Practical Reason

Edited by Sergio Tenenbaum (University of Toronto, St. George, University of Toronto at Mississauga)
Assistant editors: Parisa Moosavi, Benjamin Wald
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  1. Common Sense and Beyond.Robert M. Adams & James Joyce - forthcoming - Animus.
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  2. Challenge and Response.A. S. C. - 1971 - Review of Metaphysics 25 (2):373-374.
  3. The Nature of Moral Reasoning: The Framework and Activities of Ethical: The Framework and Activities of Ethical Deliberation, Argument, and Decision—Making.Stephen Cohen - 2004 - Oxford University Press Anz.
    The Nature of Moral Reasoning is a discussion about the landscape, or environment, in which moral reasoning occurs. The book engages the reader in an examination of the processes involved in thinking about moral matters. The theoretical underpinnings of moral reasoning are explained carefully in the context of an examination about what it means to engage in the central activity of moral reasoning. The discussion is both theoretical and practical and is about where moral reasoning is located, and how it (...)
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  4. Aquinas on Rationality, Freedom and Deformed Choice.Gavin Terence Colvert - 1995 - Dissertation, University of Toronto (Canada)
    This dissertation assesses Thomas Aquinas' response to the problem of whether agents can rationally choose to pursue one course of action when they believe another course is better and open to them. The core of the problem lies in the conceptual connection often made between desirability and normative standards of goodness. Given this connection, it is apparently contradictory to claim that a person can rationally choose to do what he or she desires rather than what he or she thinks best, (...)
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  5. Regret Aversion in Reason-Based Choice.Terry Connolly & Jochen Reb - 2012 - Theory and Decision 73 (1):35-51.
    This research examines the moderating role of regret aversion in reason-based choice. Earlier research has shown that regret aversion and reason-based choice effects are linked through a common emphasis on decision justification, and that a simple manipulation of regret salience can eliminate the decoy effect, a well-known reason-based choice effect. We show here that the effect of regret salience varies in theory-relevant ways from one reason-based choice effect to another. For effects such as the select/reject and decoy effect, both of (...)
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  6. No Lacuna and No Vicious Regress: A Reply to le Poidevin.Christina Conroy - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (4):367-372.
    In his “Space, supervenience and substantivalism”, Le Poidevin proposes a substantivalism in which space is discrete, implying that there are unmediated spatial relations between neighboring primitive points. This proposition is motivated by his concern that relationism suffers from an explanatory lacuna and that substantivalism gives rise to a vicious regress. Le Poidevin implicitly requires that the relationist be committed to the “only x and y ” principle regarding spatial relations. It is not obvious that the relationist is committed to this (...)
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  7. Risk Assessment and Rational Decision Theory.Roger M. Cooke - 1982 - Dialectica 36 (4):329-351.
    SummaryI contend on both theoretical and historical grounds that quantitative risk assessment is relevant for policy determination only as a cost estimate. In particular, it provides a method for estimating the costs of a hypothetical insurance policy against the potential liabilities associated with a given course of action. It is not relevant to the question of rational choice under risk.RésuméJe montre, en partant d'arguments aussi bien théoriques qu'historiques, que le calcul quanti‐tatif des risques n'aide à la détermination d'une politique à (...)
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  8. Introduction: Metaethics and Normative Ethics.David Copp - 2006 - In The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 3--35.
    This chapter begins by explaining the distinction between meta-ethics and normative ethics. It then introduces the main issues in the two fields and provides a critical overview of the chapters in the volume. In meta-ethics, it focuses on explaining the different kinds of moral realism and anti-realism, including the divine command theory, naturalism, non-naturalism, relativism, nihilism, and non-cognitivism. Quasi-realism illustrates how the distinction between anti-realism and realism can become blurred. A variety of views about the relation between morality and practical (...)
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  9. Gyges's Choice: Overridingness and the Unity of Reason.David Copp - 1997 - Social Philosophy and Policy 14 (1):94.
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  10. Two Jobs for Aristotle's Practical Syllogism?Corcilius Klaus - 2009 - Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 12.
    Among scholars it is common to assume that Aristotle’s practical syllogism does two jobs. It is often taken to explain both animal motion and human deliberation. I will call this the “two-jobs view of the practical syllogism”. In what follows, I will argue that the two-jobs view of the practical syllogism is not working. I will then try to give a very brief and incomplete sketch of how to conceive of a non-two-jobs view of the Aristotelian practical syllogism. Finally, I (...)
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  11. Referees for 2008–2009.J. Angelo Corlett - 2009 - The Journal of Ethics 13 (4):425-425.
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  12. A Review of the Empirical Ethical Decision-Making Literature: 2004–2011. [REVIEW]Jana L. Craft - 2013 - Journal of Business Ethics 117 (2):221-259.
    This review summarizes the research on ethical decision-making from 2004 to 2011. Eighty-four articles were published during this period, resulting in 357 findings. Individual findings are categorized by their application to individual variables, organizational variables, or the concept of moral intensity as developed by Jones :366–395, 1991). Rest’s four-step model for ethical decision-making is used to summarize findings by dependent variable—awareness, intent, judgment, and behavior. A discussion of findings in each category is provided in order to uncover trends in the (...)
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  13. On the Metaphysics of Species.Judith K. Crane - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (2):156-173.
    This paper explains the metaphysical implications of the view that species are individuals (SAI). I first clarify SAI in light of the separate distinctions between individuals and classes, particulars and universals, and abstract and concrete things. I then show why the standard arguments given in defense of SAI are not compelling. Nonetheless, the ontological status of species is linked to the traditional "species problem," in that certain species concepts do entail that species are individuals. I develop the idea that species (...)
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  14. Fichte on the Highest Good: Agent Unity and Practical Deliberation in the Jena Sittenlehre.Benjamin D. Crowe - 2008 - Philosophy Today 52 (3-4):379-390.
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  15. Risk, Gratitude, and Love: Grounding Authentic Moral Deliberation.Cynthia S. W. Crysdale - 2007 - In David S. Liptay & John J. Liptay (eds.), The Importance of Insight: Essays in Honour of Michael Vertin. University of Toronto Press. pp. 151-171.
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  16. Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism, by David Enoch.T. Cuneo - 2012 - Mind 121 (484):1059-1064.
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  17. Mind and Morality.Andrew Cunningham - 1997 - Review of Metaphysics 51 (1):140-140.
  18. Book Review:The Return to Reason: Essays in Realistic Philosophy. John Wild. [REVIEW]G. Watts Cunningham - 1954 - Ethics 64 (4):328-.
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  19. Unity of Reasons.Adam Cureton - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (4):877-895.
    There are at least two basic normative notions: rationality and reasons. The dominant normative account of reasons nowadays, which I call primitive pluralism about reasons, holds that some reasons are normatively basic and there is no underlying normative explanation of them in terms of other normative notions. Kantian constructivism about reasons, understood as a normative rather than a metaethical view, holds that rationality is the primitive normative notion that picks out which non-normative facts are reasons for what and explains why (...)
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  20. “But It Would Be Wrong”.Stephen Darwall - 2010 - Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2):135-157.
    Is the fact that an action would be wrong itself a reason not to perform it? Warranted attitude accounts of value suggest about value, that being valuable is not itself a reason but to the reasons for valuing something in which its value consists. Would a warranted attitude account of moral obligation and wrongness, not entail, therefore, that being morally obligatory or wrong gives no reason for action itself? I argue that this is not true. Although warranted attitude theories of (...)
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  21. Two Kinds of Respect.Stephen L. Darwall - 1977 - Ethics 88 (1):36-49.
    S. 39: "My project in this paper is to develop the initial distinction which I have drawn between recognition and appraisal respect into a more detailed and specific account of each. These accounts will not merely be of intrinsic interest. Ultimately I will use them to illuminate the puzzles with which this paper began and to understand the idea of self-respect." 42 " Thus, insofar as respect within such a pursuit will depend on an appraisal of the participant from the (...)
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  22. The Meaning of Evaluative Expressions.Bernard Davis - 1971 - Journal of Value Inquiry 5 (3):219-225.
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  23. A Simple Dynamic-Model for Recurrent Choice.D. G. S. Davis & Er Staddon - 1991 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 29 (6):481-481.
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  24. Temptation.J. P. Day - 1993 - American Philosophical Quarterly 30 (2):175 - 181.
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  25. The Toiling Lily: Narrative Life, Responsibility, and the Ontological Ground of Self-Deception.Steven DeLay - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (1):103-116.
    In this essay, I argue that genuine responsibility and ethical self-understanding are possible without narrative—or, at least, that narrative is not always sufficient. In §2, I introduce and clarify a distinction between our ontological subjectivity and everyday practical identity—one made famous by Heidegger and Sartre. On the basis of this distinction, in §3 I argue that narrative is unable to ground ethical choice and decision. For, although acting in light of practical identities is something we do, it cannot wholly capture (...)
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  26. The Rationality of Conditional Cooperation.Den Hartogh Govert - 1993 - Erkenntnis 38 (3):405-427.
    InMorals by Agreement, David Gauthier (1986) argues that it is rational to intend to cooperate, even in single-play Prisoner's Dilemma games, provided (1) your co-player has a similar intention; (2) both intentions can be revealed to the other player. To this thesis four objections are made. (a) In a strategic decision the parameters on which the argument relies cannot be supposed to be given. (b) Of each pair ofa-symmetric intentions at least one is not rational. But it is impossible to (...)
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  27. Affective Intentionality and Practical Rationality.Julien Deonna, Christine Clavien & Ivo Wallimann-Helmer - 2007 - .
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  28. God and Moral Obligation. By C. Stephen Evans.William M. Diem - 2014 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):170-173.
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  29. Probing the Scope of the Minimalism of Lagueux’s Rationality.Peter Dietsch - 2012 - Dialogue 51 (3):491-494.
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  30. Psychoanalysis and the Practical Inference Mode.Thomas Donaldson - 1978 - Philosophy Research Archives 4:1-16.
    The paper considers the general question of whether unconscious practical inference is possible. It undertakes an investigation of Freud's theory of psychoanalysis, in order to determine whether his theory can meet the requirements of the practical inference model, and thus make room for unconscious practical inference. The paper argues that it cannot: although Freud's theory appears to meet certain conditions necessary for practical inference, i.e., minimal agent rationality and the postulation of desires, it leaves out one element which is essential (...)
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  31. Future-Bias and Practical Reason.Tom Dougherty - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.
    Nearly everyone prefers pain to be in the past rather than the future. This seems like a rationally permissible preference. But I argue that appearances are misleading, and that future-biased preferences are in fact irrational. My argument appeals to trade-offs between hedonic experiences and other goods. I argue that we are rationally required to adopt an exchange rate between a hedonic experience and another type of good that stays fixed, regardless of whether the hedonic experience is in the past or (...)
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  32. Decision Theory and Rationality, José Luis Bermúdez. Oxford University Press, 2009. 189 Pages. [REVIEW]Igor Douven - 2011 - Economics and Philosophy 27 (1):59-64.
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  33. What Would a Deontic Logic of Internal Reasons Look Like?Rufus Duits - 2016 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 3 (4):351-373.
    The so-called ‘central problem’ of internalism has been formulated like this: one cannot concurrently maintain the following three philosophical positions without inconsistency: internalism about practical reason, moral rationalism, and moral absolutism. Since internalism about practical reason is the most controversial of these, the suggestion is that it is the one that is best abandoned. In this paper, I point towards a response to this problem by sketching a deontic logic of internal reasons that deflates moral normativity to the normativity of (...)
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  34. Aquinas, Kant, and the Eclipse of Practical Reason.George Duke - 2016 - Review of Metaphysics 69 (4):709-738.
    Contemporary debates on the nature and scope of practical reason are often framed in terms of the viewpoints of a few major figures in the history of philosophy. Whereas advocates of skeptical or procedural approaches to practical reason generally seek historical support from Hume, defenders of more substantive conceptions of practical rationality tend to draw inspiration from Aristotle or Kant. This paper argues that it is in fact the work of Aquinas which offers the best material for a defense of (...)
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  35. Practical Reason and Morality.A. R. C. Duncan - 1960 - Philosophy 35 (132):68-69.
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  36. Practical reason and morality.A. R. C. Duncan - 1957 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 12 (4):403-404.
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  37. Human Motives and History.G. Duveau & J. H. Labadie - 1958 - Diogenes 6 (22):27-38.
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  38. Reasons and Authority.Gerald Dworkin - 1972 - Journal of Philosophy 69 (20):716.
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  39. Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.E. Bratman Michael - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):277-284.
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  40. Intention, Plans and Practical Reason.E. Bratman Michael - 1989 - Ethics 100 (1):198-199.
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  41. Intention,--Plans,--And--Practical--Reason.E. Bratman Michael - 1988 - Mind 97 (388):632-634.
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  42. Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.M. E. Bratman - 1991 - Noûs 25 (2):230-233.
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  43. Practical Identity and Practical Reason.Frances E. Gill - 2000 - Southwest Philosophy Review 16 (1):33-39.
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  44. Kant’s Theory of Practical Reason.Thomas E. Hill Jr - 1989 - The Monist 72 (3):363-383.
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  45. The Theory of Practical Reason.E. Murphy Arthur - 1966 - Ethics 76 (4):319-322.
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  46. Judicial Decision and Practical Judgment. [REVIEW]N. G. E. - 1947 - Journal of Philosophy 44 (2):51-52.
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  47. Decision Theory and Rationality. [REVIEW]Anna-Maria A. Eder - 2010 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (3):326-329.
  48. Rational Decision and Causality.Ellery Eells - 1982 - Cambridge University Press.
    In past years, the traditional Bayesian theory of rational decision making, based on subjective calculations of expected utility, has faced powerful attack from philosophers such as David Lewis and Brian Skyrms, who advance an alternative causal decision theory. The test they present for the Bayesian is exemplified in the decision problem known as 'Newcomb's paradox' and in related decision problems and is held to support the prescriptions of the causal theory. As well as his conclusions, the concepts and methods of (...)
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  49. Aristotle on Woman’s Capacity for Practical Reason.Seena Eftekhari - 2016 - Southwest Philosophy Review 32 (1):85-91.
    Aristotle notoriously excludes free women and both male and female artisans and slaves from citizenship in the polis on the basis of an identifiable difference in nature: all of these groups, unlike free males, possess and exhibit some delinquency in their capacity for reason. Commentators have typically interpreted Aristotle’s comments on the nature of free women by suggesting that free women by nature have heightened or increased propensities towards incontinent behavior. If this is indeed the only difference between the natures (...)
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  50. The Ideas of Reason.Robert R. Ehman - 1961 - Review of Metaphysics 15 (2):225 - 235.
    Citing Kant, the author defines an idea of reason as a concept of the unconditioned totality of the conditions of the conditioned. A theoretical idea is valid if it conforms to the real; but a practical idea can be justified only by an appeal to the unconditioned obligation to realize it. Having introduced these terms and theses, the author examines the ontological and cosmological arguments as attempts to prove the reality of the ideas. He then argues that the apparent contradiction (...)
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