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9 found
  1. Unity of the intellectual virtues.Alan T. Wilson - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):9835-9854.
    The idea that moral virtues form some sort of “unity” has received considerable attention from virtue theorists. In this paper, I argue that the possibility of unity among intellectual virtues has been wrongly overlooked. My approach has two main components. First, I work to distinguish the variety of different views that are available under the description of a unity thesis. I suggest that these views can be categorised depending on whether they are versions of standard unity or of strong unity. (...)
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  2. The Unity of Virtue, Ambiguity, and Socrates’ Higher Purpose.George Rudebusch - 2017 - Ancient Philosophy 37 (2):333-346.
    In the Protagoras, Socrates argues that all the virtues are the very same knowledge of human wellbeing so that virtue is all one. But elsewhere Socrates appears to endorse that the virtues-such as courage, temperance, and reverence-are different parts of a single whole. Ambiguity interpretations harmonize the conflicting texts by taking the virtue words to be equivocal, such as between theoretical and applied expertise, or between a power and its deeds. I argue that such interpretations have failed in their specifics (...)
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  3. Sokrates sam ze sobą rozmawia o sprawiedliwości [Socrates Talks to Himself about Justice]. Piechowiak - 2009 - In Artur Pacewicz (ed.), Kolokwia Platońskie - Gorgias. Instytut Filozofii Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego. pp. 71-92.
    The analysis focuses on the passage of Gorgias (506c–507c) in which Plato’s Socrates is having a dialog with himself. Socrates is talking to someone who, better than any other partner of discussion, is capable to discern the truth; this is an extraordinary way of expressing philosophical views by Plato. It suggests that in this passage Plato is considering questions which are of a primary importance. There are also other signs, both in the structure of the text and in the comments (...)
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  4. Piety, justice, and the unity of virtue.Mark L. McPherran - 2000 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 38 (3):299-328.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Piety, Justice, and the Unity of VirtueMark L. McPherranNo doubt the Socrates of the Euthyphro would be delighted to encounter many of its readers, offering as they do an audience of piety-seeking interlocutors, eager to mend the dialogical breach created by Euthyphro’s sudden departure. Socrates’ enthusiasm for this pursuit is at least as intense and comprehensible as theirs. We are told, after all, that he will never abandon his (...)
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  5. The unity of the virtues in Plato's protagoras and laches.Daniel T. Devereux - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (4):765-789.
    Plato's "laches" is an investigation into the nature of courage with the intention of demonstrating the difficulty of singling out one virtue, namely courage, and defining it separately from the other cardinal virtues such as bravery, wisdom, justice, temperance, and piety. As the dialogue proceeds it becomes evident that socrates not only relates courage with the battlefield, but also with other spheres of life. Of special interest is his reference of being courageous regarding desires and pleasures where an overlap of (...)
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  6. What Laches and Nicias Miss-And Whether Socrates Thinks Courage Merely a Part of Virtue.Terry Penner - 1992 - Ancient Philosophy 12 (1):1-27.
  7. Socratic Thought-Experiments and the Unity of Virtue Paradox.Michael T. Ferejohn - 1984 - Phronesis 29 (2):105 - 122.
  8. How the inadequate models for virtue in the "protagoras" illuminate socrates' view of the unity of the virtues.Margaret Hartman - 1984 - Apeiron 18 (2):110 - 117.
  9. The unity of virtue.Terry Penner - 1973 - Philosophical Review 82 (1):35-68.