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Pleasure

Edited by Chris Heathwood (University of Colorado, Boulder)
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  1. Jean Brown (2015). The God Instinct [Book Review]. Australian Humanist, The 118:23.
    Brown, Jean Review of: The God instinct, by Jesse Bering, London, Nicholas Breakley, 2011. Paperback, 252 pp.
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  2. Pascal Bruckner (2012). 6. The Pleasures and Servitudes of Living Together. In The Paradox of Love. Princeton University Press. pp. 121-138.
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  3. James Fredal (2014). The Perennial Pleasures of the Hoax. Philosophy and Rhetoric 47 (1):73.
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  4. Fabian Gander, René T. Proyer & Willibald Ruch (2016). Positive Psychology Interventions Addressing Pleasure, Engagement, Meaning, Positive Relationships, and Accomplishment Increase Well-Being and Ameliorate Depressive Symptoms: A Randomized, Placebo-Controlled Online Study. Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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  5. Guido del Giudice (2013). Giordano Bruno, or "the Pleasure of Dispute". la Biblioteca di Via Senato (3):57-64.
    Giordano Bruno's copy of Camoeracensis Acrotismus from Prague.
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  6. Keren Gorodeisky (forthcoming). Rationally Agential Pleasure? A Kantian Proposal. In Lisa Shapiro (ed.), Pleasure: a History. Oxford University Press.
    The main claim of the paper is that, on Kant's account, aesthetic pleasure is an exercise of rational agency insofar as, when proper, it has the following two features: (1) It is an affective responsiveness to the question: “what is to be felt disinterestedly”? As such, it involves consciousness of its ground (the reasons for having it) and thus of itself as properly responsive to its object. (2) Its actuality depends on endorsement: actually feeling it involves its endorsement as an (...)
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  7. J. Gosling (1974). II—More Aristotelian Pleasures. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74 (1):15-34.
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  8. Lucien Jaume (2013). 3. Democracy as Expectation of Material Pleasures. In Tocqueville: The Aristocratic Sources of Liberty. Princeton University Press. pp. 82-94.
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  9. Sabina Lovibond (1990). XII—True and False Pleasures. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 90 (1):213-230.
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  10. G. E. L. Owen (1972). VIII—Aristotelian Pleasures. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 72 (1):135-152.
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  11. Carl Pfaffmann (1960). The Pleasures of Sensation. Psychological Review 67 (4):253-268.
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  12. Richard D. Ryder (2015). Painism Defended. Think 14 (41):47-55.
    In a previous essay, Richard Ryder argued against Utilitarianism's aggregation of pains across individuals. He continues this argument and rebuts several criticisms of his moral theory of painism. Painism not only rejects the aggregation of pains across individuals, it also questions the trade-off of pains against pleasures.
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  13. Jean-Marie Schaeffer (2015). Aesthetic Relationship, Cognition, and the Pleasures of Art. In Frederik Stjernfelt & Peer F. Bundgaard (eds.), Investigations Into the Phenomenology and the Ontology of the Work of Art. Springer Verlag.
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  14. Dorothy Wrinch (1918). XX.—Short Communications: 2.—On the Summation of Pleasures. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 18 (1):589-594.
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Pleasure and Pain
  1. George Ainslie (2009). Pleasure and Aversion: Challenging the Conventional Dichotomy. Inquiry 52 (4):357 – 377.
    Philosophy and its descendents in the behavioral sciences have traditionally divided incentives into those that are sought and those that are avoided. Positive incentives are held to be both attractive and memorable because of the direct effects of pleasure. Negative incentives are held to be unattractive but still memorable (the problem of pain) because they force unpleasant emotions on an individual by an unmotivated process, either a hardwired response (unconditioned response) or one substituted by association (conditioned response). Negative incentives are (...)
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  2. Victor Argonov (2014). The Pleasure Principle as a Tool for Scientific Forecasting of Human Self-Evolution. Journal of Evolution and Technology 24 (2):63-78.
    The pleasure principle (PP) may be a verifiable fundamental law of the living matter in the universe, and this law might then be used for forecasting human self-evolution. I do not pretend to “prove” PP, but argue that it must be regarded as a scientific hypothesis. Accordingly, I formulate verifiable and falsifiable postulates of PP. Their confirmation would allow the construction of a new scientific discipline, hedodynamics, that would be able to forecast the future development of human civilization and even (...)
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  3. Murat Aydede (forthcoming). A Contemporary Account of Sensory Pleasure. In Lisa Shapiro (ed.), Pleasure: A History. Oxford University Press.
    [This is the penultimate version, please send me an email for the final version]. Some sensations are pleasant, some unpleasant, and some are neither. Furthermore, those that are pleasant or unpleasant are so to different degrees. In this essay, I want to explore what kind of a difference is the difference between these three kinds of sensations. I will develop a comprehensive three-level account of sensory pleasure that is simultaneously adverbialist, functionalist and is also a version of an experiential-desire account.
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  4. Murat Aydede (2014). How to Unify Theories of Sensory Pleasure: An Adverbialist Proposal. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):119-133.
    A lot of qualitatively very different sensations can be pleasant or unpleasant. The Felt-Quality Views that conceive of sensory affect as having an introspectively available common phenomenology or qualitative character face the “heterogeneity problem” of specifying what that qualitative common phenomenology is. In contrast, according to the Attitudinal Views, what is common to all pleasant or unpleasant sensations is that they are all “wanted” or “unwanted” in a certain sort of way. The commonality is explained not on the basis of (...)
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  5. Murat Aydede (2000). An Analysis of Pleasure Vis-a-Vis Pain. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):537-570.
    I take up the issue of whether pleasure is a kind of sensation or not. This issue was much discussed by philosophers of the 1950’s and 1960’s, and apparently no resolution was reached. There were mainly two camps in the discussion: those who argued for a dispositional account, and those who favored an episodic feeling view of pleasure. Here, relying on some recent scientific research I offer an account of pleasure which neither dispositionalizes nor sensationalizes pleasure. As is usual in (...)
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  6. Murat Aydede & Matthew Fulkerson (forthcoming). Reasons and Theories of Sensory Affect. In David Bain, Michael Brady & Jennifer Corns (eds.), The Nature of Pain.
    Some sensory experiences are pleasant, some unpleasant. This is a truism. But understanding what makes these experiences pleasant and unpleasant is not an easy job. Various difficulties and puzzles arise as soon as we start theorizing. There are various philosophical theories on offer that seem to give different accounts for the positive or negative affective valences of sensory experiences. In this paper, we will look at the current state of art in the philosophy of mind, present the main contenders, critically (...)
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  7. Murat Aydede & Matthew Fulkerson (2014). Affect: Representationalists' Headache. Philosophical Studies 170 (2):175-198.
    Representationalism is the view that the phenomenal character of experiences is identical to their representational content of a certain sort. This view requires a strong transparency condition on phenomenally conscious experiences. We argue that affective qualities such as experienced pleasantness or unpleasantness are counter-examples to the transparency thesis and thus to the sort of representationalism that implies it.
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  8. Alexander Bain (1892). Pleasure and Pain. Mind 1 (2):161-187.
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  9. David Bain (2012). What Makes Pains Unpleasant? Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89.
    The unpleasantness of pain motivates action. Hence many philosophers have doubted that it can be accounted for purely in terms of pain’s possession of indicative representational content. Instead, they have explained it in terms of subjects’ inclinations to stop their pains, or in terms of pain’s imperative content. I claim that such “noncognitivist” accounts fail to accommodate unpleasant pain’s reason-giving force. What is needed, I argue, is a view on which pains are unpleasant, motivate, and provide reasons in virtue of (...)
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  10. David Bain & Michael Brady (2014). Pain, Pleasure, and Unpleasure. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):1-14.
    Compare your pain when immersing your hand in freezing water and your pleasure when you taste your favourite wine. The relationship seems obvious. Your pain experience is unpleasant, aversive, negative, and bad. Your experience of the wine is pleasant, attractive, positive, and good. Pain and pleasure are straightforwardly opposites. Or that, at any rate, can seem beyond doubt, and to leave little more to be said. But, in fact, it is not beyond doubt. And, true or false, it leaves a (...)
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  11. H. Heath Bawden (1910). The Comic as Illustrating the Summation-Irradiation Theory of Pleasure-Pain. Psychological Review 17 (5):336-346.
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  12. David Benatar (2011). No Life is Good. The Philosophers' Magazine 53 (53):62-66.
    The worst pains seem to be worse than the best pleasures are good. Anybody who doubts this should consider what choice they would make if they wereoffered the option of securing an hour of the most sublime pleasures possible in exchange for suffering an hour of the worst pain possible.
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  13. Yitzchak M. Binik (1997). Pain, Pleasure, and the Mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (3):440-441.
    The target articles by blumberg et al. and berkley reflect some of the recent major theoretical and clinical advances in two areas of pain research. These two articles also represent two very different approaches to which type of variables are considered relevant to the study of pain. These different approaches are contrasted in the context of the different emphases in pain and pleasure research.
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  14. Alex Blum (1996). The Agony of Pain. Philosophical Inquiry 18 (3-4):117-120.
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  15. Paul Bousfield (1926). Pleasure and Pain: A Theory of the Energic Foundation of Feeling. Routledge.
    First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
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  16. Francis H. Bradley (1888). On Pleasure, Pain, Desire and Volition. Mind 13 (49):1-36.
  17. Ben Bramble (2013). The Distinctive Feeling Theory of Pleasure. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):201-217.
    In this article, I attempt to resuscitate the perennially unfashionable distinctive feeling theory of pleasure (and pain), according to which for an experience to be pleasant (or unpleasant) is just for it to involve or contain a distinctive kind of feeling. I do this in two ways. First, by offering powerful new arguments against its two chief rivals: attitude theories, on the one hand, and the phenomenological theories of Roger Crisp, Shelly Kagan, and Aaron Smuts, on the other. Second, by (...)
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  18. Caroline Walker Bynum (2006). Suspended Animation: Pain, Pleasure, and Punishment in Medieval Culture. Common Knowledge 12 (3):516-517.
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  19. E. J. C. (1969). Pleasure and Pain. Review of Metaphysics 23 (1):126-127.
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  20. Paul Carus (1895). The Nature of Pleasure and Pain: In Comment on Prof. Th. Ribot's Theory. The Monist 6:432.
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  21. H. Cason (1932). The Pleasure-Pain Theory of Learning. Psychological Review 39 (5):440-466.
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  22. Roderick M. Chisholm (1987). Brentano's Theory of Pleasure and Pain. Topoi 6 (1):59-64.
  23. Oliver Conolly (2005). Pleasure and Pain in Literature. Philosophy and Literature 29 (2):305-320.
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  24. J. L. Cowan (1969). Pleasure and Pain. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 29 (4):610-611.
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  25. Joseph L. Cowan (1968). Pleasure and Pain: A Study in Philosophical Psychology. Macmillan.
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  26. Cecily De Monchaux (1959). Review of Szasz, Pain and Pleasure. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (39):252-254.
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  27. Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (2013). What Role for Emotions in Well-Being? Philosophical Topics 41 (1):123-142.
    It is striking that for each major theory of well-being, there exists a companion theory of the emotions. Thus, to classical hedonic views of well-being, there corresponds no less classical pure feeling views of the emotions; to desire views that conceive of well-being in terms of desire satisfaction, there corresponds a variety of theories approaching the emotions in terms of the satisfaction/frustration of desires; and finally, to so called objective list theories of well-being, there corresponds a variety of theories that (...)
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  28. Andreas Dorschel (2011). Music and Pain. In Jane Fulcher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the New Cultural History of Music. Oxford University Press. pp. 68-79.
    Ancient mythology related music to pain in a twofold way. Pain is the punishment inflicted for producing inferior music: the fate of Marsyas; music is sublimation of pain: the achievement of Orpheus and of Philomela. Both aspects have played defining roles in Western musical culture. Pain’s natural expression is the scream. To be present in music at all, pain needs to be transformed. So even where music expresses pain, at the same time it appeases that very pain. Unlike the scream, (...)
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  29. Andreas Dorschel (2008). Musik und Schmerz. Musiktheorie 23 (3):257-263.
    Ancient mythology related music to pain in a twofold way. Pain is the punishment inflicted for producing inferior music: the fate of Marsyas; music is sublimation of pain: the achievement of Orpheus and of Philomela. Both aspects have played defining roles in Western musical culture. Pain’s natural expression is the scream. To be present in music at all, pain needs to be transformed. So even where music expresses pain, at the same time it appeases that very pain. Unlike the scream, (...)
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  30. Tom Dougherty (2011). On Whether To Prefer Pain to Pass. Ethics 121 (3):521-537.
    Most of us are “time-biased” in preferring pains to be past rather than future and pleasures to be future rather than past. However, it turns out that if you are risk averse and time-biased, then you can be turned into a “pain pump”—in order to insure yourself against misfortune, you will take a series of pills which leaves you with more pain and better off in no respect. Since this vulnerability seems rationally impermissible, while time-bias and risk aversion seem rationally (...)
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  31. Otniel E. Dr0r (2012). Visceral Pleasures and Pains. In Esther Cohen (ed.), Knowledge and Pain. Rodopi. pp. 84--147.
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  32. J. Drever (1920). WOHLGEMUTH, A. -Pleasure-Unpleasure: An Experimental Investigation of the Feeling-Elements. [REVIEW] Mind 29:359.
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  33. Todd Dufresne & Gregory C. Richter (eds.) (2011). Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Broadview Press.
    _Beyond the Pleasure Principle_ is Freud’s most philosophical and speculative work, exploring profound questions of life and death, pleasure and pain. In it Freud introduces the fundamental concepts of the “repetition compulsion” and the “death drive,” according to which a perverse, repetitive, self-destructive impulse opposes and even trumps the creative drive, or Eros. The work is one of Freud’s most intensely debated, and raises important questions that have been discussed by philosophers and psychoanalysts since its first publication in 1920. The (...)
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  34. Steven M. Duncan, Pain and Evil.
    In this paper I defend the thesis that, considered simply as certain sorts of bodily sensations, pleasure is not the good nor is pain intrinsically evil. In fact, the opposite is largely the case: pursuit of pleasure is generally productive of ontic evil, and pain, when heeded, directs us toward the ontic good.
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  35. J. C. E. (1969). Cowan, J. L., Pleasure and Pain. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 23 (1):126-127.
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  36. R. Edwards (1975). Do Pleasures and Pains Differ Qualitatively? Journal of Value Inquiry 9 (4):270-81.
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