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  1. added 2018-12-01
    The Disastrous Implications of the 'English' View of Rationality in a Social World.Seungbae Park - forthcoming - Social Epistemology:1-12.
    Van Fraassen (2007, 2017) consistently uses the English view of rationality to parry criticisms from scientific realists. I assume for the sake of argument that the English view of rationality is tenable, and then argue that it has disastrous implications for van Fraassen’s (1980) contextual theory of explanation, for the empiricist position that T is empirically adequate, and for scientific progress. If you invoke the English view of rationality to rationally disbelieve that your epistemic colleagues’ theories are true, they might, (...)
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  2. added 2018-08-02
    Moralische Motivation. Kant Und Die Alternativen.Heiner F. Klemme, Manfred Kuehn & Dieter Schönecker (eds.) - 2006 - Meiner Verlag.
    Kant und die Alternativen Heiner F. Klemme Manfred Kühn, Dieter Schönecker. H . Klemme / M. Kühn / D. Schönecker (Hg.) Moralische Motivation Kant und die Alternativen Meiner KANT-FORSCHUNGEN Begründet von Reinhard Brandt und ...
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  3. added 2018-03-02
    A New Peircean Response to Radical Skepticism.Justin Remhof - 2018 - Contemporary Pragmatism 15 (1):15-22.
    The radical skeptic argues that I have no knowledge of things I ordinarily claim to know because I have no evidence for or against the possibility of being systematically fed illusions. Recent years have seen a surge of interest in pragmatic responses to skepticism inspired by C. S. Peirce. This essay challenges one such influential response and presents a better Peircean way to refute the skeptic. The account I develop holds that although I do not know whether the skeptical hypothesis (...)
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  4. added 2017-06-21
    Pragmatic Skepticism.Susanna Rinard - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Pragmatic responses to skepticism have been overlooked in recent decades. This paper explores one such response by developing a character called the Pragmatic Skeptic. The Pragmatic Skeptic accepts skeptical arguments for the claim that we lack good evidence for our ordinary beliefs, and that they do not constitute knowledge. However, they do not think we should give up our beliefs in light of these skeptical conclusions. Rather, we should retain them, since we have good practical reasons for doing so. This (...)
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  5. added 2017-04-10
    On The Foundations of Pragmatic Arguments.John Cantwell - 2003 - Journal of Philosophy 100 (8):383 - 402.
  6. added 2017-01-31
    Embodied Cognition and Perception: Dewey, Science and Skepticism.Crippen Matthew - 2017 - Contemporary Pragmatism 14 (1):112-134.
    This article examines how Modern theories of mind remain even in some materialistic and hence ontologically anti-dualistic views; and shows how Dewey, anticipating Merleau-Ponty and 4E cognitive scientists, repudiates these theories. Throughout I place Dewey’s thought in the context of scientific inquiry, both recent and historical and including the cognitive as well as traditional sciences; and I show how he incorporated sciences of his day into his thought, while also anticipating enactive cognitive science. While emphasizing Dewey’s continued relevance, my main (...)
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  7. added 2016-12-08
    The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Reid.Terence Cuneo & René van Woudenberg (eds.) - 2004 - Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
    Widely acknowledged as the principal architect of Scottish common sense philosophy, Thomas Reid is increasingly recognized today as one of the finest philosophers of the eighteenth century. Combining a sophisticated response to the skeptical and idealist views of his day, Reid's thought stands as an important alternative to Humean skepticism, Kantian idealism and Cartesian rationalism. This volume is the first comprehensive overview of Reid's output and covers not only his philosophy in detail, but also his scientific work and his extensive (...)
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  8. added 2016-12-08
    Bertrand Russell, the Passionate Sceptic. [REVIEW]L. C. - 1958 - Review of Metaphysics 11 (4):698-698.
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  9. added 2016-09-01
    Cartesian Skepticism and Internal Realism.Nicholas Tebben - 2013 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 17 (2):251.
    The Cartesian skeptic’s strategy is to tell a story about the world that is entirely consistent with all of the empirical evidence that we do, or can, have, but according to which many or all of our ordinary beliefs are false. He then suggests that, since we cannot show that his story is false, we ought to surrender those beliefs. In this paper I offer a decision-theoretic response to skepticism. Say that a cognitive attitude is a propositional attitude that may (...)
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  10. added 2016-07-14
    Common Sense and Pragmatism: Reid and Peirce on the Justification of First Principles.Nate Jackson - 2014 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 12 (2):163-179.
    This paper elucidates the pragmatist elements of Thomas Reid's approach to the justification of first principles by reference to Charles S. Peirce. Peirce argues that first principles are justified by their surviving a process of ‘self-criticism’, in which we come to appreciate that we cannot bring ourselves to doubt these principles, in addition to the foundational role they play in inquiries. The evidence Reid allows first principles bears resemblance to surviving the process of self-criticism. I then argue that this evidence (...)
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  11. added 2015-08-26
    Ethics and the Sceptical Challenge: A Pragmaticist Approach: Ética E o Desafio Cético: Uma Abordagem Pragmaticista.Claudine Tiercelin - 2007 - Cognitio 8 (2).
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  12. added 2015-08-25
    Making Space: Pragmatism Between Skepticism and Dogmatism.David F. Maier - 2002 - Dissertation, Columbia University
    Philosophical method is itself a branch of philosophy, and does not simply take philosophy as its object. An anti-foundationalist conception of philosophical method can thus be "bootstrapped." The dissertation examines different areas of philosophy which concern inquiry: e.g. , its nature , its object , its medium , finding a pattern of anti-foundationalist argument which extends without paradox to philosophical inquiry and its method. ;The pattern in question has two main aspects. In each context pragmatism occupies a space between two (...)
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  13. added 2015-08-24
    Skepticism and Non-Veridical Justification.Richard Ladd Kirkham - 1983 - Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
    In the first part of my dissertation I defend a fairly sweeping form of skepticism about the external world: For any significantly informative proposition about the external world we have not the slightest justification for thinking it more likely true than its denial. In defending this thesis, I use a version of the evil demon argument, and I argue that a skeptic need only show the logical possibility of the evil demon; he need not make the demon's existence more plausible (...)
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  14. added 2015-06-25
    No Exception for Belief.Susanna Rinard - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):121-143.
    This paper defends a principle I call Equal Treatment, according to which the rationality of a belief is determined in precisely the same way as the rationality of any other state. For example, if wearing a raincoat is rational just in case doing so maximizes expected value, then believing some proposition P is rational just in case doing so maximizes expected value. This contrasts with the popular view that the rationality of belief is determined by evidential support. It also contrasts (...)
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  15. added 2015-05-30
    The Epistemological Ties That Bind: A Pragmatist Case Against Feminist Theories of Truth and Knowledge and the Implications for Feminist Science.Sharyn Suzanne Clough - 1997 - Dissertation, Simon Fraser University (Canada)
    Feminist claims that scientific activity is intimately involved with the oppression of women, often identify aspects of the epistemology of science, or scientific method, as the primary culprit. In my dissertation I try to persuade my feminist colleagues that despite the important gains we have made through the criticism of science, our fairly recent investment in an epistemological critique is yielding diminishing returns. I begin by examining the epistemological reflections of a number of feminist critics of evolutionary biology, including Ruth (...)
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  16. added 2015-05-22
    Invariantism, Skepticism, and Two Senses of Pragmatism.Scott Aikin - 2010 - Southwest Philosophy Review 26 (2):5-7.
  17. added 2014-04-02
    Naturalistic Responses to Skepticism.Carolyn Black - 1999 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 57:67-79.
    One of the many philosophical responses to scepticism is naturalism. It is explored how and to what extent it is successful in discussing these questions as they pertain external world scepticism. One interesting feature of naturalism is that it shares with scepticism the view that we lack proof and knowledge of an external world. The naturalist, however, unlike many sceptics and their more traditional disputants, doesn't think it matters. The first part of the paper contains a description of the naturalistic (...)
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  18. added 2014-03-31
    Russell and the Possibility of Scepticism.Christopher Hookway - 1992 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 6 (2):95 - 110.
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  19. added 2014-03-29
    Defeating the Skeptic.William Throop - 1998 - Philosophia 26 (3-4):321-336.
  20. added 2014-03-27
    Scepticism, Truth and Pragmatic Inquiry.Andrew Ward - 2000 - Southwest Philosophy Review 17 (1):159-172.
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  21. added 2014-03-27
    The Plain Truth About Common Sense: Skepticism, Metaphysics, and Irony.Mark Kingwell - 1995 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 9 (3):169 - 188.
  22. added 2014-03-23
    I Believe It, but Soon I'll Not Believe It Any More: Scepticism, Empiricism, and Reflection.John M. Vickers - 2000 - Synthese 124 (2):155-174.
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  23. added 2014-03-21
    Toward a Skeptical Criticism of Transcendental Pragmatics.Frederic Cossutta - 2003 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 36 (4):301-329.
  24. added 2014-03-20
    Pluralistic Skepticism: Advertisement for Speech Act Pluralism.Herman Cappelen - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):15–39.
    Even though the lines of thought that support skepticism are extremely compelling, we're inclined to look for ways of blocking them because it appears to be an impossible view to accept, both for intellectual and practical reasons. One goal of this paper is to show that when skepticism is packaged right, it has few problematic implications (or at least fewer than is often assumed). It is, for example, compatible with all the following claims (when these are correctly interpreted).
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  25. added 2014-03-20
    Skepticism, Romanticism and “Penitent Art”.Jarnes Seaton - 2005 - Overheard in Seville 23 (23):9-15.
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  26. added 2014-03-19
    The Virtues of Common Sense.Brian Grant - 2001 - Philosophy 76 (2):191-209.
    I defend, in this paper, a version of a philosophy of common sense. I have use of some things from Reid's account of these matters, others from Wittgenstein's. Scepticism looms large—as do the questions of arguments for and examples of common sense. At least two different notions of common sense emerge, one of which has often been overlooked by philosophers.
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  27. added 2014-03-18
    The Problem of Insulation.Wai-hung Wong - 2002 - Philosophy 77 (3):349-373.
    Insulation is a noticeable phenomenon in the case of most non-Pyrrhonian sceptics about human knowledge. A sceptic is experiencing insulation when his scepticism does not have any effect on his common sense beliefs, and his common sense beliefs do not have any effect on his scepticism. I try to show why this is a puzzling phenomenon, and how it can be explained. It is puzzling because insulation seems to require blindness to one's own epistemic irresponsibility and irrationality, while the sceptic (...)
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  28. added 2014-03-17
    Aiming at Truth.Nicholas Unwin - 2007 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
    The author argues that is not obvious what it means for our beliefs and assertions to be "truth-directed", and that we need to weaken our ordinary notion of a belief if we are to deal with radical scepticism without surrendering to idealism. Topics examined also include whether there could be alien conceptual schemes and what might happen to us if we abandoned genuine belief in place of mere pragmatic acceptance. A radically new "ecological" model of knowledge is defended.
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  29. added 2014-03-14
    The Skeptical Paradox and the Indispensability of Knowledge-Beliefs.Wai-Hung Wong - 2005 - Synthese 143 (3):273-290.
    Some philosophers understand epistemological skepticism as merely presenting a paradox to be solved, a paradox given rise to by some apparently forceful arguments. I argue that such a view needs to be justified, and that the best way to do so is to show that we cannot help seeing skepticism as obviously false. The obviousness (to us) of the falsity of skepticism is, I suggest, explained by the fact that we cannot live without knowledge-beliefs (a knowledge-belief about the world is (...)
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  30. added 2014-03-12
    The Skeptic and The Madman: The Proto‐Pragmatism of Thomas Reid.Erik Lundestad - 2006 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 4 (2):125-137.
    Even though the philosophy of common sense is not justifi able as such, the assump- tion upon which it rests, namely that there are things which we are not in position to doubt is correct. The reason why Thomas Reid was unable to bring this assumption out in a justifi able manner is that his views, both on knowledge and nature, are to be considered dogmatic. American pragmatists such as Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey on the other hand, may (...)
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  31. added 2014-03-11
    Authorship and E-Science: Balancing Epistemological Trust and Skepticism in the Digital Environment.Justine Pila - 2009 - Social Epistemology 23 (1):1-24.
    In this essay I consider the role of authorship in balancing epistemological trust and skepticism in e-science. Drawing on studies of the diagnostic practices of doctors in British breast care units and the gate-keeping practices of a Californian publisher of horticultural works, I suggest that conventions of authorial designation have an important role to play in nurturing the skepticism essential for scientific rigor within the framework of epistemological trust that pragmatism and morality require. In so doing I question the assumption (...)
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  32. added 2014-03-09
    Scope and the Limits of Rational Explanation.Tony Lambie - 2009 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):117-124.
    The Reason Why by Edo Pivčević is an unconventional philosophy book. The author takes the wind out of the sails of the sceptic’s argument by removing its basis. It is neither epistemology nor ontology; nor does its outcome fall into the usual categories vis à vis the real, including pragmatism. A complete system is developed through a profound examination of explanation, contrasting the conceptual approach with the unbounded naturalistic kind and its dangers, illuminating examples of the latter kind with misunderstandings (...)
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  33. added 2014-03-09
    Two for the Show: Anti-Luck and Virtue Epistemologies in Consonance.Guy Axtell - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):363 - 383.
    This essay extends my side of a discussion begun earlier with Duncan Pritchard, the recent author of Epistemic Luck.Pritchard’s work contributes significantly to improving the “diagnostic appeal” of a neo-Moorean philosophical response to radical scepticism. While agreeing with Pritchard in many respects, the paper questions the need for his concession to the sceptic that the neo-Moorean is capable at best of recovering “‘brute’ externalist knowledge”. The paper discusses and directly responds to a dilemma that Pritchard poses for virtue epistemologies (VE). (...)
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  34. added 2014-03-07
    Pragmatic Invariantism and External World Skepticism.Eric Thompson - 2010 - Southwest Philosophy Review 26 (1):35-42.
    Simply stated, Pragmatic Invariantism is the view that the practical interests of a person can influence whether that person’s true belief constitutes knowledge. My primary objective in this article is to show that Pragmatic Invariantism entails external world skepticism. Toward this end, I’ll first introduce a basic version of Pragmatic Invariantism (PI). Then I’ll introduce a sample skeptical hypothesis (SK) to the framework. From this I will show that it is extremely important that the phenomenally equivalent skeptical scenarios generated by (...)
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  35. added 2014-03-06
    The Necessity of Pragmatism: Overcoming the Stalemate of Common Sense.Erik Lundestad - 2008 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 6 (2):175-187.
    The paper argues that the relation between the philosophy of common sense and skepticism ought to be perceived of as the relation between the two horns of a dilemma. Each position, it is therefore said, is able to confront the other with a valid objection, something which implies that neither of the two positions are defensible as such. The dilemma is only resolved, it is argued, by the way in which a pragmatic approach to knowledge enables us to incorporate the (...)
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  36. added 2014-03-04
    The Concept of Entitlement and its Epistemic Relevance.Hamid Vahid - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):380-399.
    Crispin Wright has recently suggested that, in addition to the notion of justification, we also possess a non-evidential notion of warrant, ‘entitlement’, that can play an important role in responding to various skeptical questions. My concern here is with the question of whether entitlement constitutes an epistemic kind of warrant. I claim Wright's argument for this thesis at most shows that entitlement has a pragmatic character. Having identified the sources of the troubles of this argument in its underlying assumptions, I (...)
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  37. added 2014-02-10
    Not Giving the Skeptic a Hearing: Pragmatism and Radical Doubt.Erik J. Olsson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):98–126.
    Pragmatist responses to radical skepticism do not receive much attention in contemporary analytic epistemology. This observation is my motivation for undertaking a search for a coherent pragmatist reply to radical doubt, one that can compete, in terms of clarity and sophistication, with the currently most popular approaches, such as contextualism and relevant alternatives theory. As my point of departure I take the texts of C. S. Peirce and William James. The Jamesian response is seen to consist in the application of (...)
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  38. added 2013-09-24
    Epistemic Principles and Epistemic Circularity.Byeong D. Lee - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (2):413-432.
    Can we show that our senses are reliable sources of information about the world? To show this, we need to establish that most of our perceptual judgments have been true. But we cannot determine these inductive instances without relying upon sense perception. Thus, it seems, we cannot establish the reliability of sense perception by means of an argument without falling into epistemic circularity. In this paper, I argue that this consequence is not an epistemological disaster. For this purpose, I defend (...)
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  39. added 2013-06-12
    What is a Situation?Tom Burke - 2000 - History and Philosophy of Logic 21 (2):95-113.
    This paper examines the role of ?situations? in John Dewey's philosophy of logic. To do this properly it is necessary to contrast Dewey's conception of experience and mentality with views characteristic of modern epistemology. The primary difference is that, rather than treat experience as peripheral and or external to mental functions (reason, etc.), we should treat experience as a field in and as a part of which thinking takes place. Experience in this broad sense subsumes theory and fact, hypothesis and (...)
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  40. added 2013-05-07
    Review of M. Lynch, In Praise of Reason (MIT Press, 2012). [REVIEW]Diego E. Machuca - 2013 - Philosophy in Review 33 (4):308-311.
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  41. added 2012-12-28
    Does Epistemology Rest on a Mistake? Understanding Rorty on Scepticism.Douglas James McDermid - 2000 - Critica 32 (96):3 - 42.
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  42. added 2012-12-28
    Hume, Reid and Scepticism.F. F. Centore - 1981 - Philosophical Studies 28:212-220.
  43. added 2012-12-23
    Innateness and Science.Robert Northcott - unknown
    Although a huge range of definitions has accumulated in the philosophy, biology and psychology literatures, no consensus has been reached on exactly what innateness amounts to. This has helped fuel an increasing skepticism, one that views the concept as anachronistic and actually harmful to science. Yet it remains central to many life sciences, and to several public policy issues too. So it is correspondingly urgent that its philosophical underpinnings be properly cleaned up. In this paper, I present a new approach (...)
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  44. added 2012-12-23
    Methodological Pragmatism: A Systems-Theoretic Approach to the Theory of Knowledge.Nicholas Rescher - 1977 - Blackwell.
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  45. added 2012-12-23
    Skepticism, Foundationalism, and Pragmatism.Joseph Margolis - 1977 - American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (2):119 - 127.
    This article formulates the grounds on which a pragmatist theory of knowledge may be favored against skepticism and foundationalism without requiring the refutation of skepticism. It explores in considerable detail some of the central positions bearing on the issue, Including views of g e moore, Bertrand russell, Roderick chisholm, Keith lehrer, Leonard nelson. It also provides a fresh characterization of pragmatism and shows the bearing of theories of truth on the justification of knowledge claims.
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  46. added 2012-12-23
    Statistical Explanation and Ergodic Theory.Lawrence Sklar - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 40 (2):194-212.
    Some philosphers of science of an empiricist and pragmatist bent have proposed models of statistical explanation, but have then become sceptical of the adequacy of these models. It is argued that general considerations concerning the purpose of function of explanation in science which are usually appealed to by such philosophers show that their scepticism is not well taken; for such considerations provide much the same rationale for the search for statistical explanations, as these philosophers have characterized them, as they do (...)
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  47. added 2012-12-20
    What is at Issue Between Epistemic and Traditional Accounts of Truth?John Fox - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):407 – 420.
    I will discuss those epistemic accounts of truth that say, roughly and at least, that the truth is what all ideally rational people, with maximum evidence, would in the long run come to believe. They have been defended on the grounds that they can solve sceptical problems that traditional accounts cannot surmount, and that they explain the value of truth in ways that traditional (and particularly, minimal) accounts cannot; they have been attacked on the grounds that they collapse into idealism. (...)
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  48. added 2012-12-20
    Beliefs About Other Minds: A Pragmatic Justification.James Lenman - 1994 - American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (3):223-34.
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  49. added 2012-12-18
    Wittgensteinian Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Vertigo.Cameron Boult & Duncan Pritchard - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (1):27-35.
    We offer an overview of what we take to be the main themes in Annalisa Coliva’s book, Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense. In particular, we focus on the ‘framework reading’ that she offers of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and its anti-sceptical implications. While broadly agreeing with the proposal that Coliva puts forward on this score, we do suggest one important supplementation to the view—viz., that this way of dealing with radical scepticism needs to be augmented with an account (...)
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  50. added 2012-12-06
    Showing Certainty: An Essay on Wittgenstein's Response to Scepticism.Anne Newstead - manuscript
    Coping with everyday life limits the extent of one’s scepticism. It is practically impossible to doubt the existence of the things with which one is immediately engaged and interacting. To doubt that, say, a door exists, is to step back from merely using the door (opening it) and to reflect on it in a detached, theoretical way. It is impossible to simultaneously act and live immersed in situation S while doubting that one is in S. Sceptical doubts—such as ‘Is this (...)
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