Plato: Moral Education

This interpretive introduction provides unique insight into Plato's Republic. Stressing Plato's desire to stimulate philosophical thinking in his readers, Julia Annas here demonstrates the coherence of his main moral argument on the nature of justice, and expounds related concepts of education, human motivation, knowledge and understanding. In a clear systematic fashion, this book shows that modern moral philosophy still has much to learn from Plato's attempt to move the focus from questions of what acts the just person ought to perform (...) to the more profound questions of what sort of person the just person ought to be. (shrink)

Dieser Aufsatz erörtert Heideggers Auffassung vom ‚metaphysischen‘ Charakter des abendländischen Humanismus mittels einer Hervorhebung einiger Grundzüge der Geschichte des philosophischen Bildungsbegriffes. Nach Heidegger sind die Bildungsideale der europäischen Humanismen von den metaphysischen Grundauffassungen vom idealen Sein des Seienden bestimmt. Außerdem ist für Heidegger der Bildungsbegriff mit der Tradition der Bildmetaphysik – sowohl mit der platonisch-christlichen Vorstellung des Menschen als Abbild eines göttlichen Vorbilds als auch mit der neuzeitlich-subjektivistischen ‚Eroberung der Welt als Bild‘ – verbunden. Schließlich wird die Möglichkeit eines Heideggerschen (...) nachmetaphysischen, nicht mehr ‚idealistischen‘ Bildungsbegriffes mit Rücksicht auf seinen späteren Begriff des ‚Wohnens‘ behandelt. (shrink)

This paper raises a new interpretive puzzle concerning Socrates’ attitude towards truth in the Phaedo. At one point Socrates seems to advocate that he is justified in trying to convince himself that the soul is immortal and destined for a better place regardless of whether or not these claims are true, but that Cebes and Simmias should relentlessly pursue the truth about the very same matter. This raises the question: Why might Socrates believe that he will benefit from believing things (...) about death irrespective of the truth, but that Cebes and Simmias will not? Why should they continue pursuing the truth? This paper argues that the relevant difference between Socrates and his friends is that Socrates is a fully accomplished philosopher, while his friends are not. This, I argue, makes Socrates an epistemic authority, and it is in virtue of being an epistemic authority that he is justified in not pursuing the truth about death. The upshot of this paper is that sometimes the demands of living well require that we abandon the pursuit of truth and knowledge. (shrink)

Socrates' attitude towards falsehood is quite puzzling in the Republic. Although Socrates is clearly committed to truth, at several points he discusses the benefits of falsehood. This occurs most notably in Book 3 with the "noble lie" (414d-415c) and most disturbingly in Book 5 with the "rigged sexual lottery" (459d-460c). This raises the question: What kinds of falsehoods does Socrates think are beneficial, and what kinds of falsehoods does he think are harmful? And more broadly: What can this tell us (...) about the relationship between ethics and epistemology? The key to answering these questions lies in an obscure and paradoxical passage in Book II; at 382a-d Socrates distinguishes between "true falsehoods" and "impure lies." True falsehoods are always bad, but impure lies are sometimes beneficial. Despite Socrates' insistence that he is not saying anything deep, his distinction is far from straightforward. Nevertheless, in order to determine why some falsehoods are beneficial and why some are always harmful, we must understand what exactly true falsehoods are and how they differ from impure lies. In this paper, I argue that true falsehoods are a restricted class of false beliefs about ethics; they are false beliefs about how one should live and what one should pursue. I refer to these beliefs as "normative commitments." False normative commitments are always pernicious because they create and sustain psychological disharmony. Unlike true falsehoods, impure lies can be about anything. Nevertheless, they are only beneficial when they help produce and sustain true normative commitments. I argue that the upshot of this is that practical concerns have a kind of primacy over theoretical concerns. (shrink)

In Plato’s Laws, the Athenian Stranger maintains that law should consist of both persuasion (πειθώ) and compulsion (βία) (IV.711c, IV.718b-d, and IV.722b). Persuasion can be achieved by prefacing the laws with preludes (προοίμια), which make the citizens more eager to obey the laws. Although scholars disagree on how to interpret the preludes’ persuasion, they agree that the preludes instill true beliefs and give citizens good reasons for obeying the laws. In this paper I refine this account of the preludes by (...) arguing that the primary purpose of the preludes is to motivate correct action, and that for citizens who lack rational-governance this is achieved via useful false beliefs. That is to say, in many cases, the prelude functions as a “noble lie” (γενναῖον ψεῦδος). (shrink)

This paper analyzes how the figure of the childhas been used to authorize a series ofboundaries that have constituted thelimit-points of educational theories orphilosophies. Limit-points are the conceptualboundaries that educational theories produce,move within, respond to, and make use ofbecause the perception is that they cannot beargued away or around at the time. A method ofcomparative historico-philosophy is used tocontrast limit-points in Platonic figurationsof the child and education with childcenteredand eugenic theories of the late nineteenth andtwentieth century West. The figuration of (...) thechild in both periods is imbricated in formingboundaries around a power-motion-reason nexusand in delineating what necessity and justicemean. The meaning-space that the child canoccupy in relation to such concepts has shiftedwith them and has been important to depictingUtopian and cosmological imaginings atdifferent historical moments and forauthorizing in turn what counts as anappropriate and/or realistic educationalphilosophy. (shrink)

Introduction I i Plato's critics The view that I shall put forward is that utilitarianism is the only acceptable ethical theory and that this was recognised ...

Plato's views on tragedy depend in large part on his views about the ethical consequences of emotional arousal. In the Republic, Plato treats the desires we feel in everyday life to weep and feel pity as appetites exactly like those for food or sex, whose satisfactions are ‘replenishments’. Physical desire is not reprehensible in itself, but is simply non-rational, not identical with reason but capable of being brought into agreement with it. Some desires, like that for simple and wholesome food, (...) are in fact ‘necessary’ and approved by reason. Other appetites, like lust and gluttony, are ‘unnecessary’ and anti-rational in that they are actively opposed to reason. According to the Republic, the satisfaction of these ‘unnecessary’ desires inevitably strengthens the elements in the soul that oppose reason. The desire to weep at the theatre is treated in this dialogue as just such an anti-rational desire. Even a temporary indulgence in tragic pity and fear has a permanent deleterious effect on the soul, although it does not lead directly to any action. This paper argues that a radically different psychological theory, with important aesthetic implications, appears in the discussion of wine-drinking in Books 1 and 2 of Plato's Laws. Though this long passage has been much scorned and neglected, it is of considerable philosophical importance. While in the Republic Plato condemns drunkenness and other anti-rational states, in the Laws he extols the benefits of a hypothetical ‘fear drug’ that could induce a temporary state of anti-rational terror and of wine to produce other anti-rational emotions and desires. (shrink)

One of the distinctions that Plato in the Laws stresses most heavily in his discussion of the proper relation between the individual citizen and the laws of the city is that between persuasion and compulsion. Law, Plato believes, should try to persuade rather than compel the citizens. Near the end of the fourth book of the Laws, the Athenian Stranger, Plato's spokesman in this dialogue, asks whether the lawgiver for their new city of Magnesia should in making laws ‘explain straightaway (...) what must and must not be done, add the threat of a penalty, and turn to another law, without adding a single bit of encouragement or persuasion [παραμυθας δ κα πειθος … ν] to his legislative edicts’ . A few lines later, the Athenian Stranger himself condemns such a procedure as ‘the worse and more savage alternative’ . The better method is for the laws themselves to try to persuade the citizens to act in the manner that they prescribe. And as a means of doing this, Plato proposes attaching preludes to particular laws and to the legal code as a whole: such preludes will supplement the sanctions attached to the laws and will aim at persuading the citizens to act in the way that the laws direct for reasons other than fear of the penalties attached to the law. Such a practice, Plato believes, is an innovation: it is something that no lawgiver has ever thought of doing before . And we have no reason to think that Plato is here excluding his earlier self, e.g. the Plato of the Republic and the Politicus, from this criticism. (shrink)

The gods, however, took pity on the human race, born to suffer as it was, and gave it relief in the form of religious festivals to serve as periods of rest from its labors. They gave us the Muses, with Apollo their leader, and Dionysus; by having these gods to share their holidays, men were to be made whole again . . .That Plato1 regarded music as an extremely powerful means to cultivate morality and good citizenship is well-known.2 In the (...) Laws we are told that musical license is the chief reason for political license, and in the Republic Socrates insists that music education is the greatest bulwark of a polis.3 The Platonic corpus is also peppered with striking suggestions that the well-educated soul is, above .. (shrink)

In our reply to Rowe, we explain why most of what he criticizes is actually the product of his misunderstanding our argument. We begin by showing that nearly all of his Part 1 misconceives our project by defending a position we never attacked. We then question why Rowe thinks the distinction we make between motivational and virtue intellectualism is unimportant before developing a defense of the consistency of our views about different desires. Next we turn to Rowe’s criticisms of our (...) account of the prudential paradox and show these criticisms to rest on a misunderstanding. We close with some remarks about the implausibility and textual problems Rowe faces in denying that Socrates recognized a role for painful punishments. (shrink)

This paper argues that the creation of Kallipolis and the educational pro­gamme designed therein should be read in the context of one branch of Plato’s critique of Athenian democracy; namely, its employment of the Laconizing trope prominent in Politeia literature in order to identify and radicalize the desires innervated by an idealized vision of Spartan unity. In particular, it aims to show that the discussion of sexual difference in the famous first wave of Book 5, as well as the peculiar (...) concep­tion of phusis on which the foundation of Kallipolis rests and the account of familial discord so decisive for the distinct moments of its demise, should be read in light of the service they perform to Plato’s reframing of ownership. (shrink)

An examination is made of important influences that shaped both the development of Plato's religious and philosophical teachings/theories of the Soul and Spirit which were based on core Spiritual Laws or Principles, and his scheme of education as outlined in the Republic. Included are Plato's early years and the teachings and influence of Socrates and the Orphic, Pythagorean and Eleusinian Mystery Schools. Plato's system of education is shown to be very much influenced by the Pythagoreans, to involve the 'Principle of (...) Initiation' and to be soul-centered, where all thought is related to 'The One'. The conclusion is that the philosophy and teaching of education today tends to ignore the important integrative principle of unity--the Soul/Spirit connection. A renewed philosophy and scheme of education is introduced incorporating a vision of the whole person. (shrink)

Evidence from the Apology, Crito, Protagoras, and Gorgias is mustered in defense of the claim that for Socrates, dialectic typifies just punishment: Dialectic benefits the punished by making her more just, since it disabuses her of the false beliefs that stand in the way of her acquiring knowledge of justice. Though painful and disorienting to the interlocutor, having one’s opinions refuted by Socrates—who is wiser than his interlocutors due to his awareness of the vastness of his ignorance —is in fact (...) a benefit. Socrates’ attitude toward his own pending death sentence, his claim that the virtues are unified around wisdom, and his opposition to vengeance or retaliation as a moral motive, all underscore how dialectical engagement is a paradigm instance of just Socratic punishment. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage constitue la version révisée d'une thèse de doctorat soutenue à la Scuola Normale Superiore de Pise, et traduite en anglais. Composé de quatre chapitres, l'ouvrage se propose d'abord d'examiner le rôle que Platon attribue à la musique dans l'éducation, pour ensuite analyser la relation que la musique entretient avec l'âme et le corps. F. Pelosi étudie la conception platonicienne de la musique et envisage son importance pour comprendre non seulement la relation corps-esprit chez Platon, mais (…) - 12. (...) Plato 12 (2012). (shrink)

Many commentators of the "Republic" see the conformity to authority, emphasized in the early education, as a hindrance to the development of the critical skills necessary for the philosopher. Furthermore, they see the theoretical training of the philosopher as detached from morality. I argue that Plato does not view philosophical training as separate from morality. Rather Plato views intellectual training as integral to the philosopher's overall pursuit of the Good. Philosophical knowledge is moral because the objects of such knowledge are (...) closer to the divine. Philosophical development is a moral and spiritual quest aimed at becoming god-like. (shrink)

The feminine component which can be identified with creativity is, according to Plato, crucial for education and knowledge. This essay examines how Plato in the Symposium expresses his conception of educational and cognitive relationships in analogy to amorous relationships. This analogy makes it evident why Diotima is a woman. The essay shows in addition how Eros leads to knowledge and immortality, as well as how Socrates incarnates Eros in this Platonic conception. The question is also considered whether Plato subscribed to (...) an abstract notion of Eros or rather to an individualised, personal one. (shrink)

The feminine component which can be identified with creativity is, according to Plato, crucial for education and knowledge. This essay examines how Plato in the Symposium expresses his conception of educational and cognitive relationships in analogy to amorous relationships. This analogy makes it evident why Diotima is a woman. The essay shows in addition how Eros leads to knowledge and immortality, as well as how Socrates incarnates Eros in this Platonic conception. The question is also considered whether Plato subscribed to (...) an abstract notion of Eros or rather to an individualised, personal one. (shrink)

Recent commentators have attended to dramatic and ironic aspects of Plato’s Republic. But a more sustained examination of the relation between irony and the exchanges of Socrates and Glaucon is required because a crucial purpose and presentation of the irony have largely gone unnoticed. I argue that Socrates employs irony in part to parody Glaucon’s extremism and that he does so to exhort Glaucon to think critically. I examine how Socrates uses the term makaria (blessedness) primarily ironically and pedagogically. A (...) possible reason for this use of makaria is that aspects of Kallipolis are a parody of Glaucon that aim to instruct Glaucon intellectually. (shrink)

This thesis examines the philosophy of education presented in Plato's dialogues. It dates the composition of these writings to the time of the transition of Greek culture and education from orality to literacy following the adoption of the phonetic alphabet. It shows that an awareness of this revolution in the technology for storing and retrieving communication has not been incorporated into our paradigm for interpreting Plato's philosophy. ;The study takes Homer as an example of a literature with roots in an (...) oral tradition. It explains how poetry functioned as a technology for preserving culture, and how formulas, the sequential ordering of topics, and the geometric ring structure were techniques used by the poets to recite the epics from memory, and by the audience as a guide to reception. ;Applying to Plato an understanding of the principles of the oral traditional style used to structure the verse in Homer allows us to see, in the dialogues, certain characteristic mnemonic patterns that have not been noticed until now. Recognizing the oral patterns in these writings opens the door to a comprehension of the "unwritten doctrine" of principles attributed to Plato by Aristotle, which scholars in the modern era have had difficulty finding in the dialogues. ;The analysis centers on the instructions in Plato's Sophist for drawing the lines that divide the definition of "art" into a sequence of topics, The study shows that this geometry provides the framework for the mnemonic ring composition. The ideas classed in each topic in this definition make up a sequence that recurs in every dialogue. This same series is repeated in Xenophon's Memorabilia and in Aristotle's Poetics. It is also present in the Chuang Tzu and in Genesis 1--3 of the Old Testament. The frequency of the occurrence of this multi-part sequence makes it unlikely that it is either random or accidental. That it turns up in four other ancient works that have been dated to the same time period adds even more weight to the conclusion. These different treatises were all shaped by the techniques and conventions of an oral traditional system of philosophy. (shrink)

In this thesis I shall argue (1) that for Plato ‘moral’ education, rightly understood (or ‘Platonic education’ as I shall call it), can be an effective method for cultivating virtue in non-ideal societies; (2) that Platonic education is a process that occurs (or Plato hopes might occur) through an engagement with some of the dialogues; (3) that Platonic education strongly mirrors Sokratic discourse in its aims; (4) that Plato’s whole approach to education should be understood mainly from the context of (...) the problem of teaching virtue in imperfect societies; (5) that Plato intends some of the dialogues to serve as a propaedeutic for a possible education in virtue and not as a method for creating fully virtuous people. Lastly, (6) Platonic education is primarily concerned with human virtue, and insofar as it can support a notion or notions of civic virtue, it cannot do so unequivocally. The evidence for these claims is found not chiefly in the educational programmes and theories of the Republic and the Laws but in a number of techniques, such as protreptic rhetoric, life-models, argumentation, and myth, which Plato employs in some of the dialogues. Platonic education is specifically designed to function in imperfect societies. With this in mind therefore, an additional concern of this thesis is with whether we could imagine any of Plato’s educational principles or techniques being used to improve moral education today. (shrink)

This collection of original essays pays tribute to the man by exploring topics that have interested him through a long and productive career.

Abstract The first section of the paper reviews the kind of action which unfolds in Plato's Republic, and argues that, from Book II onwards, its character shifts from a genuine dialogue (communicative action) to a more manipulative kind of intercourse (strategic action). While the former kind of action was characteristic of the educational activities of the historical Socrates, the case is made that this kind of action became largely eclipsed in Western education and superseded by the strategic concerns to which (...) Platonist conceptions of learning gave prominence. The Platonist legacy, it is pointed out, had a decisive impact on Western conceptions of learning, even beyond the Enlightenment. These conceptions were largely custodial rather than emancipatory in character. An argument is presented in thirteen steps in the second section of the paper, to establish the case that the kind of action which properly describes the experience of teaching and learning is that of a cultural courtship. A distinction is drawn between honourable and dishonourable forms of courtship, the honourable being a candidate for defence in universalist terms. The practical import of the distinction is considered. Under the title ?The Dialogue that we Aren't?, the third section reviews postmodern objections ? particularly those of Lyotard ? to the kind of argument made in the thirteen steps, and the concluding section considers Habermas? later theories in relation to my own ?universalist? argument. (shrink)

In this paper, I reconsider the commonly held position that the early moral education of the Republic is arational since the youths of the Kallipolis do not yet have the capacity for reason. I argue that, because they receive an extensive mathematical education alongside their moral education, the youths not only have a capacity for reason but that capacity is being developed in their early education. If this is so, though, then we must rethink why the early moral education is (...) arational. I argue that the reason is rooted in the nature of moral explanations. These sorts of explanations are rooted in the Forms and thus one can only understand those explanations when they have knowledge of the Forms. But this requires preparation – the very sort of preparation that is provided by both the mathematical and moral educations. (shrink)

The moral virtue of the auxiliary guardians in Plato's Republic is a state of soul which is inferior to philosophical knowledge, but greatly superior to the pseudo-virtue of mere right opinion or accidentally right action. This dissertation investigates the virtue of the auxiliary guardians, especially in relation to the Republic's account of moral psychology, moral education, and moral degeneration. An original interpretation of spiritedness is offered, as competitiveness and a desire for dominance. The apparent diversity in spiritedness is explained as (...) a consequence of the necessity that dominance and competitiveness be expressed in terms of some secondary value. The guardians' education and training involve habits of thought as well as habits of conduct and expression. The harmony of soul which is the auxiliary guardians' moral virtue is shown to be an approximation of the state of soul of the philosopher. For the musical and poetic education which the auxiliary guardians receive gives rise to a sort of moral and aesthetic paradigm, which is parallel to the paradigm which the philosophers possess by virtue of their knowledge of the Form of the Good. The marriage lie and the particular degenerative power of tragic poetry are discussed. (shrink)

The article resonates Plato's ideas on education and art. In the Apology, Socrates describes his life's mission of practicing philosophy as aimed at getting the Athenians to care for virtue; in the Gorgias, Plato claims that happiness depends entirely on education and justice; in the Protagoras and the Meno, he puzzles about whether virtue is teachable or how else it might be acquired; in the Phaedrus, he explains that teaching and persuading require knowledge of the soul and its powers, which (...) requires knowledge of what objects the soul may act on and be acted on by which, in turn, requires knowledge of nature. The article also looks at musical and gymnastic education's effects on the soul using images from metallurgy and dyeing wool, saying that prerational souls are “most malleable and take on any pattern one wishes to impress on them.”. (shrink)