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  1. Language and the complexity of the world.Paul Teller - manuscript
    Nature is complex, exceedingly so. A repercussion of this “complex world constraint” is that it is, in practice, impossible to connect words to the world in a foolproof manner. In this paper I explore the ways in which the complex world constraint makes vagueness, or more generally imprecision, in language in practice unavoidable, illuminates what vagueness comes to, and guides us to a sensible way of thinking about truth. Along the way we see that the problem of ceteris paribus laws (...)
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  2. Inferential Deflationism.Luca Incurvati & Julian J. Schlöder - forthcoming - The Philosophical Review.
    Deflationists about truth hold that the function of the truth predicate is to enable us to make certain assertions we could not otherwise make. Pragmatists claim that the utility of negation lies in its role in registering incompatibility. The pragmatist insight about negation has been successfully incorporated into bilateral theories of content, which take the meaning of negation to be inferentially explained in terms of the speech act of rejection. We implement the deflationist insight in a bilateral theory by taking (...)
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  3. Truth's Dialectical Role: From Friction to Tension.Lionel Shapiro - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper contrasts two versions of a pragmatist critique of deflationism about truth. According to the critique, understanding the practice of factual discourse requires understanding a role played in that practice by speakers’ use of the concept of truth. Huw Price takes this role to lie in the expression of attitudes of approval and disapproval toward other speakers’ assertions. Proceeding from Robert Brandom’s analysis of assertion, I defend an alternative account of truth’s role in terms of the acknowledgement and disacknowledgement (...)
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  4. Truth from the Agent Point of View.Matthew Shields - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.
    I defend a novel pragmatist account of truth that I call ‘truth from the agent point of view’ or ‘agential truth’, drawing on insights from Hilary Putnam. According to the agential view, as inquirers, when we take something to be truth-apt, we are taking ourselves and all other thinkers to be accountable to getting right a shared target that is independent of any individual’s or community’s view of that target. That we have this relationship to truth is what enables our (...)
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  5. Trueing.Holly Andersen - 2023 - In The Pragmatist Challenge: Pragmatist Metaphysics for Philosophy of Science. Oxford University Press.
    Even in areas of philosophy of science that don’t involve formal treatments of truth, one’s background view of truth still centrally shapes views on other issues. I offer an informal way to think about truth as trueing, like trueing a bicycle wheel. This holist approach to truth provides a way to discuss knowledge products like models in terms of how well-trued they are to their target. Trueing emphasizes: the process by which models are brought into true; how the idealizations in (...)
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  6. Alethic Pluralism for Pragmatists.Tom Kaspers - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-19.
    Pragmatism and the correspondence theory of truth are longtime foes. Nevertheless, there is an argument to be made that pragmatists must embrace truth as correspondence. I show that there is a distinctive pragmatic utility to taking truth to be correspondence, and I argue that it would be inconsistent for pragmatists to accept the utility of the belief that truth is correspondence while resisting the premise that this belief is correct. -/- In order to show how pragmatists can embrace truth as (...)
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  7. Dewey’s Denotative Method: A Critical Approach.Andrii Leonov - 2022 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 14 (1):1-19.
    In this paper, I critically approach the essence of Dewey’s philosophy: his method. In particular, it is what Dewey termed as denotative method is at the center of my attention. I approach Dewey’s denotative method via what I call the “genealogical deconstruction” that is followed by the “pragmatic reconstruction.” This meta-approach is not alien to Dewey’s philosophy, and in fact was employed by Dewey himself in Experience and Nature. The paper consists of two parts. In Part 1, I genealogically deconstruct (...)
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  8. Global expressivism and alethic pluralism.Huw Price - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-55.
    This paper discusses the relation between Crispin Wright’s alethic pluralism and my global expressivism. I argue that on many topics Wright’s own view counts as expressivism in my sense, but that truth itself is a striking exception. Unlike me, Wright never seems to countenance an expressivist account of truth, though the materials needed are available to him in his approaches to other topics.
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  9. Jordan Peterson on Postmodernism, Truth, and Science.Panu Raatikainen - 2022 - In Jordan Peterson. Critical Responses. Chicago: Carus Books. pp. 187–197.
  10. The Concept of Sense in Gilles Deleuze's Logic of Sense.Daniel W. Smith - 2022 - Deleuze and Guattari Studies 16 (1):3-23.
    What is the concept of sense developed by Deleuze in his 1969 Logic of Sense? This paper attempts to answer this question analysing the three dimensions of language that Deleuze isolates: the primary order of noises and intensities ; the secondary order of sense ; and the tertiary organisation of propositions. What renders language possible is that which separates sounds from bodies and organises them into propositions, freeing them for the expressive function. Deleuze argues that it is the dimension of (...)
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  11. Chapter 9: Reason, Truth, and Counterexample.Aubrey Spivey - 2022 - Springer.
    I argue in this chapter that we should not be quick to dismiss Hilary Putnam’s account of truth as (idealized) rational acceptability. Putnam defends the view that the role values play in facts and vice versa. What I argue for here does not amount to a full-blooded defense of Putnam’s account, but of an important component of a pragmatist theory of truth more generally. I defend the value of usability as particularly important and show how Jane Addams and subsequent feminist (...)
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  12. On Peterson’s Truth.Teemu Tauriainen - 2022 - In Jordan Peterson: Critical Responses. Chicago: Open Universe.
    Jordan Peterson’s remarks on the nature of truth are voluminous. Despite this, widespread confusion persists on Peterson’s understanding of truth. One reason for this is that Peterson’s treatment of this notion is scattered and unsystematic. Another reason is that the scholarly work on Peterson’s truth is lacking. It is the goal of this paper to clarify Peterson’s views by deploying instruments of analysis from contemporary philosophical literature. After critically discussing Peterson’s views, I conclude that his truth is best understood as (...)
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  13. What We Talk about When We Talk about Truth: Dewey, Wittgenstein, and the Pragmatic Test.John Capps - 2021 - Humana Mente 29 (2):159-180.
    Pragmatic theories of truth need to pass the pragmatic test: they need to make a difference. Unfortunately, defenders of the pragmatic theory have rarely applied this test. I argue that a Deweyan pragmatic account of truth passes the test by identifying the political and epistemic dangers of certain types of social networks that create a durable consensus around false beliefs. To better understand Dewey’s account of truth I propose an excursion through Wittgenstein’s later views on knowledge and certainty.
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  14. The Nature of Truth (Second edition).Michael Lynch, Jeremy Wyatt, Junyeol Kim & Nathan Kellen (eds.) - 2021 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  15. Truth and Theories of Truth.Panu Raatikainen - 2021 - In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge University Press. pp. 217–232..
    The concept of truth and competing philosophical theories on what truth amounts to have an important place in contemporary philosophy. The aim of this chapter is to give a synopsis of different theories of truth and the particular philosophical issues related to the concept of truth. The literature on this topic is vast, and we must necessarily be rather selective and very brief about complex questions of interpretation of various philosophers. The focus of the chapter is mainly on selected systematic (...)
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  16. Confiabilismo, lenguaje, y la adscripción de verdad en las creencias.Miguel Cabrera Machado - 2020 - Endoxa 46 (46):249-271.
    Este artículo propone que las actitudes proposicionales doxásticas, o creencias, funcionan en una estructura de dos niveles, uno básico o fundacional, concebido a partir del lenguaje, y otro epistémico o no fundacional, creado a partir del proceso confiabilista. Lo anterior representa sólo un modelo del funcionamiento de la mente en relación con los procesos que originan conocimientos, sin suponer que existan físicamente tales niveles. Lo que sí existiría, puesto que observamos que sus resultados se adecúan al modelo expuesto, son, por (...)
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  17. A Common-Sense Pragmatic Theory of Truth.John Capps - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (2):463-481.
    Truth is a fundamental philosophical concept that, despite its common and everyday use, has resisted common-sense formulations. At this point, one may legitimately wonder if there even is a common-sense notion of truth or what it could look like. In response, I propose here a common-sense account of truth based on four “truisms” that set a baseline for how to go about building an account of truth. Drawing on both ordinary language philosophy and contemporary pragmatic approaches to truth, I defend (...)
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  18. Habermas, Rorty, and the Problem of Competent Interlocutors.Claudio Cormick - 2020 - Análisis Filosófico 40 (2):213-246.
    In texts such as “Richard Rorty’s Pragmatic Turn” Jürgen Habermas defends a theory that associates, on the one hand, the truth-claim raised by a speaker for a proposition p with, on the other hand, the requirement that p be “defendable on the basis of good reasons […] at any time and against anybody”. This, as is known, has been the target of criticisms by Rorty, who−in spite of agreeing with Habermas on the central tenet that the way of evaluating our (...)
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  19. Shopping for Truth Pluralism.Will Gamester - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11351-11377.
    Truth pluralists say that the nature of truth varies between domains of discourse: while ordinary descriptive claims or those of the hard sciences might be true in virtue of corresponding to reality, those concerning ethics, mathematics, institutions might be true in some non-representational or “anti-realist” sense. Despite pluralism attracting increasing amounts of attention, the motivations for the view remain underdeveloped. This paper investigates whether pluralism is well-motivated on ontological grounds: that is, on the basis that different discourses are concerned with (...)
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  20. Pragmatism and Correspondence.Andrew Howat - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (2):685-704.
    It is commonplace to describe the pragmatist conception of truth as incompatible with correspondence theory. This popular description relies on a deflationary reading of Peirce and James’s many apparent endorsements of correspondence. This reading says they regarded it as a mere platitude or truism, not as a substantive piece of philosophical theorizing. There are two main reasons typically offered in support of this platitude narrative – its consonance with Peirce’s original formulation of PT from 1878, and the objections that pragmatists (...)
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  21. Democracy and Inquiry in the Post-Truth Era: A pragmatist Solution.Daniel Labrador Montero - 2020 - Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 9 (13).
    Post-truth has become a commonplace strategy. No longer are objective facts viewed as having evidentiary value; scientific knowledge is on a par with emotions or personal beliefs. We intend to show that in the context of post-truth, those proffering and receiving an assertion do not care about the truth-value of the assertion or about the best way to gather evidence concerning it. Such attitudes raise several questions about how relativism can be a corrupting influence in contemporary democracies. We will analyse (...)
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  22. How Pragmatist was Sellars? Reflections on an Analytic Pragmatism.James O'Shea - 2020 - In Stefan Brandt & Anke Breunig (eds.), Wilfrid Sellars and Twentieth-Century Philosophy. New York: Routledge. pp. 110–29.
    ABSTRACT: In this chapter I argue that Sellars’s philosophy was deeply pragmatist both in its motivation and in its content, whether considered conceptually, historically, or in his own estimation, and that this is the case even in the important respects in which his views differ from most pragmatists. However, this assessment has been rejected by many recent pragmatists, with “classicalist” pragmatists frequently objecting to Sellars’s analytic-pragmatist privileging of language at the alleged expense of experience, while many analytic pragmatists themselves emphasize (...)
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  23. Correspondence Theory as a Genuine Theory of Truth.Micah Phillips-Gary - 2020 - Ephemeris, the Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy 20 (1).
    Kwasi Wiredu argues that the correspondence theory of truth is tautologous and thus not a genuine theory of truth. After contrasting his pragmatist theory of truth with what I call Peirce's pragmaticist theory of truth, in his terminology the realist conception of reality, I argue Wiredu's pragmatist theory of truth is not a theory of the sort of truth which correspondence theory is talking about because correspondence theory is a theory of truth full-stop, while Wiredu instead offers a theory of (...)
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  24. Religious Interactions in Deliberative Democratic Systems Theory.Timothy Stanley - 2020 - Religions 4 (11):1-17.
    The following essay begins by outlining the pragmatist link between truth claims and democratic deliberations. To this end, special attention will be paid to Jeffrey Stout’s pragmatist enfranchisement of religious citizens. Stout defends a deliberative notion of democracy that fulfills stringent criteria of inclusion and security against domination. While mitigating secular exclusivity, Stout nonetheless acknowledges the new visibility of religion in populist attempts to dominate political life through mass rule and charismatic authorities. In response, I evaluate recent innovations in deliberative (...)
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  25. Recensione di Making the Social World di John Searle (2010) (recensione rivista 2019).Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - In Benvenuti all'inferno sulla Terra: Bambini, Cambiamenti climatici, Bitcoin, Cartelli, Cina, Democrazia, Diversità, Disgenetica, Uguaglianza, Pirati Informatici, Diritti umani, Islam, Liberalismo, Prosperità, Web, Caos, Fame, Malattia, Violenza, Intellige. Las Vegas, NV, USA: Reality Press. pp. 9-29.
    Prima di commentare in dettaglio su making il mondo sociale (MSW) offrirò prima alcuni commenti sulla filosofia (psicologia descrittiva) e il suo rapporto con la ricerca psicologica contemporanea come esemplificato nelle opere di Searle (S) e Wittgenstein (W), dal momento che sento che questo è il modo migliore per posizionare Searle o qualsiasi comportamento commentatore, nella giusta prospettiva. Aiuterà molto vedere le mie recensioni di PNC, TLP, PI, OC, TARW e altri libri di questi due geni della psicologia descrittiva. S (...)
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  26. There is No Truth–Theory Like the Correspondence Theory.Rognvaldur Ingthorsson - 2019 - Discusiones Filosóficas 20 (34):15–41.
    I challenge the assumption that the pragmatist-, coherence-, identity- and deflationary theories of truth are essentially incompatible and rival views to the correspondence theory, without endorsing pluralism. With the exception of some versions of the identity theory, the alternative theories only appear to genuinely contradict the correspondence theory, either when they are wedded to a rejection of an objective reality, or when it is assumed that a ‘theory of truth’ is a theory of the function of the truth-predicate. I argue (...)
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  27. Letting the Truth Out: Children, Naive Truth, and Deflationism.Brian Lightbody - 2019 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):17-42.
    In their recent paper, “Epistemology for Beginners: Two to Five-Year-Old Children’s Representation of Falsity,” Olivier Mascaro and Olivier Morin study the ontogeny of a naïve understanding of truth in humans. Their paper is fascinating for several reasons, but most striking is their claim (given a rather optimistic reading of epistemology) that toddlers as young as two can, at times, recognize false from true assertions. Their Optimistic Epistemology Hypothesis holds that children seem to have an innate capacity to represent a state (...)
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  28. The Generality of Anaphoric Deflationism.Pietro Salis - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (2):505-522.
    Anaphoric deflationism is a kind of prosententialist account of the use of “true.” It holds that “true” is an expressive operator and not a predicate. In particular, “is true” is explained as a “prosentence.” Prosentences are, for sentences, the equivalent of what pronouns are for nouns: As pronouns refer to previously introduced nouns, so prosentences like “that’s true” inherit their semantic content from previously introduced sentences. So, if Jim says, “The candidate is going to win the election,” and Bill replies (...)
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  29. Other minds and God: Russell and Stout on James and Schiller.Tim Button - 2018 - In Maria Baghramian & Sarin Marchetti (eds.), Pragmatism and the European Traditions: Encounters with analytic philosophy and phenomenology before the great divide. London: Routledge. pp. 86-109.
    In 1907–8, Russell and Stout presented an objection against James and Schiller, to which both James and Schiller replied. In this paper, I shall revisit their transatlantic exchange. Doing so will yield a better understanding of Schiller’s relationship to a worryingly solipsistic brand of phenomenalism. It will also allow us to appreciate a crucial difference between Schiller and James; a difference which James explicitly downplayed.
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  30. Did Dewey Have a Theory of Truth?John Capps - 2018 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 54 (1):39.
    Despite increased interest in pragmatic theories of truth, Dewey’s approach has not received the same degree of attention as other pragmatists such as Peirce and James. This may seem rather surprising given the sheer quantity Dewey published in his lifetime, much of it focused on issues of epistemology and scientific inquiry. On the other hand, this might seem not surprising at all, since Dewey often went to some effort, especially near the end of his career, to avoid the concept of (...)
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  31. Review of Joshua Gert, "Primitive Colors". [REVIEW]Nicholas Danne - 2018 - Metapsychology Online Reviews 22 (31).
    Good book. See this review's final paragraph for my conspiracy theory defending reflectance physicalism.
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  32. Dossier Pragmatismo.Mónica Gómez - 2018 - Theoría Revista Del Colegio de Filosofía 34 (34):77-204.
    Dossier sobre Pragmatismo. Los trabajos que se incluyen en este dossier tienen como hilo conductor el discutir una noción de verdad provisional y débil, en oposición a una concepción de verdad entendida como una fundamentación fuerte, objetiva y universal de las creencias.
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  33. Pluralidad de conocimientos y sistemas complejos.Mónica Gómez - 2018 - Ludus Vitalis 26 (49):43-59.
    In this paper, I defend an epistemological pluralism that moves away from universal and absolute rationality, as well as from a radical and arbitrary relativism, where any criterion is valid for decision making. Such epistemological pluralism maintains that subjects know the world in which they live according to different conceptual schemes. We posit a notion of truth linked to the justification process and practical effectiveness. Then we present the importance of traditional knowledge in the socio-ecological field and relative to complex (...)
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  34. Constituting assertion: a pragmatist critique of Horwich’s ‘Truth’.Andrew W. Howat - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):935-954.
    In his influential book Truth, Paul Horwich deploys a philosophical method focused on linguistic usage, that is, on the function(s) the concept of truth serves in actual discourse. In doing so Horwich eschews abstract metaphysics, arguing that metaphysical or ontological conceptions of truth rest on basic misconceptions. From this description, one might reasonably expect Horwich's book to have drawn inspiration from, or even embodied philosophical pragmatism of some kind. Unfortunately Horwich relies upon Russell's tired caricature of pragmatism about truth (''p' (...)
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  35. “A Sharply Drawn Horizon”: Peirce and Other Correspondence Theorists.Robert Lane - 2018 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 54 (3):395.
    ... I was many years ago led to define "real" as meaning being such as it is, no matter how you, or, I, or any man or definite collection of men may think it to be; where I use the long and awkward phrase in order to avoid all appearance of meaning independently of human thought. For obviously, nothing that I or anybody ever can mean can be independent of human thought. That is real which men would eventually and finally (...)
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  36. Williams’s Pragmatic Genealogy and Self-Effacing Functionality.Matthieu Queloz - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18:1-20.
    In Truth and Truthfulness, Bernard Williams sought to defend the value of truth by giving a vindicatory genealogy revealing its instrumental value. But what separates Williams’s instrumental vindication from the indirect utilitarianism of which he was a critic? And how can genealogy vindicate anything, let alone something which, as Williams says of the concept of truth, does not have a history? In this paper, I propose to resolve these puzzles by reading Williams as a type of pragmatist and his genealogy (...)
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  37. Postprawda jako skutek kryzysu oświeceniowego Rozumu.Michał Wieczorkowski - 2018 - Kraków, Polska: Ignatianum.
    Post-truth is described as a phenomenon existing at the public sphere, which consists in special emphasis on the ideologic aspect of expression, while at the same time marginalizing aspect of facts. it seems that in looking for the reasons for this behavior, statement that this practice is simply more effective is insufficient. It's not possible to describe well the phenomenon of post-truth without analyzing transformations of the epistemological plane from which the phenomenon of post-judgment emerged. One of the most important (...)
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  38. A Pragmatic Argument for a Pragmatic Theory of Truth.John Capps - 2017 - Contemporary Pragmatism 14 (2):135-156.
    Even though pragmatic theories of truth are not widely held, they have advantages not found elsewhere. Here I focus on one such advantage: that a pragmatic theory of truth does not limit the range of truth-apt beliefs and thereby “block the way of inquiry.” Furthermore, I argue that this speaks for a particular formulation of the pragmatic theory of truth, one that shifts away from Peircean approaches and their emphasis on temporal independence, and toward a theory that instead emphasizes truth’s (...)
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  39. Modeling Truth.Paul Teller - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (1):143-161.
    Many in philosophy understand truth in terms of precise semantic values, true propositions. Following Braun and Sider, I say that in this sense almost nothing we say is, literally, true. I take the stand that this account of truth nonetheless constitutes a vitally useful idealization in understanding many features of the structure of language. The Fregean problem discussed by Braun and Sider concerns issues about application of language to the world. In understanding these issues I propose an alternative modeling tool (...)
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  40. On the Evolution of Truth.Jeffrey A. Barrett - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (6):1323-1332.
    This paper is concerned with how a simple metalanguage might coevolve with a simple descriptive base language in the context of interacting Skyrms–Lewis signaling games Lewis. We will first consider a metagame that evolves to track the successful and unsuccessful use of a coevolving base language, then we will consider a metagame that evolves a truth predicate for expressions in a coevolving base language. We will see how a metagame that tracks truth provides an endogenous way to break the symmetry (...)
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  41. Against Naturalism about Truth.Berit Brogaard - 2016 - In Kelly Clark (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Naturalism. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 262-276.
    The chapter distinguishes between a weak and a strong form of ontological naturalism. Strong ontological naturalism is the view that all truths can be deduced, at least in principle, from truths about physical entities at the lowest level of organization, for example, truths about the elementary particles and forces. Weak ontological naturalism is the view that only physical properties can be causally efficacious. Strong ontological naturalism entails weak ontological naturalism but not vice versa. I then argue that the existence of (...)
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  42. O Componente Pragmatista do Perspectivismo Nietzscheano.Pietro Gori - 2016 - Estudos Nietzsche 7 (2):85-101.
    During his late period, Nietzsche focused on the problem of the “value of truth”, since according to him it plays an important role on Western culture and its anthropology. That reflection had been influenced by some outcomes of the late-nineteenth century scientific research, and can be therefore compared with other strategies that, during those years, faced the relativism implied in modern epistemology, e.g. William James’s Pragmatism. This paper aims to explore the pragmatic feature of Nietzsche’s investigation on truth. As will (...)
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  43. A few puzzles about William James' theory of truth.Xingming Hu - 2016 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 57 (135):803-821.
    William James makes several major claims about truth: (i) truth means agreement with reality independently of the knower, (ii) truth is made by human beings, (iii) truth can be verified, and (iv) truth is necessarily good. These claims give rise to a few puzzles: (i) and (ii) seem to contradict each other, and each of (ii), (iii), and (iv) has counter-intuitive implications. I argue that Richard Gale's interpretation of James' theory of truth is inadequate in dealing with these puzzles. I (...)
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  44. : From Empiricism to Expressivism: Brandom Reads Sellars[REVIEW]Colin McLear - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):808-816.
    One of the better known of the many bons mots of the Sellarsian corpus concerns his definition of philosophy: it is the attempt to understand “how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term.” When applied to Sellars’s philosophy in particular, one might be forgiven for doubting the possible success of such an endeavor. Richard Rorty once quipped of Sellars’s followers that they were either “left-wing” or “right-wing,” emphasizing one (...)
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  45. Empiricist Pragmatism.José L. Zalabardo - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):441-461.
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  46. Reflective Knowledge and the Nature of Truth.José L. Zalabardo - 2016 - Disputatio 8 (43):147-171.
    I consider the problem of reflective knowledge faced by views that treat sensitivity as a sufficient condition for knowledge, or as a major ingredient of the concept, as in the analysis I advance in Scepticism and Reliable Belief. I present the problem as concerning the correct analysis of SATs — beliefs to the effect that one of my current beliefs is true. I suggest that a plausible analysis of SATs should treat them as neither true nor false when they ascribe (...)
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  47. Meaning Without Representation: Expression, Truth, Normativity, and Naturalism.Steven Gross, Nicholas Tebben & Michael Williams (eds.) - 2015 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press UK.
    Much contemporary thinking about language is animated by the idea that the core function of language is to represent how the world is and that therefore the notion of representation should play a fundamental explanatory role in any explanation of language and language use. Leading thinkers in the field explore various ways this idea may be challenged as well as obstacles to developing various forms of anti-representationalism. Particular attention is given to deflationary accounts of truth, the role of language in (...)
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  48. Reality as Necessary Friction.Diana B. Heney - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (9):504-514.
    In this paper, I argue that Huw Price’s widely read “Truth as Convenient Friction” overstates the onerousness, and underrates the utility, of the ontological commitments involved in Charles S. Peirce’s version of the pragmatist account of truth. This argument comes in three parts. First, I briefly explain Peirce’s view of truth, and relate it to his account of assertion. Next, I articulate what I take Price’s grievance against Peirce’s view to be, and suggest that this criticism misses the target. Finally, (...)
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  49. Pragmatism and the Price of Truth.Michael P. Lynch - 2015 - In Steven Gross, Michael Williams & Nicholas Tebben (eds.), Meaning Without Representation: Essays on Truth, Expression, Normativity, and Naturalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 245-261.
    Like William James before him, Huw Price has influentially argued that truth has a normative role to play in our thought and talk. I agree. But Price also thinks that we should regard truth-conceived of as property of our beliefs-as something like a metaphysical myth. Here I disagree. In this paper, I argue that reflection on truth's values pushes us in a slightly different direction, one that opens the door to certain metaphysical possibilities that even a Pricean pragmatist can love.
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  50. Philosophical Commitments, Empirical Evidence, and Theoretical Psychology.Allen Pamela - 2015 - Theory and Psychology 25 (1):03-24.
    The philosophical or theoretical commitments informing psychological research are sometimes characterized, even by theoretical psychologists themselves, as nonempirical, outside the bounds of methodological consideration, and/or nonrational. We argue that this characterization is incoherent. We illustrate our concern by analogy with problematic appeals to Kuhn’s work that have been influential in theoretical psychology. Following the contemporary pragmatist tradition, we argue that our philosophical/theoretical commitments are part of our larger webs of belief, and that for any of these beliefs to have meaning (...)
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