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  1. Resilient Understanding: The Value of Seeing for Oneself.Matthew Slater & Jason Leddington - manuscript
    The primary aim of this paper is to argue that the value of understanding derives in part from a kind of subjective stability of belief that we call epistemic resilience. We think that this feature of understanding has been overlooked by recent work, and we think it’s especially important to the value of understanding for social cognitive agents such as us. We approach the concept of epistemic resilience via the idea of the experience of epistemic ownership and argue that the (...)
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  2. Causal Reasoning and Meno’s Paradox.Melvin Chen & Lock Yue Chew - forthcoming - AI and Society:1-9.
    Causal reasoning is an aspect of learning, reasoning, and decision-making that involves the cognitive ability to discover relationships between causal relata, learn and understand these causal relationships, and make use of this causal knowledge in prediction, explanation, decision-making, and reasoning in terms of counterfactuals. Can we fully automate causal reasoning? One might feel inclined, on the basis of certain groundbreaking advances in causal epistemology, to reply in the affirmative. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that one still has (...)
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  3. Recollecting the Religious: Augustine in Answer to Meno’s Paradox.Ryan Haecker & Daniel Moulin-Stożek - 2021 - Studies in Philosophy and Education (6):1-12.
    Philosophers of education often view the role of religion in education with suspicion, claiming it to be impossible, indoctrinatory or controversial unless reduced to secular premises and aims. The ‘post-secular’ and ‘decolonial’ turns of the new millennium have, however, afforded opportunities to revaluate this predilection. In a social and intellectual context where the arguments of previous generations of philosophers may be challenged on account of positivist assumptions, there may be an opening for the reconsideration of alternative but traditional religious epistemologies. (...)
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  4. Conhecimento e Definição no Mênon de Platão.Davi Heckert César Bastos - 2020 - Kinesis 12 (31):172-185.
    Through detailed analysis of Plato’s Meno, I identify and set general argumentative rules (useful both to scientists and philosophers) concerning how to use definitions. I show how the character Socrates establishes strong requirements for knowledge in general, i.e., that the knowledge of the definition of a thing must be prior to the knowledge of properties or instances of that thing. Socrate’s requirements and the way he characterizes a definition (as coextensive to the definiendum, not circular, true and explanatorily relevant) lead (...)
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  5. The Logic of Learning.Christian Bennet - 2019 - Axiomathes 29 (2):173-187.
    An intensional logic is presented and suggested as a framework for a formal investigation of learning. The framework allows for discussing and comparing concepts and representations, and makes it possible to view learning processes as iterations of a certain type of functions. It is shown how this framework may be used to shed light on Meno’s paradox, but also on concepts such as Vygotsky’s ZPD and learning trajectories. In the case of mathematics, where there are recent attempts to merge ideas (...)
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  6. Meno’s Paradox is an Epistemic Regress Problem.Andrew Cling - 2019 - Logos and Episteme 10 (1):107-120.
    I give an interpretation according to which Meno’s paradox is an epistemic regress problem. The paradox is an argument for skepticism assuming that acquired knowledge about an object X requires prior knowledge about what X is and any knowledge must be acquired. is a principle about having reasons for knowledge and about the epistemic priority of knowledge about what X is. and jointly imply a regress-generating principle which implies that knowledge always requires an infinite sequence of known reasons. Plato’s response (...)
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  7. The Possibility of Inquiry: Meno’s Paradox From Socrates to Sextus, by Gail Fine.David Bronstein - 2017 - Mind 126 (502):631-634.
    The Possibility of Inquiry: Meno’s Paradox from Socrates to Sextus, by Gail Fine. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. xiv + 399.
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  8. La objeción de Aristóteles a la teoría platónica de la reminiscencia.Alejandro Farieta - 2015 - Pensamiento y Cultura 18 (2):6-28.
    This paper provides an interpretation of Aristotle’s criticism to the solution to Meno’s Paradox suggested by Plato. According to Aristotle, when Plato says that reminiscence (anámnēsis) is achieved, what is actually achieved is induction (epagōgê). Our interpretation is based on two aspects: (1) semantic criticism, since Plato’s use of the term anámnēsis is unusual; and (2) the theory is not able to give an adequate explanation of the effective discovery.
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  9. The Possibility of Inquiry. Meno's Paradox From Socrates to Sextus. [REVIEW]Justin Joseph Vlasits - 2015 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23 (3):580-583.
  10. Knowing How to Ask: A Discussion of Gail Fine, The Possibility of Inquiry.Raphael Woolf - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 49:363-391.
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  11. Meno's Paradox in Context.David Ebrey - 2014 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (1):4-24.
    I argue that Meno’s Paradox targets the type of knowledge that Socrates has been looking for earlier in the dialogue: knowledge grounded in explanatory definitions. Socrates places strict requirements on definitions and thinks we need these definitions to acquire knowledge. Meno’s challenge uses Socrates’ constraints to argue that we can neither propose definitions nor recognize them. To understand Socrates’ response to the challenge, we need to view Meno’s challenge and Socrates’ response as part of a larger disagreement about the value (...)
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  12. The Possibility of Inquiry: Meno’s Paradox From Socrates to Sextus.Gail Fine - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    Meno's Paradox from Socrates to Sextus Gail Fine. sense that they consider the issues it raises; and they argue, against its conclusion, that inquiry is possible. Like Plato and Aristotle, they also explain what makes inquiry possible; and they do ...
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  13. Meno and the Monist.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (1-2):157-170.
    Recent critiques of veritistic value monism, or the idea that true belief is unique in being of fundamental epistemic value, typically invoke a claim about the surplus value of knowledge over mere true belief, in turn traced back to Plato's Meno. However, to the extent Plato at all defends a surplus claim in the Meno, it differs from that figuring in contemporary discussions with respect to both its scope and the kind of value at issue, and is under closer scrutiny (...)
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  14. Conocimiento, descubrimiento Y reminiscencia en el menón de platón.Alejandro Farieta - 2013 - Universitas Philosophica 30 (60):205-234.
    This work articulates two thesis: one Socratic and one Platonic; and displays how the first one is heir of the second. The Socratic one is called the principle of priority of definition; the Platonic one is the Recollection theory. The articulation between both theses is possible due to the Meno’s paradox, which makes a criticism on the first thesis, but it is solved with the second one. The consequence of this articulation is a new interpretation of the Recollection theory, as (...)
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  15. Knowledge, Discovery and Reminiscence in Plato's Meno.Alejandro Farieta - 2013 - Universitas Philosophica 30 (60):205-234.
    This work articulates two thesis: one Socratic and one Platonic; and displays how the first one is heir of the second. The Socratic one is called the principle of priority of definition; the Platonic one is the Recollection theory. The articulation between both theses is possible due to the Meno’s paradox, which makes a criticism on the first thesis, but it is solved with the second one. The consequence of this articulation is a new interpretation of the Recollection theory, as (...)
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  16. Colloquium 4: Meno’s Paradox And The Sisyphus.Gail Fine - 2013 - Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 28 (1):113-146.
    The pseudo-Platonic dialogue Sisyphus considers the nature of deliberation, asking whether it does or does not involve knowledge. Difficulties for both options are canvassed, in ways that recall Meno’s Paradox and that also compare interestingly with Aristotle’s account of deliberation in his ethical writings.
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  17. There is No Searching for the Self: Self-Knowledge in Book Ten of Augustine’s De Trinitate.Mateusz Stróżyński - 2013 - Phronesis 58 (3):280-300.
    This article explores the conception of self-knowledge in book 10 of Augustine’s De Trinitate. Augustine starts from the worry in Plato’s Meno that one cannot search for something entirely unknown and engages with Plotinus, Ennead 5.3 in developing his own understanding of the mind’s self-knowledge. He concludes that this knowledge is paradoxical in nature: it is necessary and, at the same time, futile; and it is separated from the knowledge of God. Augustine reaches this point by rejecting the Aristotelian identity (...)
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  18. Peut-on connaître quelque chose de nouveau? Variations médiévales sur l'argument du Ménon.Christophe Grellard - 2011 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 136 (1):37.
    Cet article cherche à préciser les modes d' appropriation médiévale du paradoxe du Ménon selon lequel il est impossible de rien apprendre, c'est-à-dire de connaître quelque chose de nouveau. Dans un premier temps, on met en évidence les vecteurs de transmission textuelle. Dans la mesure où le dialogue lui-même a été mal connu au Moyen Âge, c'est principalement par l'intermédiaire du résumé qu'en donne Aristote que le paradoxe et ses possibles solutions ont été appréhendés. Pour les commentateurs des Seconds analytiques (...)
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  19. Investigação e Paradoxo do Mênon: Aristóteles, Segundos Analíticos II 8.David Bronstein - 2010 - Dois Pontos 7 (3).
    This paper discusses some issues about Aristotle’s theory of scientific investigation in Posterior Analytics II 8. Aristotle says that scientific investigation comes in three stages. My point is that Aristotle’s theory of scientific investigation cannot avoid Meno’s paradox – the paradox about the impossibility of whatsoever sort of investigation – unless its second stage, the stage in which one establishes that an object exists, is understood in terms of establishing that the object is a legitimate explanandum in the domain of (...)
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  20. Meno's Paradox in Posterior Analytics 1.1.David Bronstein - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 38:115 - 141.
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  21. Can You Seek the Answer to This Question? (Meno in India).Amber Carpenter & Jonardon Ganeri - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):571-594.
    Plato articulates a deep perplexity about inquiry in ?Meno's Paradox??the claim that one can inquire neither into what one knows, nor into what one does not know. Although some commentators have wrestled with the paradox itself, many suppose that the paradox of inquiry is special to Plato, arising from peculiarities of the Socratic elenchus or of Platonic epistemology. But there is nothing peculiarly Platonic in this puzzle. For it arises, too, in classical Indian philosophical discussions, where it is formulated with (...)
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  22. The Paradox in the Meno and Aristotle's Attempts to Resolve It.David Charles - 2010 - In Definition in Greek Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
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  23. Signification, Essence, and Meno's Paradox: A Reply to David Charles's 'Types of Definition in the Meno'.Gail Fine - 2010 - Phronesis 55 (2):125-152.
    According to David Charles, in the Meno Socrates fleetingly distinguishes the signification from the essence question, but, in the end, he conflates them. Doing so, Charles thinks, both leads to Meno's paradox and prevents Socrates from answering it satisfactorily. I argue that Socrates doesn't conflate the two questions, and that his reply to Meno's paradox is more satisfactory than Charles allows.
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  24. Signification, Essence, and Meno’s Paradox: A Reply to David Charles’s ‘Types of Definition in the Meno’.Gail Fine - 2010 - Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 55 (2):125-152.
  25. Signification, Essence, and Meno’s Paradox: A Reply to David Charles’s ‘Types of Definition in the Meno’.Gail Fine - 2010 - Phronesis 55 (2):125-152.
  26. Meno’s Paradox, the Slave-Boy Interrogation, and the Unity of Platonic Recollection.Lee Franklin - 2009 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (4):349-377.
    Plato invokes the Theory of Recollection to explain both ordinary and philosophical learning. In a new reading of Meno’s Paradox and the Slave-Boy Interrogation, I explain why these two levels are linked in a single theory of learning. Since, for Plato, philosophical inquiry starts in ordinary discourse, the possibility of success in inquiry is tied to the character of the ordinary comprehension we bring to it. Through the claim that all learning is recollection, Plato traces the knowledge achievable through inquiry (...)
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  27. The Access Paradox in Analogical Reasoning and Transfer: Whither Invariance?Robert E. Haskell - 2009 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 30 (1):33.
    Despite the burgeoning research in recent years on what is called analogical reasoning and transfer, the problem of how similarity or invariant relations are fundamentally accessed is typically either unrecognized, or ignored in componential and computational analyses. The access problematic is not a new one, being outlined by the paradox found in Plato’s Meno. In order to understand the analogical-access problematic, it is suggested that the concepts of analogical relations including the lexical concept metaphor, isomorphic relation in mathematics, homology in (...)
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  28. Avicenna on Meno's Paradox: On Apprehending Unknown Things Through Known Things.Michael E. Marmura - 2009 - Mediaeval Studies 71:47-62.
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  29. Escaping One's Own Notice Knowing: Meno's Paradox Again.Mary Margaret McCabe - 2009 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):233 - 256.
    The complex way Meno's paradox is presented in the Meno forces reflection on both the external conditions on inquiry—its objects—and its internal conditions—the state of mind of the person who inquires. The theory of recollection does not fully account for the internal conditions—as Plato makes clear in the critique of Meno's puzzle to be found in the Euthydemus. I conclude that in the Euthydemus Plato is inviting us to reject the externalist account of knowledge urged on Socrates by the sophists (...)
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  30. XII-Escaping One's Own Notice Knowing: Meno's Paradox Again.Mary Margaret McCabe - 2009 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):233-256.
  31. Socratic Paradoxes and Their Epistemological Importance.E. Andreanský - 2008 - Filozofia 63:39-49.
    The paper offers an analysis of the forms of the Socratic paradoxes as well as their importance for the epistemological inquiries. In the author’s view there are various kinds of paradoxes. A special attention is paid to the Meno paradox from Plato’s Meno. In dealing with paradoxes there are three possible strategies: their critical overcoming, their demythologization or their acceptation. The author gives the descriptions of all of these strategies, reminding us that each of them put the stress on a (...)
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  32. How Can One Search for God?: The Paradox of Inquiry in Augustine's Confessions.Scott Macdonald - 2008 - Metaphilosophy 39 (1):20–38.
    The Confessions recounts Augustine 's successful search for God. But Augustine worries that one cannot search for God if one does not already know God. That version of the paradox of inquiry dominates and structures Confessions 1–10. I draw connections between the dramatic opening lines of book 1 and the climactic discussion in book 10.26–38 and argue that the latter discussion contains Augustine 's resolution of the paradox of inquiry as it applies to the special case of searching for God. (...)
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  33. Three Abductive Solutions to the Meno Paradox – with Instinct, Inference, and Distributed Cognition.Sami Paavola & Kai Hakkarainen - 2005 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 24 (3-4):235-253.
    This article analyzes three approaches to resolving the classical Meno paradox, or its variant, the learning paradox, emphasizing Charles S. Peirce’s notion of abduction. Abduction provides a way of dissecting those processes where something new, or conceptually more complex than before, is discovered or learned. In its basic form, abduction is a “weak” form of inference, i.e., it gives only tentative suggestions for further investigation. But it is not too weak if various sources of clues and restrictions on the abductive (...)
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  34. Peirce's Semiotics, Subdoxastic Aboutness, and the Paradox of Inquiry.Inna Semetsky - 2005 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 37 (2):227–238.
    The author suggests that educational philosophy should benefit from addressing questions traditionally asked within discourse in the philosophy of mind, namely: the relation between the mind and world and the problems of intentionality , meaning, and representation. Peirce's semiotics and his category of creative abduction provide a novel conceptual framework for exploring these questions. A model of reasoning and learning, based on Peirce's triadic logic of relations, is analysed. This model, it is argued, is fruitful for overcoming the paradox of (...)
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  35. Peirce's Semiotics, Subdoxastic Aboutness, and the Paradox of Inquiry.Inna Semetsky - 2005 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 37 (2):227-238.
    The author suggests that educational philosophy should benefit from addressing questions traditionally asked within discourse in the philosophy of mind, namely: the relation between the mind and world and the problems of intentionality, meaning, and representation. Peirce's semiotics and his category of creative abduction provide a novel conceptual framework for exploring these questions. A model of reasoning and learning, based on Peirce's triadic logic of relations, is analysed. This model, it is argued, is fruitful for overcoming the paradox of new (...)
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  36. A Modern Analytic Socrates and Meno’s Paradox: A Dialogue.Christopher A. Pynes - 2003 - Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 21 (3):23-25.
  37. God and the Other Person: Levinas’s Appropriation of Kierkegaard’s Encounter with Otherness.Brian Treanor - 2001 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 75:313-324.
    One of the most astonishing aspects of Levinas’s philosophy is the assertion that other persons are absolutely other than the self. The difficulties attending a relationship with absolute otherness are ancient, and immediately invoke Meno’s Paradox. How can we encounter that which is not already within us? The traditional reply to Meno (anamnesis) reduces other persons to the role of midwife and thereby, says Levinas, mitigates their alterity. Although Descartes seems to provide a rejoinder to anamnesis in theThird Meditation, this (...)
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  38. God and the Other Person: Levinas’s Appropriation of Kierkegaard’s Encounter with Otherness.Brian Treanor - 2001 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 75:313-324.
    One of the most astonishing aspects of Levinas’s philosophy is the assertion that other persons are absolutely other than the self. The difficulties attending a relationship with absolute otherness are ancient, and immediately invoke Meno’s Paradox. How can we encounter that which is not already within us? The traditional reply to Meno reduces other persons to the role of midwife and thereby, says Levinas, mitigates their alterity. Although Descartes seems to provide a rejoinder to anamnesis in theThird Meditation, this response (...)
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  39. The Legacy of the Meno Paradox: Plato and Aristotle on Learning and Error.Scott M. Labarge - 2000 - Dissertation, The University of Arizona
    This thesis will argue that Plato's influential philosophical puzzle known as the Meno Paradox and the related Problem of False Belief are a more serious threat to Plato's philosophical programme than many interpreters recognize. Furthermore, Plato's most obvious candidate for a solution to these problems, the Theory of Recollection, is not sufficient to explain how the Paradox misunderstands the epistemic processes of learning which it treats. ;This failure of Plato's account motivates a close consideration of Aristotle's sophisticated attempt to resolve (...)
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  40. Aristotle on Platonic Recollection and the Paradox of Knowing Universals: Prior Analytics B.21 67a8-30.Mark Gifford - 1999 - Phronesis 44 (1):1-29.
    The paper provides close commentary on an important but generally neglected passage in "Prior Analytics" B.21 where, in the course of solving a logical puzzle concerning our knowledge of universal statements, Aristotle offers his only explicit treatment of the Platonic doctrine of Recollection. I show how Aristotle defends his solution to the "Paradox of Knowing Universals", as we might call it, and why he introduces Recollection into his discussion of the puzzle. The reading I develop undermines the traditional view of (...)
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  41. Plato's Meno and the Possibility of Inquiry in the Absence of Knowledge.Filip Grgic - 1999 - Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch Fur Antike Und Mittelalter 4 (1):19-40.
    In Meno 80d5-e5, we find two sets of objections concerning the possibility of inquiry in the absence of knowledge: the so-called Meno's paradox and the eristic arguments. This essay first shows that the eristic argument is not simply a restatement of Meno's paradox, but instead an objection of a completely different kind: Meno's paradox concerns not inquiry as such, but rather Socrates' inquiry into virtue as is pursued in the first part of the Meno, whereas the eristic argument indicates a (...)
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  42. Semiotics, Scriptural Hermeneutics and Rhetoric in the Works of St. Augustine.Jason Palmisano Drucker - 1998 - Dissertation, Depaul University
    This dissertation attempts to demonstrate in the work of Augustine the intellectual foundations for a theory of Christian speech. It examines an early and short text entitledThe Teacher in which Augustine considers a version of the Socratic thesis called Meno's paradox. Augustine restates this paradox in such a way as to make the issue of language or speech primary: Why is it that no one teaches without the use of signs, he asks, but no one learns anything from them? His (...)
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  43. The Games of Logic and the Games of Inquiry.Jaakko Hintikka - 1995 - Dialectica 49 (2‐4):229-250.
    SummaryTruth‐definitions play a crucial role in the foundations of logic and semantics. Tarsik‐type truth‐definitions are not possible to formulate in a usual first‐order language for itself, and they have been criticized because they do not account for what makes them definitions of truth. It has been suggested that truth should instead be characterized by reference to the «language‐games» of verification and falsification. The author's game‐theoretical semantics here explained for formal first‐order languages, can be thought of as a realization of this (...)
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  44. The Paradox of the Meno and Plato’s Theory of Recollection.Oded Balaban - 1994 - Semiotica 98 (3-4):265-276.
  45. Recollection and the Problem of the Elenchus.Jyl Gentzler - 1994 - Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 10 (1):257-295.
    We simply cannot make sense of Socrates' procedure for cross-examining his interlocutors in the early dialogues if we insist that Socrates uses cross-examination only for the purpose of testing his interlocutor's claim to knowledge. This view of Socratic cross-examination cannot explain the fact that Socrates examines theses that he himself proposes and that neither he nor his interlocutor explicitly endorses. In contrast,the supposition that Socrates is inquiring on these occasions provides a good explanation for his procedure. When one is attempting (...)
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  46. Aristotle's Solution to Meno's Paradox.Mark Allan Gifford - 1994 - Dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin
    The opening chapter to the Posterior Analytics , home to Aristotle's largely unknown solution to Meno's Paradox, has been handed down to us in a badly damaged condition. I show this in two ways. First, I provide a careful exegesis of a partially parallel passage in Prior Analytics B.21, revealing that the traditional reading of this passage, crucially dependent on the received text of A.1, is indefensible. Second, I expose the severe dialectical, philosophical, and philological difficulties to which the received (...)
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  47. On the Sense of the Socratic Reply to Meno’s Paradox.Rod Jenks - 1992 - Ancient Philosophy 12 (2):317-330.
  48. Thought Experiments and Philosophical Analysis: An Examination of the Method of Counterexample and the Legitimacy of Appeals to Pre-Theoretical Intuitions.Michelle Marie Rotert - 1992 - Dissertation, The University of Iowa
    I begin Chapter 1 with a description of some of the better known attempts to disconfirm proposed philosophical analyses by offering counterexamples to them in the context of thought experiments. After describing the role that appeals to pre-theoretical intuitions play in these thought experiments, I raise several questions about the appropriateness of such appeals. ;The most obvious place to begin the search for answers to the questions I ask is with an examination of some different views on the data of (...)
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  49. Le paradoxe de ménon et la connaissance définitionnelle: Réponse à Dominic Scott.Monique Canto-Sperber - 1991 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 181 (4):659 - 663.
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  50. LE PARADOXE DE MÉNON ET L'ÉCOLE D'OXFORD: Réponse à Dominic Scott.Denis O'Brien - 1991 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 181 (4):643 - 658.
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