Digitalization has set in motion social processes that are having an impact on our democratic fabric. These include phenomena that affect the media system itself, such as a weakening of quality journalism, a strengthening of disinformation and populist media, and an increasing power of opinion of intermediaries (such as Google, Meta, et al.). As a result, processes can be observed that directly affect our understanding of democracy: these are, in particular, tendencies that lead to the destabilization of democratic opinion- and (...) will-forming and thus call democratic negotiation and decision-making processes into question. Surveillance technologies that encroach on our fundamental values of privacy and autonomy can be just as dangerous to democracy. The authors reflect from ethical, media studies, philosophical and legal perspectives on the significance of current developments for our democracy in a digital world, and what normative requirements and options for action exist. (shrink)
In the contemporary context, there is growing scepticism about liberal and democratic institutions as not only failing in many ways to ensure a valuable life for their citizens but even, some think, as being positively harmful to them. The essays collected in this volume contribute to an ongoing project to go ‘beyond’ liberalism without thereby abandoning commitment to liberal values or institutions. They are motivated by two commitments. First, that liberal institutions need to be defended as important for protecting human (...) well-being and even embodying duties toward our fellow citizens. Second, the conviction that the many challenges which threaten the very persistence of liberal and democratic states around the world can be met only by drawing on resources provided by perfectionist traditions. (shrink)
في سنة 2015، ذهب قرابة عشرين شخصًا من سُكان بلدة «ياهابا» (وهي بلدة صغيرة تابعة لولاية «إيواتي» شمال شرق اليابان) إلى مبنى البلدية الخاص بهم للمشاركة في تجربة فريدة من نوعها. كان هدف التجربة هو تصميم سياسات من شأنها تشكيل مستقبل بلدتهم، ما يعني طرح الأسئلة المُخصصة للسياسيين ومحاولة الإجابة عنها: هل من الأفضل أن نستثمر في البنية التحتية أم في رعاية الأطفال؟ وهل يجب أن نُشجع الطاقة المُتجددة أم الزراعة الاصطناعية؟ وهل نعمل وفق خُطط قصيرة الأجل تُحقق مصالح الجيل (...) الحالي، أم وفق خُطط بعيدة الأجل تنظر بعين الاهتمام لحاجات الأجيال التالية؟ وللإجابة عن هذه التساؤلات وفق رؤية مستقبلية تم تقسيم المشاركين إلى مجموعتين؛ الأولى ظل أعضاؤها بملابسهم وهيئاتهم المعتادة كممثلين للجيل الحالي، والثانية ارتدى أعضاؤها معاطف احتفالية رمزية صفراء وطُلب منهم أن يتخيلوا أنهم يعيشون في سنة 2060، أي أنهم يُمثلون مصالح جيل من أجيال المستقبل خلال التجربة. (shrink)
Deskripsi pemikiran Adorno terhadap fenomena ekonomi memberi isyarat bahwa neoliberalisme bisa dibongkar. Neoliberalisme mempresentasikan diri dalam wujud rasional. Neoliberalisme sangat meyakinkan dan tampak alamiah berdasarkan klaim bahwa pasar dapat mengatur diri (self-regulating market). Klaim tersebut membuat neoliberalisme dalam perkembangannya dianggap sebagai koordinasi masyarakatyang memiliki rasionalitas. Bagi Adorno sejarah tentang sesuatu yang alamiah selalu berdasarkan pada mitos. Kapitalisme menurutnya adalah fakta sosial yang tidak natural. Penulis berkesimpulan bahwa neoliberalisme adalah fenomena yang tidak natural. Kapitalisme dan neoliberalisme hanya tampak alamiah. Mitoslah yang (...) membentuk kepercayaan bahwa sesuatu alamiah dan merupakan pokok dari sejarah. Adorno menolak pandangan tersebut dengan menyatakan bahwa sejarah mesti dimengerti secara kritis sebagai kemampuan manusia untuk mengonstitusikan bentuk sosial yang baru dalam relasinya dengan alam itu sendiri. Bagian berikutnya dari artikel ini membahas bagaimana neoliberalisme bekerja lewat distorsi komunikasi dalam sendi-sendi kehidupan sosial ekonomi, budaya dan politik. Demokrasi mengalami erosi pada substansinya. Rakyat kehilangan kemampuannya untuk berkomunikasi mengorganisir kehidupan bersamanya. Rakyat secara umum cenderung ikut terseret dalam arus neoliberalisasi. Kesadaran kritis melemah dan terdapat potensi hilangnya kedaulatan rakyat atas politik dan ekonomi. (shrink)
«Τι να κάνουμε;» [Что делать?], ήταν ο τίτλος ενός πολιτικού φυλλαδίου που έγραψε ο Β. Ι. Λένιν το 1901 και κυκλοφόρησε το 1902 στη Ρωσία. Παρόλο τον ερωτηματικό χαρακτήρα του τίτλου, η απάντηση του Λένιν που αναπτυσσόταν στις σελίδες του κειμένου, έμελλε να τεθεί προστακτικά στο επαναστατικό κίνημα.
Ideologies, worldviews, or simply personal theories, often acquire a distorted and pathological character, and become a factor of alienation rather than an epistemic resource and an aid for personal existence. This paper attempts to better define the limits and characteristics of this experience, which we call distorted intellectual beliefs, or general conceptual beliefs (GB), while trying to highlight both its sometimes dramatic background and its personal and social consequences, which are no less potentially deleterious. We believe that such experiences should (...) not be confused tout court with a broader and more complex phenomenon, such as extremism and politico-religious radicalism, but are a specific typology of that broader and multifaceted fact that is self-deception. We hypothesize that the self-deception implicit in experiences of intellectual distortion produces a cognitive dissonance of which the subject is normally, though with varying intensity, aware (or may become aware through honest introspection). The phenomenon occurs in two extreme forms: one is normal (sporadic), the other is exceptional (systematic). The passage from one to the other is a complex process of escalation and de-escalation, on which multiple external and internal variables act. In its ascending path, it essentially coincides with a process of psychological polarization and cognitive "de-pluralization", while its descending phase marks a return to reality and a "re-pluralization", where the subject returns to being what he basically is, namely, an active and tireless meaning seeker. In the central part of the chapter, similarities and differences between processes of deradicalization and phenomena of religious deconversion are analyzed, with reference, among others, to the case of the Austro-Hungarian writer Arthur Koestler. -/- An abridged version of this text has been delivered for the Workshop "Explaining Extreme Belief and Extreme Behavior", September 15-16, 2022, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. I am grateful to David Konstan (NYU) for reading and commenting on a first version of this chapter and to Rik Peels (VUA) for his comments and questions during the Workshop. I would also like to thank my bachelor's and master's students at UDG, who discussed these topics at length with during semester 2022-B. (shrink)
Due to the scarcity of data from government sources, twisting facts and rewriting histories in order to warp out a belligerent present has become a rising tendency. Such a tendency brings with it a convenient inability to speak truth to power. The majority of the urban credo today has fallen victim to a system of what can be called a new-age urban ideology of 'perfective fakeness'.
The Community of Shared Future for Mankind (CSFM) concept is a comprehensive Chinese proposal for a better future of mankind. In this article, we provide a comprehensive analysis of this concept by focusing on its origin, evolution and philosophical foundation. This article deals with the origin and evolution of the CSFM concept. We show that the concept originated during the presidency of Hu Jintao, who initially used it for the domestic affairs of China. However, the usage of the concept was (...) later extended from domestic to international affairs. Though Hu Jintao conceived the CSFM concept, it is president Xi Jinping who became its greatest advocate. We explore the CSFM concept’s development and evolution into one of the most influential, diverse and dominant concepts of international relations under president Xi. Furthermore, the article explores the philosophical foundation of the CSFM concept. We argue that although CSFM concept is seen as a 21st century Chinese idea, the roots of the concept can be traced back to much earlier time in history. The concept is based on three major philosophical thoughts: Marxism, Confucianism and the philosophy of Mencius. We show that the CSFM concept is greatly influenced by Marx’s ideas such as the transformation of the world, the free association of producers, historical materialism and dialectics. We also point to a number of Confucian principles that are adopted by the CSFM concept. The CSFM concept not only adopts Confucian principles but also extends their scope from the individual level to international relations. Similarly, we also highlight that the CSFM concept is influenced by Mencius’ concepts such as universal brotherhood, responsibility towards the betterment of the world, humane governance, free trade, equal sharing of wealth and the conservation of natural resources. (shrink)
How is God related to the state? Could the existence of robust political authority somehow be evidence for God? In this Element, the author explores these questions, pro and con, looking at various major positions. At the start of the volume, they defend a political argument for God's existence. Having motivated a theistic account of political authority, they then discuss the role God plays or could play in classical liberalism, Marxism, and postliberalism. While they sympathetically survey each political theory in (...) turn, at the end of each section, they raise various objections to the view being discussed. Finally, at the end of the Element, the author articulates desiderata for theists who are looking for political frameworks. (shrink)
The International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) developed a ‘Working Definition of Antisemitism’ in 2016. Whilst the definition has received a significant amount of media attention, we are not aware of any comprehensive philosophical analysis. This article analyses this definition. We conclude that the definition and its list of examples ought to be rejected. The urgency to do so stems from the fact that pro-Israel activists can and have mobilised the IHRA document for political goals unrelated to tackling antisemitism, notably to (...) stigmatise and silence critics of the Israeli government. This causes widespread self-censorship, has an adverse impact on freedom of speech, and impedes action against the unjust treatment of Palestinians. We also identify intrinsic problems in the way the definition refers to criticism of Israel similar ‘to that leveled against any other country’, ambiguous wording about ‘the power of Jews as a collective’, lack of clarity as to the Jewish people’s ‘right to self-determination’, and its denial of obvious racism. We consider alternative definitions and prefer one like the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) definition, ‘hostility to or prejudice against Jews’, with the addition of the words ‘as Jews’. We recognise that the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism (JDA) can play a useful purpose in illustrating the shortcomings of the IHRA definition. However, we do not advocate promoting it as the prime international definition. Indeed, we question the efficacy of using complex new definitions to combat racism against Jews or other groups, and instead advocate combatting it through collective action across societies. (shrink)
This paper examines the relationship between strategies of cosmopolitan education intended to motivate citizens of affluent countries to care about distant others facing injustice, and injustices within the borders of these affluent countries. I argue that promoting justice within affluent countries and motivating citizens to act to address global injustices, are potentially complementary rather than competing projects. I make two claims. Injustices within national borders can undermine the development of cosmopolitan concern. National institutions delivering health and social care play a (...) vital role in developing and sustaining affective dispositions necessary to care about the fate of distant others. (shrink)
I argue that political forgiveness is sometimes, but not always, compatible with public commemoration of politically motivated wrongdoing. I start by endorsing the claim that commemorating serious past wrongdoing has moral value and imposes moral demands on key actors within post-conflict societies. I am concerned with active commemoration, that is, the deliberate acts of bringing victims and the wrong done to them to public attention. The main issue is whether political forgiveness requires forgetting and conversely whether remembrance can be an (...) impediment to political forgiveness. The notion of political forgiveness, its definition, very possibility and desirability are contentious issues in the contemporary literature. I develop a multidimensional account of political forgiveness with a core element. The core element of political forgiveness involves taking a non-adversarial stance towards perpetrators in the sense of committing to stop holding their wrongdoing against them. The core element of forgiveness is usually combined with other attitudes and practices, which are appropriate depending on the circumstances. This is due to the fact that there are different ways of holding a wrong against an offender. I argue that forgiving perpetrators is not compatible with continue to punishing them, refusing to reconcile with them, and/or reminding them of their misdeed if perpetrators refuse to accept punishment, deny the importance of commemorating the past or wish to reconcile against the victim’s desires. I show that some forms of political forgiveness are not morally legitimate because they conflict with moral demands to punish perpetrators, commemorate atrocities and respect victims. This conclusion is less alarming than it might initially seem because the refusal to forgive politically motivated wrongdoing does not necessarily lead to the perpetuation of violence and conflict. I briefly draw on the example of Argentina in order to show how some forms of political un-forgiveness can be morally legitimate and effective ways for victims to uphold these demands. (shrink)
Bu bölümde karşılaştırmalı siyaset teorisinin, siyaset teorisinin hem bir alt alanı, hem de bir yöntemi olarak ortaya çıkış sürecini ele alacağım. Bu bağlamda öncelikle ‘karşılaştırmalı siyaset teorisinin’ (KST) ne zaman ortaya çıktığı sorusuyla ilgileneceğim. Ardından, KST’nin neden ortaya çıktığı, ne olduğu ve nasıl yapılması gerektiği ile ilgili tartışmalara değineceğim. Bu tartışmayı, son otuz yılda literatürde öne çıkan bazı çalışmalar ve isimler ve onların tartıştığı konular, meseleler, sorular ve sorunlar üzerinden (karşılaştırmada özne/nesne ilişkisi ve güç problemi, soruların ya da sorunların evrenselliği (...) meselesi, Batı/Avrupa merkezciliğini yeniden üretme riski) ve eleştirel bir değerlendirmeye tabi tutarak yürüteceğim. Son olarak, başlangıçta Amerika odaklı bir tartışma/gelişme olarak ve siyaset teorisinin belli sorunlarını (Avrupamerkezcilik, yanlış evrensellik, dar görüşlülük) aşma hedefiyle ortaya çıkan KST’nin aradan geçen otuz yılın ardından bugünkü durumu ile ilgili bazı değerlendirmelerde bulunacağım. (shrink)
Some artificial intelligence systems can display algorithmic bias, i.e. they may produce outputs that unfairly discriminate against people based on their social identity. Much research on this topic focuses on algorithmic bias that disadvantages people based on their gender or racial identity. The related ethical problems are significant and well known. Algorithmic bias against other aspects of people’s social identity, for instance, their political orientation, remains largely unexplored. This paper argues that algorithmic bias against people’s political orientation can arise in (...) some of the same ways in which algorithmic gender and racial biases emerge. However, it differs importantly from them because there are strong social norms against gender and racial biases. This does not hold to the same extent for political biases. Political biases can thus more powerfully influence people, which increases the chances that these biases become embedded in algorithms and makes algorithmic political biases harder to detect and eradicate than gender and racial biases even though they all can produce similar harm. Since some algorithms can now also easily identify people’s political orientations against their will, these problems are exacerbated. Algorithmic political bias thus raises substantial and distinctive risks that the AI community should be aware of and examine. (shrink)
Envases frente a contenido, imagen que no tiene a la base programas. Los medias y las redes sociales frente a la plaza ateniense del debate democrático. Populismos y liderazgos que abandonan la Ilustración como movimiento general filosófico. Este pequeño escrito es una reflexión sobre las tendencias que se observan en las sociedades democráticas, colocado en el marco de la discusión entre modernidad y posmodernismo. Se defiende en él la propuesta del debate racional y público.
The modern social world is unjust. It is also complex. What does this latter fact imply about the kind of approach that should be used in ameliorating the injustice expressed in the former fact? One answer, recently put forth by Jacob Barrett, is that _ideal theory_, which he understands as being fundamentally defined by the identification and subsequent pursuit of an aspirational macro-level institutional goal, lacks a place in social reform. The reason he thinks ideal theory lacks a place has (...) to do with its inability to deal with complexity. _Pace_ Barrett, I argue that ideal theory, suitably understood, can play a valuable role in social reform in a complex world. While some ideal theorists have underappreciated the extent to which complexity considerations complicate social reform, this does not mean that there is no place for it. This paper surveys the resources ideal theory has available to cope with what I call _the challenge of complexity_. Although the coping techniques will be successful to varying degrees, I believe, in aggregate, a compelling case can be made that ideal theory can combat the challenge of complexity. Still, one may worry that even if ideal theory can adequately deal with complexity, it cannot adequately deal with ever-changing social circumstances. Call this _the dancing landscape objection_. A static ideal theory cannot overcome it, but a _dynamic ideal theory_ could. In sum, dynamic ideal theory can contribute to social reform in a complex and mutable social world. (shrink)
As the realisation kicks in that the coronavirus will not be going away any time soon, it is time for political parties to engage in a value-driven debate about the question what society should look like if the virus remains part of it. This paper presents a framework based on the values of personal, collective, and moral freedom that could help politicians to make the right choices in this regard. [Dutch].
How many questions could you answer in a pub quiz about British values? Designed to ensure new migrants have accepted British values and integrated, the UK's citizenship test is often portrayed as a bad pub quiz with answers few citizens know. With the launch of a new post-Brexit immigration system, this is a critical time to change the test. Thom Brooks draws on first-hand experience of taking the test, and interviews with key figures including past Home Secretaries, to expose the (...) test as ineffective and a barrier to citizenship. This accessible guide offers recommendations for transforming the citizenship test into a 'bridge to citizenship' which fosters greater inclusion and integration. (shrink)
Trust is essential for our democracy. We trust our political leaders and institutions to put the public interest before their personal or partisan advantage. We trust each other to work and live together. No system is perfect and there is rarely one right answer to the big challenges faced, but we expect leaders to be honest, competent and compassionate – and punish any breaches harshly in the polls or the ballot box. But not any longer. Now is a time of (...) political crisis that’s fuelled by a lack of trust in government and the mainstream. This carries significant and damaging consequences for the future of our democracy fragmenting and polarising our communities. While election results from Brexit to Trump shocked political pundits on both sides of the Atlantic, the roots of an alienated and divided public who increasingly do not trust public figures to put the public interest first have root causes that run deep. The absence of trust creates a political shift akin to a new kind of revolution putting at risk our democracy’s future health. Awareness and action have never been needed more urgently. For over two decades, Thom Brooks has been a leading voice in exposing this crisis in trust and challenging its foundations. This provocative collection of new and recent reflections brings together his work as a freelance columnist and essayist covering Brexit, British values, citizenship and immigration, Scotland’s independence referendum, tackling the Covid-19 pandemic, education policy and legal reform. These essays highlight his substantial contributions to some of the leading political issues of our day. How deep is our current crisis – and what can we do about it to rebuild trust in our politicians, public institutions and each other? Brooks provides clear insights into these issues and more with his ‘realistic optimism’ for the future and why we can be the solution to our political crisis. (shrink)
This essay critically analyzes two dominant narratives that explain and lament the rise of Donald Trump in the United States. First, I extend Jill Locke’s concept of “The Lament that Shame is Dead" to show the limitations of criticizing Trump in terms of the “death of shame.” I then turn my attention to the problems inerent in recent characterizations of Trump as a petulant child. Drawing from Locke on shame and Freud and Lee Edelman on the politics of “the child,” (...) I argue that characterizing Trump as shameless, childish, or as a shameless child only affirms, rather than deposes, Trump’s right-wing populist strategy and keeps the focus on him as a personality rather than on the broader social and political context in which he emerged. I argue this has implications for the rise of right-wing populism in the West, more broadly. (shrink)
Mainz and Uhrenfeldt have recently claimed that a violation of the right to privacy can be defined successfully under reliance on the notion of ‘Negative Control’. In this reply, I show that ‘Negative Control’ is unrelated to privacy right violations. It follows that control theorists have yet to put forth a successful normative account of privacy.
This article examines the puzzling phenomenon that many Chinese liberal intellectuals fervently idolize Donald Trump and embrace the alt-right ideologies he epitomizes. Rejecting ‘pure tactic’ and ‘neoliberal affinity’ explanations, it argues that the Trumpian metamorphosis of Chinese liberal intellectuals is precipitated by their ‘beacon complex’, which has ‘political’ and ‘civilizational’ components. Political beaconism grows from the traumatizing lived experience of Maoist totalitarianism, sanitizes the West and particularly the United States as politically near-perfect, and gives rise to both a neoliberal affinity (...) and a latent hostility toward baizuo. Civilizational beaconism, sharing with its nationalistic counterpart -- civilizational vindicativism -- the heritages of scientific racism and social Darwinism imported in late-Qing, renders the Chinese liberal intelligentsia receptive to anti-immigrant and Islamophobic paranoia, exacerbates its anti-baizuo sentiments, and catalyzes its Trumpian convergence with Chinese non-liberals. (shrink)
This paper proposes freedom as the condition of possibility for the construction of trust in human relationships. The methodology used is a review of the scientific literature of the most recent moral and political philosophy. As a result of the dialogue between different positions, it is discovered that freedom, despite being present in the act of trust, is forgotten in the discussion around trust, a forgetfulness that has as its main causes the assumption that trust is natural and the confusion (...) between the propensity to trust and the act of trusting. All this leads to proposing an approach of the act of trusting that starts from the freedom of the trustee and the trustor. (shrink)
With the help of examples and accounts of historical cases, this by now classic synthesis describes the universal traits of power, a phenomenon present in all forms of human sociality. Four basic anthropological forms of coercion are identified: power to offend, instrumental power, power of authority, and the power to change the world through technical action. The author gives an account of power relations both from the point of view of those who exercise it and those who are subjected to (...) it, reconstructing their genealogy from formation to consolidation and decline. The book, edited by Sergio Cremaschi with an Introduction to the Italian edition by Gianfranco Poggi, has been translated from German by Paolo Volonté. -/- Original ed.: Phanomene der Macht: Autoritat - Herrschaft - Gewalt - Technik; Prozesse der Machtbildung, Tubingen : Mohr, 1986. -/- . (shrink)
The word “populism” commonly elicits images of hordes of angry townspeople with pitchforks and torches. That is the classic picture of “the mob,” bolstered by countless movie and television productions, and it is clearly based on such historical events as the English civil wars, the sans-culottes’ terror, the Bolshevik revolution, and the recent genocides in Rwanda and Burundi. Many of the leaders involved in fostering such horrors are seen as radical democrats whose successors today should also be feared. In this (...) paper, I argue that any mob takeovers of the feared sort are actually antithetical to radical democracy. This is because an authentically democratic regime, even of the most extreme type, is necessarily inconsistent with “mobocracy” or any sort of “tyranny of the majority” given its essential procedural aspects. It is argued, in fact, that leaders of legitimately democratic movements have generally been quite vapid because of the fallibilistic, plebiscitary proceduralism inherent in any authentic attempt to require government policy to reflect the “general will.” And this vapidity is argued to inhere regardless of the extent of rhetorical powers of the advocate or advocacy. (shrink)
We examined the relationship between moral foundations, empathic traits, and moral identity using an online survey via Mechanical Turk. In order to determine how moral foundations contribute to empathic traits and moral identity, we performed classical correlation analysis as well as Bayesian correlation analysis, Bayesian ANCOVA, and Bayesian regression analysis. Results showed that individualizing foundations (harm/care, fairness/reciprocity) and binding foundations (ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, purity/sanctity) had various different relationships with empathic traits. In addition, the individualizing versus binding foundations showed somewhat reverse relationships (...) with internalization and symbolization of moral identity. This suggests that moral foundations can contribute to further understanding of empathic traits and moral identity and how they relate to moral behavior in reality. We discuss the implications of these results for moral educators when starting to teach students about moral issues. (shrink)
When I first contacted Jacques Rancière in March 2017, nearly three-and-a-half years before the completion of this interview, a few basic questions were growing heavy. Questions limited to current political climates, trending philosophical systems, specific literary works, designated historical shifts, or particular Rancièrean terms would be reluctantly put aside in pursuit of certain elemental distinctions that might better inform the rest. The original proposal was to work around such slippery paradoxes as resistance, and to readdress tangible material like the letter, (...) but the overall idea, communicated from the start, was to produce a sort of reintroduction to Rancière's thought, for myself and an intended... (shrink)
Freedom of speech has traditionally been a cause championed by the left and liberal side of the political spectrum, against conservatives who have tried to limit the expression of radical ideas. Here are three examples from the United States: 1) When I was appointed to Princeton University in 1999, Steve Forbes, whose father had endowed the university’s Forbes College, called for my appointment to be rescinded, and pledged that he would not donate to the university as long as I was (...) on the faculty. Forbes was, at the time, running for the Republican nomination for president. (shrink)
[Comment] I am sympathetic to Avner de Shalit’s position that a political philosophy should incorporate public values, but I see their role differently. Philosophers of science standardly distinguish between values being introduced in the context of discovery (inputs into the investigation or arguments) and in the context of justification (acceptance or rejection of substantive claims in light of the arguments or investigation). I argue that de Shalit is wrong to put the public values in the context of discovery; with respect (...) to normative theories (such as political theories), the values should be introduced in the context of justification. [Open access]. (shrink)
En un formato de texto reconcentrado y ensayı́stico, llega hasta nosotros el nuevo libro del sociólogo Carlos Ruiz Encina, Octubre chileno. La irrupción de un nuevo pueblo (Santiago, Taurus, 2020). El libro arranca con una detallada bitácora de los dı́as previos al 18 de octubre de 2019, del estallido social mismo y de los acontecimientos inmediatamente posteriores. Queda la impresión de esos raros momentos cuando la historia se acelera y libera energı́as largamente acumuladas. Si bien los hechos por su masividad (...) y fuerza son inéditos, Ruiz Encina toma distancia de esa afirmación que se instala sobre lo sucedido hasta el dı́a de hoy en el mundo polı́tico y en parte de la intelectualidad: no lo vimos venir. (shrink)
Populism has become one of the most intensely discussed topics in both public debate and academic research. So far there has been no systematic argumentation theoretic analysis of populism, however. This paper is intended to provide first steps towards such an analysis by giving a full argumentation theoretic reconstruction of the political manifesto of the German right-wing populist party “Alternative for Germany” (AfD). This allows to draw preliminary conclusions about the AfD’s argumentative strategy as exemplary for right-wing populism.
O objetivo deste livro é propor uma reflexão sobre o ideário de centro, se perguntando se ele seria possível e como. Preferi chamar de “Uma Ideologia de Centro” em vez de “Ideário”, pois o termo “Ideologia” é instigante para um título. Entretanto tenho a noção de que essa palavra é bastante carregada de significados teóricos. No modelo marxista, grosso modo, a ideologia é um conjunto de crenças, construído pela parcela dominante da sociedade, para naturalizar a dominação. Não é nesse sentido (...) que utilizo o termo “ideologia”. Gostaria de um significado mais neutro para ele, tal como um conjunto de crenças, valores e/ou ações que respeita um conjunto de princípios. Nesse sentido, podemos pensar em uma ideologia para a direita política, para a esquerda política e para o centro político. Normalmente dividimos o espectro político de acordo com esses princípios; entretanto outras divisões são possíveis, ou ainda pode ser o caso que nenhuma divisão seja realmente objetiva. Como devemos, então, pensar essa divisão? Quais princípios subjazem as ações de diferentes atores políticos? Numa época de polarização política entre esquerda e direita, faz sentido refletirmos sobre posições mais moderadas? Qual conjunto de crenças, valores e ações poderia constituir moderação no cenário atual? Nosso livro tenta trazer uma reflexão sobre o ideário de centro, apresentando pensadores que refletem sobre a possibilidade de estabelecermos um centro, sobre a relação entre a ciência e o centro, sobre reformas centristas, entre outras coisas. Nossa intenção é que este livro promova uma reflexão inicial estimulante, e não a palavra final sobre as ideias apresentadas. Nesse sentido, este livro é ensaístico e tenta produzir algo original, ainda que incompleto. Nosso livro não têm uma unidade de visão; e acreditamos que isso é um mérito, pois não tenta estabelecer, em definitivo, se há e o que é o centro, mas nos leva a pensar sobre o conceito. A reflexão filosófica tem a característica de nos aprofundar nas questões investigadas. Podemos não chegar numa resposta final, mas nosso conhecimento sobre o problema e sobre as respostas para ele aprimoram nossa capacidade reflexiva. Pode-se acabar não concordando com nada do que aqui foi escrito. Maravilha! Se esse é o caso, o mais importante é saber por que não concordamos e construirmos nossa própria crítica argumentativa. Mas não paremos na crítica; construamos também uma teoria positiva, uma visão de mundo. É a partir do processo de criação, crítica, destruição e reconstrução, que tornamos mais fortes as nossas visões de mundo. Parafraseando a maior celebridade filosófica de todos os tempos, Sócrates: a vida só vale realmente a pena, se refletida. (shrink)
Maxima lui Samuel Gompers, parafrazară adesea ca "Premiază prietenii și pedepsește dușmanii", se referă la două din cele cinci tipuri de putere recunoscute de psihologii sociali: puterea stimulativă (puterea de a premia) și puterea coercitivă (puterea de a pedepsi). Celelalte trei puteri derivă din acestea. Puterea legitimității, puterea unui polițist sau a celui care ia decizii, este puterea dată de unei persoane de o autoritate recunoscută pentru a impune standarde comportamentale. Puterea legitimității este similară puterii coercitive prin aceea că o (...) comportare inacceptabilă este pedepsită mai mult sau mai puțin direct. (shrink)
A striking feature of political discourse is how prone we are to disagree. Political opponents will even give different answers to factual questions, which suggests that opposing parties cannot agree on facts any more than they can on values. This impression is widespread and supported by survey data. I will argue, however, that the extent and depth of political disagreement is largely overstated. Many political disagreements are merely illusory. This claim has several important upshots. I will explore the implications of (...) this idea for theories about voter misinformation, motivated reasoning, public reason liberalism, deliberative democracy, and a number of other issues. (shrink)
The article develops the concept of "political judgement" - a new, affirmative understanding of the phenomena which are criticized as "political correctness" by both right-wing and liberal commentators. To that end, it takes the right's claims, that "political correctness" is slave morality in Nietzsche's sense seriously and proposes a systematic reading of a right-nietzschean position. Connecting current "political-correctness"-critique and Nietzsche in this way allows for a deeper understanding of the right-wing rationality and the affective energy underlying the critique. Through contrasting (...) this right-nietzschean reading with its systematic opposite, a left-nietzschean position, the article shows that the essence of politics is to redesign norms which distribute privilege. What is critically labelled "political correctness" is, thus, better captured by the notion of "political judgment", because - given an interest in emancipation - such politics should not be demonized when they limit the freedom provided by undeserved privileges. (shrink)