Popper: Philosophy of Specific Sciences

Karl Popper argued in 1974 that evolutionary theory contains no testable laws and is therefore a metaphysical research program. Four years later, he said that he had changed his mind. Here we seek to understand Popper’s initial position and his subsequent retraction. We argue, contrary to Popper’s own assessment, that he did not change his mind at all about the substance of his original claim. We also explore how Popper’s views have ramifications for contemporary discussion of the nature of laws (...) and the structure of evolutionary theory. (shrink)

The first Darwin Lecture was given in 1977 by Karl Popper. He there said that he had known Darwin's face and name ‘for as long as I can remember’ ; for his father's library contained a portrait of Darwin and translations of most of Darwin's works . But it was not until Popper was in his late fifties that Darwin begin to figure importantly in his writings, and he was nearly seventy when he adopted from Donald Campbell the term ‘evolutionary (...) epistemology’ as a name for his theory of the growth of knowledge . There were people who saw evolutionary epistemology as a major new turn in Popper's philosophy. I do not share that view. On the other hand, there is a piece from this evolutionist period which I regard as a real nugget. (shrink)

La littérature épistémologique actuelle véhicule une image caricaturale de la philosophie popperienne de la biologie. En effet, on suppose sa position suffisamment claire et univoque pour pouvoir se résumer succinctement en quelques lignes. De plus, on la suppose toujours la même tout au long de l'évolution intellectuelle de son auteur. Dans le présent article, nous voudrions contester ces deux suppositions car sa pensée est non seulement vague et ambiguë mais encore elle est loin d'être constante et homogène. De ce fait, (...) nous entendons corriger une conception eronnée et généralement répandue de sa philosophie de la biologie.Popper's philosophy of biology is generally miscon- ceived. It is supposed to be homogeneous and clearly statable in a few lines. Worse, Popper's changes of mind on these questions are not even taken into account. In this article, we will try to show why these suppositions are erroneous and how they hinder us from forming a more adequate idea of his philosophy of biology. (shrink)

It has been argued by Hull and others that a remnant of essentialism impeded taxonomic progress until systematists abandoned attempting to define taxa on the basis of characters necessary and sufficient for group membership. The advent of cladistics suggests instead that it is an essentialistic view of characters, not of taxa, that should be abandoned, and that only a transformational view of characters allows evolutionary novelties to be identified, much less explained. Conventional Darwinian explanations are not tautologous but are difficult (...) to test and scarcely explain evolutionary novelties, probably because of their emphasis on genetic rather than epigenetic (developmental) processes. (shrink)

This paper explores the use of Popper's philosophy of science by cladists in their battle against evolutionary and numerical taxonomy. Three schools of biological systematics fiercely debated each other from the late 1960s: evolutionary taxonomy, phenetics or numerical taxonomy, and phylogenetic systematics or cladistics. The outcome of that debate was the victory of phylogenetic systematics/cladistics over the competing schools of thought. To bring about this "cladistic turn" in systematics, the cladists drew heavily on the philosopher K.R. Popper in order to (...) dress up phylogenetic systematics as a hypothetico-deductivist, indeed falsificationist, research program that would put an end to authoritarianism. As the case of the "cladistic revolution" demonstrates, scientists who turn to philosophy in defense of a research program read philosophers with an agenda in mind. That agenda is likely to distort the philosophical picture, as happened to Popper's philosophy of science at the hands of cladists. (shrink)

Objectivo principal do presente artigo é mostrar até que ponto o evolucionismo darwinista inclui proposições centrais testáveis, para além de várias proposições acessórias também elas testáveis. Nesse sentido, o autor constrói um argumento no sentido de mostrar que as alegações de Karl Popper, segundo as quais não pode ser concedido estatuto de cientificidade ao darwinismo, carecem de fundamento. O autor defende também a necessidade de um questionamento firme em relação a todo e qualquer argumento fornecido pela ciência, pois nem a (...) capacidade de previsão nem a universalidade das leis são garantia de que a ciência, também ela, nunca caia em erro. /// Aim of the present article is to show that the doctrine of evolution defended by Charles Darwin is grounded on propositions that are verifiable, as are verifiable many of its secondary propositions. The author builds up an argument that goes in the direction of showing how the allegations by Karl Popper against the scientific nature of Darwinism are not grounded in reality. The author of the article also defends the necessity of a firm questioning in relation to each and every argument advanced by the practitioners of science, since nor its anticipatory capacity nor the universality of its laws are warrant enough that the science never falls into error. (shrink)

The article discusses Karl Popper’s account of Lamarckism. In this article I use Popper’s published and unpublished statements regarding Lamarckism as well as his correspondence with the Australian immunologist Edward Steele and other biologists to examine why Popper was interested in Lamarckism, how his account of Lamarckism can be understood in the context of his philosophy, and what, if any, new context Popper provided for the discussion of this abandoned doctrine. I begin by discussing Popper’s frame of reference regarding Lamarckism, (...) examining how it changed following his involvement with different “transitory groups” of biologists concerned with redefining the boundaries between traditional disciplines. I then discuss Popper’s account of Lamarckism in positioning it in relation to three aspects of his philosophy: his distinction between the principles of induction/instruction and deduction/selection, his distinction between scientific and teleological concepts, and his concept of progress in science. Then, I follow the debate concerning Steele’s Lamarckian experiments with a closer look at Popper’s role and his position in this controversy. I conclude that Popper’s writings provided a new context for the discussion of Lamarckism in the 1970s and 1980s, thus making it “scientifically acceptable” again. I preface this discussion by a brief outline of Steele’s Lamarckian hypothesis and Popper’s comments on Steele’s work. (shrink)

Popper Proposed the criterion of falsifiability as a solution to the problem of demarcation i.e. of distinguishing science from pseudo-science and not, as many of his contemporaries in the Vienna Circle mistook it to be, a solution to the quite different problem with which they themselves were preoccupied, viz. of providing a criterion of meaning to distinguish the meaningful from the meaningless. While the positivists were concerned to damn metaphysics and exalt science, by identifying the empirically verifiable with the meaningful, (...) Popper was concerned to separate science from scientism, to damn astrology and to extol astronomy. In other words his preoccupation belongs not to the philosophy of language but to the philosophy of science. (shrink)

Karl Popper has been one of the few philosophers of sciences who has influenced scientists. I evaluate Popper's influence on our understanding of evolutionary theory from his earliest publications to the present. Popper concluded that three sorts of statements in evolutionary biology are not genuine laws of nature. I take him to be right on this score. Popper's later distinction between evolutionary theory as a metaphysical research program and as a scientific theory led more than one scientist to misunderstand his (...) position on evolutionary theory as a scientific theory. In his later work Popper also introduced what he took to be improvements of evolutionary theory. Thus far these improvements have had almost no influence on evolutionary biology. I conclude by examining the influence of Popper on the reception of cladistic analysis. (shrink)

Taking its clues from Popperian philosophy of science, cladistics adopted a number of assumptions of the empiricist tradition. These include the identification of a dichotomy between observation reports and theoretical statements and its subsequent abandonment on the basis of the insight that all observation reports are theory-laden. The neglect of the ‘context of discovery’, which is the step of theory (hypothesis) generation. The emphasis on coherentism in the ‘context of justification’, which is the step of evaluation of the relative merits (...) of alternative theories. The appeal to a total evidence approach in phylogenetic inference. And finally, a silence about causation, which results in an instrumentalist approach to phylogeny reconstruction. This paper explores how these empiricist assumptions are embedded in phylogenetic systematics, and why these assumptions are problematic for cladists (or any taxonomists). (shrink)

In recent years Sir Karl Popper has been turning his attention more and more towards philosophical problems arising from biology, particularly evolutionary biology. Popper suggests that perhaps neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory is better categorized as a metaphysical research program than as a scientific theory. In this paper it is argued that Popper can draw his conclusions only because he is abysmally ignorant of the current status of biological thought and that Popper's criticisms of biology are without force and his suggestions for (...) its improvement are without need. Also it is suggested that Popper's desire to see scientific theory growth as being in some sense evolutionary may have led him astray about biology. And conversely it is suggested that since his claims about biology are not well taken his analysis of theory growth may well bear reexamination. (shrink)

To honour the memory of Sir Karl Popper, I put forward six elements of his philosophy which might be of particular interest to biologists and to philosophers of biology and which I think Popper would like them not to ignore, even if they disagree with him. They are: the primacy of problems; the criticizability of metaphysics (and thus the dubiousness of materialism); how downward causation might be real; how norms should matter to scientists; why dogmatism should be avoided; how genuine (...) science is recognizable. I preface these six things with a brief discussion of Popper's early (but later recanted) mistakes concerning biology. (shrink)

First, a brief history is provided of Popper's views on the status of evolutionary biology as a science. The views of some prominent biologists are then canvassed on the matter of falsifiability and its relation to evolutionary biology. Following that, I argue that Popper's programme of falsifiability does indeed exclude evolutionary biology from within the circumference of genuine science, that Popper's programme is fundamentally incoherent, and that the correction of this incoherence results in a greatly expanded and much more realistic (...) concept of what is empirical, resulting in the inclusion of evolutionary biology. Finally, this expanded concept of empirical is applied to two particular problems in evolutionary biology — viz., the species problem and the debate over the theory of punctuated equilibria — and it is argued that both of them are still mainly metaphysical. (shrink)

The primary purpose of this paper is to argue that biologists should stop citing Karl Popper on what a genuinely scientific theory is. Various ways in which biologists cite Popper on this matter are surveyed, including the use of Popper to settle debates on methodology in phylogenetic systematics. It is then argued that the received view on Popper—namely, that a genuinely scientific theory is an empirically falsifiable one—is seriously mistaken, that Popper’s real view was that genuinely scientific theories have the (...) form of statements of laws of nature. It is then argued that biology arguably has no genuine laws of its own. In place of Popperian falsifiability, it is suggested that a cluster class epistemic values approach (which subsumes empirical falsifiability) is the best solution to the demarcation problem between genuine science and pseudo- or non-science. (shrink)

"Friedrich von Hayek and Karl Popper were two of the twentieth century's greatest thinkers, and two of its greatest proponents of freedom and open society. They were also close friends, and even people who are very familiar with their writings often think that their philosophical, economic, and political views are more or less the same. This book, however, argues that Hayek and Popper differed in fundamental ways about rationality, economism, and democracy--and that these differences, and the different ways in which (...) Hayek and Popper argued for them, lie at the heart of political thought and still have significant consequences for our own political discourse today. It argues that Hayek and Popper disagreed about whether and to what extent society is well served by deliberate attempts at government intervention; about whether and to what extent democracy involves majority rule; and, most importantly, about whether we should value freedom for its own sake, as an end in itself, or merely as a means to greater prosperity and wealth. Contrary to Popper, this volume argues that Hayek was prepared to accept socialism--which in his view logically implies totalitarianism--if it could be shown to be at least as efficient and productive as the market; that his concept of freedom is grounded in the same sort of economism that Popper criticized in Marx; and that he proposed reforms to the electoral system that would actually transform a democracy into what Popper would have regarded as a tyranny"--. (shrink)

This new book, under the impressive editorship of Thomas Boylan and Paschal O'Gorman, explores a number of major themes central to the work of Karl Popper. The tensions that have resulted from Popperian thought are well documented. How can mainstream orthodox economics be falsifiable while privileging its core of rationality as unquestionable? This book includes expert contributions from thinkers such as Tony Lawson, K. Vela Velupillai and John McCall, who discuss this issue with renewed academic rigour.

Friedrich Hayek was a fervent advocate of the methodological specificity of the social sciences. However, given his contact with Karl Popper, several historians and philosophers have characterized his final position as Popperian, that is, a position that would have accepted the unity of scientific method. A closer look at Hayek's philosophy and Popper's own intellectual course shows that such a thesis is based on misconceptions that can be overcome by taking the Hayekian concept of 'spontaneous order' as the foundation of (...) a methodology immune to any kind of methodological monism. (shrink)

El presente trabajo intenta profundizar en la noción de racionalidad y la lógica de la situación de Karl Popper en el marco del debate entre “economía sustantiva” y “economía formal o instrumental”. Con tal propósito realizaremos una breve aproximación histórica al concepto de racionalidad económica señalando los distintos aportes de diversos autores a la cuestión. Este marco histórico permitirá encuadrar el planteo que Karl R. Popper hace de la lógica de la situación como metodología de las ciencias sociales tomada de (...) la teoría económica. En cuanto a la racionalidad y la lógica de la situación en Popper distinguiremos algunas notas acerca del análisis situacional y de la noción de racionalidad que subyace al mismo. Analizaremos el principio de racionalidad y el debate en torno al status epistemológico de tal principio. (shrink)

La cuestión del principio de racionalidad en el pensamiento de Karl Popper pareciera no mostrarse con precisión (observación hecha por diversos autores), al menos no como lo es su propuesta falsacionista. Pero intentaré retomar las principales notas sobre este principio e indicar algunas aproximaciones al debate epistemológico que surgen en torno a él. Popper trata de hallar un método que permita el conocimiento de las ciencias naturales y de las ciencias sociales, proponiendo un monismo metodológico. Sin embargo, al referirse a (...) las ciencias sociales, señala que éstas han de realizar explicaciones basadas en tendencias que permitan construir modelos “en términos de individuos”, llamando a esto “individualismo metodológico.” Mostrando que en las ciencias sociales intervienen proposiciones históricas singulares, se hace presente la dificultad en torno a estas ciencias; en relación a esto explica que en la mayoría de las situaciones sociales hay un elemento de racionalidad, introduciendo así el “método de construcción racional o lógica” o “método cero.”. (shrink)

Even though Popper, Lawson and Mäki are realists, the three of them understand by realism something different and support different positions on the use of models in economics. In this article we will compare the three proposals on their conceptions of reality, the function and the nature of economic models and their use to study the social world.

The central argument of this interesting paper is that Popper appears to be inconsistent: on the one hand, he preaches methodological monism-scientific method in the social sciences is identical to scientific method in the natural sciences-and on the other hand he advocates “situational analysis” as the unique method of the social sciences. Situational analysis is nothing but our old neoclassical friend, the rationality principle-individual maximizing behavior subject to constraints-and thus, Popper seems to be saying, neoclassical economics is the only valid (...) kind of social science. (shrink)

This volume examines why Sir Karl Popper's view of empirical falsifiability as the distinguishing characteristic of science has found appeal among economists.

Karl Popper and Friedrich von Hayek became close friends soon after they first met in the early 1930s. Ever since, they discussed their ideas intensively on many occasions. But even though an analysis of the origins and contents of their ideas and correspondence reveals a number of important and fundamental differences, they rarely criticize each other in their published work. The article analyzes in particular the different ideas they have on the role of reason in society and on rationalism and (...) the roots of these differences. Popper’s “Towards a Rational Theory of Tradition” of 1948 contains a criticism of Hayek’s idea—published, for instance, in “Individualism: True and False” of 1945—that we must accept tradition without trying to change it. An analysis of the differences between the two authors touches on topics such as the possibility of public intervention in society, the role of social science in this, the methodology of social science, and the differences between liberalism and social democracy. The article concludes with some possible explanations for Popper and Hayek downplaying their differences in public. The fact remains that they never resolved the tension between Popper’s critical rationalism and Hayek’s conservative rationalism. (shrink)

In his The Poverty of Historicism 1 K.R. Popper and before him F. Kaufmann2 distinguish two broad classes of epistemological and methodological positions held in the social sciences: Antinaturalistic positions and pronaturalistic positions. These positions are distinguished with respect to their attitude regarding the applicability of the methods of the natural sciences, or rather what the representatives of the anti and pronaturalistic positions assume to be the method of the natural sciences. According to Popper and Kaufmann the representatives of antinaturalistic (...) positions hold that the methods of the natural sciences can not be applied in the social sciences, whereas the representatives of the pronaturalistic positions have the opposite view. This of course raises the question what views the representatives of the anti and pronaturalistic positions embrace with respect to the methods of the natural sciences. It is interesting to note, however, that Popper in his The Poverty of Historicism, indicates those views only briefly, the reasons presumably being the special tasks and aims he set himself in that analysis. These are primarily to show the disastrous political and social consequences of a false social science methodology and the invalidity of the ideas of historical necessity and that of laws of historical development. But it is well known that Popper analysed and discussed the methods and the philosophy of science with great rigour and acumen in his other books and articles and that he triggered a philosophical revolution in that field.3 Before Popper the prevailing. (shrink)

In his situational logic, Popper offers a model for social sciences which specifies how a social explanation of human actions can be scientific and objective. He also describes the specific kind of phenomena the social sciences can explain and predict. To perform this task, the model includes a desc..

Jeffrey Friedman has attempted to make a case for limiting state social engineering that is based on the skeptical epistemology of Sir Karl Popper. But Popper's epistemology is flawed, both in its rejection of a priori theorizing and its insistence on empirical falsification rather than confirmation. Classical liberalism of the sort that Friedman advocates requires, as its basis, positive knowledge of economics and social reality?not Popperian skepticism.

Hutchison's 1938 essay has been variously interpreted as introducing positivism, ultra-empiricism and Popperian falsificationism to economics. Yet his apparent inconsistency in maintaining all of these positions seems to have gone unnoticed in the literature. Previously I have criticized attempts to characterize Hutchison as a positivist or ultra-empiricist. In this article I argue that Klappholz and Agassi failed to support their claim that Hutchison introduced Popper's criterion to economics. That is, this paper deals with this specific question, rather than the wider (...) one of whether or not Hutchison introduced Popperian falsificationism to economics. Yet the two issues are closely connected and so the latter question is briefly discussed. To the extent that the paper succeeds, it may help to resolve the inconsistency problem. For now it is possible that Hutchison in 1938 developed his own original and consistent position. The task of substantiating such a view by providing a positive account of his methodology is one for the future. (shrink)

Even if falsificationism in the strict Popper-Lakatos sense may be too harsh for economics, falsifiability and refutability are eminent criteria for theory appraisal. Hausman's (1997) revision of his (1992) methodology of economics does not come sufficiently close to meeting such a methodological requirement and risks allowing the prioritising of irrefutable theories over empirical phenomena. It therefore needs further advancement.

The pigeonholing of Hutchison's methodology as positivist, ultra-empiricist or Popperian has militated against a full appreciation of his more complex position. In this as-verbatim-as-possible account of an afternoon's discussion with Hutchison, it is the directly personal manner in which we gain insights, rather than simply the insights themselves, that we hope will help towards a re-assessment. We learn of his non-positivist view that economics is an empirical-historical discipline distinct from the natural sciences; and his rejection of Popper's view that prediction (...) in economics can and should be based on laws like the law of gravity. We hear of his wariness of relying on the hypothetico-deductivist methods of Popper and later positivists in a subject such as economics, and his support instead for the methodological views of Jacob Viner and the inductive methods associated with the historically and institutionally detailed approaches of Cliffe Leslie, Wesley Clair Mitchell and Henry Phelps Brown. (shrink)

Discussions of Karl Popper's falsificationist philosophy of science appear regularly in the recent literature on economic methodology. In this literature, there seem to be two fundamental points of agreement about Popper. First, most economists take Popper's falsificationist method of bold conjecture and severe test to be the correct characterization of scientific conduct in the physical sciences. Second, most economists admit that economic theory fails miserably when judged by these same falsificationist standards. As Latsis states, “the development of economic analysis would (...) look a dismal affair through falsificationist spectacles.”. (shrink)

It has already been argued by Frazer and Boland (1983) that, interpreted in an instrumentalist fashion, Milton Friedman’s well known and much criticized 1953 paper on “The Methodology of Positive Economics”1 proved to be convergent with Popper's falsificationist philosophy of science2. I think that this comparison is flawed. For one can assuredly contest this interpretation in view of the fact that Popper always opposed any kind of instrumentalist philosophy of science3. It is not even clear that what Friedman has to (...) say on the intricate question of the status of theories and on the function of tests has anything to do with what Popper criticizes under the general category of “instrumentalism”. What I will do here is not so much to directly challenge the Frazer-Boland interpretation as to replace it with a completely new comparison of both methodologies in order to get a new look at Friedman's methodological stance. Of course, one has to focus only on the arguments that really are comparable and leave aside those that could easily be proved to be fundamentally different, if not plainly incompatible. But, as I will try to show, the exercise is worthwhile, for this new comparison will force us to reinterpret, at least partially, what seem to me to be the two central tenets of Friedman's methodological doctrine. Of course, in order to find convergence between Friedman's and Popper's views on economic methodology, we have to read.. (shrink)