historical training, especially its relationship (...) to his career as a physicist and astronomer. She shows how he rehabilitated Epicurean atomism by bringing together the arguments of the Greek atomists and those of his contemporaries. In doing so, he produced an account of the natural world which made it an object of empirical study and mechanical explanation. (shrink)

Letter to du Faur de Pibrac, 1621.--Exercises against the Aristotelians, 1624.--Letter to Diodati, 1634.--De motu, 1642.--The rebuttals against Descartes, 1644.--The syntagma, 1658.

Pierre Gassendi was a major figure in seventeenth-century philosophy whose philosophical and scientific works contributed to shaping Western intellectual identity. Among "new philosophers", he was considered Descartes’ main rival, and he belonged to the first rank of those attempting to carve out an alternative to Aristotelian philosophy. Given the importance of Gassendi for the history of science and philosophy, it is surprising to see that he has been largely ignored in the Anglophone world. This collection of essays constitutes the first (...) book on Gassendi that comprehensively covers his biography, bibliography, and all aspects of his philosophy. The book is divided into four parts. It begins with a brief sketch of the intellectual world of seventeenth-century France, Gassendi’s early attacks on Aristotle, and a bibliographical essay on early-modern publications of Gassendi’s writings. Part II explores Gassendi’s contributions to logic, natural philosophy, and astronomy and cosmology. Part III addresses Gassendi as a humanist and participant in seventeenth-century philosophical and scientific debates, including his advocacy of Epicurean philosophy and his relation to the sceptical tradition. The fourth and final part involves a brief discussion of the reception of Gassendi’s thought, including the paraphrases of his works published in France and England. This book is an essential resource for scholars and upper-level students of early modern philosophy, intellectual history, and the history of science who want to get acquainted with Pierre Gassendi as a major philosopher and intellectual figure of the early modern period. (shrink)

The article regards the transformation of friendship in Hobbes’s work. From simple acceptance of the Aristotelian definition in The Whole Art of Rhetoric, Hobbes passes in the Elements to a dual approach. On one hand, he goes so far as to reaffirm the natural sociability of man solely through friendship but, on the other, he subordinates the whole question of passions to the new concept of power, which involves the redefinition of friendship as an "Instrumentall power". In Leviathan this connection (...) between "power", "honour" and "friendship" becomes tighter and tighter. Did Gassendi influence Hobbes’s shift, which was fully developed in Leviathan? Security and need are the key words in the Epicurean doctrine of friendship, and also Epicurus did not endorse the thesis of human natural sociability. The analogies with the Hobbesian doctrine are impressive . However, Gassendi was well aware of the objections raised against the too utilitarian nature of Epicurean friendship. His strategy consisted in moralizing this kind of affection and promoting a revival of Aristotle’s theory. With its insistence on the need for security and utility, it is Hobbes’s approach, therefore, that is closer to the true Epicurean doctrine of friendship. By contrast, he reacts against its apolitical character. Whereas for Epicurus and Gassendi the aim of friendship is essentially a "defense" within the context of individual ataraxia, for Hobbes friendship is a "power" that can bring about real and stable benefits only through the social contract and within a political dimension. (shrink)