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  1. Showing Certainty: An Essay on Wittgenstein's Response to Scepticism.Anne Newstead - manuscript
    Coping with everyday life limits the extent of one’s scepticism. It is practically impossible to doubt the existence of the things with which one is immediately engaged and interacting. To doubt that, say, a door exists, is to step back from merely using the door (opening it) and to reflect on it in a detached, theoretical way. It is impossible to simultaneously act and live immersed in situation S while doubting that one is in S. Sceptical doubts—such as ‘Is this (...)
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  2. Radical Scepticism, Stereotypes and the Practical Stance.Anne Meylan - forthcoming - Brill Studies in Skepticism.
    That we have practical reasons to believe certain propositions even if sceptical arguments are cogent is nothing new. As Hume puts it, if sceptical principles were steadily accepted, “men would remain in a total lethargy until their miserable lives came to an end through lack of food, drink and shelter.” (Enquiry, 12, 2). This heart-breaking projection fails to move contemporary epistemologists who, for the most part, brush off pragmatist stances on scepticism. In this paper, I argue that the pragmatist stance (...)
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  3. Pragmatic Skepticism.Susanna Rinard - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Pragmatic responses to skepticism have been overlooked in recent decades. This paper explores one such response by developing a character called the Pragmatic Skeptic. The Pragmatic Skeptic accepts skeptical arguments for the claim that we lack good evidence for our ordinary beliefs, and that they do not constitute knowledge. However, they do not think we should give up our beliefs in light of these skeptical conclusions. Rather, we should retain them, since we have good practical reasons for doing so. This (...)
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  4. Knowledge and Truth: A Skeptical Challenge.Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (1):93-101.
    It is widely accepted in epistemology that knowledge is factive, meaning that only truths can be known. We argue that this theory creates a skeptical challenge: because many of our beliefs are only approximately true, and therefore false, they do not count as knowledge. We consider several responses to this challenge and propose a new one. We propose easing the truth requirement on knowledge to allow approximately true, practically adequate representations to count as knowledge. In addition to addressing the skeptical (...)
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  5. The Ordinary Language Argument Against Skepticism—Pragmatized.Sinan Dogramaci - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):879-896.
    I develop a new version of the ordinary language response to skepticism. My version is based on premises about the practical functions served by our epistemic words. I end by exploring how my argument against skepticism is interestingly non-circular and philosophically valuable.
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  6. The Disastrous Implications of the 'English' View of Rationality in a Social World.Seungbae Park - 2019 - Social Epistemology 33 (1):88-99.
    Van Fraassen (2007, 2017) consistently uses the English view of rationality to parry criticisms from scientific realists. I assume for the sake of argument that the English view of rationality is tenable, and then argue that it has disastrous implications for van Fraassen’s (1980) contextual theory of explanation, for the empiricist position that T is empirically adequate, and for scientific progress. If you invoke the English view of rationality to rationally disbelieve that your epistemic colleagues’ theories are true, they might, (...)
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  7. A New Peircean Response to Radical Skepticism.Justin Remhof - 2018 - Contemporary Pragmatism 15 (1):15-22.
    The radical skeptic argues that I have no knowledge of things I ordinarily claim to know because I have no evidence for or against the possibility of being systematically fed illusions. Recent years have seen a surge of interest in pragmatic responses to skepticism inspired by C. S. Peirce. This essay challenges one such influential response and presents a better Peircean way to refute the skeptic. The account I develop holds that although I do not know whether the skeptical hypothesis (...)
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  8. The Ordinary Language Case for Contextualism and the Relevance of Radical Doubt.Michael P. Wolf & Jeremy Randel Koons - 2018 - Contemporary Pragmatism 15 (1):66-94.
    Many contextualist accounts in epistemology appeal to ordinary language and everyday practice as grounds for positing a low-standards knowledge (knowledgeL) that contrasts with high-standards prevalent in epistemology (knowledgeH). We compare these arguments to arguments from the height of “ordinary language” philosophy in the mid 20th century and find that all such arguments face great difficulties. We find a powerful argument for the legitimacy and necessity of knowledgeL (but not of knowledgeH). These appeals to practice leave us with reasons to accept (...)
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  9. Embodied Cognition and Perception: Dewey, Science and Skepticism.Crippen Matthew - 2017 - Contemporary Pragmatism 14 (1):112-134.
    This article examines how Modern theories of mind remain even in some materialistic and hence ontologically anti-dualistic views; and shows how Dewey, anticipating Merleau-Ponty and 4E cognitive scientists, repudiates these theories. Throughout I place Dewey’s thought in the context of scientific inquiry, both recent and historical and including the cognitive as well as traditional sciences; and I show how he incorporated sciences of his day into his thought, while also anticipating enactive cognitive science. While emphasizing Dewey’s continued relevance, my main (...)
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  10. No Exception for Belief.Susanna Rinard - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):121-143.
    This paper defends a principle I call Equal Treatment, according to which the rationality of a belief is determined in precisely the same way as the rationality of any other state. For example, if wearing a raincoat is rational just in case doing so maximizes expected value, then believing some proposition P is rational just in case doing so maximizes expected value. This contrasts with the popular view that the rationality of belief is determined by evidential support. It also contrasts (...)
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  11. On “biscopic” approach to the sceptical paradox. [].Francois-Igor Pris - 2015 - Философия И Социальные Науки (Philosophy and Social Sciences) 2:32-37.
  12. Common Sense and Pragmatism: Reid and Peirce on the Justification of First Principles.Nate Jackson - 2014 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 12 (2):163-179.
    This paper elucidates the pragmatist elements of Thomas Reid's approach to the justification of first principles by reference to Charles S. Peirce. Peirce argues that first principles are justified by their surviving a process of ‘self-criticism’, in which we come to appreciate that we cannot bring ourselves to doubt these principles, in addition to the foundational role they play in inquiries. The evidence Reid allows first principles bears resemblance to surviving the process of self-criticism. I then argue that this evidence (...)
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  13. Epistemic Principles and Epistemic Circularity.Byeong D. Lee - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (2):413-432.
    Can we show that our senses are reliable sources of information about the world? To show this, we need to establish that most of our perceptual judgments have been true. But we cannot determine these inductive instances without relying upon sense perception. Thus, it seems, we cannot establish the reliability of sense perception by means of an argument without falling into epistemic circularity. In this paper, I argue that this consequence is not an epistemological disaster. For this purpose, I defend (...)
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  14. Wittgensteinian Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Vertigo.Cameron Boult & Duncan Pritchard - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (1):27-35.
    We offer an overview of what we take to be the main themes in Annalisa Coliva’s book, Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense. In particular, we focus on the ‘framework reading’ that she offers of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and its anti-sceptical implications. While broadly agreeing with the proposal that Coliva puts forward on this score, we do suggest one important supplementation to the view—viz., that this way of dealing with radical scepticism needs to be augmented with an account (...)
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  15. Review of M. Lynch, In Praise of Reason (MIT Press, 2012). [REVIEW]Diego E. Machuca - 2013 - Philosophy in Review 33 (4):308-311.
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  16. Cartesian Skepticism and Internal Realism.Nicholas Tebben - 2013 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 17 (2):251.
    The Cartesian skeptic’s strategy is to tell a story about the world that is entirely consistent with all of the empirical evidence that we do, or can, have, but according to which many or all of our ordinary beliefs are false. He then suggests that, since we cannot show that his story is false, we ought to surrender those beliefs. In this paper I offer a decision-theoretic response to skepticism. Say that a cognitive attitude is a propositional attitude that may (...)
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  17. The Concept of Entitlement and its Epistemic Relevance.Hamid Vahid - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):380-399.
    Crispin Wright has recently suggested that, in addition to the notion of justification, we also possess a non-evidential notion of warrant, ‘entitlement’, that can play an important role in responding to various skeptical questions. My concern here is with the question of whether entitlement constitutes an epistemic kind of warrant. I claim Wright's argument for this thesis at most shows that entitlement has a pragmatic character. Having identified the sources of the troubles of this argument in its underlying assumptions, I (...)
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  18. Invariantism, Skepticism, and Two Senses of Pragmatism: A Comment on Eric Thompson.Scott Aikin - 2010 - Southwest Philosophy Review 26 (2):5-7.
  19. Quine’s Pragmatic Solution to Sceptical Doubts.Benjamin Bayer - 2010 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (2):177-204.
    In this paper I examine a series of criticisms that have been levelled against Quine's naturalized epistemology, regarding its response to the problem of scepticism. Barry Stroud and Michael Williams, assuming that Quine wishes to refute scepticism, argue that Quine not only fails to undertake this refutation, but is also committed to theses (such as the inscrutability of reference and the underdetermination of theory by evidence) which imply versions of scepticism of their own. In Quine's defence, Roger Gibson argues that (...)
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  20. La teodicea social de Adam Smith.Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 2010 - Empresa y Humanismo 13 (1):333-374.
    I argue the existence of two tensions in Smith's system of ideas: the first is that between the postulate of an invisible noumenal order of the universe and the imaginary principles by means of which we connect the phenomena; the second is a tension between the noumenal order of the world where 'is' and 'ought' converge, and the various partial orders that may be reconstructed in social phenomena that leave room for irrationality and injustice. My first claim is that these (...)
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  21. Pragmatic Invariantism and External World Skepticism.Eric Thompson - 2010 - Southwest Philosophy Review 26 (1):35-42.
    Simply stated, Pragmatic Invariantism is the view that the practical interests of a person can influence whether that person’s true belief constitutes knowledge. My primary objective in this article is to show that Pragmatic Invariantism entails external world skepticism. Toward this end, I’ll first introduce a basic version of Pragmatic Invariantism (PI). Then I’ll introduce a sample skeptical hypothesis (SK) to the framework. From this I will show that it is extremely important that the phenomenally equivalent skeptical scenarios generated by (...)
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  22. Scope and the Limits of Rational Explanation.Tony Lambie - 2009 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):117-124.
    The Reason Why by Edo Pivčević is an unconventional philosophy book. The author takes the wind out of the sails of the sceptic’s argument by removing its basis. It is neither epistemology nor ontology; nor does its outcome fall into the usual categories vis à vis the real, including pragmatism. A complete system is developed through a profound examination of explanation, contrasting the conceptual approach with the unbounded naturalistic kind and its dangers, illuminating examples of the latter kind with misunderstandings (...)
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  23. Authorship and E‐Science: Balancing Epistemological Trust and Skepticism in the Digital Environment.Justine Pila - 2009 - Social Epistemology 23 (1):1-24.
    In this essay I consider the role of authorship in balancing epistemological trust and skepticism in e-science. Drawing on studies of the diagnostic practices of doctors in British breast care units and the gate-keeping practices of a Californian publisher of horticultural works, I suggest that conventions of authorial designation have an important role to play in nurturing the skepticism essential for scientific rigor within the framework of epistemological trust that pragmatism and morality require. In so doing I question the assumption (...)
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  24. What is at Issue Between Epistemic and Traditional Accounts of Truth?John Fox - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):407 – 420.
    I will discuss those epistemic accounts of truth that say, roughly and at least, that the truth is what all ideally rational people, with maximum evidence, would in the long run come to believe. They have been defended on the grounds that they can solve sceptical problems that traditional accounts cannot surmount, and that they explain the value of truth in ways that traditional (and particularly, minimal) accounts cannot; they have been attacked on the grounds that they collapse into idealism. (...)
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  25. The Necessity of Pragmatism: Overcoming the Stalemate of Common Sense.Erik Lundestad - 2008 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 6 (2):175-187.
    The paper argues that the relation between the philosophy of common sense and skepticism ought to be perceived of as the relation between the two horns of a dilemma. Each position, it is therefore said, is able to confront the other with a valid objection, something which implies that neither of the two positions are defensible as such. The dilemma is only resolved, it is argued, by the way in which a pragmatic approach to knowledge enables us to incorporate the (...)
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  26. Review of Edo Pivevi, The Reason Why: A Theory of Philosophical Explanation[REVIEW]Joseph Margolis - 2008 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (1).
    Edo Pivčević's The Reason Why is a thoroughly admirable book: absolutely straightforward and simple in argument, charmingly written, uncompromisingly legible but widely and tactfully informed, bent on asking and answering a single fundamental question usually cast as "metaphysical" or (after Kant) "epistemological", but, in Pivčević's hands, skillfully turned in what must be called a "pragmatist" direction. Careful readers may find (as I do) that the general lines of the argument are notably congruent with some of Charles Peirce's earliest accounts of (...)
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  27. Two for the Show: Anti-Luck and Virtue Epistemologies in Consonance.Guy Axtell - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):363 - 383.
    This essay extends my side of a discussion begun earlier with Duncan Pritchard, the recent author of Epistemic Luck. Pritchard’s work contributes significantly to improving the “diagnostic appeal” of a neo-Moorean philosophical response to radical scepticism. While agreeing with Pritchard in many respects, the paper questions the need for his concession to the sceptic that the neo-Moorean is capable at best of recovering “‘brute’ externalist knowledge”. The paper discusses and directly responds to a dilemma that Pritchard poses for virtue epistemologies (...)
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  28. Ethics and the Sceptical Challenge: A Pragmaticist Approach: Ética E o Desafio Cético: Uma Abordagem Pragmaticista.Claudine Tiercelin - 2007 - Cognitio 8 (2).
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  29. Aiming at Truth.Nicholas Unwin - 2007 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
    The author argues that is not obvious what it means for our beliefs and assertions to be "truth-directed", and that we need to weaken our ordinary notion of a belief if we are to deal with radical scepticism without surrendering to idealism. Topics examined also include whether there could be alien conceptual schemes and what might happen to us if we abandoned genuine belief in place of mere pragmatic acceptance. A radically new "ecological" model of knowledge is defended.
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  30. Moralische Motivation. Kant Und Die Alternativen.Heiner F. Klemme, Manfred Kuehn & Dieter Schönecker (eds.) - 2006 - Meiner Verlag.
    Kant und die Alternativen Heiner F. Klemme Manfred Kühn, Dieter Schönecker. H . Klemme / M. Kühn / D. Schönecker (Hg.) Moralische Motivation Kant und die Alternativen Meiner KANT-FORSCHUNGEN Begründet von Reinhard Brandt und ...
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  31. The Skeptic and The Madman: The Proto‐Pragmatism of Thomas Reid.Erik Lundestad - 2006 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 4 (2):125-137.
    Even though the philosophy of common sense is not justifi able as such, the assump- tion upon which it rests, namely that there are things which we are not in position to doubt is correct. The reason why Thomas Reid was unable to bring this assumption out in a justifi able manner is that his views, both on knowledge and nature, are to be considered dogmatic. American pragmatists such as Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey on the other hand, may (...)
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  32. Pluralistic Skepticism: Advertisement for Speech Act Pluralism.Herman Cappelen - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):15–39.
    Even though the lines of thought that support skepticism are extremely compelling, we're inclined to look for ways of blocking them because it appears to be an impossible view to accept, both for intellectual and practical reasons. One goal of this paper is to show that when skepticism is packaged right, it has few problematic implications (or at least fewer than is often assumed). It is, for example, compatible with all the following claims (when these are correctly interpreted).
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  33. Not Giving the Skeptic a Hearing: Pragmatism and Radical Doubt.Erik J. Olsson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):98–126.
    Pragmatist responses to radical skepticism do not receive much attention in contemporary analytic epistemology. This observation is my motivation for undertaking a search for a coherent pragmatist reply to radical doubt, one that can compete, in terms of clarity and sophistication, with the currently most popular approaches, such as contextualism and relevant alternatives theory. As my point of departure I take the texts of C. S. Peirce and William James. The Jamesian response is seen to consist in the application of (...)
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  34. Wittgenstein's On Certainty and Contemporary Anti-Scepticism.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - In D. Moyal-Sharrock & W. H. Brenner (eds.), Investigating On Certainty: Essays on Wittgenstein's Last Work. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    This paper examines the relevance of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty to the contemporary debate regarding the problem of radical scepticism. In particular, it considers two accounts in the recent literature which have seen in Wittgenstein’s remarks on “hinge propositions” in On Certainty the basis for a primarily epistemological anti-sceptical thesis—viz., the inferential contextualism offered by Michael Williams and the ‘unearned warrant’ thesis defended by Crispin Wright. Both positions are shown to be problematic, both as interpretations of Wittgenstein and as anti-sceptical theses. (...)
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  35. Skepticism, Romanticism and “Penitent Art”: Bulletin of the Santayana Society.Jarnes Seaton - 2005 - Overheard in Seville 23 (23):9-15.
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  36. The Skeptical Paradox and the Indispensability of Knowledge-Beliefs.Wai-Hung Wong - 2005 - Synthese 143 (3):273-290.
    Some philosophers understand epistemological skepticism as merely presenting a paradox to be solved, a paradox given rise to by some apparently forceful arguments. I argue that such a view needs to be justified, and that the best way to do so is to show that we cannot help seeing skepticism as obviously false. The obviousness (to us) of the falsity of skepticism is, I suggest, explained by the fact that we cannot live without knowledge-beliefs (a knowledge-belief about the world is (...)
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  37. Scepticism and Pragmatism.Akeel Bilgrami - 2004 - In Denis McManus (ed.), Wittgenstein and Scepticism. Routledge. pp. 56--75.
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  38. The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Reid.Terence Cuneo & René van Woudenberg (eds.) - 2004 - Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
    Widely acknowledged as the principal architect of Scottish common sense philosophy, Thomas Reid is increasingly recognized today as one of the finest philosophers of the eighteenth century. Combining a sophisticated response to the skeptical and idealist views of his day, Reid's thought stands as an important alternative to Humean skepticism, Kantian idealism and Cartesian rationalism. This volume is the first comprehensive overview of Reid's output and covers not only his philosophy in detail, but also his scientific work and his extensive (...)
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  39. On The Foundations of Pragmatic Arguments.John Cantwell - 2003 - Journal of Philosophy 100 (8):383 - 402.
  40. Toward a Skeptical Criticism of Transcendental Pragmatics.Frederic Cossutta - 2003 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 36 (4):301-329.
  41. Making Space: Pragmatism Between Skepticism and Dogmatism.David F. Maier - 2002 - Dissertation, Columbia University
    Philosophical method is itself a branch of philosophy, and does not simply take philosophy as its object. An anti-foundationalist conception of philosophical method can thus be "bootstrapped." The dissertation examines different areas of philosophy which concern inquiry: e.g. , its nature , its object , its medium , finding a pattern of anti-foundationalist argument which extends without paradox to philosophical inquiry and its method. ;The pattern in question has two main aspects. In each context pragmatism occupies a space between two (...)
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  42. ‘‘‘Rationality and Relativism: The Historical and Contemporary Significance of Hegel’s Response to Sextus Empiricus’.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2002 - Esercizi Filosofici 6:22--33.
    Modern Philosophy bloomed into the Enlightenment, a cultural and philosophical movement still alive today, despite growing criticism. Some recent critics claim (roughly) that the alleged ‘universality’ of Enlightenment reason led directly to the imposition of Eurocentric reason on other, less militarily developed cultures. Some contend that there is no such thing as ‘universal’ reason. I contend that there are serious flaws in the Enlightenment notion of reason resulting from three basic dichotomies: (1) reason versus tradition, (2) knowledge versus customary belief, (...)
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  43. The Problem of Insulation.Wai-hung Wong - 2002 - Philosophy 77 (3):349-373.
    Insulation is a noticeable phenomenon in the case of most non-Pyrrhonian sceptics about human knowledge. A sceptic is experiencing insulation when his scepticism does not have any effect on his common sense beliefs, and his common sense beliefs do not have any effect on his scepticism. I try to show why this is a puzzling phenomenon, and how it can be explained. It is puzzling because insulation seems to require blindness to one's own epistemic irresponsibility and irrationality, while the sceptic (...)
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  44. The Virtues of Common Sense.Brian Grant - 2001 - Philosophy 76 (2):191-209.
    I defend, in this paper, a version of a philosophy of common sense. I have use of some things from Reid's account of these matters, others from Wittgenstein's. Scepticism looms large—as do the questions of arguments for and examples of common sense. At least two different notions of common sense emerge, one of which has often been overlooked by philosophers.
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  45. What is a Situation?Tom Burke - 2000 - History and Philosophy of Logic 21 (2):95-113.
    This paper examines the role of ?situations? in John Dewey's philosophy of logic. To do this properly it is necessary to contrast Dewey's conception of experience and mentality with views characteristic of modern epistemology. The primary difference is that, rather than treat experience as peripheral and or external to mental functions (reason, etc.), we should treat experience as a field in and as a part of which thinking takes place. Experience in this broad sense subsumes theory and fact, hypothesis and (...)
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  46. Philosophy and its Epistemic Neuroses.Michael Hymers - 2000 - Westview Press.
    Philosophers have often thought that concepts such as ”knowledge” and ”truth” are appropriate objects for theoretical investigation. In a discussion which ranges widely over recent analytical philosophy and radical theory, Philosophy and Its Epistemic Neuroses takes issue with this assumption, arguing that such theoreticism is not the solution but the source of traditional problems in epistemology (How can we have knowledge of the world around us? How can we have knowledge of other minds and cultures? How can we have knowledge (...)
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  47. Does Epistemology Rest on a Mistake? Understanding Rorty on Scepticism.Douglas James McDermid - 2000 - Critica 32 (96):3-42.
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  48. I Believe It, but Soon I'll Not Believe It Any More: Scepticism, Empiricism, and Reflection.John M. Vickers - 2000 - Synthese 124 (2):155-174.
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  49. Scepticism, Truth and Pragmatic Inquiry.Andrew Ward - 2000 - Southwest Philosophy Review 17 (1):159-172.
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  50. Naturalistic Responses to Skepticism.Carolyn Black - 1999 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 57 (1):67-79.
    One of the many philosophical responses to scepticism is naturalism. It is explored how and to what extent it is successful in discussing these questions as they pertain external world scepticism. One interesting feature of naturalism is that it shares with scepticism the view that we lack proof and knowledge of an external world. The naturalist, however, unlike many sceptics and their more traditional disputants, doesn't think it matters. The first part of the paper contains a description of the naturalistic (...)
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