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  1. Popper's Verisimilitude: The Scientific Journey From Ignorance to Truth.Nicholas Anakwue - 2017 - Philosophy Pathways 210:1-11.
    The question of truth is a broadly broached subject in Philosophy as it features along the entire historical and polemical growth of the discipline right from the time of the Ancients down to our Post-Modern era. Yet, the delimiting realization of being unable to register general success in our dogged attempts at truth and knowledge, mostly stares us blankly in the face, for matters on which philosophy endeavours to speculate on, are beyond the reach of definite knowledge.1 Our theories of (...)
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  2. Iterative Probability Kinematics.Horacio Arló-Costa & Richmond Thomason - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (5):479-524.
    Following the pioneer work of Bruno De Finetti [12], conditional probability spaces (allowing for conditioning with events of measure zero) have been studied since (at least) the 1950's. Perhaps the most salient axiomatizations are Karl Popper's in [31], and Alfred Renyi's in [33]. Nonstandard probability spaces [34] are a well know alternative to this approach. Vann McGee proposed in [30] a result relating both approaches by showing that the standard values of infinitesimal probability functions are representable as Popper functions, and (...)
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  3. Information, Learning and Falsification.David Balduzzi - manuscript
    There are (at least) three approaches to quantifying information. The first, algorithmic information or Kolmogorov complexity, takes events as strings and, given a universal Turing machine, quantifies the information content of a string as the length of the shortest program producing it [1]. The second, Shannon information, takes events as belonging to ensembles and quantifies the information resulting from observing the given event in terms of the number of alternate events that have been ruled out [2]. The third, statistical learning (...)
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  4. Content and Degreb of Confirmation: Further Comments on Probability and Confirmation a Rejoinder to Professor Popper.Y. Bar-Hillel - 1956 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 7 (27):245-248.
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  5. Further Comments on Probability and Confirmation: A Rejoinder to Professor Popper.Yehoshua Bar-Hillel - 1956 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 7 (27):245-248.
  6. Comments on 'Degree of Confirmation' by Professor K. R. Popper.Yehoshua Bar-Hillel - 1955 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 6 (22):155-157.
  7. An Interchange on the Popper-Miller Argument.Charles S. Chihara & Donald A. Gillies - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 54 (1):1 - 8.
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  8. Deduction, Induction and Probabilistic Support.James Cussens - 1996 - Synthese 108 (1):1 - 10.
    Elementary results concerning the connections between deductive relations and probabilistic support are given. These are used to show that Popper-Miller's result is a special case of a more general result, and that their result is not very unexpected as claimed. According to Popper-Miller, a purely inductively supports b only if they are deductively independent — but this means that a b. Hence, it is argued that viewing induction as occurring only in the absence of deductive relations, as Popper-Miller sometimes do, (...)
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  9. Deductive, Probabilistic and Inductive Dependence. An Axiomatic Study in Probability Semantics.Georg J. W. Dorn - 1997 - Verlag Peter Lang.
    This work is in two parts. The main aim of part 1 is a systematic examination of deductive, probabilistic, inductive and purely inductive dependence relations within the framework of Kolmogorov probability semantics. The main aim of part 2 is a systematic comparison of (in all) 20 different relations of probabilistic (in)dependence within the framework of Popper probability semantics (for Kolmogorov probability semantics does not allow such a comparison). Added to this comparison is an examination of (in all) 15 purely inductive (...)
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  10. Popper’s Laws of the Excess of the Probability of the Conditional Over the Conditional Probability.Georg J. W. Dorn - 1992/93 - Conceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 26:3–61.
    Karl Popper discovered in 1938 that the unconditional probability of a conditional of the form ‘If A, then B’ normally exceeds the conditional probability of B given A, provided that ‘If A, then B’ is taken to mean the same as ‘Not (A and not B)’. So it was clear (but presumably only to him at that time) that the conditional probability of B given A cannot be reduced to the unconditional probability of the material conditional ‘If A, then B’. (...)
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  11. On the Alleged Impossibility of Inductive Probability.Ellery Eells - 1988 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (1):111-116.
    Popper and Miller argued, in a 1983 paper, that there is no such thing as 'probabilistic inductive support' of hypotheses. They show how to divide a hypothesis into two "parts," where evidence only 'probabilistically supports' the "part" that the evidence 'deductively' implies, and 'probabilistically countersupports' the "rest" of the hypothesis. I argue that by distinguishing between 'support that is purely deductive in nature' and 'support of a deductively implied hypothesis', we can see that their argument fails to establish (in any (...)
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  12. Contentious Contents: For Inductive Probability.Andrew Elby - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (1):193-200.
    According to Popper and Miller [1983 and 1987], the part of a hypothesis that transcends the evidence is probablistically countersupported by the evidence. Therefore, inductive support is not probabilistic support. Their argument hinges on imposing the following necessary condition on ‘the part of a hypothesis h that goes beyond the evidence e’: that transcendent part, called k, must share no nontrivial consequences with e. I propose a new condition on k that is incompatible with Popper and Miller's condition. I then (...)
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  13. Probability.Branden Fitelson, Alan Hajek & Ned Hall - 2006 - In Jessica Pfeifer & Sahotra Sarkar (eds.), The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. Routledge.
    There are two central questions concerning probability. First, what are its formal features? That is a mathematical question, to which there is a standard, widely (though not universally) agreed upon answer. This answer is reviewed in the next section. Second, what sorts of things are probabilities---what, that is, is the subject matter of probability theory? This is a philosophical question, and while the mathematical theory of probability certainly bears on it, the answer must come from elsewhere. To see why, observe (...)
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  14. Inductive Skepticism and the Probability Calculus I: Popper and Jeffreys on Induction and the Probability of Law-Like Universal Generalizations.Ken Gemes - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (1):113-130.
  15. Inductive Skepticism and the Probability Calculus I: Popper and Earman on the Probability of Laws.Ken Gemes - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64:113-130.
  16. Popper and the Non-Bayesian Tradition: Comments on Richard Jeffrey.Ronald N. Giere - 1975 - Synthese 30 (1-2):119 - 132.
  17. Varieties of Propensity.Donald Gillies - 2000 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4):807-835.
    The propensity interpretation of probability was introduced by Popper ([1957]), but has subsequently been developed in different ways by quite a number of philosophers of science. This paper does not attempt a complete survey, but discusses a number of different versions of the theory, thereby giving some idea of the varieties of propensity. Propensity theories are classified into (i) long-run and (ii) single-case. The paper argues for a long-run version of the propensity theory, but this is contrasted with two single-case (...)
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  18. Popper's Contribution to the Philosophy of Probability.Donald Gillies - 1995 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 39:103-120.
    Popper's writings cover a remarkably wide range of subjects. The spectrum runs from Plato's theory of politics to the foundations of quantum mechanics. Yet even amidst this variety the philosophy of probability occupies a prominent place. David Miller once pointed out to me that more than half of Popper's The Logic of Scientific Discovery is taken up with discussions of probability. I checked this claim using the 1972 6th revised impression of The Logic of Scientific Discovery , and found that (...)
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  19. Popper's Propensity Interpretation and Heisenberg's Potentia Interpretation.Ravi V. Gomatam - unknown
    In other words, classically, probabilities add; quantum mechanically, the probability amplitudes add, leading to the presence of the extra product terms in the quantum case. What this means is that in quantum theory, even though always only one of the various outcomes is obtained in any given observation, some aspect of the non -occurring events, represented by the corresponding complex-valued quantum amplitudes, plays a role in determining the overall probabilities. Indeed, the observed quantum interference effects are correctly captured by the (...)
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  20. A Suspicious Feature of the Popper/Miller Argument.I. J. Good - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (3):535-536.
    The form of argument used by Popper and Miller to attack the concept of probabilistic induction is applied to the slightly different situation in which some evidence undermines a hypothesis. The result is seemingly absurd, thus bringing the form of argument under suspicion.
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  21. Quantum Mechanics and Interpretations of Probability Theory.Neal Grossman - 1972 - Philosophy of Science 39 (4):451-460.
    Several philosophers of science have claimed that the conceptual difficulties of quantum mechanics can be resolved by appealing to a particular interpretation of probability theory. For example, Popper bases his treatment of quantum mechanics on the propensity interpretation of probability, and Margenau bases his treatment of quantum mechanics on the frequency interpretation of probability. The purpose of this paper is (i) to consider and reject such claims, and (ii) to discuss the question of whether the ψ -function refers to an (...)
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  22. Rational Belief Change, Popper Functions and Counterfactuals.William L. Harper - 1975 - Synthese 30 (1-2):221 - 262.
    This paper uses Popper's treatment of probability and an epistemic constraint on probability assignments to conditionals to extend the Bayesian representation of rational belief so that revision of previously accepted evidence is allowed for. Results of this extension include an epistemic semantics for Lewis' theory of counterfactual conditionals and a representation for one kind of conceptual change.
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  23. Some Further Reflections on the Popper-Miller 'Disproof' of Probabilistic Induction.Colin Howson - 1990 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (2):221 – 228.
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  24. On a Recent Objection to Popper and Miller's "Disproof" of Probabilistic Induction.Colin Howson - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (4):675-680.
    Dunn and Hellman's objection to Popper and Miller's alleged disproof of inductive probability is considered and rejected. Dunn and Hellman base their objection on a decomposition of the incremental support P(h/e)-P(h) of h by e dual to that of Popper and Miller, and argue, dually to Popper and Miller, to a conclusion contrary to the latters' that all support is deductive in character. I contend that Dunn and Hellman's dualizing argument fails because the elements of their decomposition are not supports (...)
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  25. Popper, Prior Probabilities, and Inductive Inference.Colin Howson - 1987 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (2):207-224.
  26. Book Reviews : Karl R. Popper, A World of Propensities. Thoemmes, Bristol, 1990. Pp. 51. 5.00. [REVIEW]I. C. Jarvie - 1991 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 21 (3):407-409.
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  27. Probability and Falsification: Critique of the Popper Program.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1975 - Synthese 30 (1-2):95 - 117.
  28. Popper on the Rule of Succession.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1964 - Mind 73 (289):129.
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  29. Philosophical Conjectures and Their Refutation.Arnold G. Kluge - 2001 - Systematic Biology 50 (3):322-330.
    Sir Karl Popper is well known for explicating science in falsificationist terms, for which his degree of corroboration formalism, C(h,e,b), has become little more than a symbol. For example, de Queiroz and Poe in this issue argue that C(h,e,b) reduces to a single relative (conditional) probability, p(e,hb), the likelihood of evidence e, given both hypothesis h and background knowledge b, and in reaching that conclusion, without stating or expressing it, they render Popper a verificationist. The contradiction they impose is easily (...)
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  30. The Autonomy of Probability Theory (Notes on Kolmogorov, Rényi, and Popper).Hugues Leblanc - 1989 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (2):167-181.
    Kolmogorov's account in his [1933] of an absolute probability space presupposes given a Boolean algebra, and so does Rényi's account in his [1955] and [1964] of a relative probability space. Anxious to prove probability theory ‘autonomous’. Popper supplied in his [1955] and [1957] accounts of probability spaces of which Boolean algebras are not and [1957] accounts of probability spaces of which fields are not prerequisites but byproducts instead.1 I review the accounts in question, showing how Popper's issue from and how (...)
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  31. Popper's 1955 Axiomatization of Absolute Probability.Hugues Leblanc - 1982 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (2):133.
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  32. Getting the Constraints on Popper's Probability Functions Right.Hugues Leblanc & Peter Roeper - 1993 - Philosophy of Science 60 (1):151-157.
    Shown here is that a constraint used by Popper in The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959) for calculating the absolute probability of a universal quantification, and one introduced by Stalnaker in "Probability and Conditionals" (1970, 70) for calculating the relative probability of a negation, are too weak for the job. The constraint wanted in the first case is in Bendall (1979) and that wanted in the second case is in Popper (1959).
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  33. On Carnap and Popper Probability Functions.Hugues Leblanc & Bas C. van Fraassen - 1979 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 44 (3):369 - 373.
  34. Conjectures and Rational Preferences.Robert J. Levy - 1984 - Philosophy Research Archives 10:173-188.
    I survey the difficulties of several probabilistic views of non-deductive argument and of inductive probability and propose to explicate non-deductive reasoning in terms of rational preference. Following a critical examination of Popper’s allegedly deductive theory of rational preference, I draw upon the work of Popper and Rescher to present my view which includes: (i) the conjecturing of a set of alternative answers to or theories or hypotheses about the questions prompting the inquiry and (ii) the “reduction” of this set via (...)
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  35. Propensities and Indeterminism.D. W. Miller - 1996 - In A. O' Hear (ed.), Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities. Cambridge University Press. pp. 121--47.
    In these prefatory remarks, which are designed to locate my topic within the complex and wide-stretching field of Popper's thought and writings, I shall not say anything that those familiar with his work will not already know. Moreover, what I do say will take as understood many of the problems and theories, not to mention the terminology, that I shall later be doing my best to make understandable. My apologies are therefore due equally to those who know something about Popper's (...)
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  36. Reply to Zwirn & Zwirn.David Miller - manuscript
    I am indebted to Zwirn and Zwirn [1989] for their extended and careful comments on the arguments of Popper & Miller [1983], [1987], and also for friendly and illuminating conversations. Their judgement seems to be that although Popper and I fail to make a satisfactory case for our conclusion that inductive probability is impossible, that conclusion is nonetheless defensible on quite other grounds. I don’t really agree with this, as I shall explain.
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  37. Probabilistic Substitutivity at a Reduced Price.David Miller - 2012 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 15 (2):271-.
    One of the many intriguing features of the axiomatic systems of probability investigated in Popper (1959), appendices _iv, _v, is the different status of the two arguments of the probability functor with regard to the laws of replacement and commutation. The laws for the first argument, (rep1) and (comm1), follow from much simpler axioms, whilst (rep2) and (comm2) are independent of them, and have to be incorporated only when most of the important deductions have been accomplished. It is plain that, (...)
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  38. Single-Case Probabilities.David Miller - 1991 - Foundations of Physics 21 (12):1501-1516.
    The propensity interpretation of probability, bred by Popper in 1957(K. R. Popper, in Observation and Interpretation in the Philosophy of Physics,S. Körner, ed. (Butterworth, London, 1957, and Dover, New York, 1962), p. 65; reprinted in Popper Selections,D. W. Miller, ed. (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1985), p. 199) from pure frequency stock, is the only extant objectivist account that provides any proper understanding of single-case probabilities as well as of probabilities in ensembles and in the long run. In Sec. 1 of (...)
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  39. Propensity: Popper or Peirce?Richard W. Miller - 1975 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 26 (2):123-132.
  40. Spacetime Quantum Probabilities II: Relativized Descriptions and Popperian Propensities. [REVIEW]M. Mugur-Schächter - 1992 - Foundations of Physics 22 (2):235-312.
    In the first part of this work(1) we have explicated the spacetime structure of the probabilistic organization of quantum mechanics. We have shown that each quantum mechanical state, in consequence of the spacetime characteristics of the epistemic operations by which the observer produces the state to be studied and the processes of qualification of these, brings in a tree-like spacetime structure, a “quantum mechanical probability tree,” thattransgresses the theory of probabilities as it now stands. In this second part we develop (...)
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  41. Keynes's Weight of Argument and Popper's Paradox of Ideal Evidence.Rod O'Donnell - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (1):44-52.
    Popper's paradox of ideal evidence has long been viewed as a telling criticism of Keynes's logical theory of probability and its associated concept of the weight of argument. This paper shows that a simple addition to Keynes's definitions of irrelevance enables his theory to elude the paradox with ease. The modified definition draws on ideas already present in Keynes's Treatise on Probability (1973). As a consequence, relevant evidence and the weight of argument may increase, even when new evidence leaves the (...)
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  42. Correction: Creative and Non-Creative Definitions in the Calculus of Probability.K. R. Popper - 1970 - Synthese 21 (1):107 -.
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  43. The Mysteries of Udolpho: A Reply to Professors Jeffrey and Bar-Hillel.K. R. Popper - 1967 - Mind 76 (301):103-110.
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  44. Creative and Non-Creative Definitions in the Calculus of Probability.K. R. Popper - 1963 - Synthese 15 (1):167 - 186.
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  45. On Carnap's Version of Laplace's Rule of Succession.K. R. Popper - 1962 - Mind 71 (281):69-73.
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  46. A Propensity Interpretation of Probability.Karl Popper - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge.
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  47. Suppes's Criticism of the Propensity Interpretation of Probability and Quantum Mechanics.Karl Popper - 1974 - In P. A. Schlipp (ed.), The Philosophy of Karl Popper (Book Ii). Open Court. pp. 1125-1139.
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  48. Two Autonomous Axiom Systems for the Calculus of Probabilities.Karl R. Popper - 1955 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 6 (21):51-57.
  49. A Set of Independent Axioms for Probability.Karl R. Popper - 1938 - Mind 47 (186):275-277.
  50. Probabilité Et Support Inductif. Sur le Thèoréme de Popper-Miller (1983).Guillaume Rochefort-Maranda - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (3):499-526.
    In 1983, in an open letter to the journal Nature, Karl Popper and David Miller set forth a particularly strong critical argument which sought to demonstrate the impossibility of inductive probability. Since its publication the argument has faced many criticisms and we argue in this article that they do not reach their objectives. We will first reconstruct the demonstration made by Popper and Miller in their initial article and then try to evaluate the main arguments against it. Although it is (...)
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