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  1. Setting Precedents Without Making Norms?Katharina Stevens - 2020 - Law and Philosophy 39 (6):577-616.
    Some authors argue that the rule-of-law ideal gives judges a prima facie duty to provide a determinate formulation of the precedent’s general norm in all their precedent-opinions. I question that claim. I agree that judges have a duty to decide their cases based on reasons and that they should formulate these reasons in their opinions. I also agree that formulations of general norms should be the goal of common-law development and that judges have a duty to contribute to the realization (...)
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  2. Vertical precedents in formal models of precedential constraint.Gabriel L. Broughton - 2019 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 27 (3):253-307.
    The standard model of precedential constraint holds that a court is equally free to modify a precedent of its own and a precedent of a superior court—overruling aside, it does not differentiate horizontal and vertical precedents. This paper shows that no model can capture the U.S. doctrine of precedent without making that distinction. A precise model is then developed that does just that. This requires situating precedent cases in a formal representation of a hierarchical legal structure, and adjusting the constraint (...)
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  3. Constraint and Freedom in the Common Law.John Horty - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15:1-27.
    This paper contributes to our formal understanding of the common law — especially the nature of the reasoning involved, but also its point, or justification, in terms of social coordination. I present two apparently distinct models of constraint by precedent in the common law, establish their equivalence, and argue for a perspective according to which courts are best thought of, not as creating and modifying rules, but as generating a social priority ordering on reasons through a procedure that is piecemeal, (...)
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  4. A Factor-Based Definition of Precedential Constraint.John F. Horty & Trevor J. M. Bench-Capon - 2012 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 20 (2):181-214.
    This paper describes one way in which a precise reason model of precedent could be developed, based on the general idea that courts are constrained to reach a decision that is consistent with the assessment of the balance of reasons made in relevant earlier decisions. The account provided here has the additional advantage of showing how this reason model can be reconciled with the traditional idea that precedential constraint involves rules, as long as these rules are taken to be defeasible. (...)
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  5. A Response-Dependent Theory of Precedent.Ivo Entchev - 2011 - Law and Philosophy 30 (3):273-290.
    Doctrinally, a precedent is a case of the same or higher court that furnishes an authoritative rule for the determination of the case at hand, either because the facts are alike, or, if the facts are different, because the principle that governed the first case is applicable to the different facts. In this article I try to free precedent form the dominant doctrinal view by offering a more intuitive conception: that to be precedent means to be treated as precedent. Put (...)
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  6. Case Law Precedent and Legal Writing.Olaf Meyer & André Janssen - 2009 - In Olaf Meyer & André Janssen (eds.), Cisg Methodology. Sellier de Gruyter.
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  7. Precedent and Analogy in Legal Reasoning.Grant Lamond - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  8. Coherence, Hypothetical Cases, and Precedent.S. L. Hurley - 2006 - In Scott Hershovitz (ed.), Exploring Law's Empire: The Jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin. Oxford University Press. pp. 221-251.
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  9. Do Precedents Create Rules?Grant Lamond - 2005 - Legal Theory 11 (1):1-26.
    This article argues that legal precedents do not create rules, but rather create a special type of reason in favour of a decision in later cases. Precedents are often argued to be analogous to statutes in their law-creating function, but the common law practice of distinguishing is difficult to reconcile with orthodox accounts of the function of rules. Instead, a precedent amounts to a decision on the balance of reasons in the case before the precedent court, and later courts are (...)
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  10. Should Like Cases Be Treated Alike?Andrei Marmor - 2005 - Legal Theory 11 (1):27-38.
  11. The Morality of Precedent in Law.Raphael A. Akanmidu - 2001 - Ratio Juris 14 (2):244-251.
  12. The Meaning of a Precedent.Barbara Baum Levenbook - 2000 - Legal Theory 6 (2):185-240.
    A familiar jurisprudential view is that a judicial decision functions as a legal precedent by laying down a rule and that the content of this rule is set by officials. Precedents can be followed only by acting in accordance with this rule. This view is mistaken on all counts. A judicial decision functions as a precedent by being an example. At its best, it is an example both for officials and for a target population. Even precedents outside of law function (...)
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  13. Judicial Obligation, Precedent and the Common Law.Stephen R. Perry - 1987 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 7 (2):215-257.