Plato: Sophist

[PHILPEOPLE DOESN'T ALLOW PARAGRAPH BREAKS IN ABSTRACTS...] My [Frank Scalambrino's] dissertation first traces the development of a philosophical theory of ontological negation from Plato’s Parmenides and Sophist through Aristotle’s Metaphysics to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, especially his “Table of Nothing” (A 292). Whereas Plato’s “puzzle of non-being” sets the stage for the subsequent discussion of ontological negation, Kant’s Table of Nothing provides a formalization of the possible solutions to the puzzle. According to Kant, there are four (4) different ways (...) in which “ontological negation” could be meant. By way of this formalization two major trends for interpreting ontological negation may be seen in the history of Western philosophy. The Aristotelian trend may be seen as a reduction of ontological negation to logical negation such that the fourth possibility in Kant’s Table of Nothing is eliminated. This Aristotelian trend was later adopted by both Hegel and Heidegger. [NEW PARAGRAPH........................................................................................... .................................................................................................... .......]The Platonic trend, exemplified by the “puzzle of non-being” from the Sophist, affirms what is later formalized as the fourth possibility in Kant’s Table of Nothing. How exactly to characterize such ontological negation is precisely “the puzzle of non-being.” The idea being that if it is not even possible to characterize this type of ontological negation, then it should be eliminated, that is, by following Aristotle’s trend and reducing ontological negation to logical negation. It was as a reaction against Hegel, and thereby the Aristotelian trend regarding ontological negation, then, which prompted Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Derrida to take up the puzzle of non-being and pursue the Platonic trend. [NEW PARAGRAPH........................................................................................... .................................................................................................... .......]Both of their solutions to the puzzle of non-being follow the Platonic trend in two (2) ways: first, they affirm the fourth possibility in Kant’s Table of Nothing, and, second, they take an approach already initiated in the Sophist; that is, they attempt to characterize ontological negation in terms of one of Plato’s “Great Kinds” – Difference. Of course, both Deleuze and Derrida take a post-Kantian approach to characterizing ontological negation in terms of difference. In fact, given the internal criteria of the puzzle of non-being, in terms of historical hindsight, Kant’s critical turn seems a necessary condition for solving the puzzle. Therefore, both Deleuze and Derrida characterize ontological negation in terms of “pure difference.” When we interrogate the idea of “pure difference” we find that it refers to Différance in Derrida and what Deleuze refers to as “?-being.” [NEW PARAGRAPH........................................................................................... .................................................................................................... .......]Next, my dissertation provides a critical reading of “pure difference” in Deleuze and Derrida by criticizing the ability of “pure difference” to characterize the fourth possibility in Kant’s Table of Nothing. The criticism culminates in my advancing a different characterization of the fourth possibility in Kant’s Table of Nothing. Whereas Deleuze and Derrida provide solutions from the standpoint of a post-Kantian general ontology, I provide a solution from the standpoint of a philosophical psychology, understood in terms of Kant’s theoretical philosophy. That is to say, I provide a characterization of the fourth possibility in Kant’s Table of Nothing in terms of the relation between the Critique of Pure Reason’s Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Unity of Apperception. By juxtaposing a Kantian ontology in terms of philosophical psychology and general ontology, I examine the difference between the transcendental structure of internal time-consciousness and the register in general ontology conforming to the transcendental structure of time-consciousness, specifically what may be understood as the transcendental structure conditioning the human experience of the duration of a moment. Given that this structure is both “transcendental” and the condition for experiencing “duration,” I refer to it as “transcendental memory.” [NEW PARAGRAPH........................................................................................... .................................................................................................... .......]Thus, the limits constituting the experience of the duration of a moment for humans may be used to characterize the fourth possibility in Kant’s Table of Nothing. On the one hand, this provides a solution to the puzzle of non-being along the lines of the Platonic trend. On the other hand, this provides a solid basis for criticizing attempts to solve the puzzle along the Aristotelian trend. Further, the solution to the puzzle of non-being found in my dissertation provides a way to extend Kant’s theoretical philosophy and a pathway for future metaphysics. (Frank Scalambrino, Ph.D. Duquesne University, 2011). (shrink)

This paper explores Plato and Aristotle 's responses to the pre-Socratic philosopher Parmenides, who paradoxically said that there is no such thing as non-being, and no such things as change. I argue that Plato’s response would have been good enough to defeat the claim in a debate, thereby remedying the political aspects of the Parmenides problem. However, Aristotle ’s answer is required to answer some additional philosophical and scientific aspects. Plato's Sophist is a very difficult dialogue to understand; seeing it (...) in light of Aristotle 's discussion of the same topic helps to explain the complexities of what his teacher Plato wrote. (shrink)

I look at (I) the problem of false speech which Plato faces, (II) the solution he gives in the Sophist, and (III) how that very solution is undermined by the argument of the Theaetetus. I conclude that we ought to see the account of the Theaetetus as overruling the account of the Sophist. On this alternative, Plato holds that false speech and thought really is impossible.

In editing Plato's Sophist for the new OCT vol. I, ed. E. A. Duke, W. F. Hicken, W. S. M. Nicoll, D. B. Robinson, and J. C. G. Strachan , there was less chance of giving novel information about W = Vind. Supp. Gr. 7 for this dialogue than for others in the volume, since Apelt's edition of 1897 was used by Burnet in 1900 and was based on Apelt's own collation of W. The result was better than the somewhat (...) confused information printed by Burnet, even in his 1905 reprint, for W for the other dialogues in vol. I. But in the Sophist as elsewhere in vol. I collations largely due to Dr W. S. M. Nicoll added new facts about all of BDTWP and their correctors, and the search for testimonia largely carried out by Dr E. A. Duke added new facts in that area. A reviewer counts 66 changes in our text of the Sophist, which may perhaps be a slight over-estimate. Classification of changes as substantive or as falling into different groups is sometimes difficult, but I think plausible figures are as follows. We have in 25 places made a different choice of readings from the primary mss. and testimonia. We have printed conjectures where Burnet kept a ms. reading in 17 places, but conversely we have reverted to a ms. reading where Burnet had a conjecture in 8 places. We have printed alternative conjectures to conjectures adopted by Burnet in 6 places. So we have actually departed from the primary sources on at most 9 more occasions overall than Burnet. What must be noted is that Burnet had already printed conjectures on something like 87 occasions , so our percentage addition to Burnet's departures from the primary sources is modest. Moreover Burnet printed about 25 readings from testimonia; we have followed him in 20 or so of these cases, and this in turn implies that the primary mss. are in error at these further 20 places. It needs to be underlined that though Burnet undoubtedly deserved to be regarded as a safe and cautious editor, nevertheless he departed from the primary mss. on average about twice per Stephanus page in this dialogue. Sometimes, of course, testimonia showed him right to do this, but testimonia cover only a quite small part of this dialogue. Otherwise Burnet accepted almost 90 conjectures. For the Politicus the figures are fairly similar; Burnet accepted 22 Byzantine conjectures and 35–40 more modern ones. The new OCT there adds 15 or so more conjectures. (shrink)

One of the most interesting passages in the Republic is the comparison of the Form of the Good with the Sun. Although this depiction of the Good was never repeated, many hold that the Good retained its privileged place in Plato’s metaphysics.I shall argue that there are good reasons for thinking that Plato, when writing the Sophist, no longer held his earlier view of the Good. Specifically, I shall contend that he ceased to believe that as the Sun makes its (...) objects visible, so the Good makes the Forms knowable. This being the case, it cannot also be said to iIluminate either the Forms or the order they exhibit.My procedure will be first to consider briefly how, in the Republic, the Good can be said to iIluminate the Forms. I shall then determine the extent to which, in the Sophist, this function can still be credited to the Good. (shrink)

In his late dialogue The Sophist, Plato intends to show that the universal contents,,, and differ from and yet intermingle with each other. Plato develops this theory using the universal content as an example, whereas the present essay concentrates on as a further universal content linked with all the other contents. It thereby aims to deepen the understanding of Plato's late theory of ideas, arriving at the conclusion that for Plato the possibility of philosophy is due to the possibility of (...) the relational community of the universal contents. Plato, however, does not investigate the possibility of possibility itself - an issue which can indeed be seen as the principle of the very possibility of universal contents and their relation. (shrink)

In Plato’s Sophist an argument against metaphysical materialism in the “battle of gods and giants” is presented which is oft the cause of consternation, primarily because it appears the characters are unfair to the materialist position. Attempts to explain it usually resort to restructuring the argument while others rearrange the Sophist entirely to rebuild the argument in a more satisfying form. I propose a different account of the argument that does not rely on a disservice to the materialist nor restructuring (...) Plato’s argument. I contend, instead, that the argument is enthymematic in nature, allowing the definitions employed to flow out of the reasoning as originally presented. Moreover, it suggests that Plato’s idealism was so deeply ingrained that modern defenses of materialism were not even live options. (shrink)

At Sophist 253d-e the Eleatic Visitor offers a notoriously obscure description of the fields of one-and-many that the dialectician “adequately discerns.” Against the readings of Stenzel, Cornford, Sayre, and Gomez-Lobo, I propose an interpretation of that passage that takes into account the trilogy of Theaetetus-Sophist-Statesman as its context. The key steps are to respond to the irony of Socrates’ refutations at the end of the Theaetetus by reinterpreting the last two senses of logos as directed to forms and to recognize (...) their correlation with the two different modes of diairesis practiced by the Eleatic Visitor. These steps position us to recognize in the Visitor’s remarks at Sophist 253d-e a schematic description of the two kinds of eidetic field that the two modes of diairesis trace. (shrink)

At 252e1 to 253c9 in Plato’s Sophist, the Eleatic Visitor explains why philosophy is a science. Like the art of grammar, philosophical knowledge corresponds to a generic structure of discrete kinds and is acquired by systematic analysis of how these kinds intermingle. In the literature, the Visitor’s science is either understood as an expression of a mature and authentic platonic metaphysics, or as a sophisticated illusion staged to illustrate the seductive lure of sophistic deception. By showing how the Visitor’s account (...) of the science of philosophy is just as comprehensive, phantasmatic and self-concealing as the art of sophistry identified at the dialogue’s outset, this paper argues in favor of the latter view. (shrink)

Plato's later dialogue, the Sophist, is deemed one of the greatest works in the history of philosophy, but scholars have been shy of confronting the central problem of the dialogue. For Plato, defining the sophist is the basic philosophical problem: any inquirer must face the 'sophist within us' in order to secure the very possibility of dialogue, and of philosophy, against sophistic counterattack. Examining the connection between the large and difficult philosophical issues discussed in the Sophist in relation to the (...) basic problem of defining the sophist, Dr Notomi shows how Plato struggles with and solves all these problems in a single line of inquiry. His interpretation of the whole dialogue finally reveals how the philosopher should differ from the sophist. (shrink)

Plato's Sophist provides a careful translation of the Sophist, one of Plato's most complex and difficult dialogues, and includes materials designed to facilitate its usefulness as a text in college courses. The translation employs a minimum of interpretative paraphrasing while being presented in clear, readable English. Special attention has been given to consistency in translating key Greek terms. The book presents a special list of these terms and discusses them in the endnotes. The result is a translation that enables the (...) reader who lacks a knowledge of Greek to get much closer than usual to the original text. Cobb's introduction contains a detailed summary of the entire dialogue, clarifying the main themes and the general structure. He offers a fresh interpretation of the dialogue that shows how each theme contributes to the exploration of the nature of, and the relation between, philosophy and sophistry. The introduction is particularly useful to first readers of the Sophist. (shrink)