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Summary This category is a catch-all for papers that do not fit - or much more commonly, have aspects that do not fit - anywhere else in the taxonomy. Most papers in this category are also categorized under some heading as well. 
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466 found
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1 — 50 / 466
  1. added 2019-01-11
    A Combinatorial Argument Against Practical Reasons for Belief.Selim Berker - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (4):427-470.
    Are there practical reasons for and against belief? For example, do the practical benefits to oneself or others of holding a certain belief count in favor of that belief? I argue "No." My argument involves considering how practical reasons for belief, if there were such things, would combine with other reasons for belief in order to determine all-things-considered verdicts, especially in cases involving equally balanced reasons of either a practical or an epistemic sort.
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  2. added 2018-12-03
    An Ecumenical Account of Categorical Moral Reasons.Caj Strandberg - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Philosophy.
    According to an influential way of understanding the debate between internalism and externalism about normative reasons, these theories confront us with a dilemma. Internalism is taken to involve a view about rationality which is considered less philosophically problematic than its competitors, whereas externalism is taken to suggest a more contentious view concerning this notion. However, the assumption that externalism involves a more demanding notion of rationality implies that it is able to account for categorical moral reasons, whereas internalism is unable (...)
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  3. added 2018-08-29
    Practical Knowledge as Knowledge of a Normative Judgment.Eric Marcus - 2018 - Manuscrito (4):319-347.
    According to one interpretation of Aristotle’s famous thesis, to say that action is the conclusion of practical reasoning is to say that action is itself a judgment about what to do. A central motivation for the thesis is that it suggests a path for understanding the non-observational character of practical knowledge. If actions are judgments, then whatever explains an agent’s knowledge of the relevant judgment can explain her knowledge of the action. I call the approach to action that accepts Aristotle’s (...)
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  4. added 2018-08-16
    Agency, Experience, and Future Bias.Antti Kauppinen - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (4):237-245.
    Most of us are hedonically future-biased: other things being equal, we prefer pains to be in the past and pleasures to be in the future. Recently, various authors have argued that future bias is irrational, and that we should be temporally neutral instead. I argue that instead of temporal neutrality, the putative counterexamples and the rationales offered for them only motivate a more narrow principle I call Only Action Fixes Utility: it is only when you act on the basis of (...)
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  5. added 2018-08-10
    Action as the Conclusion of Practical Reasoning; The Critique of a Rödlian Account.Evgenia Mylonaki - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):30-45.
    In this paper I take up the question of whether and in what sense action might be the conclusion of practical reasoning and argue against the answer provided by Sebastian Rödl's account of practical reasoning. Rödl's account aspires to steer a middle ground between the attitudinal and the neo-Aristotelian accounts of practical reasoning, by proposing that its conclusion is at once a thought and a movement. This account is worth considering for it promises to explain both practical reasoning's practicality and (...)
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  6. added 2018-08-03
    Practical Reason, Sympathy and Reactive Attitudes.Max Khan Hayward - 2017 - Noûs.
    This paper has three aims. First, I defend, in its most radical form, Hume's scepticism about practical reason, as it applies to purely self-regarding matters. It's not always irrational to discount the future, to be inconstant in one's preferences, to have incompatible desires, to not pursue the means to one's ends, or to fail to maximize one's own good. Second, I explain how our response to the “irrational” agent should be understood as an expression of frustrated sympathy, in Adam Smith's (...)
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  7. added 2018-07-30
    Towards an Ecumenical Theory of Normative Reasons.Caj Sixten Strandberg - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (1):69-100.
    A theory of normative reasons for action faces the fundamental challenge of accounting for the dual nature of reasons. On the one hand, some reasons appear to depend on, and vary with, desires. On the other hand, some reasons appear categorical in the sense of being desire‐independent. However, it has turned out to be difficult to provide a theory that accommodates both these aspects. Internalism is able to account for the former aspect, but has difficulties to account for the latter, (...)
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  8. added 2018-07-29
    Psychopathy, Agency, and Practical Reason.Monique Wonderly - forthcoming - In Ruth Chang & Kurt Sylvan (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason. New York, USA: Routledge.
    Philosophers have urged that considerations about the psychopath’s capacity for practical rationality can help to advance metaethical debates. These debates include the role of rational faculties in moral judgment and action, the relationship between moral judgment and moral motivation, and the capacities required for morally responsible agency. I discuss how the psychopath’s capacity for practical reason features in these debates, and I identify several takeaway lessons from the relevant literature. Specifically, I show how the insights contained therein can illuminate the (...)
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  9. added 2018-07-11
    Normative Und Motivierende Gründe. Ein Kommentar Zu Susanne Mantels Determined by Reasons.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2018 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 72 (3):421-428.
    One of the central aims of Susanne Mantel’s book "Determined by Reasons" (2018) is to reject the idea that normative and motivating reasons can be identical. In her own words, Mantel denies the “Identity Thesis”, according to which “when an agent acts for a normative reason N, there is a motivating reason M of that agent such that M is identical with N” (Mantel 2018, 93). In this comment, I offer a simple argument for the Identity Thesis: (1) When an (...)
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  10. added 2018-06-07
    Constitutivism About Practical Reasons.Paul Katsafanas - forthcoming - In Daniel Star (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press.
    This paper introduces constitutivism about practical reason, which is the view that we can justify certain normative claims by showing that agents become committed to these claims simply in virtue of acting. According to this view, action has a certain structural feature – a constitutive aim, principle, or standard – that both constitutes events as actions and generates a standard of assessment for action. We can use this standard of assessment to derive normative claims. In short, the authority of certain (...)
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  11. added 2018-06-01
    We Need Progress in Ideas About How to Achieve Progress.Nicholas Maxwell - 2018 - Metascience (2).
    Steven Pinker's book Enlightenment NOW is in many ways a terrific book, from which I have learnt much. But it is also deeply flawed. Science and reason are at the heart of the book, but the conceptions that Steven Pinker defends are damagingly irrational. And these defective conceptions of science and reason, as a result of being associated with the Enlightenment Programme for the past two or three centuries, have been responsible, in part, for the genesis of the global problems (...)
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  12. added 2018-05-25
    Willing the End Means Willing the Means: An Overlooked Reading of Kant.Wooram Lee - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5.
    In his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant famously calls the following proposition “analytic”: “whoever wills the end also wills the indispensably necessary means to it that is in his control”. Read naïvely, with little attention to the caveat in the parenthesis, this proposition is most straightforwardly interpreted as specifying a descriptive relation between willing an end and willing the necessary means to it. It simply tells us what we do in willing an end, not what we ought to (...)
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  13. added 2018-04-23
    Contractualism for Us As We Are.Nicholas Southwood - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    A difficult problem for contractualists is how to provide an interpretation of the contractual situation that is both subject to appropriately stringent constraints and yet also appropriately sensitive to certain features of us as we actually are. My suggestion is that we should embrace a model of contractualism that is structurally analogous to the “advice model” of the ideal observer theory famously proposed by Michael Smith (1994; 1995). An advice model of contractualism is appealing since it promises to deliver a (...)
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  14. added 2018-04-12
    Stupid Goodness.Garrett Cullity - forthcoming - In Karen Jones & Francois Schroeter (eds.), The Many Moral Rationalisms. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    In Paradise Lost, Satan’s first sight of Eve in Eden renders him “Stupidly good”: his state is one of admirable yet inarticulate responsiveness to reasons. Turning from fiction to real life, I argue that this is an important moral phenomenon, but one that has limits. The essay examines three questions about the relation between having a reason and saying what it is – between normativity and articulacy. Is it possible to have and respond to morally relevant reasons without being able (...)
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  15. added 2018-03-22
    Practical Conflicts.Peter Baumann & Monika Betzler - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (4):654-656.
    This volume contains contributions on different aspects of practical conflicts by: Peter Baumann Monika Betzler Ruth Chang Jon Elster Barbara Guckes Christine M. Korsgaard Isaac Levi Alfred R. Mele Joseph Raz Henry S. Richardson Peter Schaber J. David Velleman Nicholas White.
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  16. added 2018-03-18
    Believing for Practical Reasons.Susanna Rinard - 2018 - Noûs.
    Some prominent evidentialists argue that practical considerations cannot be normative reasons for belief because they can’t be motivating reasons for belief. Existing pragmatist responses turn out to depend on the assumption that it’s possible to believe in the absence of evidence. The evidentialist may deny this, at which point the debate ends in an impasse. I propose a new strategy for the pragmatist. This involves conceding that belief in the absence of evidence is impossible. We then argue that evidence can (...)
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  17. added 2018-03-15
    Nietzsche and Self-Constitution.Ariela Tubert - 2018 - In Paul Katsafanas (ed.), Routledge Philosophical Minds: The Nietzschean Mind. Routledge.
    This paper argues for interpreting Nietzsche along the lines of a self-constitution view. According to the self-constitution view, a person is a kind of creation: we constitute our selves throughout our lives. The self-constitution view may take more than one form: on the narrative version, the self is like a story, while on the Kantian version, the self is a set of principles or commitments. Taking Marya Schechtman’s and Christine Korsgaard’s accounts as paradigmatic, I take the self-constitution view to emphasize (...)
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  18. added 2018-03-09
    Why Intentions?Jesse M. Mulder - 2018 - Ratio 31 (S1):51-64.
    There is an influential conception of intentional agency in terms of just beliefs and desires. And there is an equally influential conception that adds intentions as separate ingredients. It remains disputed whether adding intentions is really necessary, and what difference that addition exactly makes. I argue that adding intentions is required, but only because and insofar as it makes room for a distinctively practical kind of reasoning. I critically consider Bratman's main considerations in support of adding intentions, viz., conduct-control, inertia, (...)
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  19. added 2018-03-05
    Following the Law Because It’s the Law: Obedience, Bootstrapping, and Practical Reason.Paul Schofield - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (3):400-411.
    Voluntarists in the early modern period speak of an agent’s following the law because she was ordered to do so or because it’s the law. Contemporary philosophers tend either to ignore or to dismiss the possibility of justified obedience of this sort – that is, they ignore or dismiss the possibility that something’s being the law could in itself constitute a good reason to act. In this paper, I suggest that this view isn’t taken seriously because of certain widespread beliefs (...)
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  20. added 2018-03-01
    Moral Rationalism and the Normativity of Constitutive Principles.Zachary Bachman - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (1):1-19.
    Recently, Christine Bratu and Mortiz Dittmeyer have argued that Christine Korsgaard’s constitutive project fails to establish the normativity of practical principles because it fails to show why a principle’s being constitutive of a practice shows that one ought to conform to that principle. They argue that in many cases a principle’s being constitutive of a practice has no bearing on whether one ought to conform to it. In this paper I argue that Bratu and Dittmeyer’s argument fails in three important (...)
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  21. added 2018-02-22
    Virtue Ethics and Practical Guidance.Jennifer Baker - 2013 - Social Philosophy and Policy 30 (1-2):297-313.
    In this essay I argue that contemporary accounts of virtue ought to incorporate methods ancient virtue ethicists used in addressing an audience whose members were interested in improving their behavior. Ancient examples of these methods, I argue, model how to represent practical rationality in ethical arguments. They show us that when we argue for virtue we ought to address common claims, refer to moral reasoning as a stepwise process, and focus on norms when making recommendations. Our own ethical arguments will (...)
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  22. added 2018-02-17
    Lore-Abiding People.Adam Morton - 2001 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 32 (3):601-606.
    I evaluate Kusch's arguments that everyday and scientific psychological beliefs are made true by the institutional facts about the people to whom they are applied. I conclude that institutional facts are among the truth-makers of such beliefs, and that this is a very significant point to have made, but that they are unlikely to be the sole such truth-makers.
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  23. added 2018-02-16
    Practical Reason and Norms.Joseph Raz - 1975 - Hutchinson.
    Practical Reason and Norms focuses on three problems: In what way are rules normative, and how do they differ from ordinary reasons? What makes normative systems systematic? What distinguishes legal systems, and in what consists their normativity? All three questions are answered by taking reasons as the basic normative concept, and showing the distinctive role reasons have in every case, thus paving the way to a unified account of normativity. Rules are a structure of reasons to perform the required act (...)
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  24. added 2018-02-11
    “Comparativism: The Ground of Rational Choice,” in Errol Lord and Barry McGuire, Eds., Weighing Reasons , 2016.Ruth Chang - 2016 - In B. Maguire & E. Lord (eds.), Weighing Reasons. Oxford University Press. pp. 213-240.
    What, normatively speaking, are the grounds of rational choice? This paper defends ‘comparativism’, the view that a comparative fact grounds rational choice. It examines three of the most serious challenges to comparativism: 1) that sometimes what grounds rational choice is an exclusionary-type relation among alternatives; 2) that an absolute fact such as that it’s your duty or conforms to the Categorial Imperative grounds rational choice; and 3) that rational choice between incomparables is possible, and in particular, all that is needed (...)
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  25. added 2018-02-11
    What is This Thing Called Metaethics?Matthew Chrisman - 2016 - Routledge.
    Are moral standards relative to cultures? Are there any moral facts? What is goodness? If there are moral facts how do we learn about them?_ _These are all questions in metaethics, the branch of ethics that investigates the status of morality, the nature of ethical facts, and the meaning of ethical statements. To the uninitiated it can appear abstract and far removed from its two more concrete cousins, ethical theory and applied ethics, yet it is one of the fastest-growing and (...)
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  26. added 2018-02-11
    How Compatibilists Can Account for the Moral Motive: Autonomy and Metaphysical Internalism.Kelly Coble - 2007 - Kant-Studien 98 (3):329-350.
    I. Introduction In Groundwork III and in the Critique of Practical Reason Kant famously asserted that “Freiheit und unbedingtes praktisches Gesetz weisen […] wechselsweise auf einander zurück.” Kant's thesis of the analyticity of freedom and practical reason was rejected by his prominent early readers. In the eighth of his influential Letters on Kant's Philosophy of 1786–1787, Karl Leonhard Reinhold argued that the identification of the will with practical reason excluded the possibility of ascribing freedom to immoral and amoral actions. Reinhold (...)
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  27. added 2018-02-11
    Varieties of Practical Inference. Clarke - 1979 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):273-286.
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  28. added 2018-02-11
    The Role of Practical Inferences in Deliberation. Clarke - 1977 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 15 (1):15-25.
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  29. added 2018-02-09
    The Ideal Observer Theory and Motivational Internalism.Daniel Rönnedal - 2015 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 29 (1):79-98.
    In this paper I show that one version of motivational internalism follows from the so-called ideal observer theory. Let us call the version of the ideal observer theory used in this essay (IOT). According to (IOT), it is necessarily the case that it ought to be that A if and only if every ideal observer wants it to be the case that A. We shall call the version of motivational internalism that follows from (IOT) (moral) conditional belief motivational internalism (CBMI). (...)
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  30. added 2018-01-24
    Self-Validation and Internalism in Velleman’s Constitutivism.Michael Bukoski - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (11):2667-2686.
    Metaethical constitutivists explain reasons or normativity in terms of what is constitutive of agency. In Velleman’s paradigmatic constitutivist theory, that is the aim of self-understanding. The best-known objection to constitutivism is Enoch’s shmagency objection: constitutivism cannot explain normativity because a constitutive aim of agency lacks normative significance unless one has reason to be an agent rather than a “shmagent”. In response, Velleman argues that the constitutive aim is self-validating. I argue that this claim is false. If the constitutive aim of (...)
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  31. added 2018-01-24
    The Role of Diagrammatic Reasoning in Ethical Deliberation. Campos - 2015 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 51 (3):338-357.
    In the 1903 lecture “What Makes a Reasoning Sound?” Charles Peirce provides a detailed account of the process of ethical deliberation intended to shape right conduct. He does this in the context of arguing against the claim that there is no distinction between moral right and wrong. He considered the argument for this claim to be analogous to the argument for the claim that there is no distinction between good and bad reasoning.1 Though Peirce’s ultimate concern in the lecture is (...)
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  32. added 2018-01-24
    Subjectivity and Human Agency.Theodora Bryan - 1995 - Dissertation, Loyola University of Chicago
    In this dissertation I give a metaethical account of human agency by developing the notion of character and showing its relation to agency. I argue that subjectivity, defined in terms of character, is ineliminable with regard to moral deliberation and that human agency is essentially personal. Agency is personal, in that, agents act from the standpoint of their character--the standpoint of their internalized conception of value. ;I then delineate the problem this account of agency poses for certain types of objective (...)
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  33. added 2018-01-24
    Practical Reason, Reasons for Doing and Intentional Action.Héctor-Neri Castañeda - 1987 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 2 (4).
  34. added 2018-01-24
    Practical Reason, Reasons for Doing and Intentional Action.Héctor-Neri Castañeda - 1986 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 2 (1):69-96.
    To come to know what to do is to have a thought which itself consists of an awareness of its bringing about an action, or a rearrangement of one’s causal powers...The causal dimension of practical thinking is the coalescence of contemplation and the causation of that contemplation, and the contemplation of that causation.
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  35. added 2018-01-24
    Review of Rational Decision and Causality. [REVIEW]James Cargile - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):163-168.
  36. added 2018-01-09
    Emotionally Guiding Our Actions.Mary Carman - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (1):43-64.
    If emotions have a rational role in action, then one challenge for accounting for how we can act rationally when acting emotionally is to show how we can guide our actions by our emotional considerations, seen as reasons. In this paper, I put forward a novel proposal for how this can be so. Drawing on the interconnection between emotions, cares and caring, I argue that, as the emotional agent is a caring agent, she can be aware of the emotional consideration (...)
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  37. added 2018-01-09
    How Emotions Do Not Provide Reasons to Act.Mary Carman - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (3):555-574.
    If emotions provide reasons for action through their intentional content, as is often argued, where does this leave the role of the affective element of an emotion? Can it be more than a motivator and have significant bearing of its own on our emotional actions, as actions done for reasons? One way it can is through reinforcing other reasons that we might have, as Greenspan argues. Central to Greenspan’s account is the claim that the affective discomfort of an emotion, as (...)
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  38. added 2018-01-02
    Review: The Possibility of Practical Reason. [REVIEW]Thomas Pink - 2003 - Mind 112 (448):812-816.
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  39. added 2017-12-27
    Practical Truth and Its First Principles in the Theory of Grisez, Boyle, and Finnis.Stephen L. Brock - 2015 - The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 15 (2):303-329.
    This article offers an exposition and critical discussion of the account of the truth of practical reason in the natural-law theory of Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, and John Finnis. The exposition rests mainly on an article published by these authors in 1987. There they argue that “true” is said of theoretical and practical knowledge in radically diverse senses. They also distinguish, within practical knowledge, between two kinds of truth, practical and moral. This distinction is tied to their understanding of relations (...)
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  40. added 2017-12-27
    Review: Mark Schroeder, Explaining the Reasons We Share: Explanation and Expression in Ethics. [REVIEW]John Brunero - 2015 - Ethics 126 (1):238-244.
  41. added 2017-12-27
    The Ethical Subject: Accountability, Authorship, and Practical Reason.Svend Brinkmann - 2010 - SATS 11 (1).
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  42. added 2017-12-27
    Two Approaches to Instrumental Rationality and Belief Consistency.John Brunero - 2005 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (1):1-20.
    R. Jay Wallace argues that the normativity of instrumental rationality can be traced to the independent rational requirement to hold consistent beliefs. I present three objections to this view. John Broome argues that there is a structural similarity between the rational requirements of instrumental rationality and belief consistency. Since he does not reduce the former to the latter, his view can avoid the objections to Wallace’s view. However, we should not think Broome’s account explains the whole of instrumental rationality since (...)
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  43. added 2017-12-16
    Jean Hampton, The Authority of Reason:The Authority of Reason.Simon Blackburn - 2000 - Ethics 110 (3):619-621.
  44. added 2017-12-06
    The Thief of Time: Philosophical Essays on Procrastination.Chrisoula Andreou & Mark D. White (eds.) - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    When we fail to achieve our goals, procrastination is often the culprit. But how exactly is procrastination to be understood? This edited volume integrates the problem of procrastination into philosophical inquiry, exploring the relationship of procrastination to agency, rationality, and ethics--topics that philosophy is well-suited to address.
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  45. added 2017-11-30
    Can Consequences Be Right-Makers?Stephen Boulter - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-21.
    This paper sets out a novel challenge to consequentialism as a theory in normative ethics. The challenge is rooted in the ontological claim that consequences of actions do not exist at the time required to be that in virtue of which actions are right or wrong, and so consequences cannot play the role attributed to them by consequentialists. The challenge takes the form of a dilemma. The consequentialist is confronted with a set of propositions she will find individually plausible but (...)
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  46. added 2017-11-30
    Decision Theory, Philosophical Perspectives.Darren Bradley - 2013 - In Hal Pashler (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Mind. Sage Publications.
    Decision theory is concerned with how agents should act when the consequences of their actions are uncertain. The central principle of contemporary decision theory is that the rational choice is the choice that maximizes subjective expected utility. This entry explains what this means, and discusses the philosophical motivations and consequences of the theory. The entry will consider some of the main problems and paradoxes that decision theory faces, and some of responses that can be given. Finally the entry will briefly (...)
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  47. added 2017-11-30
    The Interplay of Intention and Reason.Michael E. Bratman - 2013 - Ethics 123 (4):657-672.
  48. added 2017-11-30
    Temptation Revisited.Michael Bratman - 2007 - In Bruno Verbeek (ed.), Reasons and Intentions. Ashgate.
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  49. added 2017-11-30
    “When Water Chokes”: Ideology, Communication, and Practical Rationality.James Bohman - 2000 - Constellations 7 (3):382-392.
  50. added 2017-11-30
    Reply to Sturgeon.Simon Blackburn - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 61 (1/2):39 - 42.
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1 — 50 / 466