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1 — 50 / 81
  1. added 2018-11-28
    Popper e o problema da predição prática.Eros Moreira De Carvalho - 2011 - Analytica (Rio) 15 (2):123-146.
    The problem of rational prediction, launched by Wesley Salmon, is without doubt the Achilles heel of the critical method defended by Popper. In this paper, I assess the response given both by Popper and by the popperian Alan Musgrave to this problem. Both responses are inadequate and thus the conclusion of Salmon is reinforced: without appeal to induction, there is no way to make of the practical prediction a rational action. Furthermore, the critical method needs to be vindicated if one (...)
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  2. added 2018-02-17
    Watkins and the Pragmatic Problem of Induction.Greg Bamford - 1989 - Analysis 49 (4):203-205.
    Watkins proposes a neo-Popperian solution to the pragmatic problem of induction. He asserts that evidence can be used non-inductively to prefer the principle that corroboration is more successful over all human history than that, say, counter-corroboration is more successful either over this same period or in the future. Watkins's argument for rejecting the first counter-corroborationist alternative is beside the point. However, as whatever is the best strategy over all human history is irrelevant to the pragmatic problem of induction since we (...)
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  3. added 2017-07-15
    Popper's Solution to the Problem of Induction.Colin Howson - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (135):143-147.
  4. added 2017-06-30
    Łukasiewicz and Popper on Induction.Jan Woleński & Joseph Agassi - 2010 - History and Philosophy of Logic 31 (4):381-388.
    We compare Jan ?ukasiewicz's and Karl Popper's views on induction. The English translation of the two ?ukasiewicz's papers is included in the Appendix.
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  5. added 2017-06-30
    Swann Versus Popper on Induction: An Arbitration.Tom Settle - 1990 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (3):401-405.
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  6. added 2017-06-30
    On Popper-Miller's Proof of the Impossibility of Inductive Probability.Andrés Rivadulla Rodriguez - 1987 - Erkenntnis 27 (3):353 - 357.
  7. added 2017-06-30
    On Popper-Miller's Proof of the Impossibility of Inductive Probability.Andr�Srivadulla Rodr�Guez - 1987 - Erkenntnis 27 (3):353-357.
  8. added 2017-06-30
    Popper Against Inductivism.Daniel Rothbart - 1980 - Dialectica 34 (2):121-128.
    SummaryAfter presumably cleaning science of induction, Karl Popper claims to offer a purely noninductivist theory of science. In critically evaluating this theory, I focus on the allegedly noninductive character of this theory. First, I defend and expand Wesley Salmon's charge that Popper's dismissal of induction renders science useless for practical purposes. Without induction practitioners have no grounds for believing that the predicted event will actually take place. Second, despite Popper's demands to the contrary, his theory of science is shown to (...)
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  9. added 2017-06-30
    The Mysteries of Udolpho: A Reply to Professors Jeffrey and Bar-Hillel.K. R. Popper - 1967 - Mind 76 (301):103-110.
  10. added 2017-06-30
    Popper on Qualitative Confirmation and Disconfirmation.R. H. Vincent - 1962 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):159 – 166.
  11. added 2017-06-30
    On Carnap's Version of Laplace's Rule of Succession.K. R. Popper - 1962 - Mind 71 (281):69-73.
  12. added 2017-06-29
    Deductivist Decision Making.David Miller - unknown
    The non-justificationist deductivism (or critical rationalism) of Karl Popper constitutes the only approach to human knowledge, including of course the natural and social sciences, that is capable of overcoming all the failings, and the plain contradictions, of the traditional doctrine of inductivism and of its modern incarnation, Bayesianism.
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  13. added 2017-06-29
    Reply to Zwirn & Zwirn.David Miller - manuscript
    I am indebted to Zwirn and Zwirn [1989] for their extended and careful comments on the arguments of Popper & Miller [1983], [1987], and also for friendly and illuminating conversations. Their judgement seems to be that although Popper and I fail to make a satisfactory case for our conclusion that inductive probability is impossible, that conclusion is nonetheless defensible on quite other grounds. I don’t really agree with this, as I shall explain.
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  14. added 2017-06-29
    Two Problems of Induction.John O'neill - 1989 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (1):121-125.
    In this paper I distinguish two problems of induction: a problem of the uniformity of nature and a problem of the variety of nature. I argue that the traditional problem of induction that Popper poses—the problem of uniformity—is not that which is relevant to science. The problem relevant to science is that of the variety of nature. *I would like to thank Bob Hale, Russell Keat and the Journal's referee for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
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  15. added 2017-06-29
    Popper, Prior Probabilities, and Inductive Inference.Colin Howson - 1987 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (2):207-224.
  16. added 2017-06-29
    Stumbling-Blocks and Limitations of Popper Criticism of Induction.Z. Parusnikova - 1985 - Filosoficky Casopis 33 (5):721-734.
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  17. added 2017-06-29
    Conjectural Knowledge: Popper's Solution of the Problem of Induction.David Miller - 1982 - In Karl R. Popper & Paul Levinson (eds.), In Pursuit of Truth: Essays on the Philosophy of Karl Popper on the Occasion of His 80th Birthday. Harvester Press. pp. 17--49.
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  18. added 2017-06-29
    The Popper-Carnap Controversy.Alex C. Michalos - 1971 - The Hague: M. Nijhoff.
  19. added 2017-06-29
    Popper on the Rule of Succession.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1964 - Mind 73 (289):129.
  20. added 2016-12-08
    Popper and Synthetic Judgements A Priori.Michael Drieschner - 2005 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 36 (1):49-61.
    Popper uses the "Humean challenge" as a justification for his falsificationism. It is claimed that in his basic argument he confuses two different doubts: (a) the Humean doubt (Popper's problem of induction), and (b) the "Popperean" doubt whether - presupposing that there are laws of nature - the laws we accept are in fact valid. Popper's alleged solution of the problem of induction does not solve the problem in a straightforward way (as Levison and Salmon have remarked before). But if (...)
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  21. added 2016-12-08
    The Newtonian Myth.E. B. Davies - 2003 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 34 (4):763-780.
    I examine Popper’s claims about Newton’s use of induction in Principia with the actual contents of Principia and draw two conclusions. Firstly, in common with most other philosophers of his generation, it appears that Popper had very little acquaintance with the contents and methodological complexities of Principia beyond what was in the famous General Scholium. Secondly Popper’s ideas about induction were less sophisticated than those of Newton, who recognised that it did not provide logical proofs of the results obtained using (...)
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  22. added 2016-09-10
    Popper’s Paradoxical Pursuit of Natural Philosophy.Nicholas Maxwell - 2004 - In Jeremy Shearmur & Geoffrey Stokes (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Popper. Cambridge University Press. pp. 170-207.
    Unlike almost all other philosophers of science, Karl Popper sought to contribute to natural philosophy or cosmology – a synthesis of science and philosophy. I consider his contributions to the philosophy of science and quantum theory in this light. There is, however, a paradox. Popper’s most famous contribution – his principle of demarcation – in driving a wedge between science and metaphysics, serves to undermine the very thing he professes to love: natural philosophy. I argue that Popper’s philosophy of science (...)
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  23. added 2016-05-26
    Rationality of Action and Theory-Testing in Popper.A. O'hear - 1975 - Mind 84 (1):273-276.
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  24. added 2016-01-29
    Karl Popper: Philosophy of Science.Brendan Shea - 2016 - In James Fieser & Bradley Dowden (eds.), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Karl Popper (1902-1994) was one of the most influential philosophers of science of the 20th century. He made significant contributions to debates concerning general scientific methodology and theory choice, the demarcation of science from non-science, the nature of probability and quantum mechanics, and the methodology of the social sciences. His work is notable for its wide influence both within the philosophy of science, within science itself, and within a broader social context. Popper’s early work attempts to solve the problem of (...)
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  25. added 2015-12-22
    Popper's Analysis of the Problems of Induction and Demarcation and Mises' Justification of the Theoretical Social Sciences.Natsuka Tokumaru - 2009 - In Zuzana Parusniková & R. S. Cohen (eds.), Rethinking Popper. Springer. pp. 161--174.
  26. added 2015-12-22
    Methodological Objectivism and Critical Rationalist ’Induction’.Alfred Schramm - 2006 - In Ian Jarvie, Karl Milford & David Miller (eds.), Karl Popper: A Centenary Assessment, Volume Ii. Ashgate.
    This paper constitutes one extended argument, which touches on various topics of Critical Rationalism as it was initiated by Karl Popper and further developed in his aftermath. The result of the argument will be that critical rationalism either offers no solution to the problem of induction at all, or that it amounts, in the last resort, to a kind of Critical Rationalist Inductivism as it were, a version of what I call Good Old Induction. One may think of David Miller (...)
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  27. added 2015-12-22
    Probabilité Et Support Inductif. Sur le Thèoréme de Popper-Miller (1983).Guillaume Rochefort-Maranda - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (3):499-526.
    In 1983, in an open letter to the journal Nature, Karl Popper and David Miller set forth a particularly strong critical argument which sought to demonstrate the impossibility of inductive probability. Since its publication the argument has faced many criticisms and we argue in this article that they do not reach their objectives. We will first reconstruct the demonstration made by Popper and Miller in their initial article and then try to evaluate the main arguments against it. Although it is (...)
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  28. added 2015-12-22
    Popper on Induction.Andrew J. Swann - 1988 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (3):367-373.
    The controversy surrounding Popper's proposed solution to the problem of induction is beginning to display many of the symptoms of being interminable. For decades the discussion has continued, apparently without any progress being made. Again and again, Popperians and their critics have accused each other of ‘missing the point’. The essay attempts to explain what exactly is ‘the point’ of the problem of induction, and asks whether Popper does indeed miss it. An answer is proposed, and on this basis an (...)
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  29. added 2015-12-20
    [1 − P(X, Z)][1 − P(y, Z)]/P(y, Z) If P(y, Z) >.Karl Popper & David Miller - unknown
    The burden of this theorem, stated informally, is that when a hypothesis h is maximally independent of the evidence — that is, it goes wholly beyond the evidence —, then the probability p(h, e) increases when the evidence e is weakened; and hence, the weaker is the evidence, the greater is the probabilistic support.
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  30. added 2015-12-20
    How Popper [Might Have] Solved the Problem of Induction.Alan Musgrave - 2004 - Philosophy 79 (1):19-31.
    Popper famously claimed that he had solved the problem of induction, but few agree. This paper explains what Popper's solution was, and defends it. The problem is posed by Hume's argument that any evidence-transcending belief is unreasonable because (1) induction is invalid and (2) it is only reasonable to believe what you can justify. Popper avoids Hume's shocking conclusion by rejecting (2), while accepting (1). The most common objection is that Popper must smuggle in induction somewhere. But this objection smuggles (...)
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  31. added 2015-12-20
    Partly Deductive Support in the Popper-Miller Argument.Burke Townsend - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (3):490-496.
    Popper and Miller (1983) have presented an argument purporting to establish the impossibility of inductive probability. Here I discuss critically their characterization of a deductive part of nondeductive support, a point that has not figured centrally in previous responses.
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  32. added 2015-12-19
    Karl Popper’s Philosophical Breakthrough.Stefano Gattei - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (4):448-466.
    Despite his well‐known deductivism, in his early (unpublished) writings, Popper held an inductivist position. Up to 1929 epistemology entered Popper's reflections only as far as the problem was that of the justification of the scientific character of these fields of research. However, in that year, while surveying the history of non‐Euclidean geometries, Popper explicitly discussed the cognitive status of geometry without referring to psycho‐pedagogical aspects, thus turning from cognitive psychology to the logic and methodology of science. As a consequence of (...)
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  33. added 2015-12-19
    A Mug's Game? Solving the Problem of Induction with Metaphysical Presuppositions.Nicholas Maxwell - 2004 - In John Earman & John Norton (eds.), PhilSci Archive.
    A Mug's Game? Solving the Problem of Induction with Metaphysical Presuppositions Nicholas Maxwell Emeritus Reader in Philosophy of Science at University College London Email: nicholas.maxwell@ucl.ac.uk Website: www.ucl.ac.uk/from-knowledge-to-wisdom . Abstract This paper argues that a view of science, expounded and defended elsewhere, solves the problem of induction. The view holds that we need to see science as accepting a hierarchy of metaphysical theses concerning the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe, these theses asserting less and less as we go up the (...)
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  34. added 2015-12-19
    Between Autobiography and Reality: Popper's Inductive Years.M. Hark - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (1):75-100.
    On the basis of his unpublished thesis 'Gewohnheit und Gesetzerlebnis in der Erziehung' (1926-7) a historical reconstruction is given of the genesis of Popper's ideas on induction and demarcation which differs radically from his own account in Unended quest. It is shown not only that he wholeheartedly endorses inductive epistemology and psychology but also that his 'demarcation' criterion is inductivistic. Moreover it is shown that his later demarcation thesis arises not from his worries about, on the one hand, Marxism and (...)
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  35. added 2015-12-19
    A Criticism of Popper's Argument Against Induction and Justificationism in Science.Salim Murad - unknown
    An overall depreciation of scientific thought is the converging point of almost all the trends in post-positivist and post-modern philosophy. However, the lowering of scientific methodology and scientific modes of thinking in general, along with the scientific ideals of objective truth, progress and development, is no hidden issue in the post-modern philosophy: it thrives on such criticism and openly declares its discontentment with scientific modes of thinking and criteria of reasoning. But the strategy adopted by at least some of the (...)
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  36. added 2015-12-19
    Inductive Skepticism and the Probability Calculus I: Popper and Earman on the Probability of Laws.Ken Gemes - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64:113-130.
  37. added 2015-12-19
    Inductive Skepticism and the Probability Calculus I: Popper and Jeffreys on Induction and the Probability of Law-Like Universal Generalizations.Ken Gemes - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (1):113-130.
  38. added 2015-12-19
    Inductive Countersupport.Georg J. W. Dorn - 1995 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 26 (1):187 - 189.
    The basic idea by means of which Popper and Miller proved the non-existence of inductive probabilistic support in 1983/1985/1987, is used to prove that inductive probabilistic countersupport does exist. So it seems that after falsification has won over verification on the deductive side of science, countersupport wins over support on the inductive side.
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  39. added 2015-12-19
    Popper Criticism of Inductionism.F. Mihina - 1995 - Filozofia 50 (7):343-352.
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  40. added 2015-12-19
    Popper on Induction.Alan Musgrave - 1993 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 23 (4):516-527.
  41. added 2015-12-19
    A Suspicious Feature of the Popper/Miller Argument.I. J. Good - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (3):535-536.
    The form of argument used by Popper and Miller to attack the concept of probabilistic induction is applied to the slightly different situation in which some evidence undermines a hypothesis. The result is seemingly absurd, thus bringing the form of argument under suspicion.
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  42. added 2015-12-19
    When Probabilistic Support is Inductive.Alberto Mura - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (2):278-289.
    This note makes a contribution to the issue raised in a paper by Popper and Miller (1983) in which it was claimed that probabilistic support is purely deductive. Developing R. C. Jeffrey's remarks, a new general approach to the crucial concept of "going beyond" is here proposed. By means of it a quantitative measure of the inductive component of a probabilistic inference is reached. This proposal leads to vindicating the view that typical predictive probabilistic inferences by enumeration and analogy are (...)
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  43. added 2015-12-19
    Some Further Reflections on the Popper-Miller 'Disproof' of Probabilistic Induction.Colin Howson - 1990 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (2):221 – 228.
  44. added 2015-12-19
    On a Recent Objection to Popper and Miller's "Disproof" of Probabilistic Induction.Colin Howson - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (4):675-680.
    Dunn and Hellman's objection to Popper and Miller's alleged disproof of inductive probability is considered and rejected. Dunn and Hellman base their objection on a decomposition of the incremental support P(h/e)-P(h) of h by e dual to that of Popper and Miller, and argue, dually to Popper and Miller, to a conclusion contrary to the latters' that all support is deductive in character. I contend that Dunn and Hellman's dualizing argument fails because the elements of their decomposition are not supports (...)
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  45. added 2015-12-19
    Dualling: A Critique of an Argument of Popper and Miller.J. Michael Dunn & Geoffrey Hellman - 1986 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (2):220-223.
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  46. added 2015-12-19
    Popper, Induction and Falsification.Gary Jones & Clifton Perry - 1982 - Erkenntnis 18 (1):97 - 104.
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  47. added 2015-12-19
    Induction, Simplicity and Scientific Progress.Nicholas Maxwell - 1979 - Scientia 114 (14):629-653.
    In a recent work, Popper claims to have solved the problem of induction. In this paper I argue that Popper fails both to solve the problem, and to formulate the problem properly. I argue, however, that there are aspects of Popper's approach which, when strengthened and developed, do provide a solution to at least an important part of the problem of induction, along somewhat Popperian lines. This proposed solution requires, and leads to, a new theory of the role of simplicity (...)
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  48. added 2015-12-19
    Is Falsifiability the Touchstone of Scientific Rationality? Karl Popper Versus Inductivism.Adolf Griinbaum - 1976 - In R. S. Cohen, P. K. Feyerabend & M. Wartofsky (eds.), Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos. Reidel.
  49. added 2015-12-19
    Probability and Falsification: Critique of the Popper Program.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1975 - Synthese 30 (1-2):95 - 117.
  50. added 2015-12-19
    Popper and the Non-Bayesian Tradition: Comments on Richard Jeffrey.Ronald N. Giere - 1975 - Synthese 30 (1-2):119 - 132.
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