Practical Reason

Edited by Sergio Tenenbaum (University of Toronto at Mississauga)
Assistant editors: Michael Kirley, Parisa Moosavi
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  1. Contre Parfit: une défense du naturalisme.Stéphane Lemaire - 2019 - Klēsis Revue Philosophique 43:59-95.
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  2. G.E.M. Anscombe: guida alla lettura di Intention.Elisa Grimi - 2018 - Roma RM, Italia: Carocci.
    L’opera più importante per la filosofia dell’azione dopo l’Etica di Aristotele: così Donald Davidson ha definito il libro di Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe, Intention, che Elisa Grimi ci presenta oggi attraverso questa preziosa guida alla lettura, il primo testo di questo genere in lingua italiana. dalla Prefazione di Cyrille Michon. Che cosa sia un’intenzione, quale sia il ruolo che essa svolge all'interno di un’azione, se vi si possa trovare traccia della vera intenzione del soggetto guardando l’azione che compie: questi e (...)
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  3. Praxis Und Gründe. Zu den Normativen Grundlagen Praktischer Rationalität.Florian Franken Figueiredo - 2017 - Münster: Mentis-Verlag.
    Praktische Gründe dienen uns Menschen dazu, unser Handeln verständlich zu machen. Philosophen sind fasziniert vom Wesen praktischer Gründe. Auf was für einen Gegenstand beziehen wir uns, wenn wir unser Handeln erklären? Sind praktische Gründe als psychologische Zustände der handelnden Person aufzufassen, etwa als deren Wünsche oder Überzeugungen? Oder sind sie identisch mit den sich in der Welt befindenden Tatsachen, also unabhängig vom Geist der Akteure? Verursachen Gründe unser Handeln? Diese und andere Fragen sind aktueller Gegenstand einer vielschichtigen Diskussion in der (...)
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  4. Philosophical Papers: Volume 1, Human Agency and Language.Charles Taylor - 1985 - Cambridge University Press.
    Charles Taylor has been one of the most original and influential figures in contemporary philosophy: his 'philosophical anthropology' spans an unusually wide range of theoretical interests and draws creatively on both Anglo-American and Continental traditions in philosophy. A selection of his published papers is presented here in two volumes, structured to indicate the direction and essential unity of the work. He starts from a polemical concern with behaviourism and other reductionist theories which aim to model the study of man on (...)
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  5. Review of John McMillan, The Methods of Bioethics: An Essay in Meta-Bioethics.Jonathan Lewis - 2019 - American Journal of Bioethics 19 (7):W4 - W5.
    Although McMillan recognizes that moral theory has its place, he suggests that by setting bioethics up as a discipline whose predominant issues are to do with theory, not only are students insulated from the broadness of its scope and the diversity of its methods, but the subject comes across as largely inaccessible to those without some formal train- ing in normative ethics and of limited practical signifi- cance to those dealing with concrete issues.
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  6. Enoch’s “Taking-Morality-Seriously Thought” Unpacked and at Work in the Argument From Impartiality.Giuliana Mancuso - 2018 - Topoi 37 (4):591-602.
    After a brief outline of Enoch’s defense of robust realism in his Taking Morality Seriously, I focus on Enoch’s taking-morality-seriously thought by making explicit the assumptions I see involved in it. Enoch’s argument from impartiality is then reconstructed to show how these assumptions are at work. Next, I explain the reasons why Enoch does not succeed in converting these assumptions into a positive argument for the thesis implied by robust realism that there is a moral objectivity. Finally, I conclude that (...)
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  7. Making Sense of the Sentence.Daniel Coren - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Research 43:205-222.
    Early on in his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues that there must be a single end or good desired for its own sake, for the sake of which all of our other ends are desired. The argument includes the following conditional: “If we chose everything for the sake of something else so that the process went on forever, then our desire would be empty and futile.” This paper addresses that conditional. First, I explain why the conditional appears to be false. Second, (...)
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  8. Games: Agency as Art.C. Thi Nguyen - forthcoming - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Games occupy a unique and valuable place in our lives. Game designers do not simply create worlds; they design temporary selves. Game designers set what our motivations are in the game and what our abilities will be. Thus: games are the art form of agency. By working in the artistic medium of agency, games can offer a distinctive aesthetic value. They support aesthetic experiences of deciding and doing. -/- And the fact that we play games shows something remarkable about us. (...)
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  9. Marcus Arvan, Rightness as Fairness: A Moral and Political Theory, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, Xi + 271 Pp., £88.39 , ISBN 978‐1‐137‐54180‐2, eBook ISBN 978‐1‐137‐54181‐9. [REVIEW]François Jaquet - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (2):315-320.
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  10. A Psicologia de Epicteto.Diogo Luz - 2018 - Polymatheia 11 (18):90-112.
    Resumo: O presente artigo aborda a dimensão psicológica da filosofia de Epicteto. Para tal, exploramos inicialmente a distinção epictetiana entre as coisas que dependem de nós e as que não dependem, visto que é por meio dela que o filósofo separa o que é interno do que é externo. Ao fazer isso, ele foca a abordagem ética naquilo que é interno, pois afirma que é isso que depende de nós (ἐφ ̓ ἡμῖν). Dentre as ações que são ἐφ ̓ ἡμῖν, (...)
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  11. The Logical Structure of Intentional Anonymity.Michał Barcz, Jarek Gryz & Adam Wierzbicki - 2019 - Diametros 16 (60):1-17.
    It has been noticed by several authors that the colloquial understanding of anonymity as mere unknown-ness is insufficient. This common-sense notion of anonymity does not recognize the role of the goal for which the anonymity is sought. Starting with the distinction between the intentional and unintentional anonymity (which are usually taken to be the same) and the general concept of the non-coordinatability of traits, we offer a logical analysis of anonymity and identification (understood as de-anonymization). In our enquiry, we focus (...)
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  12. Acting Intentionally and its Limits: Individuals, Groups, Institutions.Michael Schmitz, Gottfried Seebaß & Peter M. Gollwitzer (eds.) - 2013 - Berlin: DeGruyter.
    The book presents the first comprehensive survey of limits of the intentional control of action from an interdisciplinary perspective. It brings together leading scholars from philosophy, psychology, and the law to elucidate this theoretically and practically important topic from a variety of theoretical and disciplinary approaches. It provides reflections on conceptual foundations as well as a wealth of empirical data and will be a valuable resource for students and researchers alike. Among the authors: Clancy Blair, Todd S. Braver, Michael W. (...)
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  13. Gert, Joshua. Normative Bedrock: Response-Dependence, Rationality, and Reasons.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. 218. $65.00. [REVIEW]Bart Streumer - 2014 - Ethics 124 (3):608-612.
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  14. Book Reviews Bermúdez, José Luis . Decision Theory and Rationality . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Pp. 189. $50.00 (Cloth). [REVIEW]Paul Weirich - 2009 - Ethics 119 (4):757-761.
  15. Book ReviewsJoyce Jenkins, ;, Jennifer Whiting, ; and Christopher Williams,, Eds. Persons and Passions: Essays in Honor of Annette Baier.Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005. Pp. 368. $53.00. [REVIEW]Jacqueline Taylor - 2006 - Ethics 117 (1):127-130.
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  16. Book ReviewSimon Blackburn,. Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning. Oxford: Clarendon, 1999. Pp. Vii + 334. $29.95. [REVIEW]Russell Shafer‐Landau - 2001 - Ethics 111 (4):799-804.
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  17. Book ReviewB. C. Postow, Reasons for Action: Toward a Normative Theory and Meta‐Level Criteria.Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999. Pp. 204. $90.00. [REVIEW]Robert Noggle - 2001 - Ethics 112 (1):175-177.
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  18. Why Does Aristotle Defend the Principle of Non‐Contradiction Against its Contrary?Daniel Coren - 2018 - Philosophical Forum 49 (1):39-59.
    In his Metaphysics Γ.4, Aristotle defends the principle of non-contradiction (PNC). The PNC says that all contradictions are false. So if some contradictions are true, then PNC is false. Even if PNC’s contrary is false, PNC’s contradictory might still be true. But it’s been noted in the literature for over a century that Aristotle seems to be exclusively interested in attacking PNC’s contrary (‘All contradictions are true’) rather than PNC’s contradictory (‘Some contradictions are true’). So his defense of PNC seems (...)
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  19. Kitcher on Well-Ordered Science: Should Science Be Measured Against the Outcomes of Ideal Democratic Deliberation?Arnon Keren - 2013 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 28 (2):233-244.
    What should the goals of scientific inquiry be? What questions should scientists investigate, and how should our resources be distributed between different lines of investigation? Philip Kitcher has suggested that we should answer these questions by appealing to an ideal based on the consideration of hypothetical democratic deliberations under ideal circumstances. The paper argues that we have no reason to adopt this ideal. The paper examines both traditional arguments for democracy and Kitcher's own reasons for adopting this ideal, as presented (...)
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  20. Bent, Not Broken: Why Exemplification Simpliciter Remains a Problem for Eternalist Endurantism.Daniel Giberman - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (5):947-966.
    One premise in David Lewis’s well-known argument from temporary intrinsic properties in favor of temporal parts is the intuition that material objects exemplify such properties simpliciter, that is, without qualification. The argument has spawned a large critical literature, with commentators questioning the simpliciter premise’s motivation, content, dialectical force, and status as an intuition. The present essay has two chief goals: to provide a novel framework for clarifying Lewis’s simpliciter premise and to explain how the resulting clarification upends a wide range (...)
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  21. Understanding Standing: Permission to Deflect Reasons.Ori Herstein - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (12):3109-3132.
    Standing is a peculiar norm, allowing for deflecting that is rejecting offhand and without deliberation interventions such as directives. Directives are speech acts that aim to give directive-reasons, which are reason to do as the directive directs because of the directive. Standing norms, therefore, provide for deflecting directives regardless of validity or the normative weight of the rejected directive. The logic of the normativity of standing is, therefore, not the logic of invalidating directives or of competing with directive-reasons but of (...)
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  22. Toleration and its Paradoxes: A Tribute to John Horton.Rainer Forst - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (2):415-424.
    This paper discusses John Horton’s influential theory of toleration. Starting from his analysis of the paradoxes of toleration, I argue that the avoidance of these paradoxes requires a moral justification of toleration based on practical reason. I cite the conception of toleration that Pierre Bayle developed to support this claim. But Horton is skeptical of such a moral justification, and this creates problems for his account of toleration.
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  23. Reply to Nadler: Spinoza and the Metaphysics of Suicide.John Grey - 2017 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 25 (2):380-388.
    Steven Nadler has argued that Spinoza can, should, and does allow for the possibility of suicide committed as a free and rational action. Given that the conatus is a striving for perfection, Nadler argues, there are cases in which reason guides a person to end her life based on the principle of preferring the lesser evil. If so, Spinoza’s disparaging statements about suicide are intended to apply only to some cases, whereas in others he would grant that suicide is dictated (...)
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  24. Anscombe on the Sources of Normativity.Katharina Nieswandt - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (1):141-163.
    Anscombe is usually seen as a critic of “Modern Moral Philosophy.” I attempt a systematic reconstruction and a defense of Anscombe’s positive theory. -/- Anscombe’s metaethics is a hybrid of social constructivism and Aristotelian naturalism. Her three main claims are the following: (1) We cannot trace all duties back to one moral principle; there is more than one source of normativity. (2) Whether I have a certain duty will often be determined by the social practices of my community. For instance, (...)
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  25. The Self, Motivation & Virtue Project E-Newsletter 06.Project Smv - unknown
    This is the quarterly electronic publication of the Self, Motivation & Virtue Project. It features a lead article, autobiographical sketches of SMV Project research team members, publication announcements, and updates about the SMV Project leadership team. The SMV Project is made possible by a generous grant from the Templeton Religion Trust and by support from The University of Oklahoma.
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  26. Parfit Über Intuitionismus Und Die Herausforderung Moralischer Uneinigkeit.Kay Hüwelmeyer - 2016 - Zeitschrift Für Praktische Philosophie 3 (2):287-324.
    In On What Matters verbindet Parfit einen nicht-naturalistischen normativen Realismus –die Auffassung, es gebe objektive normative Wahrheiten – mit einer intuitionistischen Erkenntnistheorie bezüglich des Normativen, die davon ausgeht, wir hätten intuitiven epistemischen Zugriff auf jene normativen Wahrheiten. Beide Theorien sieht er durch ein Argument bedroht, das von moralischer Uneinigkeit ausgeht. Um diesem Argument zu entgehen, vertritt Parfit die These, dass unsere normativen Überzeugungen unter Idealbedingungen konvergieren. Dieser Aufsatz macht anhand des Beispiels meta-normativer Uneinigkeiten zunächst deutlich, dass Parfit die Plausibilität seiner (...)
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  27. Normative Wahrheiten Ohne Ontologie? Derek Parfit Und der „Neue“ Non-Naturalismus.Markus Rüther - 2016 - Zeitschrift Für Praktische Philosophie 3 (2):187-220.
    Das Thema des Beitrages bildet der „neue“ Non-Naturalismus, welcher exemplarisch am metaethischen Ansatz von Derek Parfit untersucht wird. Parfits Ansatz zeichnet sich durch das Ziel aus, eine neue Theorienoption zu ermöglichen, die einerseits von der Existenz normativer Tatsachen ausgeht, ohne jedoch andererseits auf die ontologischen Verpflichtungen der klassischen Vertreter des Non-Naturalismus festgelegt zu sein. Hierfür wird der Begriff der „nicht-ontologischen Existenz“ eingeführt und von robusten ontologischen Existenzweisen unterschieden. In diesem Beitrag wird dafür argumentiert, dass Parfit bisher nur Explikationen dieses zentralen (...)
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  28. Parfit Und Kant Über Vernünftige Zustimmung ​.Martin Sticker - 2016 - Zeitschrift Für Praktische Philosophie 3 (2):221-254.
    Nach Parfit konvergieren die systematisch stärksten Versionen von Kantianismus, Regel-Konsequentialismus und Kontraktualismus in einer Triple Theory. Ich konzentriere mich auf eine der zentralen Schwierigkeiten, Kantianismus und Konsequentialismus zusammenzubringen: die Rolle von Zustimmung, welche ihren deutlichsten Ausdruck in Kants Zweck-an-sich-Formel findet. Ich zeige zunächst, wie die Einführung unparteilicher, nichtmoralischer Gründe, auf der viel Gewicht in Parfits Zustimmungsprinzip liegt, in einigen Fällen die Zweck-an-sich-Formel zu dem intuitiv richtigen Ergebnis führen kann. Anschließend wende ich mich kritisch gegen Parfit. Ich diskutiere zwei Einwände gegen (...)
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  29. Practical reason and morality.A. R. C. DUNCAN - 1957 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 12 (4):403-404.
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  30. Practical Reason and Norms.Joseph Raz - 1993 - Law and Philosophy 12 (3):329-343.
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  31. Practical Reason.Stephan Körner - 1977 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 10 (2):133-135.
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  32. Practical Reason and Morality.A. R. C. DUNCAN - 1957 - Philosophy 35 (132):68-69.
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  33. Out of the Space of Reasons: Argumentation, Agents, and Persons.Christopher W. Tindale - 2011 - Radical Philosophy Review of Books 19 (3):383-398.
    The paper investigates the `logical space of reasons' as a social space in which rational agents operate and persons in an important sense come to be. Building from an investigation of argumentative agents in Aristotle's Rhetoric, I discuss both interior and exterior criteria for personhood and propose that the latter shows how argumentation, as a principal activity of the space of reasons, results in the particular kinds of persons we recognize there as rational agents. The overall analysis is indebted to (...)
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  34. Judgment Aggregation and Subjective Decision-Making*: Michael K. Miller.Michael K. Miller - 2008 - Economics and Philosophy 24 (2):205-231.
    I present an original model in judgment aggregation theory that demonstrates the general impossibility of consistently describing decision-making purely at the group level. Only a type of unanimity rule can guarantee a group decision is consistent with supporting reasons, and even this possibility is limited to a small class of reasoning methods. The key innovation is that this result holds when individuals can reason in different ways, an allowance not previously considered in the literature. This generalizes judgment aggregation to subjective (...)
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  35. Practical Reason and the Logic of Imperatives.Hugh T. Wilder - 1980 - Metaphilosophy 11 (3-4):244-251.
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  36. Two Jobs for Aristotle's Practical Syllogism?Klaus Corcilius - 2009 - Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 12.
    Among scholars it is common to assume that Aristotle’s practical syllogism does two jobs. It is often taken to explain both animal motion and human deliberation. I will call this the “two-jobs view of the practical syllogism”. In what follows, I will argue that the two-jobs view of the practical syllogism is not working. I will then try to give a very brief and incomplete sketch of how to conceive of a non-two-jobs view of the Aristotelian practical syllogism. Finally, I (...)
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  37. Contextuality in Practical Reason. [REVIEW]A. Price - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):586-587.
    Anthony Price's recent book presents a contextualist approach to practical rationality. Price develops his proposal in four chapters. In the first one, he outlines a contextual account of the validity of practical inferences. This chapter deals with logicism. Logicism assumes that ‘there is a form of rationality within practical thinking that connects with the logical validity of a practical entailment’. Price argues that although the principles of logic are ‘invariant and universal’, their relevance in evaluating a practical inference is constrained (...)
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  38. Crucible of Reason: Intentional Action, Practical Rationality, and Weakness of Will By Keith D. Wyma.Patrick Madigan - 2006 - Heythrop Journal 47 (4):666-667.
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  39. Practical Reason and Norms.Joseph Raz - 1975 - Philosophical Quarterly 26 (104):287-288.
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  40. Right Practical Reason: Aristotle, Action, and Prudence in Aquinas.Daniel Westberg - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):263-265.
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  41. The Inner Life of a Rational Agent: In Defence of Philosophical Behaviourism – Rowland Stout.Max Hocutt - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237):750-752.
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  42. Exploring the Relations Between Categorization and Decision Making with Regard to Realistic Face Stimuli.James T. Townsend, Kam M. Silva, Jesse Spencer-Smith & Michael J. Wenger - 2000 - Pragmatics and Cognition 8 (1):83-105.
    Categorization and decision making are combined in a task with photorealistic faces. Two different types of face stimuli were assigned probabilistically into one of two fictitious groups; based on the category, faces were further probabilistically assigned to be hostile or friendly. In Part I, participants are asked to categorize a face into one of two categories, and to make a decision concerning interaction. A Markov model of categorization followed by decision making provides reasonable fits to Part I data. A Markov (...)
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  43. Economic Rationality and Practical Reason.Julian Nida-rümmelin - 2000 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 3 (3):331-333.
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  44. The Judgment of a Weak Will.Sergio Tenenbaum - 1999 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):875-911.
    In trying to explain the possibility of akrasia, it seems plausible to deny that there is a conceptual connection between motivation and evaluation ; akrasia occurs when the agent is motivated to do something that she does not judge to be good. However, it is hard to see how such accounts could respect our intuition that the akratic agent acts freely, or that there is a difference between akrasia and compulsion. It is also hard to see how such accounts could (...)
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  45. Marmor’s Social Conventions: The Limits of Practical Reason.Maksymilian Del Mar - 2011 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 41 (3):420-445.
    This essay argues that the practical reason approach to the study of social conventions fails to adequately account for the fluency of social action in environments that we experience as familiar. The practical reason approach, articulated most recently in Andrei Marmor’s Social Conventions: From Language to Law does help us, though not wholly adequately, to understand how we tend to react to, and experience, unfamiliar situations or unfamiliar behaviors, that is, those situations in which a certain practice becomes problematic or (...)
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  46. THE SNAKE AND THE ROUNDABOUT: ETHICAL PARTICULARISM AND THE PATTERNS OF NORMATIVE INDUCTION.R. Kellogg Frederic - 2016 - DUC IN ALTUM CADERNOS DE DIREITO 8 (16).
    Using two examples of ethical choice, Philippa Foot’s snake and the traffic roundabout, this paper offers an account of normative induction that characterizes particularism and generalism as stages of normative inquiry, rather than rival accounts of moral knowledge and motivation. Ethical particularism holds that the evaluative cannot be “cashed out” in propositional form, and that it is descriptively “shapeless.” Drawing on examples from law, this paper claims that, while individual normative inquiry may be viewed as encountering a shapeless particularist context (...)
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  47. Deliberation, Practical Reasoning and Problem-Solving.Walton Douglas & Toniolo Alice - unknown
    We present a series of realistic examples of deliberation and discuss how they can form the basis for building a typology of deliberation dialogues. The observations from our examples are used to suggest that argumentation researchers and philosophers have been thinking about deliberation in overly simplistic ways. We argue that to include all the kinds of argumentation that make up realistic deliberations, it is necessary to distinguish between different kinds of deliberations. We propose a model including a problem-solving type of (...)
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  48. Commentary on Douglas N. Walton and Alice Toniolo’s “Deliberation, Practical Reasoning and Problem-Solving”.Hubert Marraud - unknown
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  49. Constructing Normative Objectivity in Ethics: David B. Wong.David B. Wong - 2008 - Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):237-266.
    This essay explains the inescapability of moral demands. I deny that the individual has genuine reason to comply with these demands only if she has desires that would be served by doing so. Rather, the learning of moral reasons helps to shape and channel self- and other-interested motivations so as to facilitate and promote social cooperation. This shaping happens through the “embedding” of reasons in the intentional objects of motivational propensities. The dominance of the instrumental conception of reason, according to (...)
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  50. Self-Interest: What's in It for Me?*: David Schmidtz.David Schmidtz - 1997 - Social Philosophy and Policy 14 (1):107-121.
    We have taken the “why be moral?” question so seriously for so long. It suggests that we lack faith in the rationality of morality. The relative infrequency with which we ask “why be prudent?” suggests that we have no corresponding lack of faith in the rationality of prudence. Indeed, we have so much faith in the rationality of prudence that to question it by asking “why be prudent?” sounds like a joke. Nevertheless, our reasons and motives to be prudent are (...)
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