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  1. Information, Learning and Falsification.David Balduzzi - 2011
    There are (at least) three approaches to quantifying information. The first, algorithmic information or Kolmogorov complexity, takes events as strings and, given a universal Turing machine, quantifies the information content of a string as the length of the shortest program producing it [1]. The second, Shannon information, takes events as belonging to ensembles and quantifies the information resulting from observing the given event in terms of the number of alternate events that have been ruled out [2]. The third, statistical learning (...)
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  2. Popper's Verisimilitude: The Scientific Journey From Ignorance to Truth.Nicholas Anakwue - 2017 - Philosophy Pathways 210 (1):1-11.
    The question of truth is a broadly broached subject in Philosophy as it features along the entire historical and polemical growth of the discipline right from the time of the Ancients down to our Post-Modern era. Yet, the delimiting realization of being unable to register general success in our dogged attempts at truth and knowledge, mostly stares us blankly in the face, for matters on which philosophy endeavours to speculate on, are beyond the reach of definite knowledge.1 Our theories of (...)
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  3. ‘The Innocent V The Fickle Few’: How Jurors Understand Random-Match-Probabilities and Judges’ Directions When Reasoning About DNA and Refuting Evidence.Michelle B. Cowley-Cunningham - 2017 - Journal of Forensic Science and Criminal Investigation 3 (5):April/May 2017.
    DNA evidence is one of the most significant modern advances in the search for truth since the cross examination, but its format as a random-match-probability makes it difficult for people to assign an appropriate probative value (Koehler, 2001). While Frequentist theories propose that the presentation of the match as a frequency rather than a probability facilitates more accurate assessment (e.g., Slovic et al., 2000), Exemplar-Cueing Theory predicts that the subjective weight assigned may be affected by the frequency or probability format, (...)
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  4. Karl Popper: Philosophy of Science.Brendan Shea - 2016 - In James Fieser & Bradley Dowden (eds.), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Karl Popper (1902-1994) was one of the most influential philosophers of science of the 20th century. He made significant contributions to debates concerning general scientific methodology and theory choice, the demarcation of science from non-science, the nature of probability and quantum mechanics, and the methodology of the social sciences. His work is notable for its wide influence both within the philosophy of science, within science itself, and within a broader social context. Popper’s early work attempts to solve the problem of (...)
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  5. Probabilistic Substitutivity at a Reduced Price.David Miller - 2011 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 15 (2):271-.
    One of the many intriguing features of the axiomatic systems of probability investigated in Popper (1959), appendices _iv, _v, is the different status of the two arguments of the probability functor with regard to the laws of replacement and commutation. The laws for the first argument, (rep1) and (comm1), follow from much simpler axioms, whilst (rep2) and (comm2) are independent of them, and have to be incorporated only when most of the important deductions have been accomplished. It is plain that, (...)
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  6. Intersubjective Corroboration.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (1):124-132.
    How are we to understand the use of probability in corroboration functions? Popper says logically, but does not show we could have access to, or even calculate, probability values in a logical sense. This makes the logical interpretation untenable, as Ramsey and van Fraassen have argued. -/- If corroboration functions only make sense when the probabilities employed therein are subjective, however, then what counts as impressive evidence for a theory might be a matter of convention, or even whim. So isn’t (...)
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  7. Probability.Branden Fitelson, Alan Hajek & Ned Hall - 2006 - In Jessica Pfeifer & Sahotra Sarkar (eds.), The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. Routledge.
    There are two central questions concerning probability. First, what are its formal features? That is a mathematical question, to which there is a standard, widely (though not universally) agreed upon answer. This answer is reviewed in the next section. Second, what sorts of things are probabilities---what, that is, is the subject matter of probability theory? This is a philosophical question, and while the mathematical theory of probability certainly bears on it, the answer must come from elsewhere. To see why, observe (...)
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  8. Probabilité Et Support Inductif. Sur le Thèoréme de Popper-Miller (1983).Guillaume Rochefort-Maranda - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (3):499-526.
    In 1983, in an open letter to the journal Nature, Karl Popper and David Miller set forth a particularly strong critical argument which sought to demonstrate the impossibility of inductive probability. Since its publication the argument has faced many criticisms and we argue in this article that they do not reach their objectives. We will first reconstruct the demonstration made by Popper and Miller in their initial article and then try to evaluate the main arguments against it. Although it is (...)
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  9. Iterative Probability Kinematics.Horacio Arló-Costa & Richmond Thomason - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (5):479-524.
    Following the pioneer work of Bruno De Finetti [12], conditional probability spaces (allowing for conditioning with events of measure zero) have been studied since (at least) the 1950's. Perhaps the most salient axiomatizations are Karl Popper's in [31], and Alfred Renyi's in [33]. Nonstandard probability spaces [34] are a well know alternative to this approach. Vann McGee proposed in [30] a result relating both approaches by showing that the standard values of infinitesimal probability functions are representable as Popper functions, and (...)
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  10. Philosophical Conjectures and Their Refutation.Arnold G. Kluge - 2001 - Systematic Biology 50 (3):322-330.
    Sir Karl Popper is well known for explicating science in falsificationist terms, for which his degree of corroboration formalism, C(h,e,b), has become little more than a symbol. For example, de Queiroz and Poe in this issue argue that C(h,e,b) reduces to a single relative (conditional) probability, p(e,hb), the likelihood of evidence e, given both hypothesis h and background knowledge b, and in reaching that conclusion, without stating or expressing it, they render Popper a verificationist. The contradiction they impose is easily (...)
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  11. Varieties of Propensity.Donald Gillies - 2000 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4):807-835.
    The propensity interpretation of probability was introduced by Popper ([1957]), but has subsequently been developed in different ways by quite a number of philosophers of science. This paper does not attempt a complete survey, but discusses a number of different versions of the theory, thereby giving some idea of the varieties of propensity. Propensity theories are classified into (i) long-run and (ii) single-case. The paper argues for a long-run version of the propensity theory, but this is contrasted with two single-case (...)
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  12. Single Case Probabilities and the Social World: The Application of Popper’s Propensity Interpretation.Malcolm Williams - 1999 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 29 (2):187–201.
    This paper is a re-examination of Popper’s propensity interpretation of probability in respect of its potential methodological value in social science. A long standing problem for the frequency interpretation of probability is that whilst it is able to treat both aggregate and individual phenomena as having measurable properties, it cannot explain the ontological relationship between such concrete individual cases and aggregates. Popper’s interpretation treats single cases as both real, but also as realisations of a propensity to occur. The frequency and (...)
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  13. Deductive, Probabilistic and Inductive Dependence. An Axiomatic Study in Probability Semantics.Georg J. W. Dorn - 1997 - Verlag Peter Lang.
    This work is in two parts. The main aim of part 1 is a systematic examination of deductive, probabilistic, inductive and purely inductive dependence relations within the framework of Kolmogorov probability semantics. The main aim of part 2 is a systematic comparison of (in all) 20 different relations of probabilistic (in)dependence within the framework of Popper probability semantics (for Kolmogorov probability semantics does not allow such a comparison). Added to this comparison is an examination of (in all) 15 purely inductive (...)
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  14. Inductive Skepticism and the Probability Calculus I: Popper and Jeffreys on Induction and the Probability of Law-Like Universal Generalizations.Ken Gemes - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (1):113-130.
  15. Inductive Skepticism and the Probability Calculus I: Popper and Earman on the Probability of Laws.Ken Gemes - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64:113-130.
  16. Deduction, Induction and Probabilistic Support.James Cussens - 1996 - Synthese 108 (1):1 - 10.
    Elementary results concerning the connections between deductive relations and probabilistic support are given. These are used to show that Popper-Miller's result is a special case of a more general result, and that their result is not very unexpected as claimed. According to Popper-Miller, a purely inductively supports b only if they are deductively independent — but this means that a b. Hence, it is argued that viewing induction as occurring only in the absence of deductive relations, as Popper-Miller sometimes do, (...)
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  17. Propensities and Indeterminism.D. W. Miller - 1996 - In A. O' Hear (ed.), Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities. Cambridge University Press. pp. 121--47.
    In these prefatory remarks, which are designed to locate my topic within the complex and wide-stretching field of Popper's thought and writings, I shall not say anything that those familiar with his work will not already know. Moreover, what I do say will take as understood many of the problems and theories, not to mention the terminology, that I shall later be doing my best to make understandable. My apologies are therefore due equally to those who know something about Popper's (...)
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  18. Popper's Contribution to the Philosophy of Probability.Donald Gillies - 1995 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 39:103-120.
    Popper's writings cover a remarkably wide range of subjects. The spectrum runs from Plato's theory of politics to the foundations of quantum mechanics. Yet even amidst this variety the philosophy of probability occupies a prominent place. David Miller once pointed out to me that more than half of Popper's The Logic of Scientific Discovery is taken up with discussions of probability. I checked this claim using the 1972 6th revised impression of The Logic of Scientific Discovery , and found that (...)
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  19. Contentious Contents: For Inductive Probability.Andrew Elby - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (1):193-200.
    According to Popper and Miller [1983 and 1987], the part of a hypothesis that transcends the evidence is probablistically countersupported by the evidence. Therefore, inductive support is not probabilistic support. Their argument hinges on imposing the following necessary condition on ‘the part of a hypothesis h that goes beyond the evidence e’: that transcendent part, called k, must share no nontrivial consequences with e. I propose a new condition on k that is incompatible with Popper and Miller's condition. I then (...)
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  20. Getting the Constraints on Popper's Probability Functions Right.Hugues Leblanc & Peter Roeper - 1993 - Philosophy of Science 60 (1):151-157.
    Shown here is that a constraint used by Popper in The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959) for calculating the absolute probability of a universal quantification, and one introduced by Stalnaker in "Probability and Conditionals" (1970, 70) for calculating the relative probability of a negation, are too weak for the job. The constraint wanted in the first case is in Bendall (1979) and that wanted in the second case is in Popper (1959).
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  21. Popper’s Laws of the Excess of the Probability of the Conditional Over the Conditional Probability.Georg J. W. Dorn - 1992/93 - Conceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 26:3–61.
    Karl Popper discovered in 1938 that the unconditional probability of a conditional of the form ‘If A, then B’ normally exceeds the conditional probability of B given A, provided that ‘If A, then B’ is taken to mean the same as ‘Not (A and not B)’. So it was clear (but presumably only to him at that time) that the conditional probability of B given A cannot be reduced to the unconditional probability of the material conditional ‘If A, then B’. (...)
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  22. Spacetime Quantum Probabilities II: Relativized Descriptions and Popperian Propensities. [REVIEW]M. Mugur-Schächter - 1992 - Foundations of Physics 22 (2):235-312.
    In the first part of this work(1) we have explicated the spacetime structure of the probabilistic organization of quantum mechanics. We have shown that each quantum mechanical state, in consequence of the spacetime characteristics of the epistemic operations by which the observer produces the state to be studied and the processes of qualification of these, brings in a tree-like spacetime structure, a “quantum mechanical probability tree,” thattransgresses the theory of probabilities as it now stands. In this second part we develop (...)
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  23. Keynes's Weight of Argument and Popper's Paradox of Ideal Evidence.Rod O'Donnell - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (1):44-52.
    Popper's paradox of ideal evidence has long been viewed as a telling criticism of Keynes's logical theory of probability and its associated concept of the weight of argument. This paper shows that a simple addition to Keynes's definitions of irrelevance enables his theory to elude the paradox with ease. The modified definition draws on ideas already present in Keynes's Treatise on Probability (1973). As a consequence, relevant evidence and the weight of argument may increase, even when new evidence leaves the (...)
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  24. POPPER, KARL R. A World of Propensities. [REVIEW]Donald Gillies - 1991 - Philosophy 66:392.
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  25. A World of Propensities By Karl R. Popper Thoemmes Antiquarian Books Ltd., 64 Pp., £5.00 Paper.Donald Gillies - 1991 - Philosophy 66 (257):392-.
  26. Review of Karl R. Popper A World of Propensities. [REVIEW]Donald Gillies - 1991 - Philosophy 66:392-394.
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  27. Book Reviews : Karl R. Popper, A World of Propensities. Thoemmes, Bristol, 1990. Pp. 51. 5.00. [REVIEW]I. C. Jarvie - 1991 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 21 (3):407-409.
  28. Single-Case Probabilities.David Miller - 1991 - Foundations of Physics 21 (12):1501-1516.
    The propensity interpretation of probability, bred by Popper in 1957(K. R. Popper, in Observation and Interpretation in the Philosophy of Physics,S. Körner, ed. (Butterworth, London, 1957, and Dover, New York, 1962), p. 65; reprinted in Popper Selections,D. W. Miller, ed. (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1985), p. 199) from pure frequency stock, is the only extant objectivist account that provides any proper understanding of single-case probabilities as well as of probabilities in ensembles and in the long run. In Sec. 1 of (...)
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  29. A Suspicious Feature of the Popper/Miller Argument.I. J. Good - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (3):535-536.
    The form of argument used by Popper and Miller to attack the concept of probabilistic induction is applied to the slightly different situation in which some evidence undermines a hypothesis. The result is seemingly absurd, thus bringing the form of argument under suspicion.
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  30. Some Further Reflections on the Popper-Miller 'Disproof' of Probabilistic Induction.Colin Howson - 1990 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (2):221 – 228.
  31. When Probabilistic Support is Inductive.Alberto Mura - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (2):278-289.
    This note makes a contribution to the issue raised in a paper by Popper and Miller (1983) in which it was claimed that probabilistic support is purely deductive. Developing R. C. Jeffrey's remarks, a new general approach to the crucial concept of "going beyond" is here proposed. By means of it a quantitative measure of the inductive component of a probabilistic inference is reached. This proposal leads to vindicating the view that typical predictive probabilistic inferences by enumeration and analogy are (...)
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  32. On a Recent Objection to Popper and Miller's "Disproof" of Probabilistic Induction.Colin Howson - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (4):675-680.
    Dunn and Hellman's objection to Popper and Miller's alleged disproof of inductive probability is considered and rejected. Dunn and Hellman base their objection on a decomposition of the incremental support P(h/e)-P(h) of h by e dual to that of Popper and Miller, and argue, dually to Popper and Miller, to a conclusion contrary to the latters' that all support is deductive in character. I contend that Dunn and Hellman's dualizing argument fails because the elements of their decomposition are not supports (...)
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  33. The Autonomy of Probability Theory (Notes on Kolmogorov, Rényi, and Popper).Hugues Leblanc - 1989 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (2):167-181.
    Kolmogorov's account in his [1933] of an absolute probability space presupposes given a Boolean algebra, and so does Rényi's account in his [1955] and [1964] of a relative probability space. Anxious to prove probability theory ‘autonomous’. Popper supplied in his [1955] and [1957] accounts of probability spaces of which Boolean algebras are not and [1957] accounts of probability spaces of which fields are not prerequisites but byproducts instead.1 I review the accounts in question, showing how Popper's issue from and how (...)
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  34. Partly Deductive Support in the Popper-Miller Argument.Burke Townsend - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (3):490-496.
    Popper and Miller (1983) have presented an argument purporting to establish the impossibility of inductive probability. Here I discuss critically their characterization of a deductive part of nondeductive support, a point that has not figured centrally in previous responses.
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  35. An Interchange on the Popper-Miller Argument.Charles S. Chihara & Donald A. Gillies - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 54 (1):1 - 8.
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  36. On the Alleged Impossibility of Inductive Probability.Ellery Eells - 1988 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (1):111-116.
    Popper and Miller argued, in a 1983 paper, that there is no such thing as 'probabilistic inductive support' of hypotheses. They show how to divide a hypothesis into two "parts," where evidence only 'probabilistically supports' the "part" that the evidence 'deductively' implies, and 'probabilistically countersupports' the "rest" of the hypothesis. I argue that by distinguishing between 'support that is purely deductive in nature' and 'support of a deductively implied hypothesis', we can see that their argument fails to establish (in any (...)
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  37. Popper, Prior Probabilities, and Inductive Inference.Colin Howson - 1987 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (2):207-224.
  38. On Popper-Miller's Proof of the Impossibility of Inductive Probability.Andrés Rivadulla Rodriguez - 1987 - Erkenntnis 27 (3):353 - 357.
  39. On Popper-Miller's Proof of the Impossibility of Inductive Probability.Andr�Srivadulla Rodr�Guez - 1987 - Erkenntnis 27 (3):353-357.
  40. The Representation of Popper Measures.Wolfgang Spohn - 1986 - Topoi 5 (1):69-74.
  41. Conjectures and Rational Preferences.Robert J. Levy - 1984 - Philosophy Research Archives 10:173-188.
    I survey the difficulties of several probabilistic views of non-deductive argument and of inductive probability and propose to explicate non-deductive reasoning in terms of rational preference. Following a critical examination of Popper’s allegedly deductive theory of rational preference, I draw upon the work of Popper and Rescher to present my view which includes: (i) the conjecturing of a set of alternative answers to or theories or hypotheses about the questions prompting the inquiry and (ii) the “reduction” of this set via (...)
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  42. Ideal Evidence, Relevance and Second-Order Probabilities.Maya Bar-Hillel - 1982 - Erkenntnis 17 (3):273 - 290.
    The concepts of supportive evidence and of relevant evidence seem very closely related to each other. Supportive evidence is clearly always relevant as well. But must relevant evidence be defined as evidence which is either supportive or weakeking? In an explicit or implicit manner, this is indeed the position of many philosophers. The paradox of ideal evidence, however, shows us that this is to restrictive. Besides increasing or decreasing the probability attached to some hypothesis, evidence can alter or interact with (...)
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  43. Popper's 1955 Axiomatization of Absolute Probability.Hugues Leblanc - 1982 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (2):133.
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  44. Popper and After: Four Modern Irrationalists.D. C. Stove - 1982 - Pergamon Press.
    Stove argues that Popper and his successors in the philosophy of science, Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend, were irrationalists because they were deductivists. That is, they believed all logic is deductive, and thus denied that experimental evidence could make scientific theories logically more probable. The book was reprinted as Anything Goes (1998) and Scientific Irrationalism: Origins of a Postmodern Cult (1998).
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  45. On Carnap and Popper Probability Functions.Hugues Leblanc & Bas C. van Fraassen - 1979 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 44 (3):369 - 373.
  46. Popper Versus Peirce on the Probability of Single Cases.Tom Settle - 1977 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 28 (2):177-180.
  47. Popper and the Non-Bayesian Tradition: Comments on Richard Jeffrey.Ronald N. Giere - 1975 - Synthese 30 (1-2):119 - 132.
  48. Rational Belief Change, Popper Functions and Counterfactuals.William L. Harper - 1975 - Synthese 30 (1-2):221 - 262.
    This paper uses Popper's treatment of probability and an epistemic constraint on probability assignments to conditionals to extend the Bayesian representation of rational belief so that revision of previously accepted evidence is allowed for. Results of this extension include an epistemic semantics for Lewis' theory of counterfactual conditionals and a representation for one kind of conceptual change.
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  49. Probability and Falsification: Critique of the Popper Program.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1975 - Synthese 30 (1-2):95 - 117.
  50. Propensity: Popper or Peirce?Richard W. Miller - 1975 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 26 (2):123-132.
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