About this topic
Summary This category is a catch-all for papers that do not fit - or much more commonly, have aspects that do not fit - anywhere else in the taxonomy. Most papers in this category are also categorized under some heading as well. 
Key works Since this category has no theme, there are no key works.
Introductions N/A
Related categories

507 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 507
  1. added 2020-05-18
    Prassi, cultura, realtà. Saggi in onore di Pier Luigi Lecis.Vinicio Busacchi, Pietro Salis & Simonluca Pinna (eds.) - 2020 - Milano-Udine: Mimesis Edizioni.
    A collection of essays dedicated to Pier Luigi Lecis' retirement. Contributors include: Mariano Bianca, Silvana Borutti, Vinicio Busacchi, Massimo Dell'Utri, Rosaria Egidi, Roberta Lanfredini, Giuseppe Lorini, Diego Marconi, Francesco Orilia, Paolo Parrini, Alberto Peruzzi, Simonluca Pinna, Pietro Salis, Paolo Spinicci.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. added 2020-05-11
    Shared Agency and Contralateral Commitments.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (3):359-410.
    My concern here is to motivate some theses in the philosophy of mind concerning the interpersonal character of intentions. I will do so by investigating aspects of shared agency. The main point will be that when acting together with others one must be able to act directly on the intention of another or others in a way that is relevantly similar to the manner in which an agent acts on his or her own intentions. What exactly this means will become (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  3. added 2020-05-09
    The Sunk Cost 'Fallacy' Is Not a Fallacy.Ryan Doody - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6:1153-1190.
    Business and Economic textbooks warn against committing the Sunk Cost Fallacy: you, rationally, shouldn't let unrecoverable costs influence your current decisions. In this paper, I argue that this isn't, in general, correct. Sometimes it's perfectly reasonable to wish to carry on with a project because of the resources you've already sunk into it. The reason? Given that we're social creatures, it's not unreasonable to care about wanting to act in such a way so that a plausible story can be told (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. added 2020-04-23
    Interpersonal Obligation in Joint Action.Abraham Roth - 2018 - In Marija Jankovic & Kirk Ludwig (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality. New York: Routledge. pp. 45-57.
  5. added 2020-04-23
    On the Normativity of Intentions.Bruno Verbeek - 2014 - Topoi 33 (1):87-101.
    Suppose you intend now to φ at some future time t. However, when t has come you do not φ. Something has gone wrong. This failing is not just a causal but also a normative failing. This raises the question how to characterize this failing. I discuss three alternative views. On the first view, the fact that you do not execute your intention to φ is blameworthy only if the balance of reasons pointed to φ-ing. The fact that you intended (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6. added 2020-04-23
    On Practical Reasoning Under Ignorance.Georg Spielthenner - 2013 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 13 (3):357-373.
    The purpose of this paper is to present an account of practical reasoning under ignorance—i.e., reasoning under conditions where the available information is so uninformative that we cannot assign probabilities to the outcomes of our options. The account shows that such reasoning need not rely on implausible principles , but can nevertheless be logically valid. Put differently, I attempt to show that we can reason in a logically correct manner even if we do not know what the outcomes of our (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. added 2020-04-23
    The Uses of Reason. By Ordway Tead. [REVIEW]Arthur E. Murphy - 1944 - Ethics 55:65.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. added 2020-04-16
    Belief, Faith, and Hope: On the Rationality of Long-Term Commitment.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - Mind.
    I examine three attitudes: belief, faith, and hope. I argue that all three attitudes play the same role in rationalizing action. First, I explain two models of rational action—the decision-theory model and the belief-desire model. Both models entail there are two components of rational action: an epistemic component and a conative component. Then, using this framework, I show how belief, faith, and hope that p can all make it rational to accept, or act as if, p. I conclude by showing (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. added 2020-04-11
    The Eclipse of Instrumental Rationality.Kurt Sylvan - forthcoming - In The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. added 2020-03-17
    On the Rationality of Vow‐Making.Alida Liberman - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):881-900.
    I offer a philosophical account of vowing and the rationality of vow-making. I argue that vows are most productively understood as exceptionless resolutions that do not have any excusing conditions. I then articulate an apparent problem for exceptionless vow-making: how can it be rational to bind yourself unconditionally, when circumstances might change unexpectedly and make it the case that vow-keeping no longer makes sense for you? As a solution, I propose that vows can be rational to make only if they (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. added 2020-02-12
    Instrumental Reasoning in Nonhuman Animals.Elisabeth Camp & Eli Shupe - 2017 - In Kristin Andrews & Jake Beck (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds. London, UK: pp. 100-118.
  12. added 2020-02-12
    Rational Decision and Causality.James Cargile - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):163-168.
  13. added 2020-02-11
    The Possibility of Practical Reason.Thomas Pink - 2003 - Mind 112 (448):812-816.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   79 citations  
  14. added 2020-02-07
    Reasoning and Rationalization.Ralph Piddington - 1928 - Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy 6 (1):42-54.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. added 2020-02-02
    Quid mihi?Konrad Utz - 2016 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 64 (2):213-227.
    Kant did not explain the method of his foundation of ethics expressly. However, we can comprehend it as the demonstration of the originality of morality. For morality cannot be derived from anything non-moral – such a relation of derivation would destroy it. Therefore, there cannot be a justification or proof of morality in the strong sense, there can only be a “groundwork”, as the term “Grundlegung” is normally translated in English. This groundwork or grounding consists in disclosing the place or (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. added 2020-02-02
    9. Forcing and Practical Inference.Peter Schotch - 2009 - In Raymond Jennings, Bryson Brown & Peter Schotch (eds.), On Preserving: Essays on Preservationism and Paraconsistent Logic. University of Toronto Press. pp. 161-174.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. added 2020-01-31
    The Aporia of Practical Reason: Reflections on What It Means to Pay Due Respect to Others.Glenn Mackin - 2011 - Contemporary Political Theory 10 (1):58-77.
    This article investigates the forms of respect and responsiveness that must be present in the process of practical reason. Drawing upon Jürgen Habermas’ discourse theory and his incidental remarks about aesthetics, I identify two modes of respect. The first is the mutual respect and equality that emerges in the process of coming to agreement on proposed norms; the second is the call to infinite responsibility that emerges in opening to the transcendent character of others. However, Habermas makes an error in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  18. added 2020-01-31
    Right Practical Reason: Aristotle, Action, and Prudence in Aquinas.Daniel Westberg.Henry Veatch - 1997 - Speculum 72 (2):578-579.
  19. added 2020-01-21
    Kant e a Defesa da Causa de Deus: algumas considerações acerca do opúsculo kantiano sobre a teodiceia.Bruno Cunha - 2018 - Ética E Filosofia Política 1 (21):5-21.
    The article On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy was published in 1791 on the pages of the monthly periodical berlinische Monatsschrift. By itself, the title of the article already seems to us quite enlightening. What would it be but a criticism of every attempt to justify the God's cause? Nevertheless, there are evidences that there is much more at stake. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to raise the question about the true meaning of the Kant`s (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. added 2019-11-14
    Practical Knowledge.Michael Schmitz - 2013 - Was Sollen Wir Glauben? Was Dürfen Wir Tun?, Sektionsbeiträge der GAP. 8.
    The contribution deals with knowledge of what to do, and how, where, when and why to do it, as it is found in a multitude of plans, rules, procedures, maxims, and other instructions. It is argued that while this knowledge is conceptual and propositional, it is still irreducible to theoretical knowledge of what is the case and why it is the case. It is knowledge of goals, of ends and means, rather than of facts. It is knowledge-to that is irreducibly (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  21. added 2019-11-11
    Improving Practical Reasoning and Argumentation.Michael D. Baumtrog - 2015 - Dissertation, Universidade Nova de Lisboa
    This thesis justifies the need for and develops a new integrated model of practical reasoning and argumentation. After framing the work in terms of what is reasonable rather than what is rational (chapter 1), I apply the model for practical argumentation analysis and evaluation provided by Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) to a paradigm case of unreasonable individual practical argumentation provided by mass murderer Anders Behring Breivik (chapter 2). The application shows that by following the model, Breivik is relatively easily able (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  22. added 2019-10-29
    The Error Condition.Jeremy David Fix - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):34-48.
    The possibility of error conditions the possibility of normative principles. I argue that extant interpretations of this condition undermine the possibility of normative principles for our action because they implicitly treat error as a perfection of an action. I then explain how a constitutivist metaphysics of capacities explains why error is an imperfection of an action. Finally, I describe and defend the interpretation of the error condition which follows.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  23. added 2019-10-07
    Contrastive Reasons. [REVIEW]Alex Worsnip - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (3):367-371.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. added 2019-09-23
    Formalism and Constitutivism in Kantian Practical Philosophy.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (2):163-176.
    Constitutivists have tried to answer Enoch’s “schmagency” objection by arguing that Enoch fails to appreciate the inescapability of agency. Although these arguments are effective against some versions of the objection, I argue that they leave constitutivism vulnerable to an important worry; namely, that constitutivism leaves us alienated from the moral norms that it claims we must follow. In the first part of the paper, I try to make this vague concern more precise: in a nutshell, it seems that constitutivism cannot (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  25. added 2019-09-19
    Nature and the Best Life. Exploring the Natural Bases of Practical Normativity in Ancient Philosophy.Gabriela Rossi (ed.) - 2013 - Hildesheim - Zurich - New York: G. Olms.
    The papers included in this book explore various aspects of the relation between nature and practical normativity in Antiquity, from the Presocratic period to Neoplatonism. Leaving aside the question how much of contemporary naturalism is present in Ancient Philosophy, and whether that much is sufficient for finding traces of it in ancient naturalism, one may still ask the historical question of whether or not this is a feature that all ancient ethics share. To this effect, the following pages offer a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. added 2019-09-09
    Agency, Patiency, and The Good Life: The Passivities Objection to Eudaimonism.Micah Lott - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (3):773-786.
    Many contemporary eudaimonists emphasize the role of agency in the good life. Mark LeBar, for example, characterizes his own eudaimonist view this way: “It is agentist, not patientist, because it emphasizes that our lives go well in virtue of what we do, rather than what happens, to us or otherwise”. Nicholas Wolterstorff, however, has argued that this prioritizing of agency over patiency is a fatal flaw in eudaimonist accounts of well-being. Eudaimonism must be rejected, Wolterstorff argues, because many life-goods are (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  27. added 2019-09-09
    Practical Rationality. Scope and Structures of Human Agency.Ana Marta Gonzalez & Alejandro G. Vigo (eds.) - 2010 - Georg Olms.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. added 2019-08-23
    Critical Thinking, Autonomy and Practical Reason.Stefaan E. Cuypers - 2004 - Philosophy of Education 38 (1):75-90.
  29. added 2019-08-19
    The Logical Structure of Philosophy Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology Religion, Politics, Economics Literature and History - Articles and Reviews 2006-2019.Michael Richard Starks - 2019 - Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press.
    It is my contention that the table of intentionality (rationality, mind, thought, language, personality etc.) that features prominently here describes more or less accurately, or at least serves as an heuristic for, how we think and behave, and so it encompasses not merely philosophy and psychology, but everything else (history, literature, mathematics, politics etc.). Note especially that intentionality and rationality as I (along with Searle, Wittgenstein and others) view it, includes both conscious deliberative linguistic System 2 and unconscious automated prelinguistic (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. added 2019-06-09
    Aristotle Against (Unqualified) Self-Motion: Physics VII 1 Α241b35-242a49 / Β241b25-242a15.Daniel Coren - forthcoming - Ancient Philosophy.
    It is well known that Aristotle tries to make room for self-motion – an idea he inherits to some extent from Plato – within his other commitments to causal determinism while at the same time modifying the idea. However, one argument in Physics VII 1 seems to pose a problem for the bare possibility of self-motion; in it he seems to argue that everything that moves must be moved by something else. The text in which this argument appears is itself (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. added 2019-06-06
    Following the Law Because It’s the Law: Obedience, Bootstrapping, and Practical Reason.Paul Schofield - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (3):400-411.
    Voluntarists in the early modern period speak of an agent’s following the law because she was ordered to do so or because it’s the law. Contemporary philosophers tend either to ignore or to dismiss the possibility of justified obedience of this sort – that is, they ignore or dismiss the possibility that something’s being the law could in itself constitute a good reason to act. In this paper, I suggest that this view isn’t taken seriously because of certain widespread beliefs (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. added 2019-06-06
    Price, A. W., Contextuality in Practical Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, Xxxiv + 208, US$70.Stephen Finlay - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):187-190.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. added 2019-06-06
    Two Conceptions of Reasons for Action.Ruth Chang - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):447-453.
    On a ‘comparative’ conception of practical reasons, reasons are like ‘weights’ that can make an action more or less rational. Bernard Gert adopts instead a ‘toggle’ conception of practical reasons: something counts as a reason just in case it alone can make some or other otherwise irrational action rational. I suggest that Gert’s conception suffers from various defects, and that his motivation for adopting this conception – his central claim that actions can be rational without there being reasons for them (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  34. added 2019-06-06
    Natural Law and Practical Reason: A Thomist View of Moral Autonomy. [REVIEW]Anthony T. Flood - 2001 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 75 (3):466-469.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. added 2019-06-06
    Coping with the Many-Coloured Dome: Pluralism and Practical Reason: Keith Graham.Keith Graham - 1996 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 40:135-146.
    The One remains, the many change and pass; Heaven's light forever shines, Earth's shadows fly; Life, like a dome of many-coloured glass, Stains the white radiance of Eternity, Until Death tramples it to fragments. At its widest, ‘pluralism’ signifies simply the variety of life, the teeming multitude of forms and entities, the many different properties that living beings manifest. Life is not everywhere the same but impressively differentiated, and without it eternity would be all of a piece, uniform. That is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. added 2019-06-06
    XV—Hume on Practical Reason.John Robertson - 1989 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 90 (1):267-282.
  37. added 2019-06-06
    Kant’s Moral Philosophy, an Interpretation of the Categorical Imperative. [REVIEW]L. L. D. - 1980 - Review of Metaphysics 34 (1):158-159.
    A defense of Kant’s moral philosophy. The author seeks to counteract those interpretations of Kant that restrict their focus to the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. He argues that one must look at the whole of Kant’s writings, the earlier and later ethical writings as well as the theoretical works. This makes it possible for him to challenge the popular misconceptions of Kant’s teaching: the overemphasis on the correct motive of an action, the mistaken impression that consequences are of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. added 2019-06-06
    Varieties of Practical Inference.D. S. Clarke Jr - 1979 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):273-286.
  39. added 2019-06-06
    The Role of Practical Inferences in Deliberation.D. S. Clarke Jr - 1977 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 15 (1):15-25.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. added 2019-06-06
    In Defense of Practical Reason: A Study and an Application of Arthur Murphy’s Theory. [REVIEW]Manuel M. Davenport - 1971 - Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 2 (1/2):233-238.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. added 2019-06-05
    Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason.Michael Byron (ed.) - 2004 - New York, USA: Cambridge University Press.
    How do we think about what we plan to do? One dominant answer is that we select the best possible option available. However, a growing number of philosophers would offer a different answer: since we are not equipped to maximize we often choose the next best alternative, one that is no more than satisfactory. This strategy choice is called satisficing. This collection of essays explores both these accounts of practical reason, examining the consequences for adopting one or the other for (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  42. added 2019-06-05
    Book ReviewsJ. David Velleman,. The Possibility of Practical Reason.Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000. Pp. Viii+302. $65.00 ; $19.95. [REVIEW]Piers Rawling - 2003 - Ethics 113 (2):450-455.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. added 2019-06-05
    IV—The Dualism of Practical Reason.Roger Crisp - 1996 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1):53-74.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  44. added 2019-05-29
    A Dilemma for Moral Deliberation in AI in Advance.Ryan Jenkins & Duncan Purves - forthcoming - International Journal of Applied Philosophy.
    Many social trends are conspiring to drive the adoption of greater automation in society, and we will certainly see a greater offloading of human decisionmaking to robots in the future. Many of these decisions are morally salient, including decisions about how benefits and burdens are distributed. Roboticists and ethicists have begun to think carefully about the moral decision making apparatus for machines. Their concerns often center around the plausible claim that robots will lack many of the mental capacities that are (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. added 2019-05-27
    Which Emotional Behaviors Are Actions?Jean Moritz Müller & Hong Yu Wong - forthcoming - In Andrea Scarantino (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Emotion Theory. New York City, New York, USA:
    There is a wide range of things we do out of emotion. For example, we smile with pleasure, our voices drop when we are sad, we recoil in shock or jump for joy, we apologize to others out of remorse. It is uncontroversial that some of these behaviors are actions. Clearly, apologizing is an action if anything is. Things seem less clear in the case of other emotional behaviors. Intuitively, the drop in a sad person’s voice is something that happens (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. added 2019-05-27
    Freedom and the Fact of Reason.Richard Galvin - 2019 - Kantian Review 24 (1):27-51.
    The focus of my argument is whether, and in what sense, freedom is “revealed” by the fact of reason in Kant’s second Critique. I examine the passages in which Kant refers to the fact of reason and conclude that he uses the term to refer to our taking morality as authoritative, and to our apprehending the content of the moral law. I then point out how various commentators have claimed each to be the fact of reason. Next I address how (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. added 2019-05-24
    Objectivity and Evaluation.Justin Clarke-Doane - forthcoming - In Christopher Cowie & Richard Rowland (eds.), Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics.
    I this article, I introduce the notion of pluralism about an area, and use it to argue that the questions at the center of our normative lives are not settled by the facts -- even the normative facts. One upshot of the discussion is that the concepts of realism and objectivity, which are widely identified, are actually in tension. Another is that the concept of objectivity, not realism, should take center stage.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. added 2019-05-24
    Deciding to Trust.Benjamin McMyler - 2017 - In Paul Faulkner & Thomas W. Simpson (eds.), The Philosophy of Trust. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 161-176.
    In this paper I argue that even if one accepts non-cognitivism about trust, the view that trust is not a species of and does not require belief, one should reject voluntarism about trust, the view that we can trust directly at will. There is good reason to think that we cannot trust directly at will, in the way that we can act, and this is so regardless of whether trust requires belief.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  49. added 2019-05-22
    Have Neo-Aristotelians Abandoned Naturalism? On the Distinctively Human Form of Practical Reason.Jessy Jordan - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (2):183-201.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. added 2019-05-22
    The Ethics–Mathematics Analogy.Justin Clarke‐Doane - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (1).
    Ethics and mathematics have long invited comparisons. On the one hand, both ethical and mathematical propositions can appear to be knowable a priori, if knowable at all. On the other hand, mathematical propositions seem to admit of proof, and to enter into empirical scientific theories, in a way that ethical propositions do not. In this article, I discuss apparent similarities and differences between ethical (i.e., moral) and mathematical knowledge, realistically construed -- i.e., construed as independent of human mind and languages. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 507