Pleasure

Edited by Chris Heathwood (University of Colorado, Boulder)
Related categories
Subcategories:See also:History/traditions: Pleasure

954 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 954
Pleasure and Pain
  1. More of Me! Less of Me! Reflexive Imperativism About Affective Phenomenal Character.Luca Barlassina & Max Khan Hayward - forthcoming - Mind.
    Experiences like pains, pleasures, and emotions have affective phenomenal character: they feel pleasant or unpleasant. Imperativism proposes to explain affective phenomenal character by appeal to imperative content, a kind of intentional content that directs rather than describes. We argue that imperativism is on the right track, but has been developed in the wrong way. There are two varieties of imperativism on the market: first-order and higher-order. We show that neither is successful, and offer in their place a new theory: reflexive (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Precis of The Emotional Mind (2018).Tom Cochrane - manuscript
    This is a precis of The Emotional Mind (2018, Cambridge University Press), summarising the key claims of the book chapter by chapter. It covers the theories of mental content (valent representation), pleasure and pain, emotions, emotional bodily feelings, social emotions, the relationship between reason and emotion, the model of character, and the general model of mental architecture presented in the book.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Philosophy of Suffering.Michael S. Brady, David Bain & Jennifer Corns (eds.) - forthcoming - London: Routledge.
    A collection, edited by David Bain, Michael Brady, and Jennifer Corns, originating in our Value of Suffering Project. Table of Contents: Michael Wheeler - ‘How should affective phenomena be studied?’; Julien Deonna & Fabrice Teroni – ‘Pleasures, unpleasures, and emotions’; Hilla Jacobson – ‘The attitudinal representational theory of painfulness fleshed out’; Tim Schroeder – ‘What we represent when we represent the badness of getting hurt’; Hagit Benbaji – ‘A defence of the inner view of pain’; Olivier Massin – ‘Suffering pain’; (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Valence, Bodily (Dis)Pleasures and Emotions.Fabrice Teroni - forthcoming - In Michael S. Brady, David Bain & Jennifer Corns (eds.), Philosophy of Suffering. New York: Routledge.
    Bodily (dis)pleasures and emotions share the striking property of being valenced, i.e. they are positive or negative. What is valence? How do bodily (dis)pleasures and emotions relate to one another? This chapter assesses the prospects of two popular theses regarding the relation between bodily (dis)pleasures and emotions in light of what we can reasonably think about valence. According to the first thesis, the valence of bodily (dis)pleasures is explanatory prior vis-à-vis the valence of emotions. According to the second, emotions contain (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Suffering Pains.Olivier Massin - forthcoming - In Jennifer Corns & Michael S. Brady David Bain (ed.), Philosophy of Suffering. London: Routledge.
    The paper aims at clarifying the distinctions and relations between pain and suffering. Three negative theses are defended: 1. Pain and suffering are not identical. 2. Pain is not a species of suffering, nor is suffering a species of pain, nor are pain and suffering of a common (proximate) genus. 3. Suffering cannot be defined as the perception of a pain’s badness, nor can pain be defined as a suffered bodily sensation. Three positive theses are endorsed: 4. Pain and suffering (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Reflective Blindness, Depression and Unpleasant Experiences.Elizabeth Ventham - forthcoming - Analysis:any093.
    This paper defends a desire-based understanding of pleasurable and unpleasant experiences. More specifically, the thesis is that what makes an experience pleasant/unpleasant is the subject having a certain kind of desire about that experience. I begin by introducing the ‘Desire Account’ in more detail, and then go on to explain and refute a prominent set of contemporary counter-examples, based on subjects who might have ‘Reflective Blindness’, looking particularly at the example of subjects with depression. I aim to make the Desire (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Can Evaluativism About Unpleasant Pains Meet the Normative Condition?Jonathan Mitchell - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 1:1-24.
    This paper assesses whether Evaluativism, as a view about the nature of unpleasant pains, can meet a specific normative condition. The normative condition says whatever candidate state is offered as an analysis of unpleasant pain should be intrinsically phenomenally bad for its subject to be in. I first articulate a method reflecting this condition, called the normative contrast method, and then frame Evaluativism in detail. The view is then tested through this method. I show that Evaluativism can explain why cases (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Happiness, Pleasures, and Emotions.Mauro Rossi - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (6):898-919.
    In The Pursuit of Unhappiness, Daniel Haybron has defended an emotional state theory of happiness, according to which happiness consists in a broadly positive balance of emotions, moods, and mood propensities. In this paper, I argue that Haybron’s theory should be modified in two ways. First, contra Haybron, I argue that sensory pleasures should be regarded as constituents of happiness, alongside emotions and moods. I do this by showing that sensory pleasures are sufficiently similar to emotions for them to be (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Emotion as Position-Taking.Jean Mueller - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (3):525-540.
    It is a popular thought that emotions play an important epistemic role. Thus, a considerable number of philosophers find it compelling to suppose that emotions apprehend the value of objects and events in our surroundings. I refer to this view as the Epistemic View of emotion. In this paper, my concern is with a rivaling picture of emotion, which has so far received much less attention. On this account, emotions do not constitute a form of epistemic access to specific axiological (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. James Warren, “The Pleasures of Reason in Plato, Aristotle, and the Hellenistic Hedonists.” Review by Facundo Bey. [REVIEW]Facundo Bey - 2016 - Boletín de Estética 36:71-76.
    The Pleasures of Reason in Plato, Aristotle, and the Hellenistic Hedonists se centra en la relación mutua entre las capacidades humanas de sentir placer y dolor y el carácter afectivo que las une con las facultades cognitivas de aprender, comprender, recordar, evocar, planificar y anticiparse. Para esto, Warren consagra toda su agudeza analítica a eminentes obras del pensamiento antiguo: particularmente nos referimos a los diálogos platónicos República, Protágoras y Filebo. Otro tanto hace con De Anima, De Memoria et Reminiscentia, Ética (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. "Enjoy Your Self": Lotze on Self-Concern and Self-Consciousness.Mark Textor - 2018 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 35 (2):157-79.
    Current work on first-person thought takes its distinctive feature to be epistemological. First-person thinking is non-observational and immune to errors to which other varieties of thought about us are open. In contrast, the nineteenth century philosopher Hermann Lotze (1817-81) put the distinctive concern we have for the object of first-person thought at the center of his account. His arguments suggest that first-person thought is essentially evaluative. In this paper I will reconstruct and defend the core of Lotze’s view of self-consciousness.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. The Emotional Mind : A Control Theory of Affective States.Tom Cochrane - 2018 - Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
    In this book, Tom Cochrane develops a new control theory of the emotions and related affective states. Grounded in the basic principle of negative feedback control, his original account outlines a new fundamental kind of mental content called 'valent representation'. Upon this foundation, Cochrane constructs new models for emotions, pains and pleasures, moods, expressive behaviours, evaluative reasoning, personality traits and long-term character commitments. These various states are presented as increasingly sophisticated layers of regulative control, which together underpin the architecture of (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. Unconscious Pleasures and Attitudinal Theories of Pleasure.Chris Heathwood - 2018 - Utilitas 30 (2):219-227.
    This paper responds to a new objection, due to Ben Bramble, against attitudinal theories of sensory pleasure and pain: the objection from unconscious pleasures and pains. According to the objection, attitudinal theories are unable to accommodate the fact that sometimes we experience pleasures and pains of which we are, at the time, unaware. In response, I distinguish two kinds of unawareness and argue that the subjects in the examples that support the objection are unaware of their sensations in only a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  14. Pain and Pleasure.Murat Aydede - forthcoming - In Andrea Scranantino (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Emotion Theory. Routledge.
    [Penultimate draft] This is a piece written for interdisciplinary audiences and contains very little philosophy. It looks into whether, or in what sense, pains and pleasures are emotions.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. Pain.David Bain - manuscript
    Commissioned for Routledge Encylopaedia of Philosophy.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. When Pain Isn't Painful.David Bain - 2015 - The Philosophers' Magazine 3.
    Sometimes the philosophical armchair gets bumped by empirical facts. So it is when thinking about pain. For good or ill (good, actually, as we shall see) most of us are intimately acquainted with physical pain, the kind you feel when you stand on a nail or burn your hand. And, from the armchair, it can seem blindingly obvious that pain is essentially unpleasant. There are of course unpleasant experiences that aren’t pains – nausea or itches, for example – but surely (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Pain and Pleasure - A Special Issue of Review of Psychology & Philosophy.David Bain & Michael Brady (eds.) - 2014 - Springer.
    Table of Contents: Olivier Massin, 'Pleasure and Its Contraries'; Colin Klein, 'The Penumbral Theory of Masochistic Pleasure'; Siri Leknes and Brock Bastian, 'The Benefits of Pain'; Valerie Gray Hardcastle, 'Pleasure Gone Awry? A New Conceptualization of Chronic Pain and Addiction'; Richard Gray, 'Pain, Perception and the Sensory Modalities: Revisiting the Intensive Theory'; Jonathan Cohen and Matthew Fulkerson, Affect, Rationalization, and Motivation; Murat Aydede, 'How to Unify Theories of Sensory Pleasure: An Adverbialist Proposal'; Adam Shriver, 'The Asymmetrical Contributions of Pleasure and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. The Philosophy of Pain - Introduction.David Bain, Jennifer Corns & Michael Brady - forthcoming - In David Bain, Jennifer Corns & Michael Brady (eds.), The Philosophy of Pain. London: Routledge.
    Over recent decades, pain has received increasing attention as – with ever greater sophistication and rigour – theorists have tried to answer the deep and difficult questions it poses. What is pain’s nature? What is its point? In what sense is it bad? The papers collected in this volume are a contribution to that effort ...
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. Pain (Oxford Bibliographies Online).David Bain - 2015 - Oxford Bibliographies Online.
    Philosophers think of pain less and less as a paradigmatic instance of mentality, for which they seek a general account, and increasingly as a rich and fruitful topic in its own right. Pain raises specific questions: about mentality and consciousness certainly, but also about embodiment, affect, motivation, and value, to name but a few. The growth of philosophical interest in pain has gone hand-in-hand with the growth of pain science, which burgeoned in the 1960s. This is no accident: developments in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. Evaluativist Accounts of Pain's Unpleasantness.David Bain - 2017 - In Jennifer Corns (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Pain. London: Routledge. pp. 40-50.
    Evaluativism is best thought of as a way of enriching a perceptual view of pain to account for pain’s unpleasantness or painfulness. Once it was common for philosophers to contrast pains with perceptual experiences (McGinn 1982; Rorty 1980). It was thought that perceptual experiences were intentional (or content-bearing, or about something), whereas pains were representationally blank. But today many of us reject this contrast. For us, your having a pain in your toe is a matter not of your sensing “pain-ly” (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. What the Body Commands, by Colin Klein. [REVIEW]David Bain - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (1):1-4.
    In various papers, Colin Klein has argued that pain experiences are commands. This monograph goes well beyond the papers, re-shaping his ‘imperativist’ view, setting it within a general account of ‘homeostatic sensations’, presenting new arguments, and criticising alternatives. Original, empirically informed, clear, and often persuasive, it is a lovely book.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. Lopsided Lives.Theron Pummer - 2017 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 275-296.
    Intuitively there are many different things that non-derivatively contribute to well-being: pleasure, desire satisfaction, knowledge, friendship, love, rationality, freedom, moral virtue, and appreciation of true beauty. According to pluralism, at least two different types of things non-derivatively contribute to well-being. Lopsided lives score very low in terms of some types of things that putatively non-derivatively contribute to well-being, but very high in terms of other such types of things. I argue that pluralists essentially face a trilemma about lopsided lives: they (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. Brentano on Sensations and Sensory Qualities.Massin Olivier - 2017 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 87-96.
    This chapter has three sections. The first introduces Brentano’s view of sensations by presenting the intentional features of sensations irreducible to features of the sensory objects. The second presents Brentano’s view of sensory objects —which include sensory qualities— and the features of sensations that such objects allow to explain, such as their intensity. The third section presents Brentano’s approach to sensory pleasures and pains, which combines both appeal to specific modes of reference and to specific sensory qualities.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. Pleasure, Pain, and Emotion.Irwin Goldstein - unknown
    In this dissertation I analyse the concepts of pleasure and unpleasantness and outline an approach whereby the insights gained about pleasure and unpleasantness are applied to the analysis of a number of feeling and emotion concepts. In trying to understand what pleasure is and hew it is related to pain and unpleasantness, I tackle various basic questions about the role of pleasure, pain, and unpleasantness in motivation and about the intrinsic goodness of pleasure and the intrinsic badness of pain and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. Critical Notice of Colin Klein's What The Body Commands: The Imperative Theory of Pain (MIT 2015) [Book Review]. [REVIEW]Aydede Murat - manuscript
    This is a slightly more polished version of a presentation I wrote for the Author-Meets-Critics session on Colin's book at the Eastern APA session on Jan 4, 2017, in Baltimore. I’ve decided to post this commentary online pretty much as is -- I am afraid I don't have time to prepare a version suitable for publication. I hope the reader will find it helpful. At any rate, please treat this piece as a rough draft originally intended to be delivered to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. Review of Feldman, Pleasure and the Good Life. [REVIEW]Georges Chapouthier - 2004 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 194 (3):363.
  27. Review of Cowan, Pleasure and Pain. [REVIEW] Unavailable - 1969 - Philosophy 44 (168):156-159.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. Pains That Don't Hurt.David Bain - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):305-320.
    Pain asymbolia is a rare condition caused by brain damage, usually in adulthood. Asymbolics feel pain but appear indifferent to it, and indifferent also to visual and verbal threats. How should we make sense of this? Nikola Grahek thinks asymbolics’ pains are abnormal, lacking a component that make normal pains unpleasant and motivating. Colin Klein thinks that what is abnormal is not asymbolics’ pains, but asymbolics: they have a psychological deficit making them unresponsive to unpleasant pain. I argue that an (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  29. Review of Fred Feldman, Pleasure and the Good Life. [REVIEW]Roger Crisp - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):152-154.
  30. Review of J. L. Cowan, Pleasure and Pain: A Study in Philosophical Psychology. [REVIEW]G. N. A. Vesey - 1969 - Philosophical Quarterly 19 (77):368-369.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. Emotions Versus Pleasure-Pain.H. R. Marshall - 1895 - Mind 4 (14):180-194.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. Review of Cowan, Pleasure and Pain: A Study in Philosophical Psychology. [REVIEW]Warner Wick - 1969 - Ethics 79 (2):166-169.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. J. L. Cowan, "Pleasure and Pain". [REVIEW]C. R. Ochs - 1969 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 29 (4):610-611.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. An Analysis of Pleasure Vis-À-Vis Pain.Murat Aydede - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):537-570.
    I take up the issue of whether pleasure is a kind of sensation or not. This issue was much discussed by philosophers of the 1950’s and 1960’s, and apparently no resolution was reached. There were mainly two camps in the discussion: those who argued for a dispositional account, and those who favored an episodic feeling view of pleasure. Here, relying on some recent scientific research I offer an account of pleasure which neither dispositionalizes nor sensationalizes pleasure. As is usual in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  35. III—Quantity of Pleasure.John C. Hall - 1967 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 67 (1):35-52.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  36. The Pleasure-Pain Theory of Learning.H. Cason - 1932 - Psychological Review 39 (5):440-466.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  37. The Comic as Illustrating the Summation-Irradiation Theory of Pleasure-Pain.H. Heath Bawden - 1910 - Psychological Review 17 (5):336-346.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. The Place of Pleasure and Pain in the Functional Psychology.Warner Fite - 1903 - Psychological Review 10 (6):633-644.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Pleasure-Pain and Emotion.Henry Rutgers Marshall - 1895 - Psychological Review 2 (1):57-64.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. Pleasure and Pain.No Authorship Indicated - 1894 - Psychological Review 1 (5):544-544.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. Bad by Nature, An Axiological Theory of Pain.Olivier Massin - forthcoming - In Jennifer Corns (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain. Routledge.
    This chapter defends an axiological theory of pain according to which pains are bodily episodes that are bad in some way. Section 1 introduces two standard assumptions about pain that the axiological theory constitutively rejects: (i) that pains are essentially tied to consciousness and (ii) that pains are not essentially tied to badness. Section 2 presents the axiological theory by contrast to these and provides a preliminary defense of it. Section 3 introduces the paradox of pain and argues that since (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  42. The Amenability of Pleasure and Pain to Aggregation.Justin Klocksiem - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (3):293-303.
    According to several prominent philosophers, pleasure and pain come in measurable quantities. This thesis is controversial, however, and many philosophers have presented or felt compelled to respond to arguments for the conclusion that it is false. One important class of these arguments concerns the problem of aggregation, which says that if pleasure and pain were measurable quantities, then, by definition, it would be possible to perform various mathematical and statistical operations on numbers representing amounts of them. It is sometimes argued (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. Precis of Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature, Varieties, and Plausiblity of Hedonism.Fred Feldman - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):405-408.
  44. Pleasure and Pain in Education.M. S. Gilliland - 1891 - Ethics 2 (3):289.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. Pleasure and Pain: A Theory of the Energic Foundation of Feeling.Paul Bousfield - 1926 - Routledge.
    First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. Painism Defended.Richard D. Ryder - 2015 - Think 14 (41):47-55.
    In a previous essay, Richard Ryder argued against Utilitarianism's aggregation of pains across individuals. He continues this argument and rebuts several criticisms of his moral theory of painism. Painism not only rejects the aggregation of pains across individuals, it also questions the trade-off of pains against pleasures.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. Pleasures of Art.Morten L. Kringelbach & Lauren DiPerna - 2014 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 18 (9):449-450.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Growing Pains and Pleasures: How Emotional Learning Guides Development.Eric E. Nelson, Jennifer Y. F. Lau & Johanna M. Jarcho - 2014 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 18 (2):99-108.
  49. Beyond the Pleasure Principle.Todd Dufresne & Gregory C. Richter (eds.) - 2011 - Broadview Press.
    _Beyond the Pleasure Principle_ is Freud’s most philosophical and speculative work, exploring profound questions of life and death, pleasure and pain. In it Freud introduces the fundamental concepts of the “repetition compulsion” and the “death drive,” according to which a perverse, repetitive, self-destructive impulse opposes and even trumps the creative drive, or Eros. The work is one of Freud’s most intensely debated, and raises important questions that have been discussed by philosophers and psychoanalysts since its first publication in 1920. The (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. What Role for Emotions in Well-Being?Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2013 - Philosophical Topics 41 (1):123-142.
    It is striking that for each major theory of well-being, there exists a companion theory of the emotions. Thus, to classical hedonic views of well-being, there corresponds no less classical pure feeling views of the emotions; to desire views that conceive of well-being in terms of desire satisfaction, there corresponds a variety of theories approaching the emotions in terms of the satisfaction/frustration of desires; and finally, to so called objective list theories of well-being, there corresponds a variety of theories that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 954