Political Power

The review argues that Lovett’s theory of domination suffers from a problem. Lovett is aware of the problem and bites a fairly large bullet in response to it. What he does not seem aware of is that the problem can be avoided by opting for an account of welfare that he unfortunately ignores, despite the fact that it would serve his purposes well.

Strawson argues that we should understand moral responsibility in terms of our practices of holding responsible and taking responsibility. The former covers what is commonly referred to as backward-looking responsibility , while the latter covers what is commonly referred to as forward-looking responsibility . We consider new technologies and interventions that facilitate assignment of responsibility. Assigning responsibility is best understood as the second- or third-personal analogue of taking responsibility. It establishes forward-looking responsibility. But unlike taking responsibility, it establishes forward-looking responsibility (...) in someone else. When such assignments are accepted, they function in such a way that those to whom responsibility has been assigned face the same obligations and are susceptible to the same reactive attitudes as someone who takes responsibility. One family of interventions interests us in particular: nudges. We contend that many instances of nudging tacitly assign responsibility to nudgees for actions, values, and relationships that they might not otherwise have taken responsibility for. To the extent that nudgees tacitly accept such assignments, they become responsible for upholding norms that would otherwise have fallen under the purview of other actors. While this may be empowering in some cases, it can also function in such a way that it burdens people with more responsibility that they can (reasonably be expected to) manage. (shrink)

This paper argues that feminists have yet to develop a satisfactory account of power. Existing feminist accounts of power tend to have a one-sided emphasis either on power as domination or on power as empowerment. This conceptual one-sided-ness must be overcome if feminists are to develop an account complex enough to illuminate women's diverse experiences with power. Such an account is sketched here.

The task of understanding and perfecting international and diplomatic relations is becoming more crucial, given the frequency of political disputes and intimidation via public diplomacy. At the root of this trend is the dominance of political personalities in international relations, dictating the direction and progress of conflict control on the international scene. With increasing technological, biological, chemical and nuclear weaponry, ignorance of and any mistaken decision on the diplomatic terrain can come at a huge cost of war and anarchy. At (...) the heart of personalities and human relations, however, Nietzsche argues, is the will to power, that singular striving of each individual to assert his individuality and uniqueness, most times, to the detriment of collective interest. The objective of this paper is to expose what Nietzsche means by will to power in order to allow us have a handle on its influence on politics and social relations. The research question, therefore, addresses the relationship between will to power and the nature of political relationships in public diplomacy. The paper will achieve this by an expository and analytical method of research. The paper finds out that it is apposite that we gain control over the tendency for political persons to exploit public diplomacy to dastardly ends. This is to prevent a consequent descent into anarchy, one that Hobbes describes in grotesque clarity as the war of everyone against everyone, with life being “nasty, brutish and short.”. (shrink)

Au XIXe siècle, il était plus facile de traverser l’Atlantique qu’il ne l’est aujourd’hui de traverser la Méditerranée. Si la traversée prenait davantage de temps, le prix du voyage et le nombre de migrants n’avaient rien de comparable avec l’actuelle traversée de la Méditerranée. En 1903 par exemple, plus de 12 000 migrants pouvaient arriver en une seule journée dans le seul port d’Ellis Island. Les migrants européens s’entassaient par milliers dans l’entrepont des bateaux payant l’équivalen..

Offering a comprehensive account of the work of Hedley Bull, Ayson analyses the breadth of Bull's work as a Foreign Office official for Harold Wilson's government, the complexity of his views, including Bull's unpublished papers, and ...

In this essay we criticise Rainer Forst's attempt to draw a connection between power and justification, and thus ground his normative theory of a right to justification. Forst draws this connection primarily conceptually, though we will also consider whether a normative connection may be drawn within his framework. Forst's key insight is that if we understand power as operating by furnishing those subjected to it with reasons, then we create a space for the normative contestation of any exercise of power. (...) He calls this the noumenal understanding of power. Against the conceptual connection between power and justification, we argue that (i) on most plausible accounts of political freedom, some freedom-restrictions commonly attributed to the successful exercise of power would perplexingly count as failures of power on Forst's view, and that (ii) on the most plausible account of reason-recognition, namely an appropriateness of response account, a justification relation is only a sufficient but not necessary condition for recognition. Against the normative connection, we argue that (iii) Forst can establish the existence of a right to justification only if he reconsiders the transcendental aspirations of his theory. (shrink)

In response to criticisms made by Keith Dowding (hereafter KD) of `Capitalists Rule OK', this article argues (1) that there is a genuine structural conflict of interest between consumers and producers, voters and politicians, and capitalists and governments, and (2) that only by ad hoc and arbitrary limitations on the scope of the concept of power can it be denied that consumers collectively have power over producers and capitalists (collectively) have power over government. KD accepts that voters (collectively) have power (...) over governments. Ironically, however, this is by far the most tenuous and generally problematic of the three putative power relations. Furthermore, there is no plausible way of conceding that voters (collectively) have power over politicians without also having to accept the validity of a power relation in the other two cases. The implication is that the thesis that is supposed to justify the standard North American or western European politico-economic system, according to which consumers and voters have power but capitalists do not, is nothing more than ideology, in Marx's sense of a fantastical picture of the world designed by the beneficiaries of the status quo to protect their privileged positions against legitimate demands for revolutionary change. The article concludes by taking up KD's primary objection to `Capitalists Rule', which is its rejection of the proposal to equate power with resources. According to KD's official definition, `resources' are the means of raising and lowering others' utilities. I pointed out in `Capitalists Rule' that KD himself acknowledges the inadequacy of this definition, since he almost immediately goes on to say that people do not necessarily have the power that is attributed to them. Obviously, `power' in this new sense must be something different, and is, in fact, the ability to get people to do what you want them to do or to refrain from doing things you do not want them to do. This is precisely my own proposed definition in `Capitalists Rule'. The only remaining disagreement arises from KD's wish to turn everything that lies between power in his first sense and power in his second (and my) sense into a further `resource'. I argue that this is obfuscatory and, in any case, infeasible. Key Words: power • democracy • capitalism. (shrink)

Even if we do not observe those who own or manage capital doing anything, are there nevertheless good reasons for saying that they have power over government? My thesis is that, on any analysis of `power over others' that enables us to say that voters have power over those elected and that consumers have power over producers, we also have to say that those who own or control capital have power over government. Conversely, the reasons that can be given (and (...) have been given) for denying that owners of capital have power over governments would be equally good reasons for denying that voters have power over governments and that consumers have power over producers. Key Words: power • capitalism • democracy. (shrink)

Rawls’s notion of civil disobedience, which still dominates the literature on this subject, comprises at least these three characteristics: it involves breaking the law, is non-violent and public. But implicit in this notion is a certain tension: it shows pessisimism about the proper functioning of the public sphere as earlier normal appeals have failed, but it also displays a certain optimism about its proper functioning as it assumes that civil disobedience may be effective. In my paper I argue that Rawls (...) cannot explain how civil disobedience may be effective as a public appeal for social justice because he does not fully understand what it means for civil disobedience to be public in relation to the public sphere. His analysis would require an additional notion of publicity which, as I argue, is the notion of hermeneutical publicity. From a Bourdieusian perspective I then make a case for the claim that public spheres always suffer from hermeneutic invisibility. This may explain why non-violent appeals for social justice fail as dialogical practices. Finally I suggest how we nevertheless could understand that civil disobedience can be effective as a dialogical practice. (shrink)

This essay demonstrates that the management and contestability of power is central to Dewey's understanding of democracy and provides a middle ground between two opposite poles within democratic theory: Either the masses become the genuine danger to democratic governance or elites are described as bent on controlling the masses . Yet, the answer to managing the relationship between them and the demos is never forthcoming. I argue that Dewey's response to Lippmann for how we ought to conceive of the relationship (...) between citizens and elites if power is not to become arbitrary is located within a larger framework that avoids the problematic distinction Wolin draws between the demos and representative government. For Dewey, the legitimacy of decision-making, and, indeed, the security of freedom, is determined not merely by our actual involvement, but the extent to which non-participation does not preclude the future contestability of power. (shrink)

There are many advantages and disadvantages to central locations. These have shown themselves in the long course of European history. In times of peace, there are important economic and cultural advantages (to illustrate: the present area of the Czech Republic was the richest country in Europe between the two World Wars). There are cross-currents of trade and culture in central Europe of great advantage. For, cultural cross-currents represent a potential benefit in comprehension and cultural growth. But under threat of large-scale (...) conflict, these locations have proved extremely dangerous. Historically, Germany and Austria may be regarded as having had two chief models of their relationships to Europe. In the Holy Roman Empire, Germany was at the center of an aspiring “universalistic” European cosmopolitanism. (In some ways similar to the present situation of the European Union.) Austria maintained a great multi¬cultural empire, until it was destroyed in the First Word War. Generally, middle-European powers have promoted the integration of European diversity, when peace and stability have been plausible objectives. But when European diversity has declined toward ethnic or national conflict, Germany has drawn away from Europe and into itself, seeking inner unity and distinctness to protect it against possible combinations of enemies. This is true of central Europe generally, in degree, but interest often centers on Germany. Generally, central Europe is a cultural pressure cooker. (shrink)

Although the French Doctrinaires built up one of the most important political theories of the 19th century and had a decisive influence on Tocqueville, Marx, and J. S. Mill, they have remained largely unknown in the English-speaking world. This article examines the Doctrinaires’ theory of political power by concentrating on François Guizot’s Des moyens de gouvernement et d’opposition dans l’état actuel de la France(On the Means of Government and Opposition in the Current State of France) and Prosper de Barante’s Des (...) communes et de l’aristocratie(On the Communes and the Aristocracy), both published in 1821. Special attention is paid to Guizot’s rejection of laissez-faire and his critique of Rousseau. I then present Guizot’s theory of the ‘new means of government’ that stressed the importance of communication between government and society. Guizot predicted that the growth of liberty would be accompanied by a simultaneous extension of state power and understood that the development of representative government would inevitably lead to a considerable extension of state power over society, made possible by a social demand unseen before. In the final section, I seek to nuance the conventional image of the Doctrinaires as rigid defenders of centralization and critically discuss the virtues and limitations of their elitist liberalism. After commenting on the specificity of French political tradition, I point out a few lessons for contemporary political theorists interested in issues such as political power and the mutual empowerment of state and society. (shrink)

The axiom at the heart of this article stipulates that everything that can be extracted from Heidegger's thought by way of political contribution can be so extracted only from a position that is itself essentially non-political. This means that everything Heidegger says about politics, or that can be seen to resonate with our political situation, is articulated from a position or a space that is itself not political, a space that, furthermore, defines and decides the essence of politics. His contribution, (...) then, is not to the political debate as such. Rather, it consists in asking whether what is historically at stake in politics and played out in political terms is itself political, and so a matter for political thought, or whether the questions and concepts of political thought are themselves shaped in response to a phenomenon, possibly an event, which it, as political thought, cannot interrogate, or even intimate. Following Heidegger, I envisage our political situation from a non-political perspective, and provide the measure for an evaluation of contemporary politics as an ontohistorical phenomenon. This, I do by following a lead Heidegger develops in the 1930s and 1940s, and by focusing on the concept of Macht, the translation of which will turn out to raise key philosophical issues. Despite its obvious political connotations and overtones, this concept will turn out to designate a phenomenon that is not so much political, as it is metaphysical: it is metaphysics itself, and metaphysics in its entirety, that is of power. This means that all metaphysics is metaphysics of power, and that power itself is through and through metaphysical. Politics, especially modern politics, turns out to be an effect of Macht understood as a metaphysical phenomenon. Having revealed the structure of power, its logic, imperatives and different regimes, I consider briefly the possibility of a politics that would not be governed by such a principle of power, the possibility of what I would call a politics of powerlessness, or a politics of the otherwise than power (Ohnmacht). Could that be ‘politics’ in the highest and ownmost sense? Could ‘Europe’ stand for such radical politics? (shrink)

Journalists in many Afiican countries have long been caught between differing ideals i n their relationship between press and government. Two models viefor dominance-the western, libertarian and development journalism models. This article uses Walzer's (1983) theory of distributive justice to illuminate the ethical significance of this debate. A t issue is political power. A case study of the 1996 proposed press law i n Kenya illustrates the ethical arguments mounted for each press model and how the arguments are marshaled not (...) necessarily for moral purposes but to gain political advantage. Finally, a viable third alternative avoids a false dilemma between the libertarian and development journalism models. Communitarianism preserves the independence from government SO central to the libertarian model while providing a basis for activist journalism. (shrink)