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  1. The Pragmatist's Troubles With Bivalence and Counterfactuals.Sean Allen-Hermanson - 2001 - Dialogue 40 (4):669-90.
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  2. Truth and the End of Inquiry.R. Almeder - 1992 - Review of Metaphysics 45 (4):874-875.
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  3. The Concept of Truth in the Philosophy of William James.Luke Anderson - 1965 - Rome.
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  4. On the Meaning of Truth.Charles M. Bakewell - 1908 - Philosophical Review 17 (6):579-591.
  5. Reliabilism and Antirealist Theories of Truth.James Beebe - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (3):375 - 391.
    In order to shed light on the question of whether reliabilism entails or excludes certain kinds of truth theories, I examine two arguments that purport to establish that reliabilism cannot be combined with antirealist and epistemic theories of truth. I take antirealism about truth to be the denial of the recognition-transcendence of truth, and epistemic theories to be those that identify truth with some kind of positive epistemic status. According to one argument, reliabilism and antirealism are incompatible because the former (...)
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  6. Against Naturalism About Truth.Berit Brogaard - forthcoming - In Kelly Clark (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Naturalism.
    The chapter distinguishes between a weak and a strong form of ontological naturalism. Strong ontological naturalism is the view that all truths can be deduced, at least in principle, from truths about physical entities at the lowest level of organization, for example, truths about the elementary particles and forces. Weak ontological naturalism is the view that only physical properties can be causally efficacious. Strong ontological naturalism entails weak ontological naturalism but not vice versa. I then argue that the existence of (...)
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  7. The Pragmatic Maxim.Tom Burke - 2001 - The Commens Encyclopedia: The Digital Encyclopedia of Peirce Studies.
    What is the pragmatic maxim? The aim here is to present in an elementary and intuitive way what the pragmatic maxim was originally intended to convey, at least in Peirce’s earliest statements, and to briefly discuss some of the consequences of this maxim for philosophical method.
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  8. Critical Notices: Horwich's Semantic Deflationism.Darragh Byrne - 2000 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (3):371 – 391.
  9. A Pragmatic Argument for a Pragmatic Theory of Truth.John Capps - 2017 - Contemporary Pragmatism 14 (2):135-156.
    Even though pragmatic theories of truth are not widely held, they have advantages not found elsewhere. Here I focus on one such advantage: that a pragmatic theory of truth does not limit the range of truth-apt beliefs and thereby “block the way of inquiry.” Furthermore, I argue that this speaks for a particular formulation of the pragmatic theory of truth, one that shifts away from Peircean approaches and their emphasis on temporal independence, and toward a theory that instead emphasizes truth’s (...)
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  10. On Alethic Functionalism’s (Absurdly?) Wide Applicability.Marc Champagne - 2016 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):29-39.
    Alethic functionalism, as propounded by Michael Lynch, is the view that there are different ways to be true, but that these differences nevertheless contain enough unity to forestall outright pluralism. This view has many virtues. Yet, since one could conceivably apply Lynch’s “one and many” strategy to other debates, I try to show how his argumentative steps can be used to solve — not just the controversy pertaining to truth — but any controversy that surrounds a “What is X?” question.
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  11. Truth.Wrenn Chase - 2014 - Polity.
    What is truth? Is there anything that all truths have in common that makes them true rather than false? Is truth independent of human thought, or does it depend in some way on what we believe or what we would be justified in believing? In what sense, if any, is it better for beliefs or statements to be true than to be false? In this engaging and accessible new introduction Chase Wrenn surveys a variety of theories of the nature of (...)
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  12. A Fairly Short Response to a Really Short Refutation.Harvey Cormier - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Research 36:35-41.
    Brian Ribeiro argues that the pragmatic theory of truth massively misrepresents the actual use of the terms “true” and “truth.” Truths, he observes, can be distinguished from “illusions.” The latter misrepresent reality and the former do not. Psychologists, as they report on the way mentally healthy people commonly overestimate themselves, draw just this distinction. They tell us of many beliefs that are “adaptive” but illusory. Pragmatists cannot draw this distinction because their theory explains truth as adaptiveness. Therefore no sensible person (...)
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  13. Hilary Putnam.Harvey J. Cormier - 2006 - In John R. Shook & Joseph Margolis (eds.), A Companion to Pragmatism. Blackwell.
  14. Epistemic Truth and Excluded Middle.Cesare Cozzo - 1998 - Theoria 64 (2-3):243-282.
    Can an epistemic conception of truth and an endorsement of the excluded middle (together with other principles of classical logic abandoned by the intuitionists) cohabit in a plausible philosophical view? In PART I I describe the general problem concerning the relation between the epistemic conception of truth and the principle of excluded middle. In PART II I give a historical overview of different attitudes regarding the problem. In PART III I sketch a possible holistic solution.
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  15. The Nature and Criterion of Truth.J. E. Creighton - 1908 - Philosophical Review 17 (6):592-605.
  16. Peircean Pragmatic Truth and da Costa's Quasi-Truth.Itala M. Loffredo DàOttaviano & Carlos Hifume - 2007 - In L. Magnani & P. Li (eds.), Model-Based Reasoning in Science, Technology, and Medicine. Springer. pp. 383--398.
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  17. Theories of Truth.Marian David - 2004 - In I. Niiniluoto, M. Sintonen & J. Wolenski (eds.), Handbook of Epistemology. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 331--414.
  18. Truth and Pragmatism in Higher Education.Phillip E. Devine - 1990 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 5 (1):67-74.
  19. Language and Truth.Michael Dummett - 1983 - In Roy Harris (ed.), Approaches to Language. Pergamon Press.
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  20. Truth and Other Enigmas.Michael A. E. Dummett - 1978 - Harvard University Press.
  21. A Pragmatic View of Truth.Luiz H. A. Dutra - 2004 - Principia 8 (2):259-277.
    This paper proposes an alternative view of the connection between knowledge and truth. Truth is traditionally seen as a semantic notion, i.e. a relation between what we say about the world and the world itself. Epistemologists and philosophers of science are therefore apt to resort to correspondence theories of truth in order to deal with the question whether our theories and beliefs are true. Correspondence theories try to define truth, but, in order to do so, they must choose a truth (...)
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  22. Anti-Realist Truth and Concepts of Superassertibility.Jim Edwards - 1996 - Synthese 109 (1):103 - 120.
    Crispin Wright offers superassertibility as an anti-realist explication of truth. A statement is superassertible, roughly, if there is a state of information available which warrants it and it is warranted by all achievable enlargements of that state of information. However, it is argued, Wright fails to take account of the fact that many of our test procedures are not sure fire, even when applied under ideal conditions. An alternative conception of superassertibility is constructed to take this feature into account. However, (...)
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  23. Internal Realism.Brian Ellis - 1988 - Synthese 76 (3):409 - 434.
    I argue in this paper that anyone who accepts the ontology of scientific realism can only accept a pragmatic theory of truth, i.e., a theory on which truth is what it is epistemically right to believe. But the combination of realism with such a theory of truth is a form of internal realism; therefore, a scientific realist should be an internal realist. The strategy of the paper is to argue that there is no adequate semantic or correspondence theory of truth (...)
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  24. Pragmatic Theory of Truth.Gertrude Ezorsky - 1967 - In Paul Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. New York: Macmillan. pp. 6--427.
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  25. What is at Issue Between Epistemic and Traditional Accounts of Truth?John Fox - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):407 – 420.
    I will discuss those epistemic accounts of truth that say, roughly and at least, that the truth is what all ideally rational people, with maximum evidence, would in the long run come to believe. They have been defended on the grounds that they can solve sceptical problems that traditional accounts cannot surmount, and that they explain the value of truth in ways that traditional (and particularly, minimal) accounts cannot; they have been attacked on the grounds that they collapse into idealism. (...)
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  26. Meaning, Truth, and Pragmatism.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1960 - Philosophical Quarterly 10 (39):171-176.
  27. Logic, Logical Form and the Disunity of Truth.Will Gamester - forthcoming - Analysis:anx165.
    Monists say that the nature of truth is invariant, whichever sentence you consider; pluralists say that the nature of truth varies between different sets of sentences. The orthodoxy is that logic and logical form favour monism: there must be a single property that is preserved in any valid inference; and any truth-functional complex must be true in the same way as its components. The orthodoxy, I argue, is mistaken. Logic and logical form impose only structural constraints on a metaphysics of (...)
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  28. On Devitt on Dummett.Alexander George - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (9):516.
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  29. On a "Pragmatic" Theory of Truth.F. H. George - 1955 - Journal of Philosophy 52 (19):518-521.
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  30. Truth.Michael Glanzberg - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Truth is one of the central subjects in philosophy. It is also one of the largest. Truth has been a topic of discussion in its own right for thousands of years. Moreover, a huge variety of issues in philosophy relate to truth, either by relying on theses about truth, or implying theses about truth.
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  31. O Componente Pragmatista do Perspectivismo Nietzscheano.Pietro Gori - 2016 - Estudos Nietzsche 7 (2):85-101.
    During his late period, Nietzsche focused on the problem of the “value of truth”, since according to him it plays an important role on Western culture and its anthropology. That reflection had been influenced by some outcomes of the late-nineteenth century scientific research, and can be therefore compared with other strategies that, during those years, faced the relativism implied in modern epistemology, e.g. William James’s Pragmatism. This paper aims to explore the pragmatic feature of Nietzsche’s investigation on truth. As will (...)
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  32. Nietzsche on Truth: A Pragmatic View?Pietro Gori - 2013 - In Renate Reschke (ed.), Nietzscheforschung. Akademie Verlag.
    In this paper I deal with Nietzsche's theory of knowledge in the context of 19th century epistemology. In particular, I argue that, even though Nietzsche shows the ontological lack of content of truths (both on the theoretic and on the moral plane), he nevertheless leaves the space for a practical use of them, in a way that can be compared with William James' pragmatism. I thus deal with Nietzsche's and James' concept of "truth", and show their relationship with some outcomes (...)
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  33. Review of What’s the Use of Truth? [REVIEW]Benjamin A. Gorman - 2009 - Philosophy in Review 29 (3):219-220.
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  34. Truth and Realism.Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.) - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
    Is truth objective or relative? What exists independently of our minds? The essays in this book debate these two questions, which are among the oldest of philosophical issues and have vexed almost every major philosopher, from Plato, to Kant, to Wittgenstein. Fifteen eminent contributors bring fresh perspectives, renewed energy, and original answers to debates of great interest both within philosophy and in the culture at large.
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  35. Meaning Without Representation: Expression, Truth, Normativity, and Naturalism.Steven Gross, Nicholas Tebben & Michael Williams (eds.) - 2015 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Much contemporary thinking about language is animated by the idea that the core function of language is to represent how the world is and that therefore the notion of representation should play a fundamental explanatory role in any explanation of language and language use. Leading thinkers in the field explore various ways this idea may be challenged as well as obstacles to developing various forms of anti-representationalism. Particular attention is given to deflationary accounts of truth, the role of language in (...)
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  36. The Pragmatist Theory of Truth.Susan Haack - 1976 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27 (3):231-249.
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  37. Agent Provocateur: A Review of Richard Rorty's Truth and Progress. [REVIEW]Matthew C. Halteman - 2000 - Books and Culture 5 (3).
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  38. Knowability and Epistemic Truth.M. Hand - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):216 – 228.
    The so-called knowability paradox results from Fitch's argument that if there are any unknown truths, then there are unknowable truths. This threatens recent versions of semantical antirealism, the central thesis of which is that truth is epistemic. When this is taken to mean that all truths are knowable, antirealism is thus committed to the conclusion that no truths are unknown. The correct antirealistic response to the paradox should be to deny that the fundamental thesis of the epistemic nature of truth (...)
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  39. The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce.C. Hartshorne, P. Weiss & A. W. Burks - 1931 - Harvard University Press.
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  40. Reality as Necessary Friction.Diana B. Heney - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (9):504-514.
    In this paper, I argue that Huw Price’s widely read “Truth as Convenient Friction” overstates the onerousness, and underrates the utility, of the ontological commitments involved in Charles S. Peirce’s version of the pragmatist account of truth. This argument comes in three parts. First, I briefly explain Peirce’s view of truth, and relate it to his account of assertion. Next, I articulate what I take Price’s grievance against Peirce’s view to be, and suggest that this criticism misses the target. Finally, (...)
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  41. Truth, Superassertability, and Conceivability.Glen Hoffmann - 2008 - Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (3):287-299.
    The superassertability theory of truth, inspired by Crispin Wright (1992, 2003), holds that a statement is true if and only if it is superassertable in the following sense: it possesses warrant that cannot be defeated by any improvement of our information. While initially promising, the superassertability theory of truth is vulnerable to a persistent difficulty highlighted by James Van Cleve (1996) and Terrence Horgan (1995) but not properly fleshed out: it is formally illegitimate in a similar sense that unsophisticated epistemic (...)
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  42. Convergence on Whose Truth?: Feminist Philosophy and the "Masculine Intellect" of Pragmatism.Nancy J. Holland - 1995 - Journal of Social Philosophy 26 (2):170-183.
  43. Truth, by Alan R. White. [REVIEW]V. Hope - 1970 - Philosophical Quarterly 22 (89):373.
  44. Theories of Truth.P. Horwich - 1994 - Dartmouth.
  45. Pragmatism, Truth and Response-Dependence.Andrew Howat - 2005 - Facta Philosophica 7 (2):231-253.
    Mark Johnston claims the pragmatist theory of truth is inconsistent with the way we actually employ and talk about that concept. He is, however, sympathetic enough to attempt to rescue its respectable core using ‘response-dependence’, a revisionary form of which he advocates as a method for clarifying various philosophically significant concepts. But Johnston has misrepresented pragmatism; it does not require rescuing, and as I show here, his ‘missing explanation argument’ against pragmatism therefore fails. What Johnston and other critics including Putnam (...)
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  46. A Few Puzzles About William James' Theory of Truth.Xingming Hu - 2016 - Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia 57 (135):803-821.
    William James makes several major claims about truth: (i) truth means agreement with reality independently of the knower, (ii) truth is made by human beings, (iii) truth can be verified, and (iv) truth is necessarily good. These claims give rise to a few puzzles: (i) and (ii) seem to contradict each other, and each of (ii), (iii), and (iv) has counter-intuitive implications. I argue that Richard Gale's interpretation of James' theory of truth is inadequate in dealing with these puzzles. I (...)
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  47. Pragmatism, a New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking ; the Meaning of Truth, a Sequel to Pragmatism.William James - 1978 - Harvard University Press.
  48. The Meaning of the Word 'Truth'.William James - 1908 - Mind 17 (67):455-456.
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  49. Pragmatism.William James - 1907 - Longmans, Green and Co..
    Noted psychologist and philosopher develops his own brand of pragmatism, based on theories of C. S. Peirce. Emphasis on "radical empiricism," versus the transcendental and rationalist tradition. One of the most important books in American philosophy. Note.
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  50. Pragmatism's Conception of Truth.William James - 1907 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 4 (6):141-155.
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