Political Concepts

Contemporary political philosophy in the West is the philosophy of democracy, is democratic theory. Philosophy under democracy has become complacent. Even the recent reaffirmation of communism by influential philosophers such as Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek failed to inspire a significant following. There has been no radical philosophical reaction to the near-collapse of the capitalist economic system, mainly because any criticism of capitalism would imply a criticism of democracy ("the best possible political shell for capitalism", as Lenin said). Techno-philosophical alternatives (...) to democracy, such as anarcho-capitalist "seasteading", and calls for the suspension of democracy to cure climate change are originating outside academic departments of philosophy. Is there still philosophy if everyone agrees? Is philosophy still philosophy if discontent with the-one-and-only-truth can only be voiced from outside the academy? Or does political philosophy more and more resemble Plato's cave? This paper will venture outside the cave, outside the comfort zone of western academic philosophy as always-already-democratic. Only in this way can it seek to engage in a meaningful dialogue with non-western worldviews. Only by stepping into the light will we illuminate why still, in the twenty-first century, scholars may be justified in studying not democracy, but anti-democracy. Where are the niches of anti-democratic thought that may yet save us from the destruction wrought upon the world by the failing capitalist-democratic complex? What are the political trends against democracy we miss at our peril and what are their philosophical implications, worldwide? What are the new alternatives to democracy that emerge in our day? Free of self-imposed prejudice, this paper rejects the boycott of thought that does not comply with western inhibitions, and refuses to shy away from the encounter of philosophical positions emanating from non-democratic political practices. Philosophy is not blind, it does not condone any ideologies uncritically, and philosophy does not equal democracy. (shrink)

This paper reconsiders Tommie Shelby's (2016) analysis of procreation in poor black communities. I identify three conceptual frames within which Shelby situates his analysis—feminization, choice-as-control, and moralization. I argue that these frames should be rejected on conceptual, empirical, and moral grounds. As I show, this framing engenders a flawed understanding of poor black women's procreative lives. I propose an alternative framework for reconceiving the relationship between poverty and procreative justice, one oriented around reproductive flourishing instead of reproductive responsibility. More generally, (...) the paper develops a methodological challenge for nonideal moral and political philosophy, especially concerning the obligations of the oppressed. Specifically, I argue that in the absence of descriptive and conceptual accountability, the "moral gaze" of the philosopher risks preserving, rather than destabilizing, oppressive ideologies. (shrink)

Scholarly curiosity about political friendship (the relationship of mutual care among political fellows) is increasing as liberal democracies around the world face radical polarization. Yet one worry persists: can political friendship really exist in contemporary democracies? The objective of this paper is to answer this question in the affirmative. To this end, I investigate whether members of modern polities have reasons to form friendly bonds with one another. The paper has four parts. The first establishes a fundamental desideratum that any (...) consideration must satisfy to count as a reason for political fellows to partake in political friendship. The second evaluates and rejects a line of argument that presents bonds of mutual identification and belonging among political fellows as reasons for political friendship. The third evaluates and rejects a line of argument due to Paul Ludwig that presents the shared utility of political community as a reason for political fellows to engage in friendly practices with one another. Finally, I introduce my own novel argument—the “argument from membership”—for why political fellows have a reason to care for one another. I argue that membership in a functioning political community is indispensably valuable for any individual in virtue of playing a constitutive role in the individual’s attainment of their final ends. I hold that, as constituent parts of the same political community, political fellows have a reason to value one another and, accordingly, to care for one another’s well-being. (shrink)

Do salient normative claims about politics require moral premises? Political moralists think they do, political realists think they do not. We defend the viability of realism in a two-pronged way. First, we show that a number of recent attacks on realism, as well as realist responses to those attacks, unduly conflate distinctively political normativity and non-moral political normativity. Second, we argue that Alex Worsnip and Jonathan Leader-Maynard’s recent attack on realist arguments for a distinctively political normativity depends on assuming moralism (...) as the default view, which places an excessive burden on the viability of realism, and so begs the question. Our discussion, though, does not address the relative merits of realism and moralism, so its upshot is relatively ecumenical: moralism need not be the view that all apt normative political judgments are moral judgments, and realism need not be the view that no apt normative political judgments are moral judgments. (shrink)

Self-determination is a central concept for political philosophers. For example, many have appealed to this concept to defend a right of states to restrict immigration. Because it is deeply embedded in our political structures, the principle possesses a kind of default authority and does not usually call for an elaborate defense. In this paper, I will argue that genealogical studies by Adom Getachew, Radhika Mongia, Nandita Sharma, and others help to challenge this default authority. Their counter-histories show that the principle (...) was used to justify, strengthen, and adapt imperial rule in the twentieth century. In particular, the idea that controlling a population's composition through regulating immigration is an essential aspect of self-determination emerged as a response to White anxieties about the migration of negatively racialized groups. Genealogies have not been adequately appreciated as a critical tool within the mainstream of political philosophy. I show that these genealogies have a critical role to play because they unsettle our uncritical attachment to the structures of the nation-state system and raise serious questions about the meaning and emancipatory force of the principle of self-determination. (shrink)

I argue that legitimacy discourses serve a gatekeeping function. They give practitioners telic standards for riding herd on social practices, ensuring that minimally acceptable versions of the practice are implemented. Such a function is a necessary part of implementing formalized social practices, especially including law. This gatekeeping account shows that political philosophers have misunderstood legitimacy; it is not secondary to justice and only necessary because we cannot agree about justice. Instead, it is a necessary feature of actual human social practices, (...) which must be implemented via practitioners' discretion in changing contexts. (shrink)

This article develops a new approach for theorizing about hermeneutical injustice. According to a dominant view, hermeneutical injustice results from a hermeneutical gap: one lacks the conceptual tools needed to make sense of, or to communicate, important social experience, where this lack is a result of an injustice in the background social methods used to determine hermeneutical resources. I argue that this approach is incomplete. It fails to capture an important species of hermeneutical injustice which doesn’t result from a lack (...) of hermeneutical resources, but from the overabundance of distorting and oppressive concepts which function to crowd-out, defeat, or preempt the application of a more accurate hermeneutical resource. I propose a broader analysis that better respects the dynamic relationship between hermeneutical resources and the social and political contexts in which they are implemented. (shrink)

Political theorists study the attributes of desirable social-moral states of affairs. Schaefer (forthcoming) aims to show that "static political theory" of this kind rests on shaky foundations. His argument revolves around an application of an abstruse mathematical theorem -- Kakutani's fixed point theorem -- to the social-moral domain. We show that Schaefer has misunderstood the implications of this theorem for political theory. Theorists who wish to study the attributes of social-moral states of affairs should carry on, safe in the knowledge (...) that Kakutani's theorem poses no threat to this enterprise. (shrink)

"Meritocracy" has historically been understood in two ways. The first is as an approach to governance. On this understanding, we seek to put meritorious (somehow defined) people into public office to the benefit of society. This understanding has its roots in Confucius, its scope is political offices, and its justification is consequentialist. The second understanding of "meritocracy" is as a theory of justice. We distribute in accordance with merit in order to give people the things that they deserve, as justice (...) demands. This understanding has its roots in Aristotle, its scope is social goods broadly, and its justification is deontological. In this article, I discuss the differences--especially the conceptual differences--between these two, prima facie distinct, meritocratic traditions. I also argue that despite their differences Eastern Meritocracy and Western Meritocracy are harmonious. In Section I of the article I introduce the two meritocratic traditions through, in part, a highly abbreviated history of talk about "merit" and "meritocracy" in Chinese and Western philosophy. In Section II, I discuss a number of conceptual issues and partition meritocratic theories in accordance with their scopes and normative justifications. I also discuss two scenarios. In one scenario, Eastern Meritocracy appears to deliver the right result and Western Meritocracy, the wrong result. In the other scenario, vice versa. Finally, in Section III, I argue that Eastern Meritocracy and Western Meritocracy are each special cases of a single, compelling notion of "meritocracy.". (shrink)

The distinction between intentional and unintentional discrimination is a prominent one in the literature and public discourse; intentional discriminatory actions are commonly considered particularly morally objectionable relative to unintentional discriminatory actions. Nevertheless, it remains unclear what the two types amount to, and what generates the moral difference between them. The paper develops philosophically-informed conceptualizations of the two types based on which the moral difference between them may be accounted for. On the suggested account, intentional discrimination is characterized by the agent (...) viewing the content of an underlying discriminatory belief as a consideration that counts in favor of her action. This, it is argued, amounts to endorsing the discriminatory belief, which generates the particular moral severity of intentional discrimination. (shrink)

I discuss the energy democracy movement and its call to expand democratic power over energy production, distribution, and development. In addition to sparking wildfires and driving climate change, the world’s energy system is linked to a host of justice issues. A commitment to a robust conception of democracy and social sustainability is the best way to guard against replicating those injustices as the world transitions to a renewable energy system. Philosophers can say much more about the value of energy democracy (...) and the role it can play in creating a more sustainable, more just future. (shrink)

The scholarship on Frantz Fanon’s theorization of violence is crowded with interpretations that follow the Arendtian paradigm of violence. These interpretations often discuss whether violence is instrumental or non-instrumental in Fanon’s work. This reading, I believe, is the result of approaching Fanon through Hannah Arendt’s framing of violence, i.e. through a binary paradigm of instrumental versus non-instrumental violence. Even some Fanon scholars who question Arendt’s reading of Fanon, do so by employing a similar binary logic, hence repeating the same either/or (...) paradigm of instrumental versus non-instrumental violence. I aim to challenge such interpretations of Fanon by demonstrating that in the context of anticolonial armed struggle in which Fanon writes, the either/or framework of the instrumental/non-instrumental binary of violence cannot fully capture his perspective. Violence can indeed be conceived as having both constructive and instrumental aspects. My argument is supported by Fanon’s corpus, including his 1960 Accra speech, “Why We Use Violence” in Alienation and Freedom. This piece, I suggest, together with Fanon’s other writings, poses a direct challenge to the Arendtian binary of violence. My analysis resists positioning the difference between Arendt and Fanon through the instrumental/non-instrumental binary. By using Judith Butler’s notion of “frame” I complicate their difference and argue Arendt’s framing of violence prevents her from apprehending Fanon and – more importantly – interpretations of Fanon based on this Arendtian frame of violence inevitably lead to misinterpretations. (shrink)

The importance of French revolutionary and philosopher Olympe de Gouges as a pioneer of the women’s rights movement is generally recognised today. In contrast, the significance of her thought for practical philosophy has not yet been fully appreciated. This article aims to bring out the relevance of de Gouges’ writings for practical philosophy both historically and systematically. Drawing on her 1791 text The Rights of Women, this article compares de Gouges’ depiction of gender relationships in the private and public spheres (...) with depictions by such classical social contract theorists as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Immanuel Kant. From a historical perspective, de Gouges’ key contribution consists in pointing to and overcoming the theoretical assumptions that hamper the universality of individual rights. From a systematic perspective, de Gouges provides an account of the relationship between abstract universalism and concrete experiences of inequality that is now more topical than ever. (shrink)

Conceptual engineering is thought to face an ‘implementation challenge’: the challenge of securing uptake of engineered concepts. But is the fact that implementation is challenging really a defect to be overcome? What kind of picture of political life would be implied by making engineering easy to implement? We contend that the ambition to obviate the implementation challenge goes against the very idea of liberal democratic politics. On the picture we draw, the implementation challenge can be overcome by institutionalizing control over (...) conceptual uptake, and there are contexts—such as professions that depend on coordinated conceptual innovation—in which there are good reasons to institutionalize control in this fashion. But the liberal fear of this power to control conceptual uptake ending up in the wrong hands, combined with the democratic demand for freedom of thought as a precondition of genuine consent, yields a liberal democratic rationale for keeping implementation challenging. (shrink)

The essays collected in this special issue explore what legitimacy means for actors and institutions that do not function like traditional states but nevertheless wield significant power in the global realm. They are connected by the idea that the specific purposes of non-state actors and the contexts in which they operate shape what it means for them to be legitimate and so shape the standards of justification that they have to meet. In this introduction, we develop this guiding methodology further (...) and show how the special issue’s individual contributions apply it to their cases. In the first section, we provide a sketch of our purpose-dependent theory of legitimacy beyond the state. We then highlight two features of the institutional context beyond the state that set it apart from the domestic case: problems of feasibility and the structure of international law. (shrink)

The terms “patriotism” and “nationalism” are distinguished historically, conceptually, and geographically. Historically, patriotism is shown to have roots in the classical republican tradition of political thought, according to which citizens should give priority to the common good of their political or civic, as distinct from national, community. Conceptually, it is argued that patriotism is best understood as a political philosophy, an account of the form or forms of dialogue that citizens should engage in when responding to their conflicts, whereas nationalism (...) is a political ideology, an account of the kinds of things that citizens should be saying within those dialogues, in particular, when they take the form of negotiation. Patriotism, then, is that political philosophy which endorses the maxim “conversation first, negotiation second, force third,” since conversation between citizens has the best prospects for realizing and developing the common good. Nationalism, by contrast, is the ideology of those who, when it comes to political negotiations, give the greatest weight to the needs of their national community. Finally, regarding geography, patriotism is shown to be concerned with the jurisdiction of the state, whereas nationalism emphasizes the permanent and sharply demarcated territory where the national community is located. The chapter then concludes with the recommendation that we all need to affirm a global patriotism, alongside the more local forms. (shrink)

Recently, some have read Turkish political developments from the perspective of Carl Schmitt’s political theory. This paper aims to modify aspects of these readings and offer in response a Schmitti...

美国和世界正处于人口过度增长的崩溃过程中，大部分都发生在上个世纪，现在这一切都是由于第三世界人民造成的。资源消耗和增加10亿至2100亿美元，将使工业文明崩溃，并造成饥饿、疾病、暴力和战争。" ;数十亿人将死去，核战争几乎可以肯定。在美国，大规模移民和移民再生产，加上民主带来的滥用，大大加速了这一速度。堕落的人性无情地把民主和多样性的梦想变成犯罪和贫穷的噩梦。崩溃的根本原因是我们天生的心理无 法适应现代世界，这导致人们把不相关的人当作他们有共同的兴趣对待。再加上对基本生物学和心理的无知，导致部分受教育者的社会工程妄想，他们控制着民主社会。很少有人明白，如果你帮助一个人，你伤害了别人——没有 免费的午餐，任何人消费的每一件物品都会破坏地球，无法修复。因此，世界各地的社会政策都是不可持续的，如果不严格控制自私，所有社会都会陷入无政府状态或独裁。如果不立即作出戏剧性改变，就没有希望阻止美国或任 何遵循民主制度的国家的崩溃。因此，我的文章"民主自杀"。 现在很清楚，统治中国的七个社会道路正在赢得第三次世界大战，所以我关于他们的结论性文章。唯一更大的威胁是人工智能，我简要地评论。 我们一切的关键是生物学，而正是它所忽视它，导致数百万聪明受过教育的人，如奥巴马，乔姆斯基，克林顿，民主党和教皇支持自杀的乌托邦理想，无情地直接导致地球上的地狱。 正如W指出的，我们眼前最难看的就是什么。 我们生活在有意识的议事语言系统2的世界里，但它是无意识的，自动反射系统1的规则。这是西尔的《现象幻象》（TPI）、平克的《空白石板》和《图比》和《科斯米德的标准社会科学模型》中描述的普遍失明的根源。 第一组文章试图让我们了解我们是如何合理摆脱理论错觉的。在接下来的三个组中，我评论了阻碍可持续世界的三个主要错觉——技术、宗教和政治（合作团体）。人们相信社会可以由他们拯救，所以我在书的其余部分提供一些 建议，为什么这不太可能通过短篇文章和评论最近出版的著名作家的书。 另一节描述了宗教错觉——有一些超级力量会拯救我们。 下一节将数字错觉描述为将系统2的语言游戏与系统1的自动化混为一谈，因此无法区分生物机器（即人）和其他种类的机器（即计算机）。 其他数字错觉是，我们将从系统1的纯邪恶（自私）由计算机/AI/机器人/纳米技术/基因工程由系统2创建。 没有免费午餐校长告诉我们，将有严重，甚至致命的后果。 最后一节描述了"一个幸福家庭"的幻想，即我们被选中与大家合作，如果我们只是正确管理事情（政治的可能性），民主、多样性和平等等异想天意将引导我们进入乌托邦。 再次，没有免费午餐原则应该警告我们，它不能是真实的，我们看到整个历史和整个当代世界，没有严格的控制，自私和愚蠢占上风，并很快摧毁任何国家，拥抱这些妄想。此外，猴子的头脑大大折扣的未来，所以我们合作出售 我们的后代的遗产为临时舒适，大大加剧了问题。 .

Centripetalism is often perceived as a type of a political system for a multi-segmental, especially multi-ethnic, country in order to create among the members of the political elite of moderate, accomodative, and integrative political behavior cross-cutting segmental divisions which, reaching beyond group interests, depoliticize the segmental separateness and, in this manner, reduce their significance. One of the central institutions of centripetalism is decentralization leading to a division of large segments into smaller parts that inhabit different, ideally multi-segmental regions, thus inclining (...) regional political elites of different segments to collaborate. Although both Nigeria and Indonesia have similar centripetal territorial structures, only Nigeria is a federation. This paper focuses on Nigerian centripetal federalism and its link to the so-called federal character principle that is mostly consociational in substance. Krzysztof Trzcinski, Centripetal Federalism, in: 50 Shades of Federalism, ed. by Soeren Keil & Paul Anderson, Canterbury: Canterbury Christ Church University & Montréal: CRÉQC, 2020. (shrink)

John Locke’s theory of state is heavily constructed around his doctrine of consent. The doctrine indeed signifies a critical moment in the development of liberal and democratic theories in the history of political thought. Nevertheless, the doctrine has provoked various controversies and raises doubts on whether Locke’s early and later positions are reconcilable. This paper joins the scholarly debate through investigating the role of consent in Locke’s theory of state. It rejects the ahistorical readings of the doctrine that deliberation and (...) voluntary intention constitute the necessary condition of consent. It also opposes the view that the doctrine of consent offers a moral ground for Locke’s argument on the legitimacy of government, nor does the doctrine directly makes the case for political obligation. Instead, I argue that the doctrine of consent normatively proclaims the essential value of liberty in Locke’s theory of state while historically it was employed as a response to England’s political reality. Locke’s articulation of the doctrine also reveals his life-long concern about the peril of anarchy. Thus, consent should be understood as a dynamic process of recognising the necessity of government while acknowledging the people’s resolution to be free. (shrink)

In a recent article, J. Angelo Corlett criticises what he takes to be the ‘offensiphobic’ practices characteristic of many universities. The ‘offensiphobe’, according to Corlett, believes that offensive speech ought to be censured precisely because it offends. We argue that there are three serious problems with Corlett’s discussion. First, his criticism of ‘offensiphobia’ misrepresents the kinds of censorship practiced by universities; many universities may in some way censure speech which they regard as offensive, but this is seldom if ever a (...) manifestation of ‘offensiphobia’. Second, we attempt to reconstruct Corlett’s criticism of ‘offensiphobia’ as a criticism of the practice of censuring hate speech, and show that this argument is unsuccessful. Third, we offer some brief reflections on how labelling universities as ‘offensiphobic’ is especially problematic in light of the current climate of political interference in university research and teaching. (shrink)

Sovereignty in premodern times evoked the dynastic figure of the 'sovereign' or territorial monarch. In modern times, it became a more abstract idea, referring to the power of the state, later of the people or 'the popular sovereign' as articulated and refined through constitutional arrangements. Today these inherited understandings of sovereignty confront various new challenges, including those of globalization, privatization of power, and the rise of sub-state nationalism. An examination of key historical writers and trends from the seventeenth century onwards, (...) including Hobbes, Bodin, Constant, Rousseau and Schmitt, brings out these developments and challenges. Sovereignty remains a malleable and 'active' feature of the global configuration of power. Will sovereignty become a redundant concept over time, or will it remain a key part of the grammar of modern politics? (shrink)

The recent global surge in large-scale foreign land acquisitions marks a radical transformation of the global economic and political landscape. Since land that attracts capital often becomes the site of expulsions and displacement, it also leads to new forms of migration. In this paper, I explore this connection from the perspective of a political philosopher. I argue that changes in global land governance unsettle the congruence of political community and bounded territory that we often take for granted. As a case (...) study, I discuss the European Union’s Renewable Energy Directive as a significant driver of foreign land acquisitions. Using its global power, the European Union (EU) is effectively governing land far outside of its international borders and with it the people who live on this land or are expelled from it. As a result, EU citizens ought to consider such people fellow members of their political community. This has implications for normative debates about immigration and, in particular, for arguments that appeal to collective self-determination to justify a right of political communities to exclude newcomers. The political community to which EU citizens belong reaches far beyond the EU’s official borders. (shrink)

वह लेख के पहले समूह के लिए हम कैसे व्यवहार है कि काफी सैद्धांतिक भ्रम से मुक्त है में कुछ अंतर्दृष्टि देने का प्रयास. अगले तीन समूहों में मैं एक स्थायी दुनिया को रोकने के प्रमुख भ्रम के तीन पर टिप्पणी - प्रौद्योगिकी, धर्म और pol(सहकारी समूह)। लोगों का मानना है कि समाज उनके द्वारा बचाया जा सकता है, तो मैं क्यों यह छोटे लेख और प्रसिद्ध लेखकों द्वारा हाल ही में पुस्तकों की समीक्षा के माध्यम से संभावना नहीं है (...) के रूप में पुस्तक के बाकी में कुछ सुझाव प्रदान करते हैं. -/- अमेरिका और दुनिया अत्यधिक जनसंख्या वृद्धि से पतन की प्रक्रिया में हैं, पिछली सदी के लिए यह सबसे अधिक है और अब यह सब 3 दुनिया के लोगों की वजह से. संसाधनों की खपत और 4 अरब से अधिक ca. 2100 के अलावा औद्योगिक सभ्यता पतन औरएक चौंका देने वालापैमाने पर भुखमरी, रोग, हिंसा और युद्ध बाहर लाना होगा. अरबों मर जाएगा और परमाणु युद्ध सब कुछ है, लेकिन कुछ है। अमेरिका में यह बेहद बड़े पैमाने पर आव्रजन और आप्रवासी प्रजनन द्वारा त्वरित किया जा रहा है, डेमोcracy द्वारा संभव बनाया दुरुपयोग के साथसंयुक्त. भ्रष्ट मानव प्रकृति inexorably अपराध और गरीबी का एक दुःस्वप्न में लोकतंत्र और विविधता के सपने बदल जाता है. पतन का मूल कारण हमारे सहज मनोविज्ञान की अक्षमताको आधुनिक दुनिया के अनुकूल है, जो लोगों को unrelat एड व्यक्तियों के इलाज के लिए की ओर जाता है जैसे कि वे आमहितों था. यह, बुनियादी जीव विज्ञान और मनोविज्ञान की अज्ञानता के अलावा, आंशिक रूप से शिक्षित जो लोकतांत्रिक समाज को नियंत्रित करने के सामाजिक इंजीनियरिंग भ्रम की ओर जाता है. बहुत कम लोग समझते हैं कि अगर आप किसी और को नुकसान पहुँचाने में आपकी मदद करते हैं, तो मुफ्त दोपहर का भोजन नहीं होता और हर एक वस्तु का उपभोग करने से धरती की मरम्मत से परे नष्ट हो जाती है। नतीजतन, हर जगह सामाजिक नीतियां unsustainable हैं और स्वार्थ पर कड़े नियंत्रण के बिना एक के बाद एक सभी समाज अराजकता या तानाशाही में गिर जाएगी. नाटकीय और तत्काल परिवर्तन के बिना, वहाँ अमेरिका, या किसी भी देश है कि एक लोकतांत्रिक प्रणाली के बाद के पतन को रोकने के लिए कोई उम्मीद नहीं है. इसलिए मेरा निबंध "लोकतंत्र द्वारा आत्महत्या". अब यह भी स्पष्ट है कि चीनपर शासन करने वाले सात समाजपथ विश्व युद्ध 3 जीत रहेहैं, और इसलिए उन पर मेरा अंतिम निबंध। केवल बड़ा खतरा आर्टिफिशियल इंटेलिजेंस है जो मैं पिछले पैराग्राफ में संक्षेप पर टिप्पणी है. (shrink)

Political legitimacy is best understood as one type of a broader notion, which I call institutional legitimacy. An institution is legitimate in my sense when it has the right to function. The right to function correlates to a duty of non-interference. Understanding legitimacy in this way favorably contrasts with legitimacy understood in the traditional way, as the right to rule correlating to a duty of obedience. It helps unify our discourses of legitimacy across a wider range of practices, especially including (...) the many evaluations we increasingly make of international institutions of various sorts, but also including domestic institutions. (shrink)

A slew of recent political theorists—many taking their cue from the political writings of Bernard Williams—have recently contended that political normativity is its own kind of normativity, distinct from moral normativity. In this article, we first attempt to clarify what this claim amounts to and then reconstruct and interrogate five major arguments for it. We contend that all these arguments are unconvincing and fail to establish a sense in which political normativity is genuinely separate from morality.

Since 2001, Continental philosophical studies of evil suggest that we are forced to rethink the category of evil as we face acts of terrorism on a global scale. In light of this suggestion, this article traces the idea of the “inscrutability of evil” as a common lens through which we associate the category of evil with the phenomena we identify as evil. This idea finds its first modern formulation in Kant’s theory of radical evil. I argue that Hannah Arendt and (...) Emmanuel Levinas follow Kant in identifying evil as an inscrutable phenomenon. While they all agree that evil cannot be rationalized, integrated into reason, or understood within the framework of theodicy, for Kant, evil is inscrutable because it is grounded in freedom; for Arendt, evil is inscrutable because it is “banal;” and for Levinas, evil is inscrutable because it is “excessive” and “useless.” My analysis demonstrates that inscrutability is an essential marker of the concept of evil since it is found in all three accounts as a feature of evil, even though in each account a different type of evil is at stake (moral, political, and existential). (shrink)

This research study focuses on the problem of populistic propaganda online. In particular, this research study provides three case studies gathered in a Facebook Group of the Italian populistic movement Movimento 5 Stelle. On the one hand, the three case studies provide three powerful counterexamples to the thesis that online media are purposeful aggregator of people. In fact, this research study finds that online media are the perfect environment for populism to thrive. For online media seem to foster the aggregation (...) of people into groups whose main common denominator is the total refusal of anything that opposes the groups’ views. On this basis, this paper provides evidence that online media may impoverish democratic confrontation. On the other hand, this paper finds that the one of the causes of the rapid rise of populistic movements in Western countries might also be related to the problem of cognitive biases. Indeed, the case studies presented in the paper posit the existence of something that is addressed as the trigger effect, i.e. agents’ tendency to react impulsively to any kind of content that fits agent’s views about current events. Specifically, this research study finds that the activation of the trigger effect might be a direct consequence of the activation of the narrow framing bias and of the anchoring heuristic in presence of fake news. (shrink)

Corruption has assumed a new turn in 4th Republic Nigeria, particularly where non-human animals are alleged by human animals to deep their hands into the public tilt for their selfish non-human animal purposes. This is a clear case of hypocrisy on the part of human animals in that, at one instance we contend that non-human animals are inferior to human beings and at the other instance, we affirm though inadvertently that non-human animals are not inferior but equal since they have (...) the capacity to steal: we, therefore, are unable to steer ourselves out from the dilemma of our ambivalence to arrogate to ourselves a god-like status over non-human animals. We contend that this is another profound inhumane case of violation of non-human animals which is condemnable. We have suggested that the solution to this quagmire is first to admit that non-human animals have basic rights like human animals especially when we understand this notion of Rights going beyond its parochial conception. The method we have employed in showing moments of human's inhumanity to non-human animals is what has been conceived as Ibuanyidanda Philosophy according to which we aver that ihe di nwereisinaodu (anything that exists serves a missing link of reality). We have argued in favour of the thesis that the federal government should allow justice prevails against acts of theft by either civil or public servants. -/- . (shrink)

The topic of ethics and migration crises has two dimensions. First, there are questions in the ethics of representation. Media, pundits, and researchers frequently describe large-scale migration as a crisis with insufficient attention to the cogency of the crisis label or the ethical issues it raises. Second, migration crises give rise to duties not to deprive people of their rights to seek safety and asylum, to protect people deprived of their rights, and to aid migrants in crisis situations. There are (...) ways in which receiving countries are playing a role in causing migration crises through their foreign and economic policies and their attempts to restrict migration, and they instead have obligations to aid. (shrink)

There have been four main motives to introduce the notion of modus vivendi in the political-philosophical literature. One is to use it as a negative contrast to what one regards as the ideal goal in politics. The second is to use it within a distinctively realist political theory that refrains from advocating utopian ideals. The third is to defend liberal institutions as a modus vivendi. The fourth is to have a concept for the institutional tools for peace. Depending on the (...) motive to introduce the notion of modus vivendi, the notion is conceptualized slightly differently. One aim of the chapter is to provide an overview of the different motives that have led theorists to think about modus vivendi and the different conceptualizations of modus vivendi they have offered. But the chapter also makes a more substantial point: it argues that we should conceptualize the notion of modus vivendi in line with the fourth motive, because this seems the most promising way to get a conception of modus vivendi that is both ‘deeply motivated’ and ‘open’ for all kinds of approaches in political theory. (shrink)

Peter Sloterdijk maintains that modern institutions and their fundamental ethos, namely self-discipline, training and the orientation to achievement, can be traced back to spiritual self-mastery and ancient ascetic models, exemplified in Christian monastic life. This article examines the bases of this claim and argues that Sloterdijk’s theory empties ascetic formations of their concrete content and removes them from their historical context. The ambition to derive the main features of modern society from a single matrix necessarily produces abstractions and self-serving definitions (...) with very little explanatory value. (shrink)

This essay analyzes what Alexis de Tocqueville calls an “application of linguistics to history.” Beginning with Tocqueville’s position that language is the ground of meaningful bonds between people, I argue that the internal logic of a language—the grammar—is correlated with the internal logic governing the social order that both begets and is begotten by that language. Social orders therefore have both linguistic and political grammars and, as the internal logic of language changes, so too can the political grammar. This essay (...) thus traces what Tocqueville envisions as the historical importance of language: from the language of aristocracy and the grammar of difference, to revolutionary language and the grammar of concurrence, to democratic language and the grammar of indifference. It concludes with Tocqueville’s suggestion of how good grammar might be taught in democratic ages. (shrink)

The corruption of public officials and institutions is generally regarded as wrong. But in what exactly does this form of corruption consist and what kind of wrong does it imply? This article aims to take stock of the current philosophical discussion of the different senses in which political corruption is wrong in a general sense, beyond the specific negative legal, economic, and social costs it may happen to have in specific circumstances. Political corruption is usually presented as a pathology of (...) the public order. Therefore, the senses in which political corruption has been presented as wrong have varied depending on the normative theory of the public order that is presupposed. In this article, we offer a critical presentation of two major interpretations of the wrongfulness of political corruption that draw respectively on a neo-republican and a liberal account of the public order. Finally, we show how the analytical distinction between these approaches has important normative implications for the identification of relevant cases of political corruption. (shrink)

For all the talk there has been lately about privilege, few have commented on the moral obligations that are associated with having privilege. Those who have commented haven't gone much beyond the idea that the privileged should be conscious of their privilege, should listen to those who don't have it. Here we want to go further, and build an account of the moral obligations of those with a particular kind of privilege: race privilege. In this paper we articulate an understanding (...) of race privilege, say how a person can know when she has it, and argue that a race-privileged person has obligations to offset her privilege. We make concrete suggestions for how she can, at least approximately, do this. We use particular racial group disparities in the United States as our running example throughout the paper, although our conclusions generalize. (shrink)

The ability of international ethics and political theory to establish a genuinely critical standpoint from which to evaluate uses of armed force has been challenged by various lines of argument. On one, theorists question the narrow conception of violence on which analysis relies. Were they right, it would overturn two key assumptions: first, that violence is sufficiently distinctive to merit attention as a category separate from other modes of human harming; second, that it is troubling in a special way that (...) makes acts of violence peculiarly hard to justify. This paper defends a narrow understanding of violence and a special ethics governing its use by arguing that a distinctive form of ‘Violent Agency’ is the factor uniting the category while partly accounting for the fearful connotations of the term. Violent Agency is defined first by a double intention (1) to inflict harm using a technique chosen (2) to eliminate or evade the target’s means of escaping it or defending against it. Second, the harms it aims at are destructive (as opposed to appropriative). The analysis offered connects the concept of violence to themes in international theory such as vulnerability, security, and domination, as well as the ethics of war. (shrink)

In recent years, political philosophers have been fiercely arguing over the virtues and vices of utopian vs realistic theorizing. Partly due to the lack of a common and consistently used vocabulary, these debates have become rather confusing. In this chapter, I attempt to bring some clarity to them and, in doing so, I offer a conciliatory perspective on the “utopian vs realistic theorizing” controversy. I argue that, once the notion of a normative or evaluative theory is clearly defined and distinguished (...) from the desiderata that any good theory should satisfy, many of the disagreements between supporters and opponents of “utopian” or “ideal” theorizing can be easily dissolved. I conclude that, in general, political philosophers should be cautious when theorizing at the extreme ends of the “utopian-realistic” spectrum, but that, setting extremes aside, the correct level of realism or idealism depends on the particular question a theory aims to address. (shrink)

This paper raises several concerns about vulnerability as an alternative language to conceptualize injustice and politicize its attendant injuries. First, the project of resignifying “vulnerability” by emphasizing its universality and amplifying its generative capacity, I suggest, might dilute perceptions of inequality and muddle important distinctions among specific vulnerabilities, as well as differences between those who are injurable and those who are already injured. Vulnerability scholars, moreover, have yet to elaborate the path from acknowledging constitutive vulnerability to addressing concrete injustices. Second, (...) vulnerability studies respond to, and have been shaped by, debates in the 1980s and 1990s over oppression, identity and agency. This genealogy needs to be acknowledged and evaluated. As I demonstrate, prominent theorists define vulnerability in contradistinction to victimization, adopting neo-liberal formulations of victims and victimhood. Finally, I turn to address the politics of vulnerability. At issue are not simply matters of utility or programmes for implementation, but the fraught relationship among ontology, ethics and politics, which I address through an engagement with Rancière's conception of the political and the case of the Black Lives Matter movement. (shrink)