This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories

336 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 336
  1. Dominance and Efficiency in Multicriteria Decision Under Uncertainty.F. Ben Abdelaziz, P. Lang & R. Nadeau - 1999 - Theory and Decision 47 (3):191-211.
    This paper proposes several concepts of efficient solutions for multicriteria decision problems under uncertainty. We show how alternative notions of efficiency may be grounded on different decision ‘contexts’, depending on what is known about the Decision Maker's (DM) preference structure and probabilistic anticipations. We define efficient sets arising naturally from polar decision contexts. We investigate these sets from the points of view of their relative inclusions and point out some particular subsets which may be especially relevant to some decision situations.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Rationality and Future Discounting.Arif Ahmed - 2018 - Topoi:1-12.
    The best justification of time-discounting is roughly that it is rational to care less about your more distant future because there is less of you around to have it. I argue that the standard version of this argument, which treats both psychological continuity and psychological connectedness as reasons to care about your future, can only rationalize an irrational—because exploitable—form of future discounting.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Exploiting Cyclic Preference.Arif Ahmed - 2017 - Mind 126 (504):975-1022.
    Probably many people have cyclic preferences: they prefer A to B, B to C and C to A for some objects of choice A, B and C. Recent work has resurrected the objection to cyclic preference that agents possessing them are open to exploitation by means of ‘money pumps’. The paper briefly reviews this work and proposes a general approach to problems of sequential choice that makes cyclic preference immune to exploitation by means of these new mechanisms.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Choice Procedure Consistent with Similarity Relations.Jose Maria Aizpurua, Jorge Nieto & Jose Ramon Uriarte - 1990 - Theory and Decision 29 (3):235-254.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Wilde Heuristics and Rum Tum Tuggers: Preference Indeterminacy and Instability.Mark Alfano - 2012 - Synthese 189 (S1):5-15.
    Models in decision theory and game theory assume that preferences are determinate: for any pair of possible outcomes, a and b, an agent either prefers a to b, prefers b to a, or is indifferent as between a and b. Preferences are also assumed to be stable: provided the agent is fully informed, trivial situational influences will not shift the order of her preferences. Research by behavioral economists suggests, however, that economic and hedonic preferences are to some degree indeterminate and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  6. Does Son Preference Matter?Syed Mubashir Ali - 1989 - Journal of Biosocial Science 21 (4):399-408.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. When an Event Makes a Difference.Massimiliano Amarante & Fabio Maccheroni - 2006 - Theory and Decision 60 (2-3):119-126.
    For (S, Σ) a measurable space, let ${\cal C}_1$ and ${\cal C}_2$ be convex, weak* closed sets of probability measures on Σ. We show that if ${\cal C}_1$ ∪ ${\cal C}_2$ satisfies the Lyapunov property , then there exists a set A ∈ Σ such that minμ1∈ ${\cal C}_1$ μ1(A) > maxμ2 ∈ ${\cal C}_2$ (A). We give applications to Maxmin Expected Utility (MEU) and to the core of a lower probability.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. Cashing Out the Money-Pump Argument.Chrisoula Andreou - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies (6):1-5.
    The money-pump argument figures as the staple argument in support of the view that cyclic preferences are irrational. According to a prominent way of understanding the argument, it is grounded in the assumption that it is irrational to make choices that lead one to a dispreferred alternative. My aim in this paper is to motivate diffidence with respect to understanding the money-pump argument in this way by suggesting that if it is so understood, the argument emerges as question-begging and as (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  9. The Real Puzzle of the Self-Torturer: Uncovering a New Dimension of Instrumental Rationality.Chrisoula Andreou - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5-6):562-575.
    The puzzle of the self-torturer raises intriguing questions concerning rationality, cyclic preferences, and resoluteness. Interestingly, what makes the case puzzling has not been clearly pinpointed. The puzzle, it seems, is that a series of rational choices foreseeably leads the self-torturer to an option that serves his preferences worse than the one with which he started. But this is a very misleading way of casting the puzzle. I pinpoint the real puzzle of the self-torturer and, in the process, reveal a neglected (...)
    No categories
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  10. There Are Preferences and Then There Are Preferences.Chrisoula Andreou - 2007 - In Barbara Montero and Mark D. White (ed.), Economics and the Mind.
    This paper draws a distinction between two closely related conceptions of 'preference' that is of great significance relative to a set of interrelated debates in rational choice theory. The distinction is particularly illuminating in relation to the idea that there is a rational defect inherent in individuals with intransitive preferences and, relatedly, in democratic collectives. I use the distinction to show that things are more complicated than they seem.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  11. Incommensurable Alternatives and Rational Choice.Chrisoula Andreou - 2005 - Ratio 18 (3):249–261.
    I consider the implications of incommensurability for the assumption, in rational choice theory, that a rational agent’s preferences are complete. I argue that, contrary to appearances, the completeness assumption and the existence of incommensurability are compatible. Indeed, reflection on incommensurability suggests that one’s preferences should be complete over even the incommensurable alternatives one faces.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  12. Models of Preference Reversals and Personal Rules: Do They Require Maximizing a Utility Function with a Specific Structure?Horacio Arló-Costa - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):650-651.
    One of the reasons for adopting hyperbolic discounting is to explain preference reversals. Another is that this value structure suggests an elegant theory of the will. I examine the capacity of the theory to solve Newcomb's problem. In addition, I compare Ainslie's account with other procedural theories of choice that seem at least equally capable of accommodating reversals of preference.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Conditional Preference and Causal Expected Utility.Brad Armendt - 1988 - In William Harper & Brian Skyrms (eds.), Causation in Decision, Belief Change, and Statistics. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 3-24.
    Sequel to Armendt 1986, ‘A Foundation for Causal Decision Theory.’ The representation theorem for causal decision theory is slightly revised, with the addition of a new restriction on lotteries and a new axiom (A7). The discussion gives some emphasis to the way in which appropriate K-partitions are characterized by relations found among the agent’s conditional preferences. The intended interpretation of conditional preference is one that embodies a sensitivity to the agent’s causal beliefs.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  14. Impartiality and Causal Decision Theory.Brad Armendt - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:326 - 336.
    Defenders of sophisticated evidential decision theory (EDT) have argued (1) that its failure to provide correct recommendations in problems where the agent believes himself asymmetrically fallible in executing his choices is no flaw of the theory, and (2) that causal decision theory gives incorrect recommendations in certain examples unless it is supplemented with an additional metatickle or ratifiability deliberation mechanism. In the first part of this paper, I argue that both positions are incorrect. In the second part of the paper, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. A Foundation for Causal Decision Theory.Brad Armendt - 1986 - Topoi 5 (1):3-19.
    The primary aim of this paper is the presentation of a foundation for causal decision theory. This is worth doing because causal decision theory (CDT) is philosophically the most adequate rational decision theory now available. I will not defend that claim here by elaborate comparison of the theory with all its competitors, but by providing the foundation. This puts the theory on an equal footing with competitors for which foundations have already been given. It turns out that it will also (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  16. Freedom and Social Choice: Notes in the Margin.Kenneth J. Arrow - 2006 - Utilitas 18 (1):52-60.
    I comment on Amartya Sen's study of the relations between the analysis of freedom and the theory of social choice. Two of his themes are analysed with regard to their contribution to an analytic understanding of the issues. These are: (1) the multiple interpretations of the concept of ‘preferences’ as a foundation for the formal conceptualizations of social choice and freedom; and (2) some issues in the formalization of freedom as a value to be compared with outcomes. Under (2), I (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. An Axiomatization of Choquet Expected Utility with Cominimum Independence.Takao Asano & Hiroyuki Kojima - 2015 - Theory and Decision 78 (1):117-139.
  18. The Preference of Albino Rats for Free or Response-Produced Food.Gilbert Atnip & David Hothersall - 1973 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 2 (3):153-154.
  19. Choice, Preference and Utility: A Response to Sommers.Harriet Baber - 1995 - Metaphilosophy 26 (4):402-412.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. Further Comments Concerning Preference for Signaled Shock Conditions.Pietro Badia & John Harsh - 1977 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 10 (1):17-20.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Preference for Signaled Over Unsignaled Shock Schedules: A Reply to Furedy and Biederman.Pietro Badia & John Harsh - 1977 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 10 (1):13-16.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Choice, Norms and Revealed Preference.N. Baigent - 2007 - Analyse & Kritik 29 (2):139-145.
    This paper considers lexical combinations of choice functions where at least one is interpreted as arising from a norm. It is shown that in for all possibilities in which a norm is present, in general final choice may be consistent with preference optimization, but that it need not be so. It is concluded therefore that a fruitful approach to understanding the effect of norms on choice is to consider particular classes of norms rather than norms in general as in the (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. Choices, Norms and Preference Revelation.Nicholas Baigent - 2007 - Analyse & Kritik 29 (2).
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. Decision Theory for Agents with Incomplete Preferences.Adam Bales, Daniel Cohen & Toby Handfield - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):453-70.
    Orthodox decision theory gives no advice to agents who hold two goods to be incommensurate in value because such agents will have incomplete preferences. According to standard treatments, rationality requires complete preferences, so such agents are irrational. Experience shows, however, that incomplete preferences are ubiquitous in ordinary life. In this paper, we aim to do two things: (1) show that there is a good case for revising decision theory so as to allow it to apply non-vacuously to agents with incomplete (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  25. A Note on Equivalent Comparisons of Information Channels.Luís Fernando Brands Barbosa & Gil Riella - 2015 - Theory and Decision 78 (1):33-44.
    Nakata (Theory Decis 71:559–574, 2011) presents a model of acquisition of information where the agent does not know what pieces of information she is missing. In this note, we point out some technical problems in a few of Nakata’s results and show how to correct them.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. Continuity Properties of Preference Relations.Marian A. Baroni & Douglas S. Bridges - 2008 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 54 (5):454-459.
    Various types of continuity for preference relations on a metric space are examined constructively. In particular, necessary and sufficient conditions are given for an order-dense, strongly extensional preference relation on a complete metric space to be continuous. It is also shown, in the spirit of constructive reverse mathematics, that the continuity of sequentially continuous, order-dense preference relations on complete, separable metric spaces is connected to Ishihara's principleBD-ℕ, and therefore is not provable within Bishop-style constructive mathematics alone.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Satan, Saint Peter and Saint Petersburg.Paul Bartha, John Barker & Alan Hájek - 2014 - Synthese 191 (4):629-660.
    We examine a distinctive kind of problem for decision theory, involving what we call discontinuity at infinity. Roughly, it arises when an infinite sequence of choices, each apparently sanctioned by plausible principles, converges to a ‘limit choice’ whose utility is much lower than the limit approached by the utilities of the choices in the sequence. We give examples of this phenomenon, focusing on Arntzenius et al.’s Satan’s apple, and give a general characterization of it. In these examples, repeated dominance reasoning (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  28. Stability of Risk Preferences and the Reflection Effect of Prospect Theory.Manel Baucells & Antonio Villasís - 2010 - Theory and Decision 68 (1-2):193-211.
    Are risk preferences stable over time? To address this question we elicit risk preferences from the same pool of subjects at two different moments in time. To interpret the results, we use a Fechner stochastic choice model in which the revealed preference of individuals is governed by some underlying preference, together with a random error. We take cumulative prospect theory as the underlying preference model (Kahneman and Tversky, Econometrica 47:263–292, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5:297–323, 1992). (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  29. Associations and the Accumulation of Preference.Sudeep Bhatia - 2013 - Psychological Review 120 (3):522-543.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  30. The Deep Side of Preference Theory.Antoine Billot - 2002 - Theory and Decision 53 (3):243-270.
    An individual is said to have a taste for a particular menu, i.e. a subset of available commodities, if he is indifferent between all commodity bundles that contain the same quantity for each commodity which actually is in the menu, whatever the rest of the bundle. Then, a taste is directly defined as a deep property of preferences. As a first result, it is shown that a complete and transitive preference relation over the commodity bundles is equivalent to regular tastes (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  31. Preference Order and the Decision Makers Point-of-View.Mh Birnbaum, Ba Mellers & G. Coffey - 1987 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 25 (5):348-348.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. A Preference in Rats for Cues Associated with Intoxication.Roger W. Black, Tony Albiniak, Melvin Davis & Joseph Schumpert - 1973 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 2 (6):423-424.
  33. Can Good News Lead to a More Pessimistic Choice of Action?Giacomo Bonanno - 1988 - Theory and Decision 25 (2):123-136.
    Adapting a definition introduced by Milgrom (1981) we say that a signal about the environment is good news relative to some initial beliefs if the posterior beliefs dominate the initial beliefs in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance (the assumption being that higher values of the parameter representing the environment mean better environments). We give an example where good news leads to the adoption of a more pessimistic course of action (we say that action a, reveals greater pessimism than action (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Guest Editors' Introduction.Giacomo Bonanno, James Delgrande & Hans Rott - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):1-5.
    The contributions to the Special Issue on Multiple Belief Change, Iterated Belief Change and Preference Aggregation are divided into three parts. Four contributions are grouped under the heading "multiple belief change" (Part I, with authors M. Falappa, E. Fermé, G. Kern-Isberner, P. Peppas, M. Reis, and G. Simari), five contributions under the heading "iterated belief change" (Part II, with authors G. Bonanno, S.O. Hansson, A. Nayak, M. Orgun, R. Ramachandran, H. Rott, and E. Weydert). These papers do not only pick (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. The Psychology of Reasoning About Preferences and Unconsequential Decisions.Jean-François Bonnefon, Vittorio Girotto & Paolo Legrenzi - 2012 - Synthese 185 (S1):27-41.
    People can reason about the preferences of other agents, and predict their behavior based on these preferences. Surprisingly, the psychology of reasoning has long neglected this fact, and focused instead on disinterested inferences, of which preferences are neither an input nor an output. This exclusive focus is untenable, though, as there is mounting evidence that reasoners take into account the preferences of others, at the expense of logic when logic and preferences point to different conclusions. This article summarizes the most (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  36. The Intentional Acquisition of Mental States.Luc Bovens - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (4):821-840.
    I examine the normative status of various wanting-to-believe cases and wanting-to-desire cases.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  37. Becker's Thesis and Three Models of Preference Change.Richard Bradley - 2009 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 8 (2):223-242.
    This article examines Becker's thesis that the hypothesis that choices maximize expected utility relative to fixed and universal tastes provides a general framework for the explanation of behaviour. Three different models of preference revision are presented and their scope evaluated. The first, the classical conditioning model, explains all changes in preferences in terms of changes in the information held by the agent, holding fundamental beliefs and desires fixed. The second, the Jeffrey conditioning model, explains them in terms of changes in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  38. Preference Kinematics.Richard Bradley - 2008 - In Till Grune (ed.), Preference Change: Approaches from Philosophy, Economics and Psychology.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Conditional Desirability.Richard Bradley - 1999 - Theory and Decision 47 (1):23-55.
    Conditional attitudes are not the attitudes an agent is disposed to acquire in event of learning that a condition holds. Rather they are the components of agent's current attitudes that derive from the consideration they give to the possibility that the condition is true. Jeffrey's decision theory can be extended to include quantitative representation of the strength of these components. A conditional desirability measure for degrees of conditional desire is proposed and shown to imply that an agent's degrees of conditional (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  40. The Rational Criticism of Preferences.Richard B. Brandt - 1998 - In Christoph Fehige & Ulla Wessels (eds.), Preferences. De Gruyter. pp. 19--63.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  41. Variety Among Hiearchies of Preference.David Braybrooke - 1978 - In A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.), Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory. D. Reidel. pp. 55--65.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. Let Needs Diminish That Preferences May Prosper.David Braybrooke - 1968 - In Studies in Moral Philosophy. Oxford, Published by Blackwell with the Cooperation of the University of Pittsburgh. pp. 86--107.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. Costs of Abandoning the Sure-Thing Principle.Rachael Briggs - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):827-840.
    Risk-weighted expected utility theory permits preferences which violate the Sure-Thing Principle. But preferences that violate the STP can lead to bad decisions in sequential choice problems. In particular, they can lead decision-makers to adopt a strategy that is dominated – i.e. a strategy such that some available alternative leads to a better outcome in every possible state of the world.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  44. Dynamic Inconsistency and Choice.Isabelle Brocas - 2011 - Theory and Decision 71 (3):343-364.
    In this paper, we analyze an intra-personal game where a decision-maker is summarized by a succession of selves. Selves may (or may not) have conflicting interests, and earlier selves may have imperfect knowledge of the preferences of future selves. At date 1, self-1 chooses a menu, at date 2, the preferences of self-2 realize and self-2 chooses an item from the menu. We show that equilibrium choice is consistent with either a preference for flexibility, a preference for betweenness or a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Reasoning with Preferences?John Broome - 2006 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 59:183-208.
  46. Wer hat ein Problem mit irrationalen Präferenzen? Entscheidungstheorie und Überlegungsgleichgewicht.Georg Brun - 2009 - Studia Philosophica: Jahrbuch Der Schweizerischen Philosoph Ischen Gesellschaft, Annuaire de la Société Suisse de Philosphie 68:11-41.
    Decision theory explicates norms of rationality for deriving preferences from preferences and beliefs. Empirical studies have found that actual preferences regularly violate these norms, launching a debate on whether this shows that subjects are prone to certain forms of irrationality or that decision theory needs to be revised. It has been claimed that such a revision is necessitated by the fact that normative uses of decision theory must be justified by a reflective equilibrium. The paper discusses three points. First, the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. From Medicine to Natural Philosophy: Francis Hauksbee's Way to the Air-Pump.Terje Brundtland - 2008 - British Journal for the History of Science 41 (2):209-240.
    Francis Hauksbee is well known for his double-barrelled air-pump. However, the origin of this pump, and Hauksbee's background, are often described as a mystery. This text seeks to dispel the riddle. It is argued that Hauksbee's competence as an exceptional maker of air-pumps was developed between 1699 and 1703 as a result of his experiences with the construction, manufacturing and sale of cupping-glasses. His cupping utensils embodied a new design, where syringes were used to evacuate the glasses, instead of the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  48. Decision Theory.Lara Buchak - forthcoming - In Christopher Hitchcock & Alan Hajek (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    Decision theory has at its core a set of mathematical theorems that connect rational preferences to functions with certain structural properties. The components of these theorems, as well as their bearing on questions surrounding rationality, can be interpreted in a variety of ways. Philosophy’s current interest in decision theory represents a convergence of two very different lines of thought, one concerned with the question of how one ought to act, and the other concerned with the question of what action consists (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  49. Why High-Risk, Non-Expected-Utility-Maximising Gambles Can Be Rational and Beneficial: The Case of HIV Cure Studies.Lara Buchak - 2016 - Journal of Medical Ethics (2):1-6.
    Some early phase clinical studies of candidate HIV cure and remission interventions appear to have adverse medical risk–benefit ratios for participants. Why, then, do people participate? And is it ethically permissible to allow them to participate? Recent work in decision theory sheds light on both of these questions, by casting doubt on the idea that rational individuals prefer choices that maximise expected utility, and therefore by casting doubt on the idea that researchers have an ethical obligation not to enrol participants (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  50. Revisiting Risk and Rationality: A Reply to Pettigrew and Briggs.Lara Buchak - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):841-862.
    I have claimed that risk-weighted expected utility maximizers are rational, and that their preferences cannot be captured by expected utility theory. Richard Pettigrew and Rachael Briggs have recently challenged these claims. Both authors argue that only EU-maximizers are rational. In addition, Pettigrew argues that the preferences of REU-maximizers can indeed be captured by EU theory, and Briggs argues that REU-maximizers lose a valuable tool for simplifying their decision problems. I hold that their arguments do not succeed and that my original (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 336