Plato

1a pt. Socrática. t. 1. Cármides ; Lisis ; Eutifron ; Apología; Critón ; Fedón ; Menón -- t. 5. Eutidemo ; Gorgias -- t. 7-8. República.

Plato's view on time, a key aspect of his doctrine of forms, is influenced by his reception of Parmenides, but the way in which Plato takes up and modifies Parmenides' view is a matter of ongoing scholarly debate. In this article, the author analyzes Plato's revision of Parmenidean time by exploring four temporalities: the eternal present, timeless eternity, the enduring present, and the instant between time and eternity. Through this examination, she uncovers the common origin of both eternal present of (...) Parmenides' fragment B8 and the flowing present of the phenomenal realm in the instant (ἐξαίφνης) in the Parmenides. This perspective on time offers a promising solution to Plato's problem of participation, bridging the gap between the eternal being of the form and the being in time of the particulars. (shrink)

This paper argues that Hesiod's Myth of the Golden Race (Op. 109-126) influenced Plato's Myth of the Cicadas from the Phaedrus (258e-259d). Among other parallels, Hesiod's Golden Race and Plato's Cicadas have a similar diet and a similar rapport with the gods, they die in a similar way and enjoy similar benefits after death. The paper further argues that Plato used the inherent ambiguity of the Golden Age myths to draw attention to the ambiguity of the Cicadas themselves, who bring (...) both benefits and rewards to humans, depending on their behavior. (shrink)

This paper challenges the prevailing interpretations about the role and the function of recollection in Plato’s Meno, by suggesting that recollection is a cognitive process inaugurated by a myth. This process sets out the methodological and epistemological context within two transitions are feasible: On the one hand, the methodological transition from the elenchus to the method of hypothesis and, on the other hand, the cognitive upshift from opinions to knowledge. Furthermore, this paper argues that Socrates uses the myth of recollection (...) just when Meno niggles and tries to escape the inquiry, introducing the paradox. Based on my deductions, Socrates’ myth imprints on Meno’s soul a true belief which facilitates the process of recollection by rending Meno valiant in continuing the inquiry. (shrink)

Donald Davidson’s causal theory of action greatly influenced a dominant analytic interpretation of the argument, in Republic 4, for parts of the soul. According to Davidson, actions are caused by a combination of belief and desire (pro-attitude). In the interpretation inspired by this account, parts of the soul have distinctive beliefs and desires, which cause action; thus, parts are distinct agents. As well, the argument in Republic 4 is taken to show that, while reason desires the good, appetite is a (...) desire which is good-independent. Then, since appetite is not a desire for the good, its being a distinct agent implies the possibility of akrasia—appetite could overcome reason’s judgment about the better course of action. In fact, the possibility of akratic conflict is taken to be integral to the distinction among parts. By contrast, this paper offers an interpretation which shows that the causal theory is not needed to establish the parts of the soul. As a consequence, akrasia has no role to play in distinguishing parts of the soul. (shrink)

The objective of this article is to offer an interpretation of the utopian society described in Plato's Republic from a simplified theory of fractals. Plato conceptualizes his Republic as a static society in terms of structure and its components, the people, as having a behavior that can be programmed as linear and not dynamic (LNDS). Based on this analogy, real social functioning (NLDS) is conceptualized, applying the concept of fractal and its corresponding fracton, as the force of attraction that acts (...) in social groups. Thus, social groups obey a fractal geometry, a geometry that reproduces the pyramidal shape, the apex being the crystallization of authority, power or leadership. Modern society, in analogy with Plato's Republic, is also a fractal production machine, replicating pyramid-shaped hierarchical structures and the respective fractons. Individuals are the basic unit of all these fractals. They are the building blocks of all groups at all levels of society. But replication is not self-similar due to fluctuations in cognition and behavior. (shrink)

--2. Bd. Des Sokrates Apologie. Kriton. Euthydemos. Menexenos. Gorgias. Menon. Bearb. von H. Hofmann.--3. Bd. Phaidon. Das Gastmahl. Kratylos. Bearb. von D. Kurz.--4. Bd. Politeia. Der Staat. Bearb. von D. Kurz.--5. Bd. Phaidros. Parmenides. Briefe. Bearb. von D. Kurz.--6. Bd. Theaitetos. Der Sophist. Der Staatsmann. Bearb. von P. Staudacher.--7. Bd. Timaios, Kritias. Philebos. Bearb. von K. Widdra.--8. Bd. Nomōn. Gesetze. Bearb. von K. Schöpsdau. 2 v.

In this paper, we examine a fundamental problem that appears in Greek philosophy: the paradoxes of self-reference of the type of “Third Man” that appears first in Plato’s 'Parmenides', and is further discussed in Aristotle and the Peripatetic commentators and Proclus. We show that the various versions are analysed using different language, reflecting different understandings by Plato and the Platonists, such as Proclus, on the one hand, and the Peripatetics (Aristotle, Alexander, Eudemus), on the other hand. We show that the (...) Peripatetic commentators do not focus on Plato’s solution but primarily on the formulation of the “Third Man” paradox. On the contrary, Proclus seems to be convinced that Plato suggests a sound solution to the paradox by defining the predicate of similarity (homogeneity) that demarcates two types of homogeneous entities – the eide and the participants in them in a way that their confusion would be inadmissible. We claim that Plato’s solution follows a sound line of reasoning that is formalisable in a language of Frege-Russell type; hence there exists a model in which Plato’s reasoning is valid. Furthermore, we notice that Plato’s definition of the second-order predicate of similarity is attained by resorting to first-order entities. In this sense, Plato’s definition is comparable to Eudoxus’ definition of ratio, which is also attained by resorting to first-order objects. Consequently, Plato seems to follow a logical practice established by the mathematicians of the 5th century, notably Eudoxus, in his solution to the paradox. (shrink)

[T. 1] Interpretationen zu den frühen und mittleren Dialogen -- T. 2. Das Bild des Dialektikers in Platons späten Dialogen.

In this paper, I show the ambiguities in the interpretations of Martin Heidegger and Alain Badiou of Plato’s allegory of the cave as an enlightening educational experience. In Heidegger’s interpretation, knowledge appears as a rational process that corrects the thinking of others. By his claim of an education by truths, Badiou prioritises, again, the Platonic event of knowledge. To indicate the limit of the rational process in these two interpretations of education, I introduce Jan Masschelein’s claim that knowledge transmission in (...) Plato’s cave story can be seen as a process where the immanent experience of companionship comes before the instruction of knowledge. The arguments in this article will be discussed in a broader context that explains how transmissive and participatory pedagogies have been influenced by the view of education as a process of rationality and companionship, and how the various approaches have either constrained or broadened the learner’s perspective. (shrink)