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  1. added 2019-09-07
    Recollection and Essence in Plato's "Meno".James Robert Peters - 1985 - Dissertation, Northwestern University
    The paradox in Inquiry in Plato's Meno raises the fundamental epistemological problem of how one can come to know the basic and primary criteria of philosophical reasoning. Two key tenets of the Socratic search for definitions underlie the paradox. First, Socrates argues in both the Euthyphro and Hippias Major, that knowledge of particular instances of a given Form presupposes knowledge of the universal Form. Secondly, Socrates insists in the Meno that knowledge of essence logically preceeds knowledge of a Form's other (...)
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  2. added 2019-09-06
    Resilient Understanding: The Value of Seeing for Oneself.Matthew Slater & Jason Leddington - manuscript
    The primary aim of this paper is to argue that the value of understanding derives in part from a kind of subjective stability of belief that we call epistemic resilience. We think that this feature of understanding has been overlooked by recent work, and we think it’s especially important to the value of understanding for social cognitive agents such as us. We approach the concept of epistemic resilience via the idea of the experience of epistemic ownership and argue that the (...)
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  3. added 2019-09-06
    Meno’s Paradox is an Epistemic Regress Problem.Andrew Cling - 2019 - Logos and Episteme 10 (1):107-120.
    I give an interpretation according to which Meno’s paradox is an epistemic regress problem. The paradox is an argument for skepticism assuming that acquired knowledge about an object X requires prior knowledge about what X is and any knowledge must be acquired. is a principle about having reasons for knowledge and about the epistemic priority of knowledge about what X is. and jointly imply a regress-generating principle which implies that knowledge always requires an infinite sequence of known reasons. Plato’s response (...)
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  4. added 2019-09-06
    The Logic of Learning.Christian Bennet - 2019 - Axiomathes 29 (2):173-187.
    An intensional logic is presented and suggested as a framework for a formal investigation of learning. The framework allows for discussing and comparing concepts and representations, and makes it possible to view learning processes as iterations of a certain type of functions. It is shown how this framework may be used to shed light on Meno’s paradox, but also on concepts such as Vygotsky’s ZPD and learning trajectories. In the case of mathematics, where there are recent attempts to merge ideas (...)
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  5. added 2019-09-06
    The Possibility of Inquiry: Meno’s Paradox From Socrates to Sextus, by Gail Fine.David Bronstein - 2017 - Mind 126 (502):631-634.
    The Possibility of Inquiry: Meno’s Paradox from Socrates to Sextus, by Gail Fine. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. xiv + 399.
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  6. added 2019-09-06
    There is No Searching for the Self: Self-Knowledge in Book Ten of Augustine’s De Trinitate.Mateusz Stróżyński - 2013 - Phronesis 58 (3):280-300.
    This article explores the conception of self-knowledge in book 10 of Augustine’s De Trinitate. Augustine starts from the worry in Plato’s Meno that one cannot search for something entirely unknown and engages with Plotinus, Ennead 5.3 in developing his own understanding of the mind’s self-knowledge. He concludes that this knowledge is paradoxical in nature: it is necessary and, at the same time, futile; and it is separated from the knowledge of God. Augustine reaches this point by rejecting the Aristotelian identity (...)
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  7. added 2019-09-06
    Peut-on connaître quelque chose de nouveau? Variations médiévales sur l'argument du Ménon.Christophe Grellard - 2011 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 136 (1):37.
    Cet article cherche à préciser les modes d' appropriation médiévale du paradoxe du Ménon selon lequel il est impossible de rien apprendre, c'est-à-dire de connaître quelque chose de nouveau. Dans un premier temps, on met en évidence les vecteurs de transmission textuelle. Dans la mesure où le dialogue lui-même a été mal connu au Moyen Âge, c'est principalement par l'intermédiaire du résumé qu'en donne Aristote que le paradoxe et ses possibles solutions ont été appréhendés. Pour les commentateurs des Seconds analytiques (...)
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  8. added 2019-09-06
    Socratic Paradoxes and Their Epistemological Importance.E. Andreanský - 2008 - Filozofia 63:39-49.
    The paper offers an analysis of the forms of the Socratic paradoxes as well as their importance for the epistemological inquiries. In the author’s view there are various kinds of paradoxes. A special attention is paid to the Meno paradox from Plato’s Meno. In dealing with paradoxes there are three possible strategies: their critical overcoming, their demythologization or their acceptation. The author gives the descriptions of all of these strategies, reminding us that each of them put the stress on a (...)
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  9. added 2019-09-06
    Peirce's Semiotics, Subdoxastic Aboutness, and the Paradox of Inquiry.Inna Semetsky - 2005 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 37 (2):227–238.
    The author suggests that educational philosophy should benefit from addressing questions traditionally asked within discourse in the philosophy of mind, namely: the relation between the mind and world and the problems of intentionality , meaning, and representation. Peirce's semiotics and his category of creative abduction provide a novel conceptual framework for exploring these questions. A model of reasoning and learning, based on Peirce's triadic logic of relations, is analysed. This model, it is argued, is fruitful for overcoming the paradox of (...)
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  10. added 2019-09-06
    Three Abductive Solutions to the Meno Paradox – with Instinct, Inference, and Distributed Cognition.Sami Paavola & Kai Hakkarainen - 2005 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 24 (3-4):235-253.
  11. added 2019-09-06
    Peirce's Semiotics, Subdoxastic Aboutness, and the Paradox of Inquiry.Inna Semetsky - 2005 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 37 (2):227-238.
    The author suggests that educational philosophy should benefit from addressing questions traditionally asked within discourse in the philosophy of mind, namely: the relation between the mind and world and the problems of intentionality, meaning, and representation. Peirce's semiotics and his category of creative abduction provide a novel conceptual framework for exploring these questions. A model of reasoning and learning, based on Peirce's triadic logic of relations, is analysed. This model, it is argued, is fruitful for overcoming the paradox of new (...)
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  12. added 2019-09-06
    God and the Other Person: Levinas’s Appropriation of Kierkegaard’s Encounter with Otherness.Brian Treanor - 2001 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 75:313-324.
    One of the most astonishing aspects of Levinas’s philosophy is the assertion that other persons are absolutely other than the self. The difficulties attending a relationship with absolute otherness are ancient, and immediately invoke Meno’s Paradox. How can we encounter that which is not already within us? The traditional reply to Meno reduces other persons to the role of midwife and thereby, says Levinas, mitigates their alterity. Although Descartes seems to provide a rejoinder to anamnesis in theThird Meditation, this response (...)
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  13. added 2019-09-06
    God and the Other Person.Brian Treanor - 2001 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 75:313-324.
    One of the most astonishing aspects of Levinas’s philosophy is the assertion that other persons are absolutely other than the self. The difficulties attending a relationship with absolute otherness are ancient, and immediately invoke Meno’s Paradox. How can we encounter that which is not already within us? The traditional reply to Meno (anamnesis) reduces other persons to the role of midwife and thereby, says Levinas, mitigates their alterity. Although Descartes seems to provide a rejoinder to anamnesis in theThird Meditation, this (...)
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  14. added 2019-09-06
    The Paradox of the Meno and Plato’s Theory of Recollection.Oded Balaban - 1994 - Semiotica 98 (3-4):265-276.
  15. added 2019-09-06
    LE PARADOXE DE MÉNON ET L'ÉCOLE D'OXFORD: Réponse à Dominic Scott.Denis O'Brien - 1991 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 181 (4):643 - 658.
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  16. added 2019-09-06
    Le paradoxe de ménon et la connaissance définitionnelle: Réponse à Dominic Scott.Monique Canto-Sperber - 1991 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 181 (4):659 - 663.
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  17. added 2019-09-06
    Hegel on Metaphilosophy and the “Philosophic Spectator”.Daniel Berthold-Bond - 1986 - Idealistic Studies 16 (3):205-217.
    In this article I will discuss various aspects of Hegel’s radical critique of metaphilosophy. This critique announces a clear-cut departure from the widely held conviction in the philosophic tradition that in order to gain a firm foundation for science, a preliminary examination of the capacity and nature of knowledge is required. Hegel’s position is that such a propaedeutic is impossible. In the first part of this article, I will show how Hegel’s position can be illuminated in terms of his criticism (...)
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  18. added 2019-09-06
    Bradie on Polanyi on the Meno Paradox.Herbert A. Simon - 1976 - Philosophy of Science 43 (1):147-150.
  19. added 2019-09-06
    Significance of Meno's Paradox.Bernard Phillips - 1948 - Classical Weekly 42:87-91.
  20. added 2019-09-06
    Resolving the Socratic Paradox: A Semiotic Approach.Inna Semetsky - unknown
    This paper revisits the learning paradox first posited by Socrates in his famous dialogue with Meno. The paradox of new knowledge has been steadily attracting the attention of educational researchers (e. g. see Bereiter 1985; Petrie 199 1; Prawat 1999). My paper briefly examines Kierkegaard's classical solution in terms of the necessity of the decisive moment, arguing that, contrary to Kierkegaard, there is no miraculous knowledge. The paper justifies this assertion by suggesting a two-fold approach towards re-solving the Socratic paradox: (...)
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  21. added 2019-09-05
    The Access Paradox in Analogical Reasoning and Transfer: Whither Invariance?Robert E. Haskell - 2009 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 30 (1):33.
    Despite the burgeoning research in recent years on what is called analogical reasoning and transfer, the problem of how similarity or invariant relations are fundamentally accessed is typically either unrecognized, or ignored in componential and computational analyses. The access problematic is not a new one, being outlined by the paradox found in Plato’s Meno. In order to understand the analogical-access problematic, it is suggested that the concepts of analogical relations including the lexical concept metaphor, isomorphic relation in mathematics, homology in (...)
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  22. added 2019-09-05
    Thought Experiments and Philosophical Analysis: An Examination of the Method of Counterexample and the Legitimacy of Appeals to Pre-Theoretical Intuitions.Michelle Marie Rotert - 1992 - Dissertation, The University of Iowa
    I begin Chapter 1 with a description of some of the better known attempts to disconfirm proposed philosophical analyses by offering counterexamples to them in the context of thought experiments. After describing the role that appeals to pre-theoretical intuitions play in these thought experiments, I raise several questions about the appropriateness of such appeals. ;The most obvious place to begin the search for answers to the questions I ask is with an examination of some different views on the data of (...)
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  23. added 2019-09-05
    Identity and the Heuristic Dilemma.Michael Anthony Brown - 1987 - Dissertation, Emory University
    This dissertation supports two general conclusions. I show that if the heuristic dilemma is considered in terms of the problem of identity then we have good reason to question the common belief that the idea of inquiry is coherent. I show moreover that we have good reason to suppose that responses to the heuristic dilemma are variations on themes established in Plato's dialogue, the Meno . ;In Part One I flesh out the historical and conceptual links between the heuristic dilemma (...)
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  24. added 2019-09-05
    Discovery as Correction.James Blachowicz - 1987 - Synthese 71 (3):235 - 321.
    In recent years, there have been some attempts to defend the legitimacy of a non-inductive generative logic of discovery whose strategy is to analyze a variety of constraints on the actual generation of explanatory hypotheses. These proposed new theories, however, are only weakly generative (relying on sophisticated processes of elimination) rather than strongly generative (embodying processes of correction).This paper develops a strongly generative theory which holds that we can come to know something new only as a variant of what we (...)
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  25. added 2019-06-06
    Meno’s Paradox, the Slave-Boy Interrogation, and the Unity of Platonic Recollection.Lee Franklin - 2009 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (4):349-377.
    Plato invokes the Theory of Recollection to explain both ordinary and philosophical learning. In a new reading of Meno’s Paradox and the Slave-Boy Interrogation, I explain why these two levels are linked in a single theory of learning. Since, for Plato, philosophical inquiry starts in ordinary discourse, the possibility of success in inquiry is tied to the character of the ordinary comprehension we bring to it. Through the claim that all learning is recollection, Plato traces the knowledge achievable through inquiry (...)
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  26. added 2019-06-06
    A Modern Analytic Socrates and Meno’s Paradox: A Dialogue.Christopher A. Pynes - 2003 - Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 21 (3):23-25.
  27. added 2018-02-18
    Investigação e Paradoxo do Mênon: Aristóteles, Segundos Analíticos II 8.David Bronstein - 2010 - Dois Pontos 7 (3).
    This paper discusses some issues about Aristotle’s theory of scientific investigation in Posterior Analytics II 8. Aristotle says that scientific investigation comes in three stages. My point is that Aristotle’s theory of scientific investigation cannot avoid Meno’s paradox – the paradox about the impossibility of whatsoever sort of investigation – unless its second stage, the stage in which one establishes that an object exists, is understood in terms of establishing that the object is a legitimate explanandum in the domain of (...)
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  28. added 2017-09-22
    Polanyi on the Meno Paradox.Michael Bradie - 1974 - Philosophy of Science 41 (2):203.
  29. added 2017-06-23
    Meno: Many Things Are Odd About Our Meno.Gilbert Ryle - 1976 - Paideia 5:1-9.
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  30. added 2017-02-15
    The Paradox in the Meno and Aristotle's Attempts to Resolve It.David Charles - 2010 - In Definition in Greek Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
  31. added 2017-02-13
    Meno's Paradox and Socrates as a Teacher.Alexander Nehamas - 1985 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 3:1-30.
  32. added 2017-01-31
    Colloquium 4: Meno’s Paradox And The Sisyphus.Gail Fine - 2013 - Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 28 (1):113-146.
  33. added 2017-01-31
    Signification, Essence, and Meno’s Paradox: A Reply to David Charles’s ‘Types of Definition in the Meno’.Gail Fine - 2010 - Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 55 (2):125-152.
  34. added 2017-01-31
    Avicenna on Meno's Paradox: On Apprehending Unknown Things Through Known Things.Michael E. Marmura - 2009 - Mediaeval Studies 71:47-62.
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  35. added 2017-01-31
    How Can One Search for God?: The Paradox of Inquiry in Augustine's Confessions.Scott Macdonald - 2008 - Metaphilosophy 39 (1):20–38.
    The Confessions recounts Augustine 's successful search for God. But Augustine worries that one cannot search for God if one does not already know God. That version of the paradox of inquiry dominates and structures Confessions 1–10. I draw connections between the dramatic opening lines of book 1 and the climactic discussion in book 10.26–38 and argue that the latter discussion contains Augustine 's resolution of the paradox of inquiry as it applies to the special case of searching for God. (...)
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  36. added 2017-01-31
    Aristotle on Platonic Recollection and the Paradox of Knowing Universals: Prior Analytics B.21 67a8-30.Mark Gifford - 1999 - Phronesis 44 (1):1-29.
    The paper provides close commentary on an important but generally neglected passage in "Prior Analytics" B.21 where, in the course of solving a logical puzzle concerning our knowledge of universal statements, Aristotle offers his only explicit treatment of the Platonic doctrine of Recollection. I show how Aristotle defends his solution to the "Paradox of Knowing Universals", as we might call it, and why he introduces Recollection into his discussion of the puzzle. The reading I develop undermines the traditional view of (...)
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  37. added 2017-01-31
    Semiotics, Scriptural Hermeneutics and Rhetoric in the Works of St. Augustine.Jason Palmisano Drucker - 1998 - Dissertation, Depaul University
    This dissertation attempts to demonstrate in the work of Augustine the intellectual foundations for a theory of Christian speech. It examines an early and short text entitledThe Teacher in which Augustine considers a version of the Socratic thesis called Meno's paradox. Augustine restates this paradox in such a way as to make the issue of language or speech primary: Why is it that no one teaches without the use of signs, he asks, but no one learns anything from them? His (...)
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  38. added 2017-01-31
    The Games of Logic and the Games of Inquiry.Jaakko Hintikka - 1995 - Dialectica 49 (2‐4):229-250.
    SummaryTruth‐definitions play a crucial role in the foundations of logic and semantics. Tarsik‐type truth‐definitions are not possible to formulate in a usual first‐order language for itself, and they have been criticized because they do not account for what makes them definitions of truth. It has been suggested that truth should instead be characterized by reference to the «language‐games» of verification and falsification. The author's game‐theoretical semantics here explained for formal first‐order languages, can be thought of as a realization of this (...)
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  39. added 2017-01-31
    Aristotle's Solution to Meno's Paradox.Mark Allan Gifford - 1994 - Dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin
    The opening chapter to the Posterior Analytics , home to Aristotle's largely unknown solution to Meno's Paradox, has been handed down to us in a badly damaged condition. I show this in two ways. First, I provide a careful exegesis of a partially parallel passage in Prior Analytics B.21, revealing that the traditional reading of this passage, crucially dependent on the received text of A.1, is indefensible. Second, I expose the severe dialectical, philosophical, and philological difficulties to which the received (...)
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  40. added 2017-01-31
    Socratic Elenchus and the Coherence Theory of Truth.Rod Alan Jenks - 1989 - Dissertation, University of California, San Diego
    The elenchus, Socrates' method in Plato's 'early' dialogues, consists of Socrates' eliciting a definition of some moral term from the interlocutor, then proceeding to demonstrate that that definition has consequences at odds with other things the interlocutor believes. Socrates' goal is standardly to force the interlocutor to abandon his definition. But this relies on the secondary beliefs' having some special status, for otherwise, it would be open to the interlocutor to cling to his definition and abandon his secondary beliefs. Another (...)
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  41. added 2017-01-31
    Meno's Paradox and De Re Knowledge in Aristotle's Theory of Demonstration.Michael Ferejohn - 1988 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 5 (2):99 - 117.
  42. added 2017-01-31
    Meno's Paradox.Michael Welbourne - 1986 - Philosophy 61 (236):229 - 243.
    Hintikka has said this about questions: ‘The questioner asks his listener to supply a certain item of information, to make him know a certain thing’. 1 Now this certainly seems to capture our intuitions about one kind of enquiry, a kind which I call market-place enquiry . That is, it seems to capture the speaker's aims when, in typical situations, he addresses a question to another person. But there are many uses of interrogative sentences, even some questioning uses, which Hintikka's (...)
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  43. added 2017-01-31
    Meno's Paradox Reconsidered.Brian Calvert - 1974 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 12 (2):143-152.
  44. added 2017-01-30
    Signification, Essence, and Meno’s Paradox: A Reply to David Charles’s ‘Types of Definition in the Meno’.Gail Fine - 2010 - Phronesis 55 (2):125-152.
  45. added 2017-01-30
    XII-Escaping One's Own Notice Knowing: Meno's Paradox Again.Mary Margaret McCabe - 2009 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):233-256.
  46. added 2017-01-30
    Reflections on Meno's Paradox.Dennis A. Rohatyn - 1980 - Apeiron 14 (2):69 - 73.
  47. added 2017-01-29
    Significance of Meno's Paradox.Bernard Phillips - 1948 - Classical World: A Quarterly Journal on Antiquity 42:87-91.
  48. added 2016-09-21
    La objeción de aristóteles a la teoría platónica de la reminiscencia.Alejandro Farieta - 2015 - Pensamiento y Cultura 18 (2):6-28.
    This paper provides an interpretation of Aristotle’s criticism to the solution to Meno’s Paradox suggested by Plato. According to Aristotle, when Plato says that reminiscence (anámnēsis) is achieved, what is actually achieved is induction (epagōgê). Our interpretation is based on two aspects: (1) semantic criticism, since Plato’s use of the term anámnēsis is unusual; and (2) the theory is not able to give an adequate explanation of the effective discovery.
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  49. added 2016-08-16
    Meno's Paradox in Posterior Analytics 1.1.David Bronstein - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 38:115 - 141.
  50. added 2016-03-17
    The Legacy of the Meno Paradox: Plato and Aristotle on Learning and Error.Scott M. Labarge - 2000 - Dissertation, The University of Arizona
    This thesis will argue that Plato's influential philosophical puzzle known as the Meno Paradox and the related Problem of False Belief are a more serious threat to Plato's philosophical programme than many interpreters recognize. Furthermore, Plato's most obvious candidate for a solution to these problems, the Theory of Recollection, is not sufficient to explain how the Paradox misunderstands the epistemic processes of learning which it treats. ;This failure of Plato's account motivates a close consideration of Aristotle's sophisticated attempt to resolve (...)
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