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Summary This category is a catch-all for papers that do not fit - or much more commonly, have aspects that do not fit - anywhere else in the taxonomy. Most papers in this category are also categorized under some heading as well. 
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644 found
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1 — 50 / 644
  1. Sunk Costs.Robert Bass - manuscript
    Decision theorists generally object to “honoring sunk costs” – that is, treating the fact that some cost has been incurred in the past as a reason for action, apart from the consideration of expected consequences. This paper critiques the doctrine that sunk costs should never be honored on three levels. As background, the rationale for the doctrine is explained. Then it is shown that if it is always irrational to honor sunk costs, then other common and uncontroversial practices are also (...)
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  2. We are Optimizers: Re-opening the Case for Rational Genuine Satisficing.Gary Goh - manuscript
    This paper critically reviews the arguments supporting rational genuine satisficing. The deconstructive effort unearths inherent problems with the position in both static and dynamic contexts. Many of these arguments build on Herbert Simon’s canonical arguments surrounding incommensurability and demandingness problems. Optimizing is re-constructed using the principles of instrumental satisficing to answer these charges. The resulting conception is both obviously undemanding and a recognizable response to focused decision making.
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  3. Acts, Attitudes, and Rational Choice.Douglas W. Portmore - manuscript
    In this paper, I argue that we have obligations not only to perform certain actions, but also to have certain attitudes (such as desires, beliefs, and intentions), and this despite the fact that we rarely, if ever, have direct voluntary control over our attitudes. Moreover, I argue that whatever obligations we have with respect to actions derive from our obligations with respect to attitudes. More specifically, I argue that an agent is obligated to perform an action if and only if (...)
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  4. Chapter 3: The Teleological Conception of Practical Reasons.Douglas W. Portmore - manuscript
    This is Chapter 3 of my Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality. In this chapter, I defend the teleological conception of practical reasons, which holds that the reasons there are for and against performing a given act are wholly determined by the reasons there are for and against preferring its outcome to those of its available alternatives, such that, if S has most reason to perform x, all things considered, then, of all the outcomes that S could bring about, S (...)
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  5. Maximalism vs. Omnism about Permissibility.Douglas W. Portmore - manuscript
    The performance of one option can entail the performance of another. For instance, I have the option of baking a pumpkin pie as well as the option of baking a pie, and the former entails the latter. Now, suppose that both of these options are permissible. This raises the issue of which, if either, is more fundamental than the other. Is baking a pie permissible because it’s permissible to perform some instance of pie-baking, such as pumpkin-pie baking? Or is baking (...)
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  6. Artificial Intelligence and Practical Reason.Shu-yan Mok - unknown - Eidos: The Canadian Graduate Journal of Philosophy 6.
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  7. A Hybrid View of Commitment.Facundo M. Alonso - forthcoming - In David W. Shoemaker, Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Volume 9. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    We often appeal to the notion of an agent’s commitment to action to characterize, e.g., an agent’s faithfulness to a promise she has given to another, her robust disposition to pursue a goal she values or cares about, and her determination to stick to that goal. In the philosophy of action, that notion is often associated with the idea of an agent’s intention to act. In ethics, it is associated primarily with the idea of an agent’s commitment to, or endorsement (...)
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  8. (1 other version)General assessments and attractive exceptions: temptation in Planning, Time, and Self-Governance.Chrisoula Andreou - forthcoming - Tandf: Inquiry:1-9.
    One of Bratman’s aims in Planning, Time, and Self-Governance is to develop his insights regarding planning to shed light on temptation. I focus on the main case of temptation Bratman appeals to in supporting his conclusion that it can be rational for an agent facing temptation to stick to her prior plan even if she finds herself with an evaluative judgment that favors deviating. Bratman’s reasoning is meant to be consistent with the priority of present evaluation, and to be sensitive (...)
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  9. Metaethical Lessons of a Failed Ontological Proof of Robust Moral Realism.Marcus Arvan - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Philosophy.
    Michael Huemer claims to give an ontological proof of robust moral realism, the influential view that we have non-selfish, categorical, observer-independent reasons for action. This paper argues that one of Huemer’s premises – that knowing that baby torture is not objectively wrong would provide us with no first-person reasons to torture babies – is false of agents with sadistic desires. This in turn falsifies Huemer’s further premise that the premises of his “Antitorture Argument” are true independent of interests, desires, or (...)
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  10. Psychology in Action.A. Reply To Baumrind - forthcoming - Research Ethics.
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  11. The Unity of the Moral Domain.Jeremy David Fix - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    What is the function of morality—what is it all about? What is the basis of morality—what explains our moral agency and patiency? This essay defends a unique Kantian answer to these questions. Morality is about securing our independence from each other by giving each other equal discretion over whether and how we interact. The basis of our moral agency and patiency is practical reason. The first half addresses objections that this account cannot explain the moral patiency of beings who are (...)
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  12. When is Evidence No Longer Prior?Xian He - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    Some pragmatists hold that there are both practical and epistemic reasons to believe. A crucial issue for this view is how epistemic and practical reasons should be weighed against each other to deliver all-things-considered verdicts regarding what one ought to believe. According to threshold models, when the strength of practical reasons for belief exceeds a certain threshold, practical reasons become prior to epistemic reasons. These models are affected by a threshold problem: they fail to specify the threshold at which practical (...)
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  13. Explaining Deontic Status by Good Reasoning.Ulf Hlobil - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.
    This paper offers an account of deontic normativity in terms of attributive goodness. An action is permissible for S in C just in case there is a good practical inference available to S in C that results in S performing (or intending to perform) the action. The standards of goodness for practical inferences are determined by what is a good or bad exercise of the human capacity of practical reason, which is an attributive (and not a deontic) assessment.
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  14. When Reasons Run Out.Jason Kay - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    Subjectivists about practical normativity hold that an agent’s favoring and disfavoring attitudes give rise to practical reasons. On this view, an agent’s normative reason to choose vanilla over chocolate ice cream ultimately turns on facts about what appeals to her rather than facts about what her options are like attitude-independently. Objectivists—who ground reasons in the attitude-independent features of the things we aim at—owe us an explanation of why it is rational to choose what we favor, if not because favoring is (...)
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  15. Varieties of Second-Personal Reason.James H. P. Lewis - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.
    A lineage of prominent philosophers who have discussed the second-person relation can be regarded as advancing structural accounts. They posit that the second-person relation effects one transformative change to the structure of practical reasoning. In this paper, I criticise this orthodoxy and offer an alternative, substantive account. That is, I argue that entering into second-personal relations with others does indeed affect one's practical reasoning, but it does this not by altering the structure of one's agential thought, but by changing what (...)
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  16. Stigmergy 3.0: From Ants to Economies.Leslie Marsh & Margery Doyle - forthcoming - Cognitive Systems Research.
    The editors introduce the themed issue “stigmergy 3.0”.
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  17. Future-bias and intuition shifts between moments and lifetimes.Anh-Quân Nguyen - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Proponents of temporal neutrality have challenged the intuitive appeal of future-bias: The intuitive appeal of future-bias is limited to a set of isolated cases that involve only hedonic and self-regarding goods and harms. They suggest that we should treat future-bias as irrational in self-regarding hedonic cases too, or at least not treat the intuitive appeal as evidence for future-bias's permissibility, since hedonic and non-hedonic cases are relevantly similar. This paper defends the rationality of future-bias against this concern. Firstly, hedonic goods (...)
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  18. Problems of Choice.Mathea Slåttholm Sagdahl & Attila Tanyi (eds.) - forthcoming - London: Routledge.
    This will be a volume on problems of choice with four sections dedicated to: normativity and choice, rationality and choice, value and choice, morality and choice. Chapters by: Chrisoula Andreau, Paul Bloomfield, Krister Bykvist, Sophie Grace Chappell, David Copp, Guy Fletcher, Joshua Gert, Olasv Gjelsvik, Natalie Gold, Marina Moreno, Fredrik Nyseth, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Andrew Reisner, Caj Strandberg, Sarah Stroud, Johanna Thoma.
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  19. Review: Wu, Wayne (2023). Movements of the Mind: A Theory of Attention, Intention and Action. Oxford University Press. [REVIEW]Joshua Shepherd - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
  20. Shifting Scope: A Model of Instrumental Rationality.Caj Strandberg - forthcoming - Theoria.
    The paper develops a new model of instrumental rationality: There is a general concept of instrumental rationality that has two types of instances that differ with regard to coherence and scope. The ‘primary aspect’ applies in effect only to cases where an agent has reason to do what she intends to do and corresponds to a narrow-scope requirement. The ‘secondary aspect’ applies also to cases where an agent does not have reason to do what she intends to do and corresponds (...)
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  21. Practical Death.Angela Sun - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Philosophy.
    This article argues that integrity requires living up to the requirements of our core commitments. I argue that an agent who violates the requirements of her core commitments and ceases to be integrated suffers a _practical death_: an experience characterized by psychological crisis, loss of direction, and a diminished capacity for instrumental reasoning. Because these conditions undermine self-governance, the account I offer illuminates an important but underexplored connection between integrity and self-governance.
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  22. “When in Rome…”: On the Authority of Social Norms.Francesco Testini - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.
    The debate on moral norms and standards is as old as philosophy itself. But social norms and conventions have finally started attracting their fair share of attention too. Their authority is the topic of two sophisticated books published in the last few years, namely David Owens’ Bound by Convention (2022) and Laura Valentini’s Morality and Socially Constructed Norms (2023). In this essay, I present the theoretical outlooks of these two books and then proceed to criticize both. First, I point out (...)
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  23. Embeddedness and the Psychological Nature of Default Reason: On How Particularists Should Address the Flattening Objection.Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    Particularism is widely conceived to endorse the view that moral reason is context-dependent. This being so, it is often accused of flattening the moral landscape—treating the feature of promise-keeping as constituting no more of a (moral) reason for action than the feature of wearing a yellow shoelace in advance of the considerations of the contexts. In reply, Dancy maintains that his particularism allows some features such as promise-keeping to have a reason status by default, ontologically speaking; it is just that (...)
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  24. 2008. Practical reason.J. Wallace - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  25. Knowledge and Action: What Depends on What?Itamar Weinshtock Saadon - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.
    Some philosophers think that knowledge or justification is both necessary and sufficient for rational action: they endorse knowledge-action or justification-action biconditionals. This paper offers a novel, metaphysical challenge to these biconditionals, which proceeds with a familiar question: What depends on what? If you know that p iff it is rational for you to act on p, do you know that p partly because it is rational for you to act on p, or is it rational for you to act on (...)
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  26. Il progresso morale. Teorie e prospettive sul cambiamento dei valori.Federico Bina - 2025 - Il Mulino.
  27. Review of Daniel Whiting’s The Range of Reasons: in Ethics and Epistemology[REVIEW]Bowen Chan - 2025 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  28. Memory, Anticipation, and Future Bias.Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, James Norton, Shen Pan & Rasmus Pedersen - 2025 - Philosophical Psychology.
    One proposed explanation for a particular kind of temporal preference lies in a disparity between the emotional intensity of memory compared to anticipation. According to the memory/anticipation disparity explanation, the utility of anticipation of a particular event if that event is future, whether positive or negative, is greater than the utility of retrospection of that same event if it is past, whether positive or negative, and consequently, overall utility is maximised when we prefer negative events to be located in the (...)
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  29. Non-Ardent Non-Naturalism.Olle Risberg - 2025 - In Russ Shafer-Landau, Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 20. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    In this chapter, I defend a novel metanormative view called non-ardent non-naturalism. The central claim of this view is that moral facts (and normative facts more generally) are non-natural but not authoritatively prescriptive. My main argument for this view is cumulative: I formulate five attractive metanormative claims and argue that while non-ardent non-naturalism accommodates all these claims, its main rivals fail to do so. These claims are: (i) the Moorean intuition, (ii) the Just-Too-Different intuition, (iii) the Frege-Geach insight, (iv) the (...)
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  30. The practical standpoint.Joe Saunders - 2025 - Synthese 205 (5):1-22.
    Some Kantians argue that freedom is not a metaphysical property that we might or might not possess, but instead an idea or presupposition that we must adopt from the practical standpoint. In doing so, they look to secure our freedom, no matter what science or theoretical reason reveals about us. This paper lays out two problems for this position. The problems are both metaphysical and epistemic. The metaphysical issues are that conceiving of freedom as an idea or presupposition that we (...)
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  31. Moral Archetypes - etika sa prehistory.Roberto Thomas Arruda - 2025 - Independent.
    Ang tradisyong pilosopikal sa paglapit sa moralidad ay pangunahing nakabatay sa mga konsepto at teoryang metapisikal at teolohikal. Sa mga tradisyunal na konsepto ng etika, ang pinakaprominente ay ang Divine Command Theory (DCT). Ayon sa DCT, ang Diyos ang nagbibigay ng moral na pundasyon sa sangkatauhan sa pamamagitan ng paglikha at Rebelasyon. Ang moralidad at pagka-Diyos ay hindi mapaghihiwalay mula pa noong pinakalumang sibilisasyon. Ang mga konseptong ito ay nakalubog sa isang teolohikal na balangkas at malawakang tinatanggap ng karamihan sa (...)
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  32. Naive Action Theory and Essentially Intentional Actions.Armand Babakhanian - 2024 - Southwest Philosophy Review 40 (1):229-237.
    In their recent paper, “Practical Knowledge without Luminosity,” Bob Beddor and Carlotta Pavese (2022) claim that the doctrine of essentially intentional actions, or “essentialism,” is false. Essentialism states that some actions are essentially intentional, such that, “whenever they are performed, they are performed intentionally” (2022, p. 926). Beddor and Pavese work to reject essentialism, which figures as a key premise in Juan Piñeros Glasscock’s anti-luminosity argument against the knowledge condition for intentional action (Piñeros Glasscock, p. 1240). Historically, essentialism has received (...)
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  33. Vontade, Autonomia e Universalidade: Um ensaio sobre a capacidade da razão prática de gerir autonomamente a conduta moral sob uma perspectiva universalista na Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes de Kant.Fernanda Cardoso - 2024 - Revista If-Sophia (28).
    Como começamos a refletir e deliberar sobre nossa conduta moral, colocando-nos no lugar dos outros? Mais especificamente, de que forma gerimos, de maneira arbitrária, nossa conduta a partir de uma perspectiva que prioriza o bem de todos os seres humanos de forma universal? Com o objetivo de responder essa questão, parto da hipótese de que o conceito de razão prática, frequentemente tratado como 'vontade' na Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes de Kant, pode esclarecer o desenvolvimento de nossa capacidade de refletir (...)
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  34. On Giving Yourself a Sign.Justin Dealy - 2024 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 28 (2).
    I argue we can have subjective practical reasons to perform actions we believe are neither morally required nor a means to satisfy our intrinsic desires. These reasons are grounded in extrinsic desires. Specifically, my claim is that subjective practical reasons can be grounded in desires for signs (i.e., signatory desires), a species of extrinsic desire, together with means-end beliefs. These reasons act like any other subjective practical reason, except when they are trumped, which I argue can happen when they are (...)
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  35. Non-Conceptual Normative Pluralism and the Dualism of Practical Reason.Jesse Hambly - 2024 - Utilitas (4):1-11.
    According to normative pluralists there are no truths about what one ought simpliciter to do, only truths about what one ought to do according to some normative system or stand-point. In contrast with conceptual normative pluralists who argue for this conclusion on the basis that the concept of an ought simpliciter is somehow defective, non-conceptual normative pluralists defend this conclusion on first-order grounds. Non-conceptual normative pluralism has recently received a book-length defence by Mathea Slåttholm Sagdahl. In this article I critique (...)
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  36. Review of Fitting Things Together: Coherence and the Demands of Structural Rationality[REVIEW]Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2024 - Mind 133 (532):1229-1238.
  37. Book review: ALMEIDA, Rogério Miranda de. A consciência moral: Das raízes gregas ao pensamento medieval. São Paulo: Loyola, 2023, 356 p. [REVIEW]Marco Antônio Pensak - 2024 - Basilíade - Revista de Filosofia 6 (11):115-117.
  38. Characterizing Digital Design: A Philosophical Approach.Christopher Quintana - 2024 - Dissertation, Villanova University
    In this dissertation, I investigate the resources for Neo-Aristotelian moral philosophy to address social and ethical issues that arise in the use of technologies that rely on digital environments. The theoretical underpinnings of this dissertation represent efforts from contemporary philosophers to re-engineer the theories of Ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle for the present. I offer my own contribution to this tradition in the context of the ethics and philosophy of technology. I aim to answer the following question: what moral and social (...)
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  39. Unthinkable actions.Etye Steinberg - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly.
    For each person, some actions are unthinkable: performing them requires crossing a line that one's conscience cannot allow crossing. This article explores what such unthinkability is. In doing so, it introduces a novel categorization of theories of action and practical reason. The article argues that an action is unthinkable if and only if the agent judges that she should never treat any consideration as a reason in favor of performing this action. This view meets two important tests. The first is (...)
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  40. The Hard Things about Hard Choices? A Reply to Chang.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2024 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 17 (1):aa-aa.
  41. Practical reason.R. Jay Wallace & Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2024 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Practical reason is the general human capacity for resolving, through reflection, the question of what one is to do. Deliberation of this kind is practical in at least two senses. First, it is practical in its subject matter, insofar as it is concerned with action. But it is also practical in its consequences or its issue, insofar as reflection about action itself directly moves people to act. Our capacity for deliberative self-determination raises two sets of philosophical problems. For one thing, (...)
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  42. Egalitarian Justice as a Challenge for the Value-Based Theory of Practical Reasons.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2023 - In Andrés Garcia, Mattias Gunnemyr & Jakob Werkmäster, Value, Morality & Social Reality: Essays dedicated to Dan Egonsson, Björn Petersson & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen. Department of Philosophy, Lund University. pp. 239-249.
    In this essay, I argue that the objections that have been raised against the view that equality is intrinsically valuable also provide objections to the view that all practical reasons can be explained in terms of value. Plausible egalitarian principles entail that under certain conditions people have claims to an equal share. These claims entail reasons to distribute goods equally that cannot be explained by value if equality has no intrinsic value.
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  43. Structural Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter & Alex Worsnip - 2023 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    This entry is composed of three sections. In §1, we survey debates about what structural rationality is, including the emergence of the concept in the contemporary literature, its key characteristics, its relationship to substantive rationality, its paradigm instances, and the questions of whether these instances are unified and, if so, how. In §2, we turn to the debate about structural requirements of rationality – including controversies about whether they are “wide-scope” or “narrow-scope”, synchronic or diachronic, and whether they govern processes (...)
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  44. Which Emotional Behaviors are Actions?Jean Moritz Müller & Hong Yu Wong - 2023 - In Andrea Scarantino, The Routledge Handbook of Emotion Theory. Routledge.
    There is a wide range of things we do out of emotion. For example, we smile with pleasure, our voices drop when we are sad, we recoil in shock or jump for joy, we apologize to others out of remorse. It is uncontroversial that some of these behaviors are actions. Clearly, apologizing is an action if anything is. Things seem less clear in the case of other emotional behaviors. Intuitively, the drop in a sad person’s voice is something that happens (...)
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  45. Metaethics as conceptual engineering.Knut Olav Skarsaune - 2023 - Analytic Philosophy 65 (4):514-536.
    On the traditional approach to metaethics, theories are expected to be faithful to ordinary normative discourse—or at worst (if we think the ordinary discourse is metaphysically unsound) to deviate from it as little as possible. This paper develops an alternative, “conceptual engineering” approach to metaethical enquiry, which is not in this way restricted by our present discourse. On this approach, we will seek to understand the psychology, semantics, metaphysics and epistemology, not just of our present concepts, but also of other (...)
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  46. Precis of Rational Powers in Action.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2023 - Philosophical Inquiries 11 (1):67-85.
    A précis of Sergio Tenenbaum's Rational Powers in Action (Oxford 2021).
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  47. Can't Kant count? Innumerate Views on Saving the Many over Saving the Few.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2023 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 13:215-234.
    It seems rather intuitive that if I can save either one stranger or five strangers, I must save the five. However, Kantian (and other non-consequentialist) views have a difficult time explaining why this is the case, as they seem committed to what Parfit calls “innumeracy”: roughly, the view that the values of lives (or the reasons to save them) don’t get greater (or stronger) in proportion to the number of lives saved. This chapter first shows that in various cases, it (...)
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  48. Rational Powers in Interaction: Replies to Paul, Andreou, Brunero, Mayr, and Haase.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2023 - Philosophical Inquiries 11 (1):163-183.
    A response to review essays by Chrisoula Andreou, John Brunero, Matthias Haase, Erasmus Mayr, and Sarah Paul on Sergio Tenenbaum's _Rational Powers in Action_.
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  49. How Requests Give Reasons: The Epistemic Account versus Schaber's Value Account.Daniel Weltman - 2023 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 26 (3):397-403.
    I ask you to X. You now have a reason to X. My request gave you a reason. How? One unpopular theory is the epistemic account, according to which requests do not create any new reasons but instead simply reveal information. For instance, my request that you X reveals that I desire that you X, and my desire gives you a reason to X. Peter Schaber has recently attacked both the epistemic account and other theories of the reason-giving force of (...)
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  50. Moral judgement: an introduction through Anglo-American, German and French philosophy.Étienne Brown - 2022 - Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
    This book is the first to introduce readers to contemporary philosophical works on moral judgement stemming from France, Germany and the Anglo-American world – many of which remain untranslated. By integrating Kantian and Aristotelian reflections on this subject, the author combines historiography and critical reflection to offer a rich picture of what it means to make good moral decisions. As both Kantians and Aristotelians argue, moral judgements are ultimately grounded in the normativity of practical identities. Thus, it is by identifying (...)
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