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  1. added 2018-09-03
    Readings of Plato’s Apology of Socrates.Vivil Valvik Haraldsen, Olof Pettersson & Oda E. Wiese Tvedt (eds.) - 2018 - Lexington Books.
    In Plato’s Apology of Socrates we see a philosopher in collision with his society—a society he nonetheless claims to have benefited through his philosophic activity. It has often been asked why democratic Athens condemned a philosopher of Socrates' character to death. This anthology examines the contribution made by Plato’s Apology of Socrates to our understanding of the character of Socrates as well as of the conception of philosophy Plato attributes to him. The 11 chapters offer complementary readings of the Apology, (...)
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  2. added 2018-06-27
    "Plato: Dramatist of the Life of Reason". By John Herman Randall, Jr. New York: Columbia U.P.; Montreal: McGill U.P. 1970. Pp. Xii, 274. $8.25. [REVIEW]Roger A. Shiner - 1971 - Dialogue 10 (3):568-572.
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  3. added 2018-06-14
    "Socratic Moral Psychology". By Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Pp. Vii + 276. $85.00 (Hardback). ISBN 978-0-521-19843-1. [REVIEW]J. Clerk Shaw - 2012 - Ancient Philosophy 32 (1):181-185.
  4. added 2018-06-13
    Socratic Philosophy, Rationalism, and "Obedience": Decision Making Without Divine Intervention.Scott J. Senn - 2012 - Plato: The Internet Journal of the International Plato Society 12.
    The main aim of this paper is to explain why Plato's Socrates devotes himself to philosophy. In so doing, I hope also to show that he does not sincerely believe that any of his decisions, about philosophy or anything, involve any kind of divine intervention. As my conclusions are contrary to a good bit of first-rate, recent scholarship on the subject, and also contrary to part of what Socrates himself says in Plato's Apology of Socrates, I think it is especially (...)
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  5. added 2018-06-06
    Socrates on Why We Should Inquire.David Ebrey - 2017 - Ancient Philosophy 37 (1):1-17.
    This paper examines whether Socrates provides his interlocutors with good reasons to seek knowledge of what virtue is, reasons that they are in a position to appreciate. I argue that in the Laches he does provide such reasons, but they are not the reasons that are most commonly identified as Socratic. Socrates thinks his interlocutors should be motivated not by the idea that virtue is knowledge nor by the idea that knowledge is good for its own sake, but rather by (...)
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  6. added 2018-05-18
    If You Know What is Best, You Do It: Socratic Intellectualism in Xenophon and Plato.Gerhard Seel - 2006 - In Lindsay Judson & Vassilis Karasmanis (eds.), Remembering Socrates: Philosophical Essays. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 20-49.
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  7. added 2018-03-02
    Readings of Plato's Apology of Socrates: Defending the Philosophical Life.Vivil Valvik Haraldsen, Olof Pettersson & Oda E. Wiese Tvedt (eds.) - 2017 - Lexington.
    Contributors to this volume focus on the character of Socrates as the embodiment of philosophy, employing this as a starting point for exploring various themes exposed in the Apology. These include the relation of philosophy to democracy, rhetoric, politics, or society in general, and the overarching question of what comprises the philosophic life.
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  8. added 2017-11-06
    On the Value of Drunkenness in the Laws.Nicholas Baima - 2017 - Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 20:65-81.
    Plato's attitude towards drunkenness is surprisingly positive in the Laws, especially as compared to his negative treatment of intoxication in the Republic. In the Republic, Plato maintains that intoxication causes cowardice and intemperance, while in the Laws, Plato holds that it can produce courage and temperance. This raises the question: Did Plato change his mind, and if he did, why? Ultimately, this paper answers affirmatively and argues that his marks a substantive shift in Plato's attitude towards anti-rational desires.
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  9. added 2017-10-27
    Socrates at Work on Virtue and Knowledge in Plato's "Laches".Gerasimos Santas - 1969 - Review of Metaphysics 22 (3):433 - 460.
  10. added 2017-09-25
    Knowledge and Hedonism in Plato's "Protagoras".M. Dyson - 1976 - Journal of Hellenic Studies 96:32-45.
  11. added 2016-10-08
    Plato, Forms, and Moral Motivation.Iakovos Vasiliou - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 49:37-70.
  12. added 2016-09-19
    Virtue and Knowledge: An Introduction to Ancient Greek Ethics.William J. Prior - 1991 - Routledge.
    Originally published in 1991, this book focuses on the concept of virtue, and in particular on the virtue of wisdom or knowledge, as it is found in the epic poems of Homer, some tragedies of Sophocles, selected writings of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoic and Epicurean philosophers. The key questions discussed are the nature of the virtues, their relation to each other, and the relation between the virtues and happiness or well-being. This book provides the background and interpretative framework to (...)
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  13. added 2016-07-08
    Pleasure, Pain, and the Unity of Soul in Plato's Protagoras.Vanessa de Harven & Wolfgang-Rainer Mann - forthcoming - In William V. Harris (ed.), Pleasure and Pain in Classical Antiquity.
  14. added 2016-04-22
    Philosopher Rulers and False Beliefs.Nicholas R. Baima - 2017 - Ancient Philosophy 37 (1):19-37.
    Many scholars have viewed the noble lie as fundamentally a device for educating the non-philosophers in the Kallipolis. On this reading, the elite and sophisticated philosopher rulers lie to the non-philosophers, who are unable to fully grasp the truth; such lies help motivate the non-philosophers towards virtuous activity and the promotion of the common good. Hence, according to many scholars, the falsehoods of the noble lie play no role in motivating fully accomplished adult philosophers towards virtue. The motivation for this (...)
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  15. added 2015-11-17
    Republic 382a-D: On the Dangers and Benefits of Falsehood.Nicholas R. Baima - 2017 - Classical Philology 112 (1):1-19.
    Socrates' attitude towards falsehood is quite puzzling in the Republic. Although Socrates is clearly committed to truth, at several points he discusses the benefits of falsehood. This occurs most notably in Book 3 with the "noble lie" (414d-415c) and most disturbingly in Book 5 with the "rigged sexual lottery" (459d-460c). This raises the question: What kinds of falsehoods does Socrates think are beneficial, and what kinds of falsehoods does he think are harmful? And more broadly: What can this tell us (...)
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  16. added 2015-11-17
    Persuasion, Falsehood, and Motivating Reason in Plato’s Laws.Nicholas R. Baima - 2016 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 33 (2).
    In Plato’s Laws, the Athenian Stranger maintains that law should consist of both persuasion (πειθώ) and compulsion (βία) (IV.711c, IV.718b-d, and IV.722b). Persuasion can be achieved by prefacing the laws with preludes (προοίμια), which make the citizens more eager to obey the laws. Although scholars disagree on how to interpret the preludes’ persuasion, they agree that the preludes instill true beliefs and give citizens good reasons for obeying the laws. In this paper I refine this account of the preludes by (...)
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  17. added 2015-04-12
    Akrasia in the Protagoras and the Republic.Michael Morris - 2006 - Phronesis 51 (3):195-229.
    Although it is a commonplace that the "Protagoras" and the "Republic" present diffent views of akrasia, the nature of the difference is not well understood. I argue that the logic of the famous argument in the "Protagoras" turns just on two crucial assumptions: that desiring is having evaluative beliefs (or that valuing is desiring), and that no one can have contradictory preferences at the same time; hedonism is not essential to the logic of the argument. And the logic of the (...)
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  18. added 2015-04-08
    Socrates on Desire for the Good and the Involuntariness of Wrongdoing: Gorgias 466a-468e.Kevin Mctighe - 1984 - Phronesis 29 (3):193-236.
  19. added 2015-03-26
    Seeking the Truth and Taking Care for Common Goods – Plato on Expertise and Recognizing Experts.Jörg Hardy - 2010 - Episteme 7 (1):7-22.
    In this paper I discuss Plato's conception of expertise as a part of the Platonic theory of a good, successful life (eudaimonia). In various Platonic dialogues, Socrates argues that the good life requires a certain kind of knowledge that guides all our good, beneficial actions: the “knowledge of the good and bad”, which is to be acquired by “questioning ourselves and examining our and others’ beliefs”. This knowledge encompasses the particular knowledge of how to recognize experts in a given technical (...)
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  20. added 2015-03-25
    Moral Evil and Ignorance in Plato's Ethics.R. Hackforth - 1946 - Classical Quarterly 40 (3-4):118-.
    It is universally agreed that Plato inherited from Socrates, and consistently maintained to the end, the doctrine that no man does evil of set purpose—οδες κν μαρτνει—but because he mistakes evil for good. All moral evil, therefore, for Plato, involves ignorance. There are, however, two passages, one in the Sophist, the other in Laws ix, which on the face of them appear to recognize a type of moral evil in which ignorance is not involved, a type which is indeed contrasted (...)
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  21. added 2015-03-24
    The Interpretation of 'No One Does Wrong Willingly' in Plato's Dialogues.Norman Gulley - 1965 - Phronesis 10 (1):82 - 96.
  22. added 2015-03-22
    Socratic Intellectualism and the Problem of Courage: An Interpretation of Plato's Laches.Carol S. Gould - 1987 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 4 (3):265 - 279.
  23. added 2015-03-17
    A Partisan's Guide to Socratic Intellectualism.Matthew Evans - 2010 - In Sergio Tenenbaum (ed.), Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good. Oxford University Press. pp. 6.
  24. added 2015-03-11
    Plato's Charmides and the Socratic Ideal of Rationality by W. Thomas Schmid. [REVIEW]Darrel D. Colson - 2000 - Ancient Philosophy 20 (1):206-210.
  25. added 2015-03-11
    The Moral and Intellectual Development of the Philosopher in Plato's Republic.Elizabeth F. Cooke - 1999 - Ancient Philosophy 19 (1):37-44.
    Many commentators of the "Republic" see the conformity to authority, emphasized in the early education, as a hindrance to the development of the critical skills necessary for the philosopher. Furthermore, they see the theoretical training of the philosopher as detached from morality. I argue that Plato does not view philosophical training as separate from morality. Rather Plato views intellectual training as integral to the philosopher's overall pursuit of the Good. Philosophical knowledge is moral because the objects of such knowledge are (...)
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  26. added 2015-03-09
    Dialectical Refutation as a Paradigm of Socratic Punishment.Michael J. Cholbi - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Research 27:371-379.
    Evidence from the Apology, Crito, Protagoras, and Gorgias is mustered in defense of the claim that for Socrates, dialectic typifies just punishment: Dialectic benefits the punished by making her more just, since it disabuses her of the false beliefs that stand in the way of her acquiring knowledge of justice. Though painful and disorienting to the interlocutor, having one’s opinions refuted by Socrates—who is wiser than his interlocutors due to his awareness of the vastness of his ignorance —is in fact (...)
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  27. added 2015-03-06
    Socratic Rationalism and Political Philosophy.Scott W. Calef - 1996 - Ancient Philosophy 16 (1):186-189.
  28. added 2015-03-04
    Reply to Rowe.Thomas C. Brickhouse & Nicholas D. Smith - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (3):325-338.
    In our reply to Rowe, we explain why most of what he criticizes is actually the product of his misunderstanding our argument. We begin by showing that nearly all of his Part 1 misconceives our project by defending a position we never attacked. We then question why Rowe thinks the distinction we make between motivational and virtue intellectualism is unimportant before developing a defense of the consistency of our views about different desires. Next we turn to Rowe’s criticisms of our (...)
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  29. added 2015-03-01
    Plato and His Predecessors: The Dramatisation of Reason. [REVIEW]Eugenio Benitez - 2002 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 40 (1):115-116.
  30. added 2015-02-24
    The Moral Intellectualism of Plato’s Socrates. [REVIEW]Oded Balaban - 2008 - Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch Fur Antike Und Mittelalter 13 (1):1-14.
    Commentators do not take Socrates' theses in the Hippias Minor seriously. They believe it is an aporetic dialogue and even that Socrates does not mean what he says. Hence they are unable to understand the presuppositions behind Socrates' two interconnected theses: that those who do wrong and lie voluntarily are better than those who do wrong unintentionally, and that no one does wrong and lies voluntarily. Arguing that liars are better than the unenlightened, Socrates concludes that there are no liars. (...)
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  31. added 2015-02-22
    Before Theory and Practice: Implication of Desire and Knowledge in Plato's Dialogues.Colin Alexander Anderson - 2002 - Dissertation, Loyola University of Chicago
    In this dissertation, I re-examine the relationship between knowledge and virtue in Plato's dialogues. I argue that "knowledge" in the dialogues is not defined in opposition to "desire" but rather involves "desire" as a constitutive component and that "knowledge" has affective and "erotic" aspects. As a point of reference, I examine Aristotle's brief arguments against the Socratic identification of episteme and arete . I argue that they rest on epistemological and psychological assumptions that Socrates need not accept: viz., a differentiation (...)
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  32. added 2015-02-05
    Sokrates: Tugend ist Wissen.Rafael Ferber - 1991 - Elenchos 12:39-66.
    The article examines the Socratic principle that (1) virtue is knowledge and its corollary that (2) nobody errs voluntarily (nemo sua sponte peccat). It tries to show (I) that both principles are paradoxa, i.e. from a phenomenological point of view, they seem to be false; (II) that nevertheless the platonic Socrates accepts both principles as true; and finally (III) that these principles are analytical truths a priori which can only be understood if a person (soul) finds them in him- or (...)
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  33. added 2014-11-29
    Socrates Vs. Callicles: Examination and Ridicule in Plato's Gorgias.David Levy - 2013 - Plato: The Internet Journal of the International Plato Society 13:27-36.
    The Callicles colloquy of Plato’s Gorgias features both examination and ridicule. Insofar as Socrates’ examination of Callicles proceeds via the elenchus, the presence of ridicule requires explanation. This essay seeks to provide that explanation by placing the effort to ridicule within the effort to examine; that is, the judgment/pronouncement that something/someone is worthy of ridicule is a proper part of the elenchic examination. Standard accounts of the Socratic elenchus do not include this component. Hence, the argument of this essay suggests (...)
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