Plato: Myths

Showcases methods of visualization to support text comprehension and engagement with texts. Includes examples from teaching Plato's Phaedo.

Both current and past analyses and critiques of transhumanist and posthumanist theories have had a propensity to cite the Greek myth of Prometheus as a paradigmatic figure. Although stark differences exist amongst the token forms of posthumanist theories and transhumanism, both theoretical domains claim promethean theory as their own. There are numerous definitions of those two concepts: therefore, this article focuses on posthumanism thought. By first analyzing the appropriation of the myth in posthumanism, we show how the myth fails to (...) be foundational and how we need to rethink the posthumanist mythological framework. We then introduce Haldane’s Daedalus figure as a fruitful analogy to understand the demiurgic posture that critics mean to unveil by first using Prometheus. Daedalus embodies the artisan role, whose status as an inventor for the mighty preserves from the gods' direct opprobrium. Thereafter, we introduce the Camusian Myth of Sisyphus as a competing analogy that ultimately serves as a myth better suited to address the posthumanist position on an existential standpoint. we ultimately show that Sisyphus, as the ‘absurd man’ that Camus claims him to be, is himself the posthuman, thus serving as a more ideal foundational myth for posthumanism and preserving the importance of narrative in posthuman discourses. To conclude, we specifically show that the concept of Sisyphus as a posthuman icon has significance that reaches beyond narrative value to current ecological debates in posthumanism. (shrink)

Inverting the sequence of the traditional terms, in Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence Levinas redefines philosophy as the “wisdom of love”. Through an intertwining of Platonic motifs and Levinasian inspirations, the essay argues for a mutually regulated interplay of mythos and logos as a way to regain a sense of wisdom that remains respectful of the elements of otherness in reality-in particular, respectful of the otherness of the Third who, for Levinas, constitutes the ground for politics. That is, the (...) interplay of mythos and logos results into a mytho-logy in which the logos directing the mythos is the voice of the other which imposes not only the preservation, but also the institutionalization of the differences, alterities and incommensurabilities that constitute reality. The consequence of this differently negotiated notion of wisdom is a reconfiguration of philosophy in terms of a mythological politics of bodily, economic testimony in the service of the Third. (shrink)

Plato, as a poet, employs muthos extensively to express his philosophical dialectical development, so the majority of his dialogues are comprised of muthoi. We cannot separate his muthos from his philosophical thought, since the former has great influence in the latter. So the methodology of this paper is first to discuss the dialogue "Theaetetus" to find out why he compares Socrates to the Greek goddess Artemis; then his concept of Maieutikē will be investigated. At the beginning of Plato’s "Theaetetus", Socrates (...) first likens himself to the goddess Artemis, who, though unmarried, has a duty to assist women in labour. Socrates’ role, as Plato portrays, is the same as that of Artemis; and the technē he possesses is Maieutikē, which is to assist his students in giving birth to their mental offspring. This paper will focus on discussion on the Socratic mythological role in Platonic interpretation and dialectics so as to reveal the philosophical meaning of Socratic ignorance. (shrink)

Dr. Zaslavsky’s Platonic Myth and Platonic Writing: A Philosophico-Literary Exploration addresses the thorny issue of precisely what is meant by mythos (myth) in the Platonic corpus of dialogues. Dr. Zaslavsky rejects the common notion that what makes a myth in Plato a myth (as opposed to a speech or logos) is its truth value. Therefore, after an analysis of why Plato wrote as he did and a cataloguing and examination of every occurence of mythos and its derivatives in the Platonic (...) corpus, he articulates the new linguistic and philosophical principle that a myth is a genetic or causal synagogic/synoptic account, in contradistinction to logos as a descriptive or calssificatory diairetic account. He tests this definition successfully through an examination of all those accounts in Plato that are explicitly designated as myths. (shrink)

I review White's account of the swan song, of Socrates' last words, and of the importance of myth in Plato. Against any account of myth as a remedy in the nature of rational argument, I defend Hegel's account that myth addresses a less-than-fully-rational part of the soul.

This article undertakes to examine the reception of Platonic theories of falsification in the contemporary philosophy of Leo Strauss and his adherents. The aim of the article is to consider the Straussian response to, and interaction with, Platonic ideas concerning deception and persuasion with an emphasis on the arguments found in the Laws. The theme of central interest in this analysis is Plato's development of paramyth in the Laws. Paramyth entails the use of rhetorical language in order to persuade the (...) many that it is to their advantage to obey certain laws. It does so without explaining in detail why a given law is ethically correct and its use assumes that the audience, on the whole, is not capable of understanding the finer philosophical underpinnings of the law. The so-called 'noble lie' of the Republic is also considered in this context. The crucial issue, for Plato if not for Strauss, is whether or not an instance of falsification, however minor, for the purposes of persuasion contains 'truth-value', that is, whether it is morally justifiable in terms of ends and means. In terms of Strauss's reception of Plato, such issues as ancient Hebrew mysticism, Medieval Jewish and Islamic scholarship and Heideggerian Phenomenology figure in the argument. Ultimately, the article finds that Strauss and his followers have constructed a particular view of Platonic ideas that, while unique, is not compatible with their original signification. (shrink)

The article analyses the relation between logos and myth in Plato's philosophy using the Phaidros as a representative example; this includes the investigation of the function of the myth in this dialogue. The palinode proves to be the central unifying element of the Phaidros, and thus the dialogue s core. The second speech of Socrates mediates between the different parts of the Phaidros, its themes, motives and thoughts: for example love, rhetoric, dialectic, forms, different kinds of knowledge and speech or (...) of souls and gods. These entities are connected in the myth with the aim of mutual elucidation. While the myth is to be seen on a metaphorical level, the logos has to reflect the relation of the myth's themes in a rational and discursive manner. Thus, the myth gives the dialogue its epistemological purpose. (shrink)

The cosmological myth in Plato’s Statesman has generated several longstanding scholarly disputes, among them a controversy concerning the number and nature of the cosmic rotation cycles that it depicts. According to the standard interpretation, there are two cycles of rotation: west-to-east rotation occurs during the age of Cronus, and east-to-west rotation occurs during the age of Zeus, which is also our present era. Recent readings have challenged this two-cycle interpretation, arguing that the period of rotation opposed to our own is (...) governed neither by Cronus nor by Zeus, but is instead a separate rotational cycle during which chaos reigns before a divine ruler reestablishes control. We introduce a new constraint on any plausible interpretation of the myth. According to the Correspondence Principle, changes in fundamental cyclical processes that shape the way of life on earth (mode of generation, growth, aging, and mode of death) occur if and only if there is a change in the direction of cosmic rotation. We use the Correspondence Principle to defend a version of the standard two-cycle interpretation. (shrink)

In his recently published posthumous works "Prefiguration" and "The Rigorism of Truth" Hans Blumenberg surprisingly steps into the area of political history that he had left widely unconsidered in "Work on Myth". While "Prefiguration" tackles the “demonic” aspects of Napoleon and Hitler that Blumenberg tries to dismantle and bring into derision, in "Rigorism of Truth" he attacks Hannah Arendt's phrase of the Banality of Evil in relation to the Jerusalem trial against Adolf Eichmann in 1961. In this latter issue Blumenberg (...) defends the demonic he sees culminated in the form of Eichmann to assert what he calls the “mythical dimension“ in the Israeli process of nation-building. To him, Eichmann represents a prototypical demon incarnate that must be slaughtered by the heroic character seen in young state Israel. This obviously turns Blumenberg's criticism of Napoleon and Hitler into an affirmation of political myths that, on the face of it, appears to be a contradiction in terms. The essay focuses on this theoretical tension and tries to point out that significance (“Bedeutsamkeit”) is not only a necessity for individual self-assertion (“Selbstbehauptung”) but also a category of communality that must be handled with care. (shrink)

The beginning of Greek rational thought is usually rendered as „transition from myth to logos”. This immediate conclusion was popularized by W. Nestle’s work although its sources can be tracked down to Aristotle’s Metaphysics I, and may be understood in two ways: 1. As a breakdown by rational thought a thinking through „images”, natural in the first stories of „carriers of primitive mentality”, which in Plato’s metaphor of a cave equals leaving by a philosopher the world of images-shadows. 2. As (...) development of a sensu stricto rational thought already present in the myth, which can be rendered as its objectification in a “technical” language, natural for philosophy. Myth can be treated then as thinking via images and logos as discourse, or argument. Both can be rendered as oppositions or, remembering of a presence, function and role of myth in philosophical texts – following W. Jaeger – it can be argued that “myth contains in principle the whole Greek philosophy”. In the vast literature we can a variety of arguments advocating one or the other position. The major problem of relation- ship: myth-logos cannot be unanimously and finally resolved also because of the state of the extant texts of the first philosophers. However, this problem may be also analyzed from a different perspective, posing an important question about the genesis of myth. Myth “tells images”, transferring perceptions of which the subject is the reality surrounding human beings in its order and cause-effect consequences plus conclusions from these observations into a language of a story, which — in turn — will be translated into logos language by philosophy. It is then possible to formulate a thesis that thinking rationally sensu stricto is prior to thinking through images: in the order of being, general concepts, rules, axioms precede images. This thesis is substantiated explicitly for the first time by Plato the concept of anamnesis . If we reject the metaphorical aspect of Plato’s argument, we will be left with the notion that human being is born with a priori qualities which Descartes will later call innate ideas and Kant will develop into a priori qualities of human sensuality, reason and intellect. If we accept, following certain philosophical currents, the existence of such pre-cognitive models, enabling orderly and synoptic perception of first that, what appears to human being in the aspect of reality, which is accessible through sensual observation, and then transfer to the unknown sphere and unravel it, verified by logical-dialectical procedures, we would have to conclude that logos is prior in order of being to myth. Thanks to these models, human being — we will never know where and when he/she lived — in the first acts of perception of reality sees both its order, its rules and its structures, regardless of the fact whether he/she perceived them in qualitative or quantitative aspect. These models shape character and forms of sensual perception, and also determine, articulated in various ways, questions about the beginning, questions: why?, i.e. questions about the cause, but also enable him/her to see necessary cause-effect relationships. One can risk a statement that these models take forms of axioms, which — as most general statements, not required proofs — constitute unquestionable basis of every philosophical discourse. It can also be stated that, beginning with the questions of the first philosophers, the beginning and cause-effect relationships determines every philosophical system. These pre-cognitive models are then prior to “storytelling” in a diachronic aspect. However, even if logos precedes myth, first objectifications of logos take form of a myth — a story. Regardless declared the above equality of judgments about diachronic relationship myth-logos, I accept that certain philosophical concepts may confirm that myth comes from logos. Such a confirmation may be found in a few extant fragments and doxographic testimonies inherited after Xenocrates from Chalcedon, who both ontological spheres and rules consciously names after gods of myth. Also the Stoic allegoric and allegorical method may serve as a confirmation of the above interpretation of the treatise About Gods by Xenocrates from Chalcedon and the general thesis that myth-“story” comes from logos: from pre-cognitive models characteristic to reason, objectified in myth, which in turn rationalizes philosophical discourse. Later tracts of Iamblichus advocating numbers of hypostases of the Absolute, and theology of one of the latest Neo-platonic philosophers — Proclus confirm this truth. Key words LOGOS, MYTH, BEGINNING OF PHILOSOPHY. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie Jahrgang: 96 Heft: 4 Seiten: 403-430.

This article examines a series of Greek myths which establish a structural equivalence between two motifs, stoning and blinding; the two penalties either substitute for one another in alternative versions of a single story, or appear in sequence as repayments in kind. After reviewing other theories concerning the motives behind blinding and lapidation, I argue that both punishments-together with petrifaction and live imprisonment, which frequently figure alongside the other motifs-are directed against individuals whose crimes generate pollution. This miasma affects not (...) only the perpetrator of the deed, but risks spreading to the community at large, and prompts measures aimed at containing the source of the disease. Both blinding and lapidation are designed to cordon off the contaminant by removing him from all visual and tactile contact with other men. But it is not only the nature of the crimes that explains the kinship between the two penalties. I further argue that the attributes Greek thinking assigned to stones, repeatedly characterized as unseeing, mute, immobile, and dry, and symbolic of the condition of the dead, elucidate the connections and clarify the antagonism that myth suggests between lapidation and sight. Stoning, blinding, imprisonment, and petrifaction all consign the criminal to an existence exactly parallel to that of the stone, stripping him of the properties that distinguish the living from the dead, and making him both unseeing and unseen. Three examples drawn from archaic and classical literature provide examples of these interactions between stones, blindness, invisibility, and death: the snake portent sent by Zeus in Book 2 of the Iliad, the Perseus myth, and Hermes' activity in both the Homeric Hymn to Hermes and Aeschylus' Choephoroe. (shrink)