Practical Reason

Edited by Sergio Tenenbaum (University of Toronto)
Assistant editor: Benjamin Elliott Wald (University of Toronto)
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  1. Rationality and Morality.E. M. Adams - 1993 - Review of Metaphysics 46 (4):683 - 697.
    The purpose of the article is to challenge widely accepted views of the relationship among rationality, morality, and prudence. It contends that we cannot understand either the rational or the moral enterprise without a correct philosophical view of the human self, and that such a view of the self is impossible without taking account of the rational and the moral enterprises themselves. The paper concludes that the moral point of view is anchored in the nature of selfhood so that one (...)
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  2. The Basis of Objective Judgments in Ethics.George P. Adams - 1927 - International Journal of Ethics 37 (2):128-137.
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  3. Common Sense and Beyond.Robert M. Adams & James Joyce - forthcoming - Animus.
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  4. Theories of Rationality.Joseph Agassi - 1987 - In Joseph Agassi & I. C. Jarvie (eds.), Rationality: The Critical View. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 249--263.
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  5. A Discourse‐Theoretical Conception of Practical Reason.Robert Alexy - 1992 - Ratio Juris 5 (3):231-251.
    Contemporary discussions about practical reason or practical rationality invoke four competing views which can be named as follows by reference to their historical models: Aristotelian, Hobbesian, Kantian and Nietzschean. The subject‐matter of this article is a defence of the Kantian conception of practical rationality in the interpretation of discourse theory. At the heart, lies the justification and the application of the rules of discourse. An argument consisting of three parts is pre sented to justify the rules of discourse. The three (...)
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  6. The Operations of Practical Reason. [REVIEW]D. J. Allan - 1964 - The Classical Review 14 (2):152-154.
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  7. Defending Fundamental Requirements of Practical Reason: A Constitutivist Framework.David Alm - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Research 36:77-102.
    In this paper I offer a partial defense of a constitutivist view according to which it is possible to defend fundamental requirements of practical reason by appeal to facts about what is constitutive of rational agency. I show how it is possible for that approach to circumvent the ‘is’/’ought’ problem as well as the requirement that it be possible to act contrary to practical reason. But I do not attempt to establish any particular fundamental requirement. The key ideas are that (...)
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  8. Le Corbusier, Jacobsová a Ich Racionalita.Filozofický Ústav Sav Andrej Gogora & A. Gogora - 2010 - Filozofia 65 (4):361.
    The paper gives an analysis of the conceptions of rationality of two influential representatives of the 20th century theory of urbanism, and their philosophical grounds. It also outlines the problem of modern rationality, questions its character and points out, that for the time being the transition to a new way of thinking is problematic.
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  9. The Thief of Time.Chrisoula Andreou & Mark D. White (eds.) - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    This edited volume starts in on the task of integrating the problem of procrastination into philosophical inquiry.
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  10. Personal Identity and Practical Reason: The Failure of Kantian Replies to Parfit.Anomaly Jonny - 2008 - Dialogue 47 (2):331-350.
    ABSTRACT: This essay examines and criticizes a set of Kantian objections to Parfit's attempt in Reasons and Persons to connect his theory of personal identity to practical rationality and moral philosophy. Several of Parfit's critics have tried to sever the link he forges between his metaphysical and practical conclusions by invoking the Kantian thought that even if we accept his metaphysical theory of personal identity, we still have good practical grounds for rejecting that theory when deliberating about what to do. (...)
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  11. Personal Identity and Practical Reason: The Failure of Kantian Replies to Parfit: Dialogue.Anomaly Jonny - 2008 - Dialogue 47 (2):331-350.
    ABSTRACT This essay examines and criticizes a set of Kantian objections to Parfit's attempt in Reasons and Persons to connect his theory of personal identity to practical rationality and moral philosophy. Several of Parfit's critics have tried to sever the link he forges between his metaphysical and practical conclusions by invoking the Kantian thought that even if we accept his metaphysical theory of personal identity, we still have good practical grounds for rejecting that theory when deliberating about what to do. (...)
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  12. Personal Identity and Practical Reason.Jonny Anomaly - 2008 - Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie 47 (2):331-350.
    ABSTRACT: This essay examines and criticizes a set of Kantian objections to Parfit's attempt in Reasons and Persons to connect his theory of personal identity to practical rationality and moral philosophy. Several of Parfit's critics have tried to sever the link he forges between his metaphysical and practical conclusions by invoking the Kantian thought that even if we accept his metaphysical theory of personal identity, we still have good practical grounds for rejecting that theory when deliberating about what to do. (...)
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  13. 1. Social Action and the Concept of Rationality.Karl-Otto Apel - 1981 - Philosophical Topics 12 (Supplement):9-35.
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  14. Presuppositions of Collective Moral Agency.David Ardagh - 2012 - Philosophy of Management 11 (2):5-28.
    This is the second of three papers with the overall title: “A Quasi-Personal Alternative to Some Anglo-American Pluralist Models of Organisations: Towards an Analysis of Corporate Self-Governance for Virtuous Organisations”.1 In the first paper, entitled: “Organisations as quasi-personal entities: from ‘governing’ of the self to organisational ‘self ’-governance: a Neo-Aristotelian quasi-personal model of organisations”, the artificial corporate analogue of a natural person sketched there, was said to have quasi-directive, quasi-operational and quasi-enabling/resource-provision capacities. Its use of these capacities following joint deliberation (...)
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  15. Rational Decision Theory: The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory.Bradshaw Frederick Armendt - 1983 - Dissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago
    In recent years rational decision theories such as Richard Jeffrey's, which recommend that an agent act so as to maximize his conditional expected utility, have come under attack on the grounds that they are unable to adequately handle certain kinds of decision problems. Because of their general structure, these problems are sometimes known as "causal counterexamples" to the theories; well-known examples are Newcomb's problem, the Prisoner's Dilemma, and Fisher's smoking gene problem. Several versions of "causal decision theory" have been presented (...)
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  16. What Kind of Theory is the Humean Theory of Motivation?Caroline T. Arruda - 2016 - Ratio 30 (2).
    I consider an underappreciated problem for proponents of the Humean theory of motivation. Namely, it is unclear whether is it to be understood as a largely psychological or largely metaphysical theory. I show that the psychological interpretation of HTM will need to be modified in order to be a tenable view and, as it will turn out, the modifications required render it virtually philosophically empty. I then argue that the largely metaphysical interpretation is the only a plausible interpretation of HTM's (...)
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  17. The Scope of Motivation and the Basis of Practical Reason.Robert Audi - 1999 - Philosophic Exchange 29 (1).
    This paper explores the relationship between motivation, desire, pleasure and value. I argue that the motivational grounds of action are the kinds of desires that tend, in rational persons, to be produced both by experience of the good, and by beliefs that something one can do would be good.
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  18. Book Review:Practical Reasoning. Robert Audi. [REVIEW]Bruce Aune - 1993 - Ethics 103 (2):379-.
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  19. A Theory of Rational Decision in Games.Michael Bacharach - 1987 - Erkenntnis 27 (1):17 - 55.
  20. Under the Guise of the Good: Kant and a Tenet of Moral Rationalism.Stefano Bacin - forthcoming - In Violetta Waibel & Margit Ruffing (eds.), Natur und Freiheit: Akten des XII. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. de Gruyter.
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  21. A Paradox for Supertask Decision Makers.Andrew Bacon - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):307.
    I consider two puzzles in which an agent undergoes a sequence of decision problems. In both cases it is possible to respond rationally to any given problem yet it is impossible to respond rationally to every problem in the sequence, even though the choices are independent. In particular, although it might be a requirement of rationality that one must respond in a certain way at each point in the sequence, it seems it cannot be a requirement to respond as such (...)
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  22. Vulnerability and the Incompleteness of Practical Reason.Carla Bagnoli - 2016 - In C. Strahele (ed.), Vulnerability, Autonomy, and Applied Ethics. Rutledge. pp. 13-32.
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  23. Constitutivism and Transcendental Practical Philosophy: How to Pull the Rabbit Out of the Hat.Sorin Baiasu - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-24.
    Constitutivism aims to justify substantial normative standards as constitutive of practical reason. In this way, it can defend the constructivist commitment to avoiding realism and anti-realism in normative disciplines. This metaphysical debate is the perspective from which the nature of the constitutivist justification is usually discussed. In this paper, I focus on a related, but distinct, debate. My concern will not be whether the substantial normative claims asserted by the constructivist have some elements, which are not constructed, but real, given (...)
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  24. Book Review:Hume's Philosophy of Mind. John Bricke; The High Road to Pyrrhonism. Richard H. Popkin, Richard A. Watson, James E. Force; McGill Hume Studies. David Fate Norton, Nicholas Capaldi, Wade L. Robison. [REVIEW]Annette Baier - 1982 - Ethics 92 (2):346-.
  25. [Book Review] the Rational and the Moral Order, the Social Roots of Reason and Morality. [REVIEW]Kurt Baier - 1995 - Ethics 106 (3):633-636.
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  26. The Verdictive Organization of Desire.Derek Baker - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-24.
    Deliberation often begins with the question ‘What do I want to do?’ rather than the question of what one ought to do. This paper takes that question at face value, as a question about which of one’s desires is strongest, which sometimes guides action. The paper aims to explain which properties of a desire make that desire strong, in the sense of ‘strength’ relevant to this deliberative question. Both motivational force and phenomenological intensity seem relevant to a desire’s strength; however, (...)
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  27. Deliberators Must Be Imperfect.Derek Baker - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):321-347.
    This paper argues that, with certain provisos, predicting one's future actions is incompatible with rationally deliberating about whether to perform those actions. It follows that fully rational omniscient agents are impossible, since an omniscient being could never rationally deliberate about what to do. Consequently, theories that explain practical reasons in terms of the choices of a perfectly rational omniscient agent must fail. The paper considers several ways of defending the possibility of an omniscient agent, and concludes that while some of (...)
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  28. Decision Theory for Agents with Incomplete Preferences.Adam Bales, Daniel Cohen & Toby Handfield - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):453-70.
    Orthodox decision theory gives no advice to agents who hold two goods to be incommensurate in value because such agents will have incomplete preferences. According to standard treatments, rationality requires complete preferences, so such agents are irrational. Experience shows, however, that incomplete preferences are ubiquitous in ordinary life. In this paper, we aim to do two things: (1) show that there is a good case for revising decision theory so as to allow it to apply non-vacuously to agents with incomplete (...)
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  29. Ethical Experience and the Motives for Practical Rationality. Barber - 2007 - International Philosophical Quarterly 47 (4):425-441.
    John McDowell’s ethical writings interpret ethical experience as intentional, socially-conditioned, virtuous responsiveness to situations and develop a modest account of practical rationality. His work converges with investigations of ethical experience by recent Kant scholars and Emmanuel Levinas. The Kantian interpreters and Levinas locate the categorical demands of ethical experience in rational agents’ demands for respect, while McDowell finds it in noble adherence to the demands of virtuous living. For McDowell, moral-practical rational efforts to justify ethics cannot transcend one’s form of (...)
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  30. Paul Bloomfield.Captain Barclay - 1963 - Eugenics Review 54:25.
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  31. Justification and the Intelligibility of Behavior.Peter H. Barnett - 1975 - Journal of Value Inquiry 9 (1):24-33.
    In trying to make sense out of our behavior, we reach a point at which we stop talking about what we did and start talking about what we wish we had done, about what we mean to do next. But we think we are still talking about our motives and intentions in what we did. How do we know when we cross the line between finding out what actually happened and ascribing to a situation what we think ought to have (...)
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  32. The Highest Good and the Notion of the Good as Object of Pure Practical Reason.Federica Basaglia - 2016 - In Thomas Höwing (ed.), The Highest Good in Kant’s Philosophy. De Gruyter. pp. 17-32.
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  33. Social Conceptions of Moral Agency in Hegel and Sellars.David Baumeister - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (2):249-265.
    This essay contributes to our understanding of the relation between the philosophies of Hegel and Sellars. While most treatments of this relation have focused on metaphysics or epistemology, I focus on ethics, and in particular on the formulation of moral agency. I argue that Hegel and Sellars arrive at a similar metaphilosophical rejection of individual moral agency in favor of conceptions of moral agency as the outcome of social mediation. To demonstrate this, I trace how Hegel and Sellars offer parallel (...)
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  34. Psychology in Action.A. Reply To Baumrind - forthcoming - Research Ethics.
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  35. The Theory of Practical Reason.Charles A. Baylis, Arthur Edward Murphy & A. I. Melden - 1967 - Philosophical Review 76 (4):511.
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  36. Nicholas Rescher, Ed., The Logic of Decision and Action. [REVIEW]Robert W. Beard - 1969 - Journal of Value Inquiry 3 (2):159.
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  37. A New Theory of Humean Reasons? A Critical Note on Schroeder's Hypotheticalism.Matthew Bedke - forthcoming - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
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  38. Of Demands and Desires for Picon Punch: Commentary on Avery Archer’s “What is Direction of Fit?”.Dave Beisecker - 2015 - Southwest Philosophy Review 31 (2):75-80.
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  39. Labor motivation as a factor of innovative development of the economic sphere of social production.O. A. Belenkova - 2016 - Liberal Arts in Russia 5 (5):439-453.
    In the article, the problem of formation of innovation potential of the labor motivation of employees of the social production economic sphere, determining their innovative activity is studied. The importance of positive work motivation of employees increases dramatically in terms of the Fourth industrial revolution. It is connected with the formation in the social production sphere of the sixth technological structure and innovative economy of the 21st century. The author justifies the problem decision of innovative potential formation of labor motivation (...)
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  40. Castañeda Hector-Neri. Imperative Reasonings. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 21 No. 1 , Pp. 21–49.Williams B. A. O.. Imperative Inference. I. Analysis , Vol. 23 Suppl. , Pp. 30–36.Geach P. T.. Imperative Inference. II. Analysis , Vol. 23 Suppl. , Pp. 37–42.Rescher Nicholas and Robison John. Can One Infer Commands From Commands? Analysis , Vol. 24 No. 5 , Pp. 176–179.Gombay André. Imperative Inference and Disjunction. Analysis , Vol. 25 No. 3 , Pp. 58–62.Åqvist Lennart. Choice-Offering and Alternative-Presenting Disjunctive Commands. Analysis , No. 5 , Pp. 182–184.Kenny A. J.. Practical Inference. Analysis , Vol. 26 No. 3 , Pp. 65–75.Geach P. T.. Dr. Kenny on Practical Inference. Analysis , Vol. 26 No. 3 , Pp. 76–79.Bar-Hillel Yehoshua. Imperative Inference. Analysis , Vol. 26 No. 3 , Pp. 79–82.Gombay André. What is Imperative Inference? Analysis , Vol. 27 No. 5 , Pp. 145–152.Hare R. M.. Some Alleged Differences Between Imperatives and Indicatives. Mind, N.S. Vol. 76 , P. [REVIEW]Jonathan Bennett - 1970 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (2):314-318.
  41. Kant's Categories of Practical Reason as Such.R. J. Benton - 1980 - Société Française de Philosophie, Bulletin 71 (2):181.
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  42. The Consistency and Ecological Rationality Approaches to Normative Bounded Rationality.Nathan Berg - 2014 - Journal of Economic Methodology 21 (4):375-395.
    This paper focuses on tacit versus explicit uses of plural performance metrics as a primary methodological characteristic. This characteristic usefully distinguishes two schools of normative analysis and their approaches to normative interpretations of bounded rationality. Both schools of thought make normative claims about bounded rationality by comparing the performance of decision procedures using more than one performance metric. The consistency school makes tacit reference to performance metrics outside its primary axiomatic framework, but lexicographically promotes internal axiomatic consistency as the primary, (...)
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  43. Giving Reasons Does Not Always Amount to Arguing.Lilian Bermejo-Luque - forthcoming - Topoi:1-10.
    Both because of the vagueness of the word ‘give’ when speaking about giving reasons, and because we lack an adequate definition of ‘reasons’, there is a harmful ambiguity in the expression ‘giving reasons’. Particularly, straightforwardly identifying argumentation with reasons giving would make of virtually any interplay a piece of argumentation. Besides, if we adopt the mainstream definition of reasons as “considerations that count in favour of doing or believing something”, then only good argumentation would count as argumentation. In this paper, (...)
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  44. Rational Decision Making: Balancing RUN and JUMP Modes of Analysis.Tilmann Betsch & Carsten Held - 2012 - Mind and Society 11 (1):69-80.
    Rationality in decision making is commonly assessed by comparing choice performance against normative standards. We argue that such a performance-centered approach blurs the distinction between rational choice and adaptive behavior. Instead, rational choice should be assessed with regard to the way individuals make analytic decisions. We suggest that analytic decisions can be made in two different modes in which control processes are directed at different levels. In a RUN mode, thought is directed at controlling the operation of a decision strategy. (...)
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  45. Intentions and Intentionality.Matteo Bianchin - 2015 - Philosophy and Public Issues – Filosofia E Questioni Pubbliche:43-54.
    Michael Thompson recently advanced a “naïve action theory” as an alternative to the “sophisticated” accounts of action displayed by ordinary folk psychology. In what follows I defend the plausibility of intentional psychology and folk psychological explanations. I do this in two ways. First I question that naïve explanations are more naïve than the ones provided by folk psychology and suggest that the latter are phenomenologically prior to the former. Second, I focus on the role of intentionality in deliberation and action (...)
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  46. Rationality in Question: On Eastern and Western Views of Rationality. Biderman & Scharfstein - 1989 - Brill.
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  47. Rationality and Transitivity in Social Explanation: Logical-Mathematical Aspects.Ioan Biriș - 2015 - Balkan Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):65-70.
    The term “rationality” is applied to many different things, from beliefs and preferences to decisions and choices, actions and behaviors, people, collectivities, andinstitutions. Therefore this paper will limit its considerations only to social preferences and choices in order to clarify the role of rationality in social explanation. The paper will focus on degrees of rationality, calling upon the concept of transitivity for help.
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  48. Jean Hampton, The Authority of Reason:The Authority of Reason.Simon Blackburn - 2000 - Ethics 110 (3):619-621.
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  49. Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Simon Blackburn puts forward a compelling original philosophy of human motivation and morality. He maintains that we cannot get clear about ethics until we get clear about human nature. So these are the sorts of questions he addresses: Why do we behave as we do? Can we improve? Is our ethics at war with our passions, or is it an upshot of those passions? Blackburn seeks the answers in an exploration of guilt, shame, disgust, and other moral emotions; he draws (...)
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  50. Reply to Sturgeon.Simon Blackburn - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 61 (1/2):39 - 42.
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