Plato, Misc

So Emma thought, at least. Could a linguist, could a grammarian, could even a mathematician have seen what she did, have witnessed their appearance together, have heard their history of it, without feeling that circumstances had been at work to make them particularly interesting to each other? — How much more must an imaginist, like herself, be on fire with speculation and foresight!

This paper aims to suggest a new arrangement of Plato’s dialogues based on a different theory of the ontological as well as epistemological development of his philosophy. In this new arrangement, which proposes essential changes in the currently agreed upon chronology of the dialogues, Parmenides must be considered as criticizing an elementary theory of Forms and not the theory of so-called middle dialogues. Dated all as later than Parmenides, the so-called middle and late dialoguesare regarded as two consecutive endeavors to (...) resolve the problems drawn out in there; an effort in the theory of knowledge through Theaetetus, Meno and Phaedo and another in ontology through the second part of Parmenides, Sophist and Republic. (shrink)

The history of science is polarized by debates over Plato and Aristotle’s holism versus the atomism of Democritus and others. This includes the complementarity of continuous and discrete, one and the many, waves and particles, and analog or digital views of reality. The three-fold method of the Pythagorean paradigm of unity, duality, and harmony enables the calculation of fundamental physical constants required by the forces of nature in the formation of matter; thereby demonstrating Plato’s archetypal viewpoint.

Scholarship on Plato's Timaeus has paid relatively little attention to Tim. 77a–81, a seemingly disjointed passage on topics including plants, respiration, blood circulation, and musical sounds. Despite this comparative neglect, commentators both ancient and modern have levelled a number of serious charges against Timaeus' remarks in the passage, questioning the coherence and explanatory power of what they take to be a theory of respiration. In this paper, I argue that the project of 77a–81e is not to sketch theories of respiration, (...) circulation, and digestion (inter alia), but to explain how the human body is maintained in light of and despite constant environmental depletion. Further, I argue that in order to understand this account of “the replenishing system,” we need to understand Timaeus' striking analogy of the fish trap or nassa. Commentators have generally focused directly on the workings of the bodily construction that Timaeus likens to a fish trap, but without considering how we should understand the analogy qua analogy. I develop a functional reading of the analogy that yields a coherent account of the replenishing system on which previous criticisms of Timaeus' remarks on respiration do not arise. Aside from lending greater unity to the passage, both internally and within its immediate context in the dialogue, this account of the replenishing system contributes to our understanding of Timaeus' reason-and-necessity explanatory framework as applied to the human body and has noteworthy implications for specific explanatory principles, in particular like-to-like motion and circular thrust. (shrink)

In this article I seek to come to some understanding of the interlocutors in the first book of Plato’s Republic, particularly Cephalus. A more complete view of Cephalus not only provides some interesting ways to think about Plato and the Republic, but also suggests an interesting alternative to Plato’s view of justice. The article will progress as follows: First, I discuss Plato’s allegory of the cave. I, then, critique the cave allegory by applying the same kind of reasoning that O. (...) K. Bouwsma used to criticize Descartes’ evil genius. Next, I present what I think is a fruitful way to understand Cephalus. Finally, I draw some important conclusions regarding justice and offer some interesting critiques of Plato and Platonism. (shrink)

Payne's commentary on Republic I–VII is not advanced as a sustained argument for the new type of teleology he finds there but is structured by themes in the text. It engages with selected previous scholarship on the Republic and is written with care and deliberation. Payne begins with an overview of the types of teleology, or end-directed action, found in Plato's corpus, but does not address contemporary philosophy of action. Payne's own "functional teleology of action" accounts for how agents act (...) for the sake of ends of which they are unaware, as when mathematical study is directed to the Form of the Good... (shrink)

Dans l’œuvre de Platon, l’image du rêve semble d’abord servir à désigner l’état d’ignorance du commun des mortels qui « rêvent » leur vie. Cet usage métaphorique ne saurait correspondre parfaitement à la pensée platoni- cienne du phénomène onirique, particulièrement lorsqu’on l’envisage d’un point de vue éthique (qu’advient-il de la vertu de l’homme dans son sommeil ?), plutôt qu’épistémologique ou ontologique. Dans la République, le sommeil apparaît essentiellement comme l’endormissement d’une partie de l’âme – la rationnelle – au profit d’une (...) autre – la désirante. Platon laisse pourtant entendre que, sous certaines conditions, les visions qui s’y manifestent ne sont pas nécessairement mensongères et pourraient même, pour certaines, avoir une origine divine. Le rêve doit donc être compris non seulement comme un moment de séparation de l’âme et du corps, mais aussi de différenciation des facultés ou parties de l’âme elles-mêmes qui acquièrent là leur autonomie propre et déploient, sans se limiter l’une l’autre, leur plein pouvoir. -/- In Plato’s works the image of a dream at first seems to serve the purpose of indicating the state of ignorance of ordinary humans who « dream » their way through life. This metaphorical usage does not reflect perfectly Plato’s thought on the phenomenon of dreams, especially when it is considered from an ethical point of view (what happens to human virtue during sleep?) rather than an epistemological or ontological one. In the Republic sleep appears to be essen- tially where a part of the soul goes asleep – namely the rational part – to the advantage of the desiring part. However, Plato implies that under certain condi- tions the visions that occur in sleep are not necessarily false and could even, in some cases, have a divine origin. Dreams must therefore be understood not merely as a moment of separation of soul and body, but also of differentiation of the faculties or parts of the soul themselves, which acquire their own autonomy in dreams and deploy their full power without limiting one another (transl. J. Dudley). (shrink)

Translations of the “myths” from Plato’s Protagoras (320c-324d), Symposium (189c-193d), Republic (614b-621d), Timaeus (20d-25d and 29d-34b), and Kritias (108e-121c).

Thinking Life is a narrative exploration of such themes as the decline of the contemporary university, man’s alienation from nature, modern melancholia, Dionysian intoxication, the relative value of knowledge, truth, and artistry in the life of the philosopher, and the creative construction of self. The author engages throughout with Plato and Nietzsche, with the Phaedo and The Gay Science in particular.

Journal Name: Apeiron Issue: Ahead of print.

On chercherait en vain dans l’œuvre de Platon des développements explicites sur le silence. Mais le génie littéraire de Platon lui fait une place, et la mise en scène des dialogues, comme les interactions des personnages, mettent en jeu différentes figures du silence par lesquelles se dévoilent d’autres aspects des réflexions socratico-platoniciennes sur le langage. Les silences du philosophe s’opposent, en effet, à ceux de ses interlocuteurs, autant que la pratique philosophique du dialogue aux discours sophistiques. Car le silence véritable (...) n’est pas que l’absence de voix, ni même simplement l’attente d’une parole à venir, mais, en dernière analyse, un retour à la source du logos : la pensée et l’être même. (shrink)

Este texto argumenta que el discurso de Sócrates, que constituye un compendio de su discusión con el rétor Gorgias acerca la retórica (464b2-466e3), forma parte de la estrategia polémica empleada por Platón, en la que el humor juega un papel fundamental. Con ayuda del método de la división, Sócrates desacredita la retórica (tal y como la presenta Gorgias), comparándola con la sofística, la cosmética y la cocina, y llamándolas a todas adulaciones. El propósito del presente escrito es mostrar la complejidad (...) de la crítica platónica y de su dimensión intertextual, en tanto que contiene notables referencias a diferentes conceptos del “arte” [τέχνη], del “placer” [ἡδονή], de la “ilusión” [ἀπατη] y del “simulacro” [εἴδωλον] empleados los textos de Gorgias. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to understand some meaningful aspects of the Socratic use of Iliad x 224 in Plato’s Protagoras and Symposium. In these dialogues the Homeric reference appears in different contexts, but Plato’s Socrates applies it in the same way and seems to indicate it as a relevant step for the implementation of the dialectic method. Socrates is not only provoking his interlocutor, but rather making a comparison between the dialogue’s scene and the context involving Diomedes and (...) Odysseus’ in Iliad x. Ultimately, the use of this reference shows that a dialogical interplay to achieve a common purpose is a precondition for the Socratic dialectic. This previous cooperation between Homeric characters is emphasized by Plato’s Socrates and is derived from a specific soul’s manifestation. (shrink)

Socrates' attitude towards falsehood is quite puzzling in the Republic. Although Socrates is clearly committed to truth, at several points he discusses the benefits of falsehood. This occurs most notably in Book 3 with the "noble lie" (414d-415c) and most disturbingly in Book 5 with the "rigged sexual lottery" (459d-460c). This raises the question: What kinds of falsehoods does Socrates think are beneficial, and what kinds of falsehoods does he think are harmful? And more broadly: What can this tell us (...) about the relationship between ethics and epistemology? The key to answering these questions lies in an obscure and paradoxical passage in Book II; at 382a-d Socrates distinguishes between "true falsehoods" and "impure lies." True falsehoods are always bad, but impure lies are sometimes beneficial. Despite Socrates' insistence that he is not saying anything deep, his distinction is far from straightforward. Nevertheless, in order to determine why some falsehoods are beneficial and why some are always harmful, we must understand what exactly true falsehoods are and how they differ from impure lies. In this paper, I argue that true falsehoods are a restricted class of false beliefs about ethics; they are false beliefs about how one should live and what one should pursue. I refer to these beliefs as "normative commitments." False normative commitments are always pernicious because they create and sustain psychological disharmony. Unlike true falsehoods, impure lies can be about anything. Nevertheless, they are only beneficial when they help produce and sustain true normative commitments. I argue that the upshot of this is that practical concerns have a kind of primacy over theoretical concerns. (shrink)

Contributors to this volume focus on the character of Socrates as the embodiment of philosophy, employing this as a starting point for exploring various themes exposed in the Apology. These include the relation of philosophy to democracy, rhetoric, politics, or society in general, and the overarching question of what comprises the philosophic life.

This book presents a thorough study and an up to date anthology of Plato’s Protagoras. International authors' papers contribute to the task of understanding how Plato introduced and negotiated a new type of intellectual practice – called philosophy – and the strategies that this involved. They explore Plato’s dialogue, looking at questions of how philosophy and sophistry relate, both on a methodological and on a thematic level.

Analisi della possibile influenza esercitata dalla lettura di Platone su Freud, e in particolare della teoria del sogno come via per conoscere dei desideri precedentemnte "repressi" esposta nella "Repubblica".

Plato’s Allegory of the Cave is both a staple in the philosopher’s diet and the lesson that is often difficult to digest. In this paper, I describe one way to teach the Sun, Line, and Cave analogies in reference to students’ personal past experiences. After first learning about Plato’s metaphysics and epistemology through reading Republic VI-VII, students are asked to reflect upon a time in their lives when they emerged from a particular “cave of ignorance.” In reflecting on this experience, (...) students are encouraged to consider how each aspect of the line analogy might be represented in their own experience. Students also consider the epistemological experience turning towards that which is more real. In so doing, students gain a deeper understanding of these lessons by connecting new, abstract, and difficult information to information that is so familiar, it is remembered and not merely imagined. Putting Plato’s theories into the context of their own learning experiences facilitates students’ comprehension of the different levels of being and cognition, their interrelation, and the psychological process of increasing understanding. (shrink)

Despite the prominent argument for equal educational opportunity for women inWe examine carefully Plato’s argument for the equal nature of women in.

This is the annotated bibliography that accompanied Volume 2 of American Association of Philosophy Teachers Studies in Pedagogy, a special issue on teaching Plato. It includes sections covering teaching several specific dialogues: Republic, Meno, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito and Lysis, as well as sections on "Socrates as Teacher" and general articles on teaching Plato.

The 19th Century New England author Thoreau provides an approach to conscience and unjust laws approximating that given by St. Thomas Aquinas in _Summa Theologiae_. But the portrait of conscience given by Thoreau in the 1848 oration “Civil Disobedience” is incomplete. Thoreau’s approach is solved by accepting insights given in Part I and Part I–II of _Summa Theologiae_. Allowing St. Thomas’ insights requires reform of Thoreau’s civil disobedience and conscientious objection. But Thoreau’s arguments are given new life.

This paper is a study about the social dimension of the philosophical education according to Aristotle. Aristotle is not a individualistic thinker but he understands the philosophical activity in the social context of the friendship.

Plato was a Socrates’ friend and disciple, but he wasn’t the only one. No doubt, Socrates had many followers, however, the majority of their work is lost. Was there any antagonism among his followers? Who succeeded in interpreting Socrates? Who could be considered as his successor? Of course, we don’t know if these questions emerged after the death of Socrates, but the Greek doxography suggests that there was a literary rivalry. As we underlined earlier, most unfortunately, we can’t examine all (...) of them thoroughly due to the lack of their work, but we can scrutinize Xenophon’s and Aristippus’ work. All of them, Plato, Xenophon and Aristippus, presented to a certain extent their ideas concerning education. Furthermore, they have not neglected the matter of gymnastikè, but what is exactly the role of physical education in their work? Are there any similarities or any differences between them? Since, Xenophon and Aristippus (as well as Plato) seem to be in favor of gymnastikè, it is necessary to understand its role. (shrink)

In Plato’s Symposium Eryximachus provides a metaphysical theory based on the attraction of basic elements which he applies to a variety of domains, including music. In the text of his speech there is a variation in the manuscripts at 187d2 between two readings, “μέλεσί τε καὶ μέτροις” and “μέλεσί τε καὶ ῥυθμοῖς”. Though the former is almost universally followed, I argue that the latter is the correct reading, based on three sources of evidence: (1) the manuscript tradition, (2) Plato’s style (...) and diction, and (3) the logic of the passage. In all three cases ῥυθμοῖς is the preferable reading. (shrink)

El hombre actual como dios. Textos de Platón, Lactancio, Malebranche... ISBN 978 84 686 6212 1 Published by Bubok Publishing S.L., 2015.

Name der Zeitschrift: Apeiron Jahrgang: 47 Heft: 1 Seiten: 48-80.

Mantissa is the fourth volume of Jonathan Barnes' collected essays on ancient philosophy. It contains twenty-three papers on a diverse range of subjects, from the size of the sun to Plato and Aristotle in Victorian Oxford. One of the essays is new, and the others are all retouched or revised; six are newly translated into English.