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  1. Invariantism, Skepticism, and Two Senses of Pragmatism.Scott Aikin - 2010 - Southwest Philosophy Review 26 (2):5-7.
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  2. Perception and Basic Beliefs: Zombies, Modules, and the Problem of the External World.Keith Allen - unknown
  3. Two for the Show: Anti-Luck and Virtue Epistemologies in Consonance.Guy Axtell - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):363 - 383.
    This essay extends my side of a discussion begun earlier with Duncan Pritchard, the recent author of Epistemic Luck.Pritchard’s work contributes significantly to improving the “diagnostic appeal” of a neo-Moorean philosophical response to radical scepticism. While agreeing with Pritchard in many respects, the paper questions the need for his concession to the sceptic that the neo-Moorean is capable at best of recovering “‘brute’ externalist knowledge”. The paper discusses and directly responds to a dilemma that Pritchard poses for virtue epistemologies (VE). (...)
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  4. Quine's Pragmatic Solution to Sceptical Doubts.Benjamin Bayer - 2010 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (2):177-204.
    In this paper I examine a series of criticisms that have been levelled against Quine's naturalized epistemology, regarding its response to the problem of scepticism. Barry Stroud and Michael Williams, assuming that Quine wishes to refute scepticism, argue that Quine not only fails to undertake this refutation, but is also committed to theses (such as the inscrutability of reference and the underdetermination of theory by evidence) which imply versions of scepticism of their own. In Quine's defence, Roger Gibson argues that (...)
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  5. Scepticism and Pragmatism.Akeel Bilgrami - 2004 - In Denis McManus (ed.), Wittgenstein and Scepticism. Routledge. pp. 56--75.
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  6. Naturalistic Responses to Skepticism.Carolyn Black - 1999 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 57:67-79.
    One of the many philosophical responses to scepticism is naturalism. It is explored how and to what extent it is successful in discussing these questions as they pertain external world scepticism. One interesting feature of naturalism is that it shares with scepticism the view that we lack proof and knowledge of an external world. The naturalist, however, unlike many sceptics and their more traditional disputants, doesn't think it matters. The first part of the paper contains a description of the naturalistic (...)
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  7. Wittgensteinian Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Vertigo.Cameron Boult & Duncan Pritchard - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (1):27-35.
    We offer an overview of what we take to be the main themes in Annalisa Coliva’s book, Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense. In particular, we focus on the ‘framework reading’ that she offers of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and its anti-sceptical implications. While broadly agreeing with the proposal that Coliva puts forward on this score, we do suggest one important supplementation to the view—viz., that this way of dealing with radical scepticism needs to be augmented with an account (...)
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  8. What is a Situation?Tom Burke - 2000 - History and Philosophy of Logic 21 (2):95-113.
    This paper examines the role of ?situations? in John Dewey's philosophy of logic. To do this properly it is necessary to contrast Dewey's conception of experience and mentality with views characteristic of modern epistemology. The primary difference is that, rather than treat experience as peripheral and or external to mental functions (reason, etc.), we should treat experience as a field in and as a part of which thinking takes place. Experience in this broad sense subsumes theory and fact, hypothesis and (...)
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  9. Bertrand Russell, the Passionate Sceptic. [REVIEW]L. C. - 1958 - Review of Metaphysics 11 (4):698-698.
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  10. On The Foundations of Pragmatic Arguments.John Cantwell - 2003 - Journal of Philosophy 100 (8):383 - 402.
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  11. Pluralistic Skepticism: Advertisement for Speech Act Pluralism.Herman Cappelen - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):15–39.
    Even though the lines of thought that support skepticism are extremely compelling, we're inclined to look for ways of blocking them because it appears to be an impossible view to accept, both for intellectual and practical reasons. One goal of this paper is to show that when skepticism is packaged right, it has few problematic implications (or at least fewer than is often assumed). It is, for example, compatible with all the following claims (when these are correctly interpreted).
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  12. Hume, Reid and Scepticism.F. F. Centore - 1981 - Philosophical Studies 28:212-220.
  13. The Epistemological Ties That Bind: A Pragmatist Case Against Feminist Theories of Truth and Knowledge and the Implications for Feminist Science.Sharyn Suzanne Clough - 1997 - Dissertation, Simon Fraser University (Canada)
    Feminist claims that scientific activity is intimately involved with the oppression of women, often identify aspects of the epistemology of science, or scientific method, as the primary culprit. In my dissertation I try to persuade my feminist colleagues that despite the important gains we have made through the criticism of science, our fairly recent investment in an epistemological critique is yielding diminishing returns. I begin by examining the epistemological reflections of a number of feminist critics of evolutionary biology, including Ruth (...)
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  14. Toward a Skeptical Criticism of Transcendental Pragmatics.Frédéric Cossutta - 2003 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 36 (4):301-329.
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  15. The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Reid.Terence Cuneo & René van Woudenberg (eds.) - 2004 - Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
    Widely acknowledged as the principal architect of Scottish common sense philosophy, Thomas Reid is increasingly recognized today as one of the finest philosophers of the eighteenth century. Combining a sophisticated response to the skeptical and idealist views of his day, Reid's thought stands as an important alternative to Humean skepticism, Kantian idealism and Cartesian rationalism. This volume is the first comprehensive overview of Reid's output and covers not only his philosophy in detail, but also his scientific work and his extensive (...)
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  16. Practical Reason and Motivational Scepticism. [REVIEW]Heiner F. Klemme Dieter Schönecker & Manfred Kuehn (eds.) - 2006 - Felix Meiner Verlag.
  17. What is at Issue Between Epistemic and Traditional Accounts of Truth?John Fox - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):407 – 420.
    I will discuss those epistemic accounts of truth that say, roughly and at least, that the truth is what all ideally rational people, with maximum evidence, would in the long run come to believe. They have been defended on the grounds that they can solve sceptical problems that traditional accounts cannot surmount, and that they explain the value of truth in ways that traditional (and particularly, minimal) accounts cannot; they have been attacked on the grounds that they collapse into idealism. (...)
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  18. The Virtues of Common Sense.Brian Grant - 2001 - Philosophy 76 (2):191-209.
    I defend, in this paper, a version of a philosophy of common sense. I have use of some things from Reid's account of these matters, others from Wittgenstein's. Scepticism looms large—as do the questions of arguments for and examples of common sense. At least two different notions of common sense emerge, one of which has often been overlooked by philosophers.
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  19. Scepticism and Absurdity.Ingemund Gullv - 1964 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 7 (1-4):163 – 190.
    Analytic rejections of extreme traditional views, especially scepticism, as 'absurd' in some sense of violating 'rules' of discourse, arc considered. References to linguistic and pragmatic rules are discussed and found inadequate as bases for rejecting scepticism. References to logical principles alone are found to lead into scepticism. The claim that epistemology and scepticism take for granted an inadequate theory of words like 'know', or 'knowledge', as descriptive predicates, is considered. Alternatives, construing such words as appraisive or performative, are discussed, but (...)
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  20. Scepticism and Absurdity.Ingemund Gullvåg - 1964 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 7 (1-4):163-190.
    Analytic rejections of extreme traditional views, especially scepticism, as ?absurd? in some sense of violating ?rules? of discourse, arc considered. References to linguistic and pragmatic rules are discussed and found inadequate as bases for rejecting scepticism. References to logical principles alone are found to lead into scepticism. The claim that epistemology and scepticism take for granted an inadequate theory of words like ?know?, or ?knowledge?, as descriptive predicates, is considered. Alternatives, construing such words as appraisive or performative, are discussed, but (...)
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  21. Rules, Scepticism, Proof, Wittgenstein.Ian Hacking - 1985 - In Exercises in Analysis: Essays by Students of Casimir Lewy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  22. Russell and the Possibility of Scepticism.Christopher Hookway - 1992 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 6 (2):95 - 110.
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  23. Philosophy and its Epistemic Neuroses.Michael Hymers - 2000 - Westview Press.
    Philosophers have often thought that concepts such as ”knowledge” and ”truth” are appropriate objects for theoretical investigation. In a discussion which ranges widely over recent analytical philosophy and radical theory, Philosophy and Its Epistemic Neuroses takes issue with this assumption, arguing that such theoreticism is not the solution but the source of traditional problems in epistemology (How can we have knowledge of the world around us? How can we have knowledge of other minds and cultures? How can we have knowledge (...)
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  24. Common Sense and Pragmatism: Reid and Peirce on the Justification of First Principles.Nate Jackson - 2014 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 12 (2):163-179.
    This paper elucidates the pragmatist elements of Thomas Reid's approach to the justification of first principles by reference to Charles S. Peirce. Peirce argues that first principles are justified by their surviving a process of ‘self-criticism’, in which we come to appreciate that we cannot bring ourselves to doubt these principles, in addition to the foundational role they play in inquiries. The evidence Reid allows first principles bears resemblance to surviving the process of self-criticism. I then argue that this evidence (...)
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  25. The Plain Truth About Common Sense: Skepticism, Metaphysics, and Irony.Mark Kingwell - 1995 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 9 (3):169 - 188.
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  26. Skepticism and Non-Veridical Justification.Richard Ladd Kirkham - 1983 - Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
    In the first part of my dissertation I defend a fairly sweeping form of skepticism about the external world: For any significantly informative proposition about the external world we have not the slightest justification for thinking it more likely true than its denial. In defending this thesis, I use a version of the evil demon argument, and I argue that a skeptic need only show the logical possibility of the evil demon; he need not make the demon's existence more plausible (...)
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  27. Scope and the Limits of Rational Explanation.Tony Lambie - 2009 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):117-124.
    The Reason Why by Edo Pivčević is an unconventional philosophy book. The author takes the wind out of the sails of the sceptic’s argument by removing its basis. It is neither epistemology nor ontology; nor does its outcome fall into the usual categories vis à vis the real, including pragmatism. A complete system is developed through a profound examination of explanation, contrasting the conceptual approach with the unbounded naturalistic kind and its dangers, illuminating examples of the latter kind with misunderstandings (...)
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  28. Epistemic Principles and Epistemic Circularity.Byeong D. Lee - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (2):413-432.
    Can we show that our senses are reliable sources of information about the world? To show this, we need to establish that most of our perceptual judgments have been true. But we cannot determine these inductive instances without relying upon sense perception. Thus, it seems, we cannot establish the reliability of sense perception by means of an argument without falling into epistemic circularity. In this paper, I argue that this consequence is not an epistemological disaster. For this purpose, I defend (...)
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  29. Beliefs About Other Minds: A Pragmatic Justification.James Lenman - 1994 - American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (3):223-34.
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  30. The Necessity of Pragmatism: Overcoming the Stalemate of Common Sense.Erik Lundestad - 2008 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 6 (2):175-187.
    The paper argues that the relation between the philosophy of common sense and skepticism ought to be perceived of as the relation between the two horns of a dilemma. Each position, it is therefore said, is able to confront the other with a valid objection, something which implies that neither of the two positions are defensible as such. The dilemma is only resolved, it is argued, by the way in which a pragmatic approach to knowledge enables us to incorporate the (...)
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  31. The Skeptic and The Madman: The Proto‐Pragmatism of Thomas Reid.Erik Lundestad - 2006 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 4 (2):125-137.
    Even though the philosophy of common sense is not justifi able as such, the assump- tion upon which it rests, namely that there are things which we are not in position to doubt is correct. The reason why Thomas Reid was unable to bring this assumption out in a justifi able manner is that his views, both on knowledge and nature, are to be considered dogmatic. American pragmatists such as Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey on the other hand, may (...)
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  32. Review of M. Lynch, In Praise of Reason (MIT Press, 2012). [REVIEW]Diego E. Machuca - 2013 - Philosophy in Review 33 (4):308-311.
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  33. Making Space: Pragmatism Between Skepticism and Dogmatism.David F. Maier - 2002 - Dissertation, Columbia University
    Philosophical method is itself a branch of philosophy, and does not simply take philosophy as its object. An anti-foundationalist conception of philosophical method can thus be "bootstrapped." The dissertation examines different areas of philosophy which concern inquiry: e.g. , its nature , its object , its medium , finding a pattern of anti-foundationalist argument which extends without paradox to philosophical inquiry and its method. ;The pattern in question has two main aspects. In each context pragmatism occupies a space between two (...)
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  34. Review of Edo Pivevi, The Reason Why: A Theory of Philosophical Explanation[REVIEW]Joseph Margolis - 2008 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (1).
    Edo Pivčević's The Reason Why is a thoroughly admirable book: absolutely straightforward and simple in argument, charmingly written, uncompromisingly legible but widely and tactfully informed, bent on asking and answering a single fundamental question usually cast as "metaphysical" or (after Kant) "epistemological", but, in Pivčević's hands, skillfully turned in what must be called a "pragmatist" direction. Careful readers may find (as I do) that the general lines of the argument are notably congruent with some of Charles Peirce's earliest accounts of (...)
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  35. Skepticism, Foundationalism, and Pragmatism.Joseph Margolis - 1977 - American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (2):119 - 127.
    This article formulates the grounds on which a pragmatist theory of knowledge may be favored against skepticism and foundationalism without requiring the refutation of skepticism. It explores in considerable detail some of the central positions bearing on the issue, Including views of g e moore, Bertrand russell, Roderick chisholm, Keith lehrer, Leonard nelson. It also provides a fresh characterization of pragmatism and shows the bearing of theories of truth on the justification of knowledge claims.
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  36. Embodied Cognition and Perception: Dewey, Science and Skepticism.Crippen Matthew - forthcoming - Contemporary Pragmatism.
    This article examines how Modern theories of mind remain even in some materialistic and hence ontologically anti-dualistic views; and shows how Dewey, anticipating Merleau-Ponty and 4E cognitive scientists, repudiates these theories. Throughout I place Dewey’s thought in the context of scientific inquiry, both recent and historical and including the cognitive as well as traditional sciences; and I show how he incorporated sciences of his day into his thought, while also anticipating enactive cognitive science. While emphasizing Dewey’s continued relevance, my main (...)
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  37. Does Epistemology Rest on a Mistake? Understanding Rorty on Scepticism.Douglas James McDermid - 2000 - Critica 32 (96):3 - 42.
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  38. Showing Certainty: An Essay on Wittgenstein's Response to Scepticism.Anne Newstead - manuscript
    Coping with everyday life limits the extent of one’s scepticism. It is practically impossible to doubt the existence of the things with which one is immediately engaged and interacting. To doubt that, say, a door exists, is to step back from merely using the door (opening it) and to reflect on it in a detached, theoretical way. It is impossible to simultaneously act and live immersed in situation S while doubting that one is in S. Sceptical doubts—such as ‘Is this (...)
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  39. Innateness and Science.Robert Northcott - unknown
    Although a huge range of definitions has accumulated in the philosophy, biology and psychology literatures, no consensus has been reached on exactly what innateness amounts to. This has helped fuel an increasing skepticism, one that views the concept as anachronistic and actually harmful to science. Yet it remains central to many life sciences, and to several public policy issues too. So it is correspondingly urgent that its philosophical underpinnings be properly cleaned up. In this paper, I present a new approach (...)
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  40. Not Giving the Skeptic a Hearing: Pragmatism and Radical Doubt.Erik J. Olsson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):98–126.
    Pragmatist responses to radical skepticism do not receive much attention in contemporary analytic epistemology. This observation is my motivation for undertaking a search for a coherent pragmatist reply to radical doubt, one that can compete, in terms of clarity and sophistication, with the currently most popular approaches, such as contextualism and relevant alternatives theory. As my point of departure I take the texts of C. S. Peirce and William James. The Jamesian response is seen to consist in the application of (...)
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  41. Not Giving the Skeptic a Hearing: Pragmatism and Radical Doubt Lund University, Sweden.Erik J. Olsson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):98-126.
    Pragmatist responses to radical skepticism do not receive much attention In contemporary analytic epistemology. This observation is my motivation for undertaking a search for a coherent pragmatist reply to radical doubt, one that can compete, in terms of clarity and sophistication, with the currently most popular approaches, such as contextualism and relevant alternatives theory. As my point of departure I take the texts of C. S. Peirce and William James. The Jamesian response is seen to consist in the application of (...)
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  42. The Quest for Ignorance or the Reasonable Limits of Skepticism.Stephen C. Pepper - 1936 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 45 (2):126-143.
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  43. Authorship and E-Science: Balancing Epistemological Trust and Skepticism in the Digital Environment.Justine Pila - 2009 - Social Epistemology 23 (1):1-24.
    In this essay I consider the role of authorship in balancing epistemological trust and skepticism in e-science. Drawing on studies of the diagnostic practices of doctors in British breast care units and the gate-keeping practices of a Californian publisher of horticultural works, I suggest that conventions of authorial designation have an important role to play in nurturing the skepticism essential for scientific rigor within the framework of epistemological trust that pragmatism and morality require. In so doing I question the assumption (...)
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  44. Wittgenstein's On Certainty and Contemporary Anti-Scepticism.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - In D. Moyal-Sharrock & W. H. Brenner (eds.), Investigating On Certainty: Essays on Wittgenstein's Last Work. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    This paper examines the relevance of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty to the contemporary debate regarding the problem of radical scepticism. In particular, it considers two accounts in the recent literature which have seen in Wittgenstein’s remarks on “hinge propositions” in On Certainty the basis for a primarily epistemological anti-sceptical thesis—viz., the inferential contextualism offered by Michael Williams and the ‘unearned warrant’ thesis defended by Crispin Wright. Both positions are shown to be problematic, both as interpretations of Wittgenstein and as anti-sceptical theses. (...)
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  45. Methodological Pragmatism: A Systems-Theoretic Approach to the Theory of Knowledge.Nicholas Rescher - 1977 - Blackwell.
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  46. Pragmatic Skepticism.Susanna Rinard - manuscript
    Pragmatic responses to skepticism have been overlooked in recent decades. This paper explores one such response by developing a character called the Pragmatic Skeptic. The Pragmatic Skeptic accepts skeptical arguments for the claim that we lack good evidence for our ordinary beliefs, and that they do not constitute knowledge. However, they do not think we should give up our beliefs in light of these skeptical conclusions. Rather, we should retain them, since we have good practical reasons for doing so. This (...)
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  47. No Exception for Belief.Susanna Rinard - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):121-143.
    This paper defends a principle I call Equal Treatment, according to which the rationality of a belief is determined in precisely the same way as the rationality of any other state. For example, if wearing a raincoat is rational just in case doing so maximizes expected value, then believing some proposition P is rational just in case doing so maximizes expected value. This contrasts with the popular view that the rationality of belief is determined by evidential support. It also contrasts (...)
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  48. Scepticism and Animal Faith.Santayana George - 1955 - Dover Publications.
    Detailed presentation of American philosopher's pragmatic concept of epistemology, isolation of realms of existents and subsistents.
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  49. Pragmatism Versus Skepticism.F. C. S. Schiller - 1907 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 4 (18):482-487.
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  50. Skepticism, Romanticism and “Penitent Art”.Jarnes Seaton - 2005 - Overheard in Seville 23 (23):9-15.
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