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  1. The Problem of Induction and Karl Popper's Hypothetico-Deductive Methodology: A Critical Evaluation.Oseni Taiwo Afisi - unknown
    The focus of this paper is to examine the problem of induction as a methodology for science. It also evaluates Karl Popper’s deductive approach as the suitable methodology for scientific research. Popper calls his theory ‘hypothetico-deductive methodology’. However, this paper argues the thesis that Popper’s theory of hypothetico-deductive methodology, which he claims is the only appropriate methodology of science is fraught with some theoretical difficulties, which makes it unacceptable. Popper’s logical asymmetry between verification and falsification, we argue, is philosophically untenable. (...)
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  2. Corroboration Versus Induction.Joseph Agassi - 1958 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 9 (36):311-317.
  3. Watkins and the Pragmatic Problem of Induction.Greg Bamford - 1989 - Analysis 49 (4):203-205.
    Watkins proposes a neo-Popperian solution to the pragmatic problem of induction. He asserts that evidence can be used non-inductively to prefer the principle that corroboration is more successful over all human history than that, say, counter-corroboration is more successful either over this same period or in the future. Watkins's argument for rejecting the first counter-corroborationist alternative is beside the point. However, as whatever is the best strategy over all human history is irrelevant to the pragmatic problem of induction since we (...)
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  4. Some Proposals for the Solution of the Carnap-Popper Discussion on 'Inductive Logic'.Diderik Batens - 1968 - Philosophica 6.
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  5. Content and Degreb of Confirmation: Remarks on Popper's Note on Content and Degree of Confirmation.Rudolf Carmap - 1956 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 7 (27):243-244.
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  6. Reply to KR Popper.R. Carnap - 1968 - In Imre Lakatos (ed.), The Problem of Inductive Logic. Amsterdam: North Holland Pub. Co.. pp. 309--11.
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  7. KR Popper on Probability and Induction.Rudolf Carnap - 1963 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. La Salle, Ill., Open Court. pp. 995--998.
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  8. Remarks on Popper's Note on Content and Degree of Confirmation.Rudolf Carnap - 1956 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 7 (27):243-244.
  9. A Refutation of Pure Conjecture.Timothy Cleveland - 1997 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 28 (1):55-81.
    The present paper explores three interrelated topics in Popper's theory of science: (1) his view of conjecture, (2) the aim of science, and (3) his (never fully articulated) theory of meaning. Central to Popper's theory of science is the notion of conjecture. Popper writes as if scientists faced with a problem proceed to tackle it by conjecture, that is, by guesses uninformed by inferential considerations. This paper develops a contrast between guesses and educated guesses in an attempt to show that (...)
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  10. Deduction, Induction and Probabilistic Support.James Cussens - 1996 - Synthese 108 (1):1 - 10.
    Elementary results concerning the connections between deductive relations and probabilistic support are given. These are used to show that Popper-Miller's result is a special case of a more general result, and that their result is not very unexpected as claimed. According to Popper-Miller, a purely inductively supports b only if they are deductively independent — but this means that a b. Hence, it is argued that viewing induction as occurring only in the absence of deductive relations, as Popper-Miller sometimes do, (...)
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  11. The Newtonian Myth.E. B. Davies - 2003 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 34 (4):763-780.
    I examine Popper’s claims about Newton’s use of induction in Principia with the actual contents of Principia and draw two conclusions. Firstly, in common with most other philosophers of his generation, it appears that Popper had very little acquaintance with the contents and methodological complexities of Principia beyond what was in the famous General Scholium. Secondly Popper’s ideas about induction were less sophisticated than those of Newton, who recognised that it did not provide logical proofs of the results obtained using (...)
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  12. On Popper's Strong Inductivism (or Strongly Inconsistent Anti-Inductivism).José A. Díez - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (1):105-116.
    It is generally accepted that Popper‘s degree of corroboration, though “inductivist” in a very general and weak sense, is not inductivist in a strong sense, i.e. when by ‘inductivism’ we mean the thesis that the right measure of evidential support has a probabilistic character. The aim of this paper is to challenge this common view by arguing that Popper can be regarded as an inductivist, not only in the weak broad sense but also in a narrower, probabilistic sense. In section (...)
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  13. Inductive Countersupport.Georg J. W. Dorn - 1995 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 26 (1):187 - 189.
    The basic idea by means of which Popper and Miller proved the non-existence of inductive probabilistic support in 1983/1985/1987, is used to prove that inductive probabilistic countersupport does exist. So it seems that after falsification has won over verification on the deductive side of science, countersupport wins over support on the inductive side.
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  14. Inductive Support.Georg J. W. Dorn - 1991 - In Gerhard Schurz & Georg J. W. Dorn (eds.), Advances in Scientific Philosophy. Essays in Honour of Paul Weingartner on the Occasion of the 60th Anniversary of his Birthday. Rodopi. pp. 345.
    I set up two axiomatic theories of inductive support within the framework of Kolmogorovian probability theory. I call these theories ‘Popperian theories of inductive support’ because I think that their specific axioms express the core meaning of the word ‘inductive support’ as used by Popper (and, presumably, by many others, including some inductivists). As is to be expected from Popperian theories of inductive support, the main theorem of each of them is an anti-induction theorem, the stronger one of them saying, (...)
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  15. Popper and Synthetic Judgements A Priori.Michael Drieschner - 2005 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 36 (1):49-61.
    Popper uses the "Humean challenge" as a justification for his falsificationism. It is claimed that in his basic argument he confuses two different doubts: (a) the Humean doubt (Popper's problem of induction), and (b) the "Popperean" doubt whether - presupposing that there are laws of nature - the laws we accept are in fact valid. Popper's alleged solution of the problem of induction does not solve the problem in a straightforward way (as Levison and Salmon have remarked before). But if (...)
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  16. Dualling: A Critique of an Argument of Popper and Miller.J. Michael Dunn & Geoffrey Hellman - 1986 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (2):220-223.
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  17. On the Alleged Impossibility of Inductive Probability.Ellery Eells - 1988 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (1):111-116.
    Popper and Miller argued, in a 1983 paper, that there is no such thing as 'probabilistic inductive support' of hypotheses. They show how to divide a hypothesis into two "parts," where evidence only 'probabilistically supports' the "part" that the evidence 'deductively' implies, and 'probabilistically countersupports' the "rest" of the hypothesis. I argue that by distinguishing between 'support that is purely deductive in nature' and 'support of a deductively implied hypothesis', we can see that their argument fails to establish (in any (...)
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  18. Contentious Contents: For Inductive Probability.Andrew Elby - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (1):193-200.
    According to Popper and Miller [1983 and 1987], the part of a hypothesis that transcends the evidence is probablistically countersupported by the evidence. Therefore, inductive support is not probabilistic support. Their argument hinges on imposing the following necessary condition on ‘the part of a hypothesis h that goes beyond the evidence e’: that transcendent part, called k, must share no nontrivial consequences with e. I propose a new condition on k that is incompatible with Popper and Miller's condition. I then (...)
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  19. More on Popper and Biology: The Utility of Induction.John R. S. Fincham - 2000 - Bioessays 22 (7):684-684.
  20. On Inductive Support and Some Recent Tricks.Haim Gaifman - 1985 - Erkenntnis 22 (1-3):5 - 21.
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  21. Karl Popper’s Philosophical Breakthrough.Stefano Gattei - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (4):448-466.
    Despite his well‐known deductivism, in his early (unpublished) writings, Popper held an inductivist position. Up to 1929 epistemology entered Popper's reflections only as far as the problem was that of the justification of the scientific character of these fields of research. However, in that year, while surveying the history of non‐Euclidean geometries, Popper explicitly discussed the cognitive status of geometry without referring to psycho‐pedagogical aspects, thus turning from cognitive psychology to the logic and methodology of science. As a consequence of (...)
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  22. Inductive Skepticism and the Probability Calculus I: Popper and Jeffreys on Induction and the Probability of Law-Like Universal Generalizations.Ken Gemes - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (1):113-130.
  23. Inductive Skepticism and the Probability Calculus I: Popper and Earman on the Probability of Laws.Ken Gemes - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64:113-130.
  24. Popper and the Non-Bayesian Tradition: Comments on Richard Jeffrey.Ronald N. Giere - 1975 - Synthese 30 (1-2):119 - 132.
  25. In Defense of the Popper-Miller Argument.Donald Gillies - 1986 - Philosophy of Science 53 (1):110-113.
    In their 1983 article, Popper and Miller present an argument against inductive probability. This argument is criticized by Redhead in his 1985 article. The aim of the present note is to state one form of the Popper-Miller argument, and defend it against Redhead's criticisms.
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  26. Popper and Computer Induction.Donald A. Gillies - 2001 - Bioessays 23 (9):859-860.
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  27. A Suspicious Feature of the Popper/Miller Argument.I. J. Good - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (3):535-536.
    The form of argument used by Popper and Miller to attack the concept of probabilistic induction is applied to the slightly different situation in which some evidence undermines a hypothesis. The result is seemingly absurd, thus bringing the form of argument under suspicion.
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  28. Karl Popper and the 'the Problem of Induction': A Fresh Look at the Logic of Testing Scientific Theories. [REVIEW]I. Grattan-Guinness - 2004 - Erkenntnis 60 (1):107-120.
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  29. Is Falsifiability the Touchstone of Scientific Rationality? Karl Popper Versus Inductivism.Adolf Griinbaum - 1976 - In R. S. Cohen, P. K. Feyerabend & M. Wartofsky (eds.), Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos. Reidel.
  30. Between Autobiography and Reality: Popper's Inductive Years.M. Hark - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (1):75-100.
    On the basis of his unpublished thesis 'Gewohnheit und Gesetzerlebnis in der Erziehung' (1926-7) a historical reconstruction is given of the genesis of Popper's ideas on induction and demarcation which differs radically from his own account in Unended quest. It is shown not only that he wholeheartedly endorses inductive epistemology and psychology but also that his 'demarcation' criterion is inductivistic. Moreover it is shown that his later demarcation thesis arises not from his worries about, on the one hand, Marxism and (...)
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  31. Discussions: New Argument for Induction: Reply to Professor Popper.Roy Harrod - 1960 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (40):309-312.
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  32. A Critique of Karl Popper's Solution to the Problem of Induction.Ruth Bradfute Heizer - 1971 - Dissertation, Indiana University
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  33. Some Further Reflections on the Popper-Miller 'Disproof' of Probabilistic Induction.Colin Howson - 1990 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (2):221 – 228.
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  34. On a Recent Objection to Popper and Miller's "Disproof" of Probabilistic Induction.Colin Howson - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (4):675-680.
    Dunn and Hellman's objection to Popper and Miller's alleged disproof of inductive probability is considered and rejected. Dunn and Hellman base their objection on a decomposition of the incremental support P(h/e)-P(h) of h by e dual to that of Popper and Miller, and argue, dually to Popper and Miller, to a conclusion contrary to the latters' that all support is deductive in character. I contend that Dunn and Hellman's dualizing argument fails because the elements of their decomposition are not supports (...)
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  35. Popper, Prior Probabilities, and Inductive Inference.Colin Howson - 1987 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (2):207-224.
  36. Popper's Solution to the Problem of Induction.Colin Howson - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (135):143-147.
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  37. Probability and Falsification: Critique of the Popper Program.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1975 - Synthese 30 (1-2):95 - 117.
  38. Popper on the Rule of Succession.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1964 - Mind 73 (289):129.
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  39. Popper, Induction and Falsification.Gary Jones & Clifton Perry - 1982 - Erkenntnis 18 (1):97 - 104.
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  40. Confirmation and Corroboration.G. B. Keene - 1961 - Mind 70 (277):85-87.
  41. Inductive Probability and the Paradox of Ideal Confirmation.T. A. F. Kuipers - 1971 - Philosophica 17 (1):197-205.
  42. A Brand New Type of Inductive Logic: Reply to Diderik Batens.Theo A. F. Kuipers - 2005 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1):248-252.
    In section I the notions of logical and inductive probability will be discussed as well as two explicanda, viz. degree of confirmation, the base for inductive probability, and degree of evidential support, Popper's favourite explicandum. In section II it will be argued that Popper's paradox of ideal evidence is no paradox at all; however, it will also be shown that Popper's way out has its own merits.
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  43. Some Estimates of the Optimum Inductive Method.Theo A. F. Kuipers - 1986 - Erkenntnis 24 (1):37 - 46.
    In section I the notions of logical and inductive probability will be discussed as well as two explicanda, viz. degree of confirmation, the base for inductive probability, and degree of evidential support, Popper's favourite explicandum. In section II it will be argued that Popper's paradox of ideal evidence is no paradox at all; however, it will also be shown that Popper's way out has its own merits.
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  44. Two Types of Inductive Analogy by Similarity.Theo A. F. Kuipers - 1984 - Erkenntnis 21 (1):63 - 87.
    In section I the notions of logical and inductive probability will be discussed as well as two explicanda, viz. degree of confirmation, the base for inductive probability, and degree of evidential support, Popper's favourite explicandum. In section II it will be argued that Popper's paradox of ideal evidence is no paradox at all; however, it will also be shown that Popper's way out has its own merits.
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  45. Non-Inductive Explication of Two Inductive Intuitions.Theo A. F. Kuipers - 1983 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34 (3):209-223.
    In section I the notions of logical and inductive probability will be discussed as well as two explicanda, viz. degree of confirmation, the base for inductive probability, and degree of evidential support, Popper's favourite explicandum. In section II it will be argued that Popper's paradox of ideal evidence is no paradox at all; however, it will also be shown that Popper's way out has its own merits.
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  46. A Generalization of Carnap's Inductive Logic.Theo A. F. Kuipers - 1973 - Synthese 25 (3-4):334 - 336.
    In section I the notions of logical and inductive probability will be discussed as well as two explicanda, viz. degree of confirmation, the base for inductive probability, and degree of evidential support, Popper's favourite explicandum. In section II it will be argued that Popper's paradox of ideal evidence is no paradox at all; however, it will also be shown that Popper's way out has its own merits.
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  47. Introductive Probability and the Paradox of Ideal Evidence.Theo A. F. Kuypers - 1976 - Philosophica 17.
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  48. Review: Rudolf Carnap, Inductive Logic and Inductive Intuition; M. Bunge, J. W. N. Watkins, Y. Bar-Hillel, K. R. Popper, J. Hintikka, R. Carnap, Discussion. [REVIEW]Henry E. Kyburg - 1975 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 40 (3):449-450.
  49. Popper on Induction and Independence.Bruce Langtry - 1977 - Philosophy of Science 44 (2):326-331.
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  50. Neopositivists' Crusade Against Karl Popper.Maurilio Lovatti - 1996 - Per la Filosofia (36):99-109.
    Neopositivistic philosophers held that Popper's destructive criticism to inductive methods is wrong. The legend according to which Popper's criticism, in the final analysis, is inconsistent is greatly widespread also amongst neopositivistic Italian scholars. I argue that they are wrong, and that, in general, Popper's view about induction is true. According to Popper all scientific concepts are theoretical, for every assertion not only entails hypotheses but it is also hypothetical, that is not sure and always falsifiable. I argue that the validity (...)
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