Practical Reason

Edited by Sergio Tenenbaum (University of Toronto, St. George, University of Toronto at Mississauga)
Assistant editors: Parisa Moosavi, Benjamin Elliott Wald
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  1. Common Sense and Beyond.Robert M. Adams & James Joyce - forthcoming - Animus.
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  2. Jean Hampton, The Authority of Reason:The Authority of Reason.Simon Blackburn - 2000 - Ethics 110 (3):619-621.
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  3. Appropriate Attitudes and the Value Problem.Michael S. Brady - 2006 - American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1):91 - 99.
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  4. Government Action and Morality. [REVIEW]David Braybrooke - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (12):363-367.
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  5. Socratic Moral Psychology.Thomas C. Brickhouse & Nicholas D. Smith - 2012 - Cambridge University Press.
    Socrates' moral psychology is widely thought to be 'intellectualist' in the sense that, for Socrates, every ethical failure to do what is best is exclusively the result of some cognitive failure to apprehend what is best. Until publication of this book, the view that, for Socrates, emotions and desires have no role to play in causing such failure went unchallenged. This book argues against the orthodox view of Socratic intellectualism and offers in its place a comprehensive alternative account that explains (...)
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  6. Socratic Moral Psychology.Thomas C. Brickhouse & Nicholas D. Smith - 2010 - Cambridge University Press.
    Socrates' moral psychology is widely thought to be 'intellectualist' in the sense that, for Socrates, every ethical failure to do what is best is exclusively the result of some cognitive failure to apprehend what is best. Until publication of this book, the view that, for Socrates, emotions and desires have no role to play in causing such failure went unchallenged. This book argues against the orthodox view of Socratic intellectualism and offers in its place a comprehensive alternative account that explains (...)
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  7. The Ethical Subject: Accountability, Authorship, and Practical Reason.Svend Brinkmann - 2010 - SATS 11 (1).
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  8. Practical Truth and Its First Principles in the Theory of Grisez, Boyle, and Finnis.Stephen L. Brock - 2015 - The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 15 (2):303-329.
    This article offers an exposition and critical discussion of the account of the truth of practical reason in the natural-law theory of Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, and John Finnis. The exposition rests mainly on an article published by these authors in 1987. There they argue that “true” is said of theoretical and practical knowledge in radically diverse senses. They also distinguish, within practical knowledge, between two kinds of truth, practical and moral. This distinction is tied to their understanding of relations (...)
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  9. Broome, John.Rationality Through Reasoning.Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013. Pp. 322. $99.95.Aaron Bronfman - 2015 - Ethics 125 (4):1194-1199.
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  10. Review: John Broome, Rationality Through Reasoning. [REVIEW]Aaron Bronfman - 2015 - Ethics 125 (4):1194-1199.
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  11. Review: John Broome, Rationality Through Reasoning. [REVIEW]Review by: Aaron Bronfman - 2015 - Ethics 125 (4):1194-1199,.
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  12. Enkrasia.John Broome - 2013 - Organon F 20 (4):425-436.
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  13. 3. I Love You: Weakness and Capture.Pascal Bruckner - 2012 - In The Paradox of Love. Princeton University Press. pp. 57-76.
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  14. Review: Mark Schroeder, Explaining the Reasons We Share: Explanation and Expression in Ethics. [REVIEW]John Brunero - 2015 - Ethics 126 (1):238-244.
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  15. Two Approaches to Instrumental Rationality and Belief Consistency.John Brunero - 2005 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (1).
    R. Jay Wallace argues that the normativity of instrumental rationality can be traced to the independent rational requirement to hold consistent beliefs. I present three objections to this view. John Broome argues that there is a structural similarity between the rational requirements of instrumental rationality and belief consistency. Since he does not reduce the former to the latter, his view can avoid the objections to Wallace’s view. However, we should not think Broome’s account explains the whole of instrumental rationality since (...)
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  16. Review: Mark Schroeder, Explaining the Reasons We Share: Explanation and Expression in Ethics. [REVIEW]Review by: John Brunero - 2015 - Ethics 126 (1):238-244.
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  17. Subjectivity and Human Agency.Theodora Bryan - 1995 - Dissertation, Loyola University of Chicago
    In this dissertation I give a metaethical account of human agency by developing the notion of character and showing its relation to agency. I argue that subjectivity, defined in terms of character, is ineliminable with regard to moral deliberation and that human agency is essentially personal. Agency is personal, in that, agents act from the standpoint of their character--the standpoint of their internalized conception of value. ;I then delineate the problem this account of agency poses for certain types of objective (...)
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  18. Self-Validation and Internalism in Velleman’s Constitutivism.Michael Bukoski - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (11):2667-2686.
    Metaethical constitutivists explain reasons or normativity in terms of what is constitutive of agency. In Velleman’s paradigmatic constitutivist theory, that is the aim of self-understanding. The best-known objection to constitutivism is Enoch’s shmagency objection: constitutivism cannot explain normativity because a constitutive aim of agency lacks normative significance unless one has reason to be an agent rather than a “shmagent”. In response, Velleman argues that the constitutive aim is self-validating. I argue that this claim is false. If the constitutive aim of (...)
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  19. Review of Elijah Milgram Practical Induction. [REVIEW]Sarah Buss - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (4):571.
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  20. Challenge and Response.A. S. C. - 1971 - Review of Metaphysics 25 (2):373-374.
  21. Rationality and Reality.Cheyne C. (ed.) - 2006 - Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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  22. The Role of Diagrammatic Reasoning in Ethical Deliberation.Daniel G. Campos - 2015 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 51 (3):338-357.
    In the 1903 lecture “What Makes a Reasoning Sound?” Charles Peirce provides a detailed account of the process of ethical deliberation intended to shape right conduct. He does this in the context of arguing against the claim that there is no distinction between moral right and wrong. He considered the argument for this claim to be analogous to the argument for the claim that there is no distinction between good and bad reasoning.1 Though Peirce’s ultimate concern in the lecture is (...)
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  23. Review of Rational Decision and Causality. [REVIEW]James Cargile - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):163-168.
  24. Decision Framing in Judgment Aggregation.Fabrizio Cariani, Marc Pauly & Josh Snyder - 2008 - Synthese 163 (1):1 - 24.
    Judgment aggregation problems are language dependent in that they may be framed in different yet equivalent ways. We formalize this dependence via the notion of translation invariance, adopted from the philosophy of science, and we argue for the normative desirability of translation invariance. We characterize the class of translation invariant aggregation functions in the canonical judgment aggregation model, which requires collective judgments to be complete. Since there are reasonable translation invariant aggregation functions, our result can be viewed as a possibility (...)
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  25. Roughing Out the Ground Rules: Reason and Experience in Practical Deliberation.David Carr - 1995 - Philosophy of Education 29 (1):137-147.
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  26. Practical Reason, Reasons for Doing and Intentional Action.Héctor-Neri Castañeda - 1987 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 2 (4).
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  27. Practical Reason, Reasons for Doing and Intentional Action.Héctor-Neri Castañeda - 1986 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 2 (1):69-96.
    To come to know what to do is to have a thought which itself consists of an awareness of its bringing about an action, or a rearrangement of one’s causal powers...The causal dimension of practical thinking is the coalescence of contemplation and the causation of that contemplation, and the contemplation of that causation.
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  28. Rigorous Reasoning.Peter Cave - 1994 - Philosophy Now 9:14-17.
  29. The Moral Psychology of Revenge.A. Chakrabarti - 2005 - Journal of Human Values 11 (1):31-36.
    The tendency and ability to take adequate revenge for an insult or injury inflicted in the past have been often glorified as part of a ‘just and honourable’ individual or communal character. This article argues against this old—and currently popular—belief that the act of revenge is justified and reasonable. The central flaw in the idea of revenge is that it is a futile attempt to remedy past suffering. The article shows how revenge cannot be defended as ‘teaching the aggressor a (...)
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  30. “Comparativism: The Ground of Rational Choice,” in Errol Lord and Barry McGuire, Eds., Weighing Reasons , 2016.Ruth Chang - 2016 - In B. Maguire & E. Lord (eds.), Weighing Reasons. Oxford University Press. pp. 213-240.
    What, normatively speaking, are the grounds of rational choice? This paper defends ‘comparativism’, the view that a comparative fact grounds rational choice. It examines three of the most serious challenges to comparativism: 1) that sometimes what grounds rational choice is an exclusionary-type relation among alternatives; 2) that an absolute fact such as that it’s your duty or conforms to the Categorial Imperative grounds rational choice; and 3) that rational choice between incomparables is possible, and in particular, all that is needed (...)
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  31. Voting and Vagueness.James Kennedy Chase - 2016 - Synthese 193 (8):2453–2468.
    How to handle vagueness? One way is to introduce the machinery of acceptable sharpenings, and reinterpret truth as truth-in-all-sharpenings or truth-in-some-sharpenings. A major selling point has been the conservativism of the resulting systems with respect to classical theoremhood and inference. Supervaluationism and subvaluationism possess interesting formal symmetries, a fact that has been used to argue for the subvaluationist approach. However, the philosophical motivation behind each is a different matter. Subvaluationism comes with a standard story that is difficult to sign up (...)
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  32. The Denial of Moral Dilemmas as a Regulative Ideal.Michael Cholbi - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):268-289.
    The traditional debate about moral dilemmas concerns whether there are circumstances in which an agent is subject to two obligations that cannot both be fulfilled. Realists maintain there are. Irrealists deny this. Here I defend an alternative, methodologically-oriented position wherein the denial of genuine moral dilemmas functions as a regulative ideal for moral deliberation and practice. That is, moral inquiry and deliberation operate on the implicit assumption that there are no genuine moral dilemmas. This view is superior to both realism (...)
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  33. What is This Thing Called Metaethics?Matthew Chrisman - 2016 - Routledge.
    Are moral standards relative to cultures? Are there any moral facts? What is goodness? If there are moral facts how do we learn about them?_ _These are all questions in metaethics, the branch of ethics that investigates the status of morality, the nature of ethical facts, and the meaning of ethical statements. To the uninitiated it can appear abstract and far removed from its two more concrete cousins, ethical theory and applied ethics, yet it is one of the fastest-growing and (...)
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  34. The Thief of Time. Philosophical Essays on Procrastination.Chrisoula Andreou & Mark D. White (eds.) - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    When we fail to achieve our goals, procrastination is often the culprit. But how exactly is procrastination to be understood? This edited volume integrates the problem of procrastination into philosophical inquiry, exploring the relationship of procrastination to agency, rationality, and ethics--topics that philosophy is well-suited to address.
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  35. The Entwinement Logic of Practices: Insights From an Ethnography of Young IT Professionals.Hameed Chughtai & Michael David Myers - unknown
    This paper seeks to place the phenomenon of technology within the context of everyday practices using the logic of practical rationality. We draw some insights from our ethnography of young professionals and shed light on their everyday technological practices by invoking the concept of entwinement from hermeneutic phenomenology. Our findings reveal that the new generation users are becoming intimately entwined with information technologies in their everyday practices. Our study contributes toward the ongoing debate concerning the theorizing of technology and its (...)
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  36. Varieties of Practical Inference. Clarke - 1979 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):273-286.
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  37. The Role of Practical Inferences in Deliberation. Clarke - 1977 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 15 (1):15-25.
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  38. How Compatibilists Can Account for the Moral Motive: Autonomy and Metaphysical Internalism.Kelly Coble - 2007 - Kant-Studien 98 (3):329-350.
    I. Introduction In Groundwork III and in the Critique of Practical Reason Kant famously asserted that “Freiheit und unbedingtes praktisches Gesetz weisen […] wechselsweise auf einander zurück.” Kant's thesis of the analyticity of freedom and practical reason was rejected by his prominent early readers. In the eighth of his influential Letters on Kant's Philosophy of 1786–1787, Karl Leonhard Reinhold argued that the identification of the will with practical reason excluded the possibility of ascribing freedom to immoral and amoral actions. Reinhold (...)
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  39. Argumentative Virtues as Conduits for Reason’s Causal Efficacy: Why the Practice of Giving Reasons Requires That We Practice Hearing Reasons.Daniel H. Cohen - forthcoming - Topoi:1-8.
    Psychological and neuroscientific data suggest that a great deal, perhaps even most, of our reasoning turns out to be rationalizing. The reasons we give for our positions are seldom either the real reasons or the effective causes of why we have those positions. We are not as rational as we like to think. A second, no less disheartening observation is that while we may be very effective when it comes to giving reasons, we are not that good at getting reasons. (...)
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  40. The Nature of Moral Reasoning: The Framework and Activities of Ethical: The Framework and Activities of Ethical Deliberation, Argument, and Decision—Making.Stephen Cohen - 2004 - Oxford University Press Anz.
    The Nature of Moral Reasoning is a discussion about the landscape, or environment, in which moral reasoning occurs. The book engages the reader in an examination of the processes involved in thinking about moral matters. The theoretical underpinnings of moral reasoning are explained carefully in the context of an examination about what it means to engage in the central activity of moral reasoning. The discussion is both theoretical and practical and is about where moral reasoning is located, and how it (...)
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  41. Aquinas on Rationality, Freedom and Deformed Choice.Gavin Terence Colvert - 1995 - Dissertation, University of Toronto (Canada)
    This dissertation assesses Thomas Aquinas' response to the problem of whether agents can rationally choose to pursue one course of action when they believe another course is better and open to them. The core of the problem lies in the conceptual connection often made between desirability and normative standards of goodness. Given this connection, it is apparently contradictory to claim that a person can rationally choose to do what he or she desires rather than what he or she thinks best, (...)
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  42. Regret Aversion in Reason-Based Choice.Terry Connolly & Jochen Reb - 2012 - Theory and Decision 73 (1):35-51.
    This research examines the moderating role of regret aversion in reason-based choice. Earlier research has shown that regret aversion and reason-based choice effects are linked through a common emphasis on decision justification, and that a simple manipulation of regret salience can eliminate the decoy effect, a well-known reason-based choice effect. We show here that the effect of regret salience varies in theory-relevant ways from one reason-based choice effect to another. For effects such as the select/reject and decoy effect, both of (...)
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  43. No Lacuna and No Vicious Regress: A Reply to le Poidevin.Christina Conroy - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (4):367-372.
    In his “Space, supervenience and substantivalism”, Le Poidevin proposes a substantivalism in which space is discrete, implying that there are unmediated spatial relations between neighboring primitive points. This proposition is motivated by his concern that relationism suffers from an explanatory lacuna and that substantivalism gives rise to a vicious regress. Le Poidevin implicitly requires that the relationist be committed to the “only x and y ” principle regarding spatial relations. It is not obvious that the relationist is committed to this (...)
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  44. Risk Assessment and Rational Decision Theory.Roger M. Cooke - 1982 - Dialectica 36 (4):329-351.
    SummaryI contend on both theoretical and historical grounds that quantitative risk assessment is relevant for policy determination only as a cost estimate. In particular, it provides a method for estimating the costs of a hypothetical insurance policy against the potential liabilities associated with a given course of action. It is not relevant to the question of rational choice under risk.RésuméJe montre, en partant d'arguments aussi bien théoriques qu'historiques, que le calcul quanti‐tatif des risques n'aide à la détermination d'une politique à (...)
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  45. Introduction: Metaethics and Normative Ethics.David Copp - 2006 - In The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 3--35.
    This chapter begins by explaining the distinction between meta-ethics and normative ethics. It then introduces the main issues in the two fields and provides a critical overview of the chapters in the volume. In meta-ethics, it focuses on explaining the different kinds of moral realism and anti-realism, including the divine command theory, naturalism, non-naturalism, relativism, nihilism, and non-cognitivism. Quasi-realism illustrates how the distinction between anti-realism and realism can become blurred. A variety of views about the relation between morality and practical (...)
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  46. Gyges's Choice: Overridingness and the Unity of Reason.David Copp - 1997 - Social Philosophy and Policy 14 (1):94.
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  47. Two Jobs for Aristotle's Practical Syllogism?Corcilius Klaus - 2009 - Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 12.
    Among scholars it is common to assume that Aristotle’s practical syllogism does two jobs. It is often taken to explain both animal motion and human deliberation. I will call this the “two-jobs view of the practical syllogism”. In what follows, I will argue that the two-jobs view of the practical syllogism is not working. I will then try to give a very brief and incomplete sketch of how to conceive of a non-two-jobs view of the Aristotelian practical syllogism. Finally, I (...)
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  48. Referees for 2008–2009.J. Angelo Corlett - 2009 - Journal of Ethics 13 (4):425-425.
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  49. A Review of the Empirical Ethical Decision-Making Literature: 2004–2011. [REVIEW]Jana L. Craft - 2013 - Journal of Business Ethics 117 (2):221-259.
    This review summarizes the research on ethical decision-making from 2004 to 2011. Eighty-four articles were published during this period, resulting in 357 findings. Individual findings are categorized by their application to individual variables, organizational variables, or the concept of moral intensity as developed by Jones :366–395, 1991). Rest’s four-step model for ethical decision-making is used to summarize findings by dependent variable—awareness, intent, judgment, and behavior. A discussion of findings in each category is provided in order to uncover trends in the (...)
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  50. On the Metaphysics of Species.Judith K. Crane - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (2):156-173.
    This paper explains the metaphysical implications of the view that species are individuals (SAI). I first clarify SAI in light of the separate distinctions between individuals and classes, particulars and universals, and abstract and concrete things. I then show why the standard arguments given in defense of SAI are not compelling. Nonetheless, the ontological status of species is linked to the traditional "species problem," in that certain species concepts do entail that species are individuals. I develop the idea that species (...)
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