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  1. The Problem of the Empirical Basis in the Popperian Tradition: Popper, Bartley, and Feyerabend.Jamie Shaw - 2020 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 10 (2):524-561.
  2. Karl Popper: Philosophy of Science.Brendan Shea - 2016 - In James Fieser & Bradley Dowden (eds.), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Karl Popper (1902-1994) was one of the most influential philosophers of science of the 20th century. He made significant contributions to debates concerning general scientific methodology and theory choice, the demarcation of science from non-science, the nature of probability and quantum mechanics, and the methodology of the social sciences. His work is notable for its wide influence both within the philosophy of science, within science itself, and within a broader social context. Popper’s early work attempts to solve the problem of (...)
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  3. Popper e o problema da predição prática.Eros Moreira De Carvalho - 2011 - Analytica (Rio) 15 (2):123-146.
    The problem of rational prediction, launched by Wesley Salmon, is without doubt the Achilles heel of the critical method defended by Popper. In this paper, I assess the response given both by Popper and by the popperian Alan Musgrave to this problem. Both responses are inadequate and thus the conclusion of Salmon is reinforced: without appeal to induction, there is no way to make of the practical prediction a rational action. Furthermore, the critical method needs to be vindicated if one (...)
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  4. On Popper’s Strong Inductivism.José A. Díez - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (1):105-116.
    It is generally accepted that Popper‘s degree of corroboration, though “inductivist” in a very general and weak sense, is not inductivist in a strong sense, i.e. when by ‘inductivism’ we mean the thesis that the right measure of evidential support has a probabilistic character. The aim of this paper is to challenge this common view by arguing that Popper can be regarded as an inductivist, not only in the weak broad sense but also in a narrower, probabilistic sense. In section (...)
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  5. Łukasiewicz and Popper on Induction.Jan Woleński & Joseph Agassi - 2010 - History and Philosophy of Logic 31 (4):381-388.
    We compare Jan ?ukasiewicz's and Karl Popper's views on induction. The English translation of the two ?ukasiewicz's papers is included in the Appendix.
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  6. Popper's Analysis of the Problems of Induction and Demarcation and Mises' Justification of the Theoretical Social Sciences.Natsuka Tokumaru - 2009 - In Zuzana Parusniková & R. S. Cohen (eds.), Rethinking Popper. Springer. pp. 161--174.
  7. Critical Rationalism.Alan Musgrave - 2007 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 93 (1):171.
  8. Methodological Objectivism and Critical Rationalist ’Induction’.Alfred Schramm - 2006 - In Ian Jarvie, Karl Milford & David Miller (eds.), Karl Popper: A Centenary Assessment, Volume Ii. Ashgate.
    This paper constitutes one extended argument, which touches on various topics of Critical Rationalism as it was initiated by Karl Popper and further developed in his aftermath. The result of the argument will be that critical rationalism either offers no solution to the problem of induction at all, or that it amounts, in the last resort, to a kind of Critical Rationalist Inductivism as it were, a version of what I call Good Old Induction. One may think of David Miller (...)
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  9. Popper and Synthetic Judgements A Priori.Michael Drieschner - 2005 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 36 (1):49-61.
    Popper uses the "Humean challenge" as a justification for his falsificationism. It is claimed that in his basic argument he confuses two different doubts: (a) the Humean doubt (Popper's problem of induction), and (b) the "Popperean" doubt whether - presupposing that there are laws of nature - the laws we accept are in fact valid. Popper's alleged solution of the problem of induction does not solve the problem in a straightforward way (as Levison and Salmon have remarked before). But if (...)
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  10. A Brand New Type of Inductive Logic: Reply to Diderik Batens.Theo A. F. Kuipers - 2005 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1):248-252.
    In section I the notions of logical and inductive probability will be discussed as well as two explicanda, viz. degree of confirmation, the base for inductive probability, and degree of evidential support, Popper's favourite explicandum. In section II it will be argued that Popper's paradox of ideal evidence is no paradox at all; however, it will also be shown that Popper's way out has its own merits.
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  11. Karl Popper’s Philosophical Breakthrough.Stefano Gattei - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (4):448-466.
    Despite his well‐known deductivism, in his early (unpublished) writings, Popper held an inductivist position. Up to 1929 epistemology entered Popper's reflections only as far as the problem was that of the justification of the scientific character of these fields of research. However, in that year, while surveying the history of non‐Euclidean geometries, Popper explicitly discussed the cognitive status of geometry without referring to psycho‐pedagogical aspects, thus turning from cognitive psychology to the logic and methodology of science. As a consequence of (...)
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  12. Karl Popper and the 'the Problem of Induction': A Fresh Look at the Logic of Testing Scientific Theories. [REVIEW]I. Grattan-Guinness - 2004 - Erkenntnis 60 (1):107-120.
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  13. A Mug's Game? Solving the Problem of Induction with Metaphysical Presuppositions.Nicholas Maxwell - 2004 - In John Earman & John Norton (eds.), PhilSci Archive.
    A Mug's Game? Solving the Problem of Induction with Metaphysical Presuppositions Nicholas Maxwell Emeritus Reader in Philosophy of Science at University College London Email: nicholas.maxwell@ucl.ac.uk Website: www.ucl.ac.uk/from-knowledge-to-wisdom . Abstract This paper argues that a view of science, expounded and defended elsewhere, solves the problem of induction. The view holds that we need to see science as accepting a hierarchy of metaphysical theses concerning the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe, these theses asserting less and less as we go up the (...)
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  14. Popper’s Paradoxical Pursuit of Natural Philosophy.Nicholas Maxwell - 2004 - In Jeremy Shearmur & Geoffrey Stokes (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Popper. Cambridge University Press. pp. 170-207.
    Unlike almost all other philosophers of science, Karl Popper sought to contribute to natural philosophy or cosmology – a synthesis of science and philosophy. I consider his contributions to the philosophy of science and quantum theory in this light. There is, however, a paradox. Popper’s most famous contribution – his principle of demarcation – in driving a wedge between science and metaphysics, serves to undermine the very thing he professes to love: natural philosophy. I argue that Popper’s philosophy of science (...)
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  15. How Popper [Might Have] Solved the Problem of Induction.Alan Musgrave - 2004 - Philosophy 79 (1):19-31.
    Popper famously claimed that he had solved the problem of induction, but few agree. This paper explains what Popper's solution was, and defends it. The problem is posed by Hume's argument that any evidence-transcending belief is unreasonable because (1) induction is invalid and (2) it is only reasonable to believe what you can justify. Popper avoids Hume's shocking conclusion by rejecting (2), while accepting (1). The most common objection is that Popper must smuggle in induction somewhere. But this objection smuggles (...)
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  16. Probabilité Et Support Inductif. Sur le Thèoréme de Popper-Miller (1983).Guillaume Rochefort-Maranda - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (3):499-526.
    In 1983, in an open letter to the journal Nature, Karl Popper and David Miller set forth a particularly strong critical argument which sought to demonstrate the impossibility of inductive probability. Since its publication the argument has faced many criticisms and we argue in this article that they do not reach their objectives. We will first reconstruct the demonstration made by Popper and Miller in their initial article and then try to evaluate the main arguments against it. Although it is (...)
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  17. The Newtonian Myth.E. B. Davies - 2003 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 34 (4):763-780.
    I examine Popper’s claims about Newton’s use of induction in Principia with the actual contents of Principia and draw two conclusions. Firstly, in common with most other philosophers of his generation, it appears that Popper had very little acquaintance with the contents and methodological complexities of Principia beyond what was in the famous General Scholium. Secondly Popper’s ideas about induction were less sophisticated than those of Newton, who recognised that it did not provide logical proofs of the results obtained using (...)
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  18. Between Autobiography and Reality: Popper's Inductive Years.M. Hark - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (1):75-100.
    On the basis of his unpublished thesis 'Gewohnheit und Gesetzerlebnis in der Erziehung' (1926-7) a historical reconstruction is given of the genesis of Popper's ideas on induction and demarcation which differs radically from his own account in Unended quest. It is shown not only that he wholeheartedly endorses inductive epistemology and psychology but also that his 'demarcation' criterion is inductivistic. Moreover it is shown that his later demarcation thesis arises not from his worries about, on the one hand, Marxism and (...)
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  19. Popper and Computer Induction.Donald A. Gillies - 2001 - Bioessays 23 (9):859-860.
  20. More on Popper and Biology: The Utility of Induction.John R. S. Fincham - 2000 - Bioessays 22 (7):684-684.
  21. Anything Goes: Origins of the Cult of Scientific Irrationalism.D. C. Stove - 1998 - Sydney, Australia: Macleay Press.
    A reprint of Popper and After: Four Modern Irrationalists.
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  22. Scientific Irrationalism: Origins of a Postmodern Cult.D. C. Stove - 1998 - New Brunswick, NJ, USA: Transaction Publishers.
    Reprint of Popper and After: Four Modern Irrationalists. In an afterword, James Franklin discusses reactions to Stove's work.
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  23. A Refutation of Pure Conjecture.Timothy Cleveland - 1997 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 28 (1):55-81.
    The present paper explores three interrelated topics in Popper's theory of science: (1) his view of conjecture, (2) the aim of science, and (3) his (never fully articulated) theory of meaning. Central to Popper's theory of science is the notion of conjecture. Popper writes as if scientists faced with a problem proceed to tackle it by conjecture, that is, by guesses uninformed by inferential considerations. This paper develops a contrast between guesses and educated guesses in an attempt to show that (...)
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  24. Inductive Skepticism and the Probability Calculus I: Popper and Jeffreys on Induction and the Probability of Law-Like Universal Generalizations.Ken Gemes - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (1):113-130.
  25. Inductive Skepticism and the Probability Calculus I: Popper and Earman on the Probability of Laws.Ken Gemes - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64:113-130.
  26. Deduction, Induction and Probabilistic Support.James Cussens - 1996 - Synthese 108 (1):1 - 10.
    Elementary results concerning the connections between deductive relations and probabilistic support are given. These are used to show that Popper-Miller's result is a special case of a more general result, and that their result is not very unexpected as claimed. According to Popper-Miller, a purely inductively supports b only if they are deductively independent — but this means that a b. Hence, it is argued that viewing induction as occurring only in the absence of deductive relations, as Popper-Miller sometimes do, (...)
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  27. Neopositivists' Crusade Against Karl Popper.Maurilio Lovatti - 1996 - Per la Filosofia (36):99-109.
    Neopositivistic philosophers held that Popper's destructive criticism to inductive methods is wrong. The legend according to which Popper's criticism, in the final analysis, is inconsistent is greatly widespread also amongst neopositivistic Italian scholars. I argue that they are wrong, and that, in general, Popper's view about induction is true. According to Popper all scientific concepts are theoretical, for every assertion not only entails hypotheses but it is also hypothetical, that is not sure and always falsifiable. I argue that the validity (...)
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  28. Inductive Countersupport.Georg J. W. Dorn - 1995 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 26 (1):187 - 189.
    The basic idea by means of which Popper and Miller proved the non-existence of inductive probabilistic support in 1983/1985/1987, is used to prove that inductive probabilistic countersupport does exist. So it seems that after falsification has won over verification on the deductive side of science, countersupport wins over support on the inductive side.
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  29. Popper Criticism of Inductionism.F. Mihina - 1995 - Filozofia 50 (7):343-352.
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  30. Contentious Contents: For Inductive Probability.Andrew Elby - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (1):193-200.
    According to Popper and Miller [1983 and 1987], the part of a hypothesis that transcends the evidence is probablistically countersupported by the evidence. Therefore, inductive support is not probabilistic support. Their argument hinges on imposing the following necessary condition on ‘the part of a hypothesis h that goes beyond the evidence e’: that transcendent part, called k, must share no nontrivial consequences with e. I propose a new condition on k that is incompatible with Popper and Miller's condition. I then (...)
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  31. Popper on Induction.Alan Musgrave - 1993 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 23 (4):516-527.
  32. Inductive Support.Georg J. W. Dorn - 1991 - In Gerhard Schurz & Georg J. W. Dorn (eds.), Advances in Scientific Philosophy. Essays in Honour of Paul Weingartner on the Occasion of the 60th Anniversary of his Birthday. Rodopi. pp. 345.
    I set up two axiomatic theories of inductive support within the framework of Kolmogorovian probability theory. I call these theories ‘Popperian theories of inductive support’ because I think that their specific axioms express the core meaning of the word ‘inductive support’ as used by Popper (and, presumably, by many others, including some inductivists). As is to be expected from Popperian theories of inductive support, the main theorem of each of them is an anti-induction theorem, the stronger one of them saying, (...)
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  33. A Suspicious Feature of the Popper/Miller Argument.I. J. Good - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (3):535-536.
    The form of argument used by Popper and Miller to attack the concept of probabilistic induction is applied to the slightly different situation in which some evidence undermines a hypothesis. The result is seemingly absurd, thus bringing the form of argument under suspicion.
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  34. Some Further Reflections on the Popper-Miller 'Disproof' of Probabilistic Induction.Colin Howson - 1990 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (2):221 – 228.
  35. When Probabilistic Support is Inductive.Alberto Mura - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (2):278-289.
    This note makes a contribution to the issue raised in a paper by Popper and Miller (1983) in which it was claimed that probabilistic support is purely deductive. Developing R. C. Jeffrey's remarks, a new general approach to the crucial concept of "going beyond" is here proposed. By means of it a quantitative measure of the inductive component of a probabilistic inference is reached. This proposal leads to vindicating the view that typical predictive probabilistic inferences by enumeration and analogy are (...)
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  36. Swann Versus Popper on Induction: An Arbitration.Tom Settle - 1990 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (3):401-405.
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  37. Watkins and the Pragmatic Problem of Induction.Greg Bamford - 1989 - Analysis 49 (4):203-205.
    Watkins proposes a neo-Popperian solution to the pragmatic problem of induction. He asserts that evidence can be used non-inductively to prefer the principle that corroboration is more successful over all human history than that, say, counter-corroboration is more successful either over this same period or in the future. Watkins's argument for rejecting the first counter-corroborationist alternative is beside the point. However, as whatever is the best strategy over all human history is irrelevant to the pragmatic problem of induction since we (...)
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  38. On a Recent Objection to Popper and Miller's "Disproof" of Probabilistic Induction.Colin Howson - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (4):675-680.
    Dunn and Hellman's objection to Popper and Miller's alleged disproof of inductive probability is considered and rejected. Dunn and Hellman base their objection on a decomposition of the incremental support P(h/e)-P(h) of h by e dual to that of Popper and Miller, and argue, dually to Popper and Miller, to a conclusion contrary to the latters' that all support is deductive in character. I contend that Dunn and Hellman's dualizing argument fails because the elements of their decomposition are not supports (...)
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  39. Two Problems of Induction.John O'neill - 1989 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (1):121-125.
    In this paper I distinguish two problems of induction: a problem of the uniformity of nature and a problem of the variety of nature. I argue that the traditional problem of induction that Popper poses—the problem of uniformity—is not that which is relevant to science. The problem relevant to science is that of the variety of nature. *I would like to thank Bob Hale, Russell Keat and the Journal's referee for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
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  40. Partly Deductive Support in the Popper-Miller Argument.Burke Townsend - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (3):490-496.
    Popper and Miller (1983) have presented an argument purporting to establish the impossibility of inductive probability. Here I discuss critically their characterization of a deductive part of nondeductive support, a point that has not figured centrally in previous responses.
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  41. On the Alleged Impossibility of Inductive Probability.Ellery Eells - 1988 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (1):111-116.
    Popper and Miller argued, in a 1983 paper, that there is no such thing as 'probabilistic inductive support' of hypotheses. They show how to divide a hypothesis into two "parts," where evidence only 'probabilistically supports' the "part" that the evidence 'deductively' implies, and 'probabilistically countersupports' the "rest" of the hypothesis. I argue that by distinguishing between 'support that is purely deductive in nature' and 'support of a deductively implied hypothesis', we can see that their argument fails to establish (in any (...)
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  42. Popper on Induction.Andrew J. Swann - 1988 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (3):367-373.
    The controversy surrounding Popper's proposed solution to the problem of induction is beginning to display many of the symptoms of being interminable. For decades the discussion has continued, apparently without any progress being made. Again and again, Popperians and their critics have accused each other of ‘missing the point’. The essay attempts to explain what exactly is ‘the point’ of the problem of induction, and asks whether Popper does indeed miss it. An answer is proposed, and on this basis an (...)
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  43. Popper, Prior Probabilities, and Inductive Inference.Colin Howson - 1987 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (2):207-224.
  44. On Popper-Miller's Proof of the Impossibility of Inductive Probability.Andrés Rivadulla Rodriguez - 1987 - Erkenntnis 27 (3):353 - 357.
  45. On Popper-Miller's Proof of the Impossibility of Inductive Probability.Andr�Srivadulla Rodr�Guez - 1987 - Erkenntnis 27 (3):353-357.
  46. Dualling: A Critique of an Argument of Popper and Miller.J. Michael Dunn & Geoffrey Hellman - 1986 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (2):220-223.
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  47. In Defense of the Popper-Miller Argument.Donald Gillies - 1986 - Philosophy of Science 53 (1):110-113.
    In their 1983 article, Popper and Miller present an argument against inductive probability. This argument is criticized by Redhead in his 1985 article. The aim of the present note is to state one form of the Popper-Miller argument, and defend it against Redhead's criticisms.
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  48. Some Estimates of the Optimum Inductive Method.Theo A. F. Kuipers - 1986 - Erkenntnis 24 (1):37 - 46.
    In section I the notions of logical and inductive probability will be discussed as well as two explicanda, viz. degree of confirmation, the base for inductive probability, and degree of evidential support, Popper's favourite explicandum. In section II it will be argued that Popper's paradox of ideal evidence is no paradox at all; however, it will also be shown that Popper's way out has its own merits.
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  49. On Inductive Support and Some Recent Tricks.Haim Gaifman - 1985 - Erkenntnis 22 (1-3):5 - 21.
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  50. Stumbling-Blocks and Limitations of Popper Criticism of Induction.Z. Parusnikova - 1985 - Filosoficky Casopis 33 (5):721-734.
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