Plato: The Good

The article first (i) gives an exegesis of the famous passage in the Republic, 505d11-506a2. Attention is drawn to the fact that the principle that every soul does everything for the Good (panta prattei) can be translated in two ways: Every soul does everything for the sake of the Good, or goes to all lengths for the sake of the Good. Depending on the different translations, we have a different picture of the platonic Socrates in the Republic, an intellectualistic Socrates (...) for whom pure irrational desires do not exist, or a Socrates who also accepts irrational desires. The article favours the first picture. Then it (ii) attempts to show that we can elucidate two dark points in the Socratic thesis that the Good is what every soul pursues and for which every soul does everything, with the help of Aquinas. Finally, the article (iii) outlines three substantive answers to the question ``What is the Good?'' - the henological, the perfectionist and the structuralist - and shows that these three answers lead into a trilemma. Instead of advancing a new answer, the article suggests an uncontroversial formal starting point for an answer to this question. (shrink)

To what extent can the structure of dialogue be used to ground a theory of human understanding? In this paper, I examine Plato’s Phaedo, Republic, and Philebus with an eye toward challenging Gadamer’s thesis that Socratic dialogue grounds a theory of hermeneutics that characterizes understanding as a factor within experience as “radical openness.” I contend that there is a basic problem in Gadamer’s historical appropriation of the dialectic. This is that the elenchtic ideal of most of the early dialogues of (...) Plato, which underlies Gadamer’s notion of privileging process over result in conversation, is fundamentally in tension with reaching an understanding of concepts, and ultimately reaching toward the Good.Dans quelle mesure la structure du dialogue peut-elle être utilisee pour fonder une théorie de la compréhension humaine? Dans cet article, je considère le Phédon, la République et le Philèbe en vue de mettre en question la thése gadamérienne selon laquelle le dialogue socratique fonde une théorie herméneutique qui définit la compréhension comme un facteur a l’intérieur de l’expérience entendue comme «ouverture radicale». Je soutiens qu’il y a un problème fondamental dans le projet gadamérien de l’appropriation historique de la dialectique. Ceci tient à ce que l’ideal élenchtique de la plupart des premiers dialogues platoniciens, lequel idéal sous-tend la notion gadamérienne qui privilégie le processus au profit du résultat de la conversation, se trouve dans une tension fondamentale avec le but qui consiste à accéder à une compréhension des concepts et, en définitive, à accéder au Bien. (shrink)

It is widely recognized that according to Plato the supreme object of knowledge and the supreme object of desire are the same: "the good." But the reason for this belief, and the roles of desire in Platonic education, are not adequately understood. My study of relatively neglected topics, such as Platonic inquiry $,$ intellectual "lacking" or "wanting" $,$ and knowledge of "the good" as a kind of self-knowledge, bring new light to the well-worn themes of Meno's Paradox, Socratic method and (...) Platonic love. ;Each of the various models of education in Plato's middle period incorporates everything that is essential to the Socratic method of elenchus in his earlier dialogues. Each of these models maintains that the desire-component of any inquiry specifies beliefs about the object of inquiry that must be true if the inquiry admits of success; each model also maintains that true beliefs can become understanding $$ under conditions of Socratic scrutiny, which always seeks the explanation of the beliefs that define the inquiry. Throughout early and middle dialogues, Plato hopes that an allegedly universal desire of the good will make ethical understanding possible by enabling the identification of true beliefs about "the good." According to Plato, all genuine understanding must begin with the desire to learn, and all genuine understanding includes a kind of self-knowledge, which is the result of understanding one's own desires. ;These essential elements of Socratic and Platonic education promise partial resolutions of well-known epistemological difficulties in early and middle dialogues. They describe the conditions under which the Socratic elenchus of early dialogues can achieve positive results, rather than merely test for consistency among an individual's beliefs. They are part of Plato's complete response to Meno's Paradox, and describe the necessary conditions of success both in the geometry lesson, and in the inquiry about the nature of virtue. They are also a neglected element of the philosopher's "dialectical method" in Republic, and they help to explain why dialectic alone, according to Plato, can achieve understanding of "the good.". (shrink)

Pendant l’ete de 1928 Heidegger a offert un seminaire sur le troisieme livre de la Physique d’Aristote et donc sur l’explication aristotelicienne de la nature du mouvement. La derniere seance de ce cours, qui eut lieu le 25 juillet, est d’une grande importance parce que c’est a cette occasion que Heidegger va au livre neuf de la Metaphysique pour essayer de comprendre la notion ontologique qui est a la base de l’interpretation aristotelicienne du mouvement : l’energeia. Mais dans les protocoles (...) de ce seminaire qui se trouvent parmi les papiers de Heidegger et qui ont ete publies recemment dans le volume 83 de la Gesamtausgabe, la seance du 25 juillet se trouve absente. Ce fait a conduit l’editeur a conclure que le seminaire avait pris fin le 23 juillet, sans s’apercevoir donc que la conclusion du seminaire manquait. Il existe heureusement une transcription preservee parmi les papiers de l’etudiante de Heidegger, Helene Weiss, et accessible aujourd’hui dans les archives de l’universite de Stanford. Cette transcription montre que la derniere session eut bien lieu le 25 juillet et nous offre la lecture heideggerienne de Metaphysique IX qui ne se trouve pas dans la version de la Gesamtausgabe. C’est dans le contexte de cette lecture que Heidegger fait la declaration etonnante qui nous concerne ici : ≪Dans la derniere instance, la Metaphysique Θ revient a Platon ; la priorite de l’energeia est fondamentalement la meme chose que l’epekeina des Idees. ≫La première tâche que je me propose ici sera d’expliquer cette déclaration qui suggère une relation tres etroite, ou meme une identite, entre la notion aristotelicienne de l’energeia comme ayant une priorite vis‑a‑vis de la dunamis et la notion platonicienne de l’Idee du Bien comme etant epekeina de l’ousia. Pour cette explication je ferai appel non seulement au contexte du seminaire de 1928, mais aussi aux textes plus tardifs comme les Beitrage et les cours sur Nietzsche dans lesquels Heidegger semble presupposer et développer sa déclaration de 1928. Ma seconde tâche sera de comparer cette thèse heideggerienne a la tentative de Gadamer de surmonter l’opposition traditionnelle entre les ontologies de Platon et d’Aristote en faisant appel a l’idee du bien chez les deux. Cette tentative se trouve dans le texte Die Idee des Guten zwischen Plato und Aristoteles. La comparaison que j’entreprends ici va montrer certaines affinites entre les interpretations de l’Idee du Bien chez Heidegger et Gadamer, mais aussi de profondes differences qui vont determiner leurs differents projets philosophiques. (shrink)

For all its diversity, contemporary discourse about the Other shares the following suppositions: the Other in its radicality eludes the economy of the logic of the Same; it is beyond Being; its alterity is tied to the infinite in a manner that exceeds the ambit of thematization; and the problem it presents to philosophy is novel, in the precise sense that the dominant logic of the Western tradition, the so-called “logic of the Same” , is incapable of recognizing the full (...) depth of the problem of the Other. In what follows I will engage critically each of these suppositions, to the end of answering the question whether contemporary discourse about the Other is determined by a two-fold one-sidedness, characterized by its thoroughly modern presuppositions about the nature of the Self and logic and by its positing of the kath auto status of the Other as something that is either completely unrelated to the Same or, granting the necessity of recognizing some kind of relation to the Same, something that has absolute priority over the Same. My answer to this question will be “yes.” I will endeavor to demonstrate the two-fold one-sidedness belonging to these suppositions by first returning to the original discussion of the Other in the Western tradition, Plato’s account of the dialogue between the philosophical Stranger from Elea and the mathematician Theaetetus in the Sophist. (shrink)

In Republic VI-VII, Plato claims not only that even if one were to have knowledge other than knowledge of the Form of the Good, one would not benefit from that knowledge unless one has knowledge of the Form of the Good, and unless one knows the Form of the Good, one cannot know any particular good, but also, arguably, that unless one knows the Form of the Good, one cannot be ethically good . In Nicomachean Ethics I.6, however, Aristotle denies (...) not only the existence of the Form of the Good, but also the usefulness of the Form of the Good with respect to ethical goodness. To argue against the existence of the Form of the Good, Aristotle argues that there are many natures of goodness and no one general nature of goodness, through his belief in the ambiguity of 'good' and categories. Aristotle argues against the usefulness of the Form of the Good to ethical goodness as follows: The experts of practical and productive pursuits are ignorant of and do not seek knowledge of the Form of the Good, and would not benefit from knowledge of the Form of the Good. For this argument, Aristotle assumes that one can be an expert in a practical pursuit without being an expert in any theoretical pursuit , and that the Form of the Good, were it to exist, would be the object of a theoretical science. I respond on Plato's behalf by arguing, with the aid of his writings, that craftspersons seek knowledge of the appropriate Form in doing their work, would benefit in their craft from having knowledge of the Form of the Good, and therefore that it is necessary for craftspersons to seek knowledge of the Form of the Good in doing their work. If such knowledge is necessary for craftspersons, I argue, it is necessary for students of ethics as well. (shrink)

One of this century’s most important philosophers here focuses on Plato’s _Protagoras, Phaedo, Republic, _and _Philebus_ and on Aristotle’s three moral treatises to show the essential continuity of Platonic and Aristotelian reflection on the nature of the good. “Well translated and usefully annotated by P. Christopher Smith…. Gadamer’s book exhibits a broad and grand vision as well as a great love for the Greek thinkers.”—Alexander Nehemas, _New York__ Times Book Review_ “The translation is highly readable. The translator’s introduction and frequent (...) annotation provide special elucidation on points of doctrinal complexity, giving ample references to other works and rival interpretations.”—_Choice_ “This book is an important addition to the steadily growing number of Gadamer’s works available in English. In it, we see Gadamer at his best, that is, engaged in the practice of interpreting important texts from the philosophical tradition, and also at his most controversial…. I enthusiastically recommend this…challenging book as one that rewards all efforts to understand the important claims it makes on its readers.”—Francis J. Ambrosio, _International Philosophy Quarterly_ Hans-Georg Gadamer is professor of philosophy emeritus at the University of Heidelberg. He is the author of numerous books, including two others translated by Smith: _Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato _and _Hegel’s Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies._. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie Jahrgang: 101 Heft: 1 Seiten: 1-29.

John Mackie famously dismissed the rational tenability of moral objectivism with two quick arguments. The second, the so-called “argument from queerness,” proceeds as follows. A commitment to moral objectivism brings with it a commitment to the existence of moral properties as “queer” as Platonic Forms that are apprehended only through occult faculties like so-called “moral intuition” (Mackie 1977, 38). Since we have no reason to believe that there is any faculty such as moral intuition that serves as a reliable Form (...) detector, we equally have no reason to accept moral objectivism (1977, 23–24, 38–41). Recently, Julia Annas has observed that Mackie has offered us “a coarse and imperceptive interpretation of Plato,” in addition to a mistaken account of the epistemic requirements of moral objectivism (2001, 238). But one might worry that the case Annas makes for the homely nature of Platonic moral knowledge—it’s just like plumbing, only non-optional (2001, 246)—rests, as she admits, on her focus on dialogues like the Laches, in which the analogy between the moral virtues and crafts like flute-playing, shoe-making, and navigating is emphasized (2001, 244). Annas explicitly leaves open the question whether Mackie’s interpretation might capture Plato’s conception of moral knowledge in dialogues like the Republic, in which the analogy between moral and mathematical knowledge is emphasized (2001, 243). Yet it is clear from Mackie’s brief remarks about Plato that he has the Republic primarily in mind (Mackie 1977, 23–24). (shrink)

What makes something good for me? Most contemporary philosophers argue that something cannot count as good for me unless I am in some way attracted to it, or take delight in it. However, subjectivist theories of prudential value face difficulties, and there is no consensus about how these difficulties should be resolved. Whether one opts for a hedonist or a desire-satisfaction account of prudential value, certain fundamental assumptions about human well-being must be abandoned. I argue that we should reconsider Plato's (...) objectivist theory of goodness as unity, or the One. This view is both consistent with and explains our most basic views both about goodness in general and human well-being in particular. (shrink)

The first part of the paper (p. 10-21) tries to answer the first question of the title and describes a set of seven “knowledge-claims” made by Socrates: 1. There is a distinction between right opinion and knowledge. 2. Virtue is knowledge. 3. Nobody willingly does wrong. 4. To do injustice is the greatest evil for the wrongdoer himself. 5. An even greater evil is if the wrongdoer is not punished. 6. The just person is happy; the unjust person is unhappy. (...) 7. The pleasant is not the good. These claims seem to be the “few” (oliga) (Men. 98 b3) but “very important” (kallista) (Grg. 472 c8) things that Socrates claims to know. The second part (p. 22-39) tries to answer the second question and defends the thesis that the supposed “knowledge” of Socrates is dianoetic, but not noetic. The main new idea of this paperis the comparison of the Socratic knowledge-claims with the upper states of the mind symbolized in theDivided Line, noesis and dianoia (cf. R. 511 d7-e1). Posted. (shrink)

In Plato's Republic the prime cause of all things, the Good, is presented both as transcending every form of being and as the supreme Idea, that is to say as the supreme being. The inconsistency between these two characterizations seems to point to the paradoxical relation subsisting between the absolutely transcendent Good and its supreme self-revelation : by revealing itself, the γαθν πκεινα τς οσας constitutes the highest being and therefore has to be considered to be identical with the δα (...) το γαθο; on the other hand its absolute transcendence implies a clear supereminence in regard to the Idea of the Good. This article tries to highlight and illustrate these antinomic aspects of Plato's notion of the Good with the help of both the so-called γραφα δγματα and the representation of the Demiurge in Plato's work. (shrink)

The author's project is an ambitious one: Not only does he dedicate a whole monograph to the centerpiece of Plato's metaphysical thought as it is contained in the similes of the Sun, Line, and Cave in the Republic, he also points out connections between Plato's "greatest doctrine" and some highlights in the work of other European metaphysicians such as Kant, Fichte, the young Wittgenstein and Heidegger. As Ferber sees it, although their answers to the question of the ultimate foundation of (...) philosophic truth may vary, their questioning calls for a foundation whose archetype is that of Plato's notion of the Form of the Good as what underlies both Being and Thought, the tertium quid that transcends all thought and being, the "epekeina tes ousias." In falling short of providing such a foundation that transcends the subject-object dualism, Ferber claims, the later philosophers have all fallen short of attaining the level of Plato's philosophizing : If philosophy is ever to be grounded adequately, then a "trialism" of the Platonic kind will have to be worked out. (shrink)

The Clitophon has posed a riddle to its readers: Why does Socrates not respond to the criticisms levelled against him? A careful reading of the dialogue shows that Clitophon’s criticism of Socrates already contains its own rebuttal. It is not, as many have suggested, certain beliefs of Clitophon’s that make a Socratic response impossible. Rather, Socrates’s silence is itself the response, intended to force Clitophon to turn back to what has already been said. It is Clitophon’ lack of self-knowledge, or (...) better his self-oblivion, his failure to see his own soul as implicated in the logos, that propels him always to seek out what’s next in the logos without any reflection on what has already been said. (shrink)