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Summary Primitivism about truth maintains that truth is a primitive, indefinable notion. Accordingly, primitivism is opposed to the traditional theories of truth, such as the correspondence theory, coherence theory, and pragmatic theory, which hold that truth can be defined into those further notions. Primitivism is also opposed to deflationary theories of truth, which maintain that truth is not a substantial notion. Hence, primitivism offers a substantial (i.e., non-deflationary) theory of truth, but one that resists definition in terms of any other notions.    
Key works Primitivism has a distinguished history. At the dawn of analytic philosophy, G. E. Moore (Moore 1899) and Bertrand Russell (Russell 1904) both defended the view, as did Gottlob Frege. The most famous argument for primitivism, known variously as Frege's treadmill, regress, or circularity argument, is found in Frege 1956. The most important contemporary discussion of primitivism is found in the work of Donald Davidson, notably Davidson 1990 and Davidson 1996. For a sustained discussion and defense of primitivism, see Asay 2013.
Introductions For an accessible introduction to primitivism and some of the theoretical motivations for it, see Davidson 1996 and Wyatt 2022.
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  1. Primitivism about Truth.Jamin Asay - forthcoming - In Michael Lynch, Nathan Kellen, Junyeol Kim & Jeremy Wyatt (eds.), The Nature of Truth (Second edition). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
    This essay offers an account and defense of conceptual primitivism about truth: the view that the concept of truth is a fundamental concept that cannot be analyzed or defined in terms of concepts that are more fundamental. It considers three arguments in defense of primitivism, and meets a familiar objection that fundamental concepts are by their nature obscure and mysterious. It concludes by considering the ways in which primitivism is similar to and different from other theories of truth, both substantive (...)
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  2. Classical Determinate Truth I.Kentaro Fujimoto & Volker Halbach - forthcoming - Journal of Symbolic Logic:1-44.
    We introduce and analyze a new axiomatic theory$\mathsf {CD}$of truth. The primitive truth predicate can be applied to sentences containing the truth predicate. The theory is thoroughly classical in the sense that$\mathsf {CD}$is not only formulated in classical logic, but that the axiomatized notion of truth itself is classical: The truth predicate commutes with all quantifiers and connectives, and thus the theory proves that there are no truth value gaps or gluts. To avoid inconsistency, the instances of the T-schema are (...)
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  3. On Semantic and Ontic Truth.Karen Green - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-19.
    It is argued that we should distinguish ontic truth––the True––that Frege claimed is sui generis and indefinable, from the semantic concept, for which Tarski provided a definition. Frege’s argument that truth is not definable is clarified and Wittgenstein’s introduction of the distinction between saying and showing is interpreted as an attempted response to Frege’s rejection of the correspondence theory. It is argued that conflicts between realism and Dummettian anti-realism result from their proponents not thoroughly distinguishing between the two closely connected (...)
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  4. Truth in Frege.Richard Heck & Robert May - forthcoming - In M. Glanzberg (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Truth. Oxford University Press.
    A general survey of Frege's views on truth, the paper explores the problems in response to which Frege's distinctive view that sentences refer to truth-values develops. It also discusses his view that truth-values are objects and the so-called regress argument for the indefinability of truth. Finally, we consider, very briefly, the question whether Frege was a deflationist.
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  5. Internal Categoricity, Truth and Determinacy.Martin Fischer & Matteo Zicchetti - 2023 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 52 (5):1295-1325.
    This paper focuses on the categoricity of arithmetic and determinacy of arithmetical truth. Several ‘internal’ categoricity results have been discussed in the recent literature. Against the background of the philosophical position called internalism, we propose and investigate truth-theoretic versions of internal categoricity based on a primitive truth predicate. We argue for the compatibility of a primitive truth predicate with internalism and provide a novel argument for (and proof of) a truth-theoretic version of internal categoricity and internal determinacy with some positive (...)
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  6. Davidson on Truth.Bogdan Oprea - 2023 - Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai Philosophia 68 (1):11-22.
    "Truth-conditional semantics is by far the best-known philosophical contribution of Donald Davidson. The main idea of this approach is to explain the concept of meaning by appeal to the concept of truth. Accordingly, we understand a sentence s of a natural language L, if and only if, we know its truth-conditions. Challenging in its nature, this proposal immediately caught the attention of the philosophical community, being equally appreciated and criticized. The aim of this paper is to argue that Davidson’s approach (...)
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  7. A “Modest” Primitivist Theory of Truth: The Ineffability of Truth, Effability of the Correspondence Relation.Marco Simionato - 2023 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 79 (3):937-964.
    The primitivist theory of truth, i.e., the view that truth cannot be analysed in more fundamental terms, has been cleverly revamped by Jamin Asay, who has combined a primitivist approach to the concept of truth with a deflationary approach to the (metaphysical) property of being true. This paper aims to adjust Asay’s primitivist theory to consistently include the primitiveness of the (pre-theoretical) correspondence relation, grasped by our correspondence intuition, alongside the primitiveness of truth. In the process, I apply a thesis (...)
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  8. Truth and the Metaphysics of Semantic and Logical Notions.Andrea Strollo - 2023 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 79 (3):917-936.
    In contemporary philosophy, it is tempting to apply the metaphysics of properties to the specific case of truth, in the hope of making progress on the investigation of the latter. In this paper, I argue that a different approach, mostly independent from the metaphysics of properties and based on the naturalness, in Lewis’ sense, of semantic nations, is often a better alternative, both in general and in some specific cases. In particular, adopting the new perspective, I present a new problem (...)
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  9. From Infants to Great Apes: False Belief Attribution and Primitivism About Truth.Joseph Ulatowski & Jeremy Wyatt - 2023 - In David Bordonaba-Plou (ed.), Experimental Philosophy of Language: Perspectives, Methods, and Prospects. Springer Verlag. pp. 263-286.
    There is a growing body of empirical evidence which shows that infants and non-human primates have the ability to represent the mental states of other agents, i.e. that they possess a Theory of Mind. We will argue that this evidence also suggests that infants and non-human primates possess the concept of truth, which, as we will explain, is good news for primitivists about truth. First, we will offer a brief overview of alethic primitivism, focusing on Jamin Asay’s conceptual version of (...)
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  10. What Cannot Be Deconstructed? Truth.Piotr Kozak - 2022 - Studia Philosophiae Christianae 58 (2):129-136.
    In this paper, I discuss the interpretation of the method of deconstruction in David J. Gunkel’s Deconstruction (MIT Press 2021). I focus on the relationship between deconstruction and truth. I hold that the concept of truth is indispensable for deconstruction since truth introduces correctness conditions for the deconstructive method. However, I claim that truth, being essential and primitive for deconstruction, is fundamentally inaccessible for being analyzed by the latter. ------------------------- Received: 19/10/2022. Reviewed: 13/12/2022. Accepted: 20/12/2022.
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  11. Is Truth Primitive?Jeremy Wyatt - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (4):1281-1304.
    Primitivist theories of truth have been defended by some of the luminaries of analytic philosophy, including the early Moore and Russell, Frege, Davidson, and Sosa. In this paper, I take up a contemporary primitivist theory that has been systematically developed throughout a sizeable body of work but has yet to receive sustained critical attention—Jamin Asay's primitivist deflationism. Asay's major ambitions are to defend a novel primitivist account of the concept truth and to harmonise that account with a deflationary theory of (...)
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  12. Primitivist theories of truth: Their history and prospects.Jeremy Wyatt - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (6):e12832.
    Primitivists about truth maintain that truth cannot be analysed in more fundamental terms. Defences of primitivism date back to the early years of analytic philosophy, being offered by G.E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, and Gottlob Frege. In more recent years, a number of contemporary philosophers—including Donald Davidson, Ernest Sosa, Trenton Merricks, Douglas Patterson, and Jamin Asay—have followed suit, defending their own versions of primitivism. I'll begin by offering a brief history of primitivism, situating each of these views within the landscape of (...)
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  13. Truth : a concept unlike any other.Jamin Asay - 2021 - Synthese 198 (Supplement issue 2):S605-S630.
    This paper explores the nature of the concept of truth. It does not offer an analysis or definition of truth, or an account of how it relates to other concepts. Instead, it explores what sort of concept truth is by considering what sorts of thoughts it enables us to think. My conclusion is that truth is a part of each and every propositional thought. The concept of truth is therefore best thought of as the ability to token propositional thoughts. I (...)
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  14. Frege, the self-consciousness of judgement, and the indefinability of truth.Colin Johnston - 2021 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 29 (6):1124-1143.
    ABSTRACT Frege characterizes judgement as the acknowledgement of the truth of a thought, appearing thereby to rule out false judgement. First in this paper I explain Frege’s characterization so that it does not have this consequence. Frege is not saying that for a subject S to judge that p is for S to acknowledge the truth of the thought that p. Rather, he is articulating judgement’s nature within self-consciousness. From within, to judge means to acknowledge a truth. Second, I suggest (...)
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  15. Frege's Choice: The Indefinability Argument, Truth, and the Fregean Conception of Judgment.Junyeol Kim - 2021 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 9 (5):1-26.
    I develop a new reading of Frege’s argument for the indefinability of truth. I concentrate on what Frege literally says in the passage that contains the argument. This literal reading of the passage establishes that the indefinability argument is an arguably sound argument to the following conclusion: provided that the Fregean conception of judgment—which has recently been countered by Hanks—is correct and that truth is a property of truth-bearers, a vicious infinite regress is produced. Given this vicious regress, Frege chooses (...)
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  16. The Nature of Truth (Second edition).Michael Lynch, Jeremy Wyatt, Junyeol Kim & Nathan Kellen (eds.) - 2021 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  17. Fix, Express, Quantify: Disquotation After Its Logic.Carlo Nicolai - 2021 - Mind 130 (519):727-757.
    Truth-theoretic deflationism holds that truth is simple, and yet that it can fulfil many useful logico-linguistic roles. Deflationism focuses on axioms for truth: there is no reduction of the notion of truth to more fundamental ones such as sets or higher-order quantifiers. In this paper I argue that the fundamental properties of reasonable, primitive truth predicates are at odds with the core tenets of classical truth-theoretic deflationism that I call fix, express, and quantify. Truth may be regarded as a broadly (...)
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  18. The circularity reading of Frege’s indefinability argument.Junyeol Kim - 2020 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):128-136.
    This paper criticizes the circularity reading of Frege's argument for the indefinability of truth. According to this reading, Frege is appealing to a sort of circularity in the argument. I argue that the circularity reading is interpretatively incorrect, or makes Frege's argument a non‐starter.
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  19. Frege's Conception of Truth as an Object.Junyeol Kim - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Connecticut
    In this dissertation I explore Frege’s conception of truth. In particular I defend the thesis that Frege in his mature career takes truth to be an object, i.e., the True qua the reference of true sentences. In the literature on truth Frege has been usually taken to be a truth deflationist or a truth primitivist. Indeed Frege leaves a number of comments that sound like typical deflationist claims and his famous indefinability argument is the most discussed argument for primitivism. However, (...)
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  20. Editorial introduction to ‘truth: concept meets property’.Jeremy Wyatt - 2020 - Synthese 198 (2):591-603.
  21. Anaphoric Deflationism, Primitivism, and the Truth Property.Pietro Salis - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (1):117-134.
    Anaphoric deflationism is a prosententialist account of the use of “true.” Prosentences are, for sentences, the equivalent of what pronouns are for nouns: as pronouns refer to previously introduced nouns, so prosentences like “that’s true” inherit their content from previously introduced sentences. This kind of deflationism concerning the use of “true” (especially in Brandom’s version) is an explanation in terms of anaphora; the prosentence depends anaphorically on the sentence providing its content. A relevant implication of this theory is that “true” (...)
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  22. Putting Pluralism in its Place.Jamin Asay - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):175–191.
    Pluralism about truth is the view that there are many properties, not just one, in virtue of which things are true. Pluralists hope to dodge the objections that face traditional monistic substantive views of truth, as well as those facing deflationary theories of truth. More specifically, pluralists hope to advance an explanatorily potent understanding of truth that can capture the subtleties of various realist and anti-realist domains of discourse, all while avoiding the scope problem. I offer a new objection to (...)
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  23. A simple theory containing its own truth predicate.Nicholas Shackel - 2018 - South American Journal of Logic 4 (1):121-131.
    Tarski's indefinability theorem shows us that truth is not definable in arithmetic. The requirement to define truth for a language in a stronger language (if contradiction is to be avoided) lapses for particularly weak languages. A weaker language, however, is not necessary for that lapse. It also lapses for an adequately weak theory. It turns out that the set of G{\"o}del numbers of sentences true in arithmetic modulo $n$ is definable in arithmetic modulo $n$.
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  24. From one to many: recent work on truth.Jeremy Wyatt & Michael Lynch - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (4):323-340.
    In this paper, we offer a brief, critical survey of contemporary work on truth. We begin by reflecting on the distinction between substantivist and deflationary truth theories. We then turn to three new kinds of truth theory—Kevin Scharp's replacement theory, John MacFarlane's relativism, and the alethic pluralism pioneered by Michael Lynch and Crispin Wright. We argue that despite their considerable differences, these theories exhibit a common "pluralizing tendency" with respect to truth. In the final section, we look at the underinvestigated (...)
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  25. Wang Chong, truth, and quasi-pluralism.Lajos L. Brons - 2015 - Comparative Philosophy 6 (1):129-148.
    In (2011) McLeod suggested that the first century Chinese philosopher Wang Chong 王充 may have been a pluralist about truth. In this reply I contest McLeod's interpretation of Wang Chong, and suggest "quasi-pluralism" (albeit more as an alternative to pluralism than as an interpretation of Wang Chong), which combines primitivism about the concept of truth with pluralism about justification.
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  26. The Primitive Thesis: Defending a Davidsonian Conception of Truth.Justin Robert Clarke - 2015 - Dissertation,
    In this dissertation I defend the claim, long held by Donald Davidson, that truth is a primitive concept that cannot be correctly or informatively defined in terms of more basic concepts. To this end I articulate the history of the primitive thesis in the 20th century, working through early Moore, Russell, and Frege, and provide improved interpretations of their reasons for advancing and eventually abandoning the primitive thesis. I show the importance of slingshot-style arguments in the work of Frege, Church, (...)
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  27. The Primitivist Theory of Truth By J. Asay. [REVIEW]John Collins - 2015 - Analysis 75 (3):525-527.
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  28. The Weight of Truth: Lessons for Minimalists from Russell's Gray's Elegy Argument.Tim Button - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (3pt3):261-289.
    Minimalists, such as Paul Horwich, claim that the notions of truth, reference and satisfaction are exhausted by some very simple schemes. Unfortunately, there are subtle difficulties with treating these as schemes, in the ordinary sense. So instead, minimalists regard them as illustrating one-place functions, into which we can input propositions (when considering truth) or propositional constituents (when considering reference and satisfaction). However, Bertrand Russell's Gray's Elegy argument teaches us some important lessons about propositions and propositional constituents. When applied to minimalism, (...)
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  29. The Primitivist Theory of Truth, by Jamin Asay: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. xiii + 354, US$95.00. [REVIEW]Paul Dicken - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):816-816.
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  30. Examination of Merricks' Primitivism about Truth.A. R. J. Fisher - 2014 - Metaphysica 15 (2):281-98.
    Trenton Merricks argues for and defends a novel version of primitivism about truth : being true is a primitive monadic but non-intrinsic property. This examination consists of the following triad: a critical discussion of Merricks’ argument for his view, a rejection of his objection against Paul Horwich’s minimalist theory of truth, and a direct objection against his view on the grounds that it entails being true is a mysterious and suspicious property. The conclusion is that Merricks’ primitivism should be rejected.
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  31. The Primitivist Theory of Truth.Jamin Asay - 2013 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Jamin Asay's book offers a fresh and daring perspective on the age-old question 'What is truth?', with a comprehensive articulation and defence of primitivism, the view that truth is a fundamental and indefinable concept. Often associated with Frege and the early Russell and Moore, primitivism has been largely absent from the larger conversation surrounding the nature of truth. Asay defends primitivism by drawing on a range of arguments from metaphysics, philosophy of language and philosophy of logic, and navigates between correspondence (...)
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  32. Primitive Truth.Jamin Asay - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (4):503-519.
    Conceptual primitivism is the view that truth is among our most basic and fundamental concepts. It cannot be defined, analyzed, or reduced into concepts that are more fundamental. Primitivism is opposed to both traditional attempts at defining truth (in terms of correspondence, coherence, or utility) and deflationary theories that argue that the notion of truth is exhausted by means of the truth schema. Though primitivism might be thought of as a view of last resort, I believe that the view is (...)
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  33. Tarski and Primitivism About Truth.Jamin Asay - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13:1-18.
    Tarski’s pioneering work on truth has been thought by some to motivate a robust, correspondence-style theory of truth, and by others to motivate a deflationary attitude toward truth. I argue that Tarski’s work suggests neither; if it motivates any contemporary theory of truth, it motivates conceptual primitivism, the view that truth is a fundamental, indefinable concept. After outlining conceptual primitivism and Tarski’s theory of truth, I show how the two approaches to truth share much in common. While Tarski does not (...)
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  34. A crítica de Frege a teoria da verdade como correspondência.Kariel Antonio Giarolo - 2013 - Philósophos - Revista de Filosofia 18 (2):135-166.
    This paper has as main objective present and discuss Gottlob Frege critic to the attempt to define the concept of truth, especially, the attempt to define of truth as correspondence. The correspondence theories of truth sustain that truth can be defined in terms of correspondence between sentences, propositions or true thoughts and facts. However, in his posthumous writing Logic (1897) and, after, in The Thought (1918), Frege presents a severe critic to this kind of approach. He holds that truth is (...)
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  35. Truth and Epistemology.Matthew McGrath & Jeremy Fantl - 2013 - In John Turri (ed.), Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa. Springer. pp. 127--145.
    In Sect. 1 of this chapter, Matthew McGrath examines Sosa's work on the nature of truth. Sosa's chief purpose is to determine what sort of theory of truth is appropriate for truth-centered epistemology -- an epistemology that takes truth to be the goal of inquiry and which explains key epistemic notions in terms of truth. While Sosa refutes arguments from Putnam and Davidson against the correspondence theory, he is hesitant to endorse it because he doubts we have a clear enough (...)
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  36. Frege, la verdad y el progreso cientifico.Carlos Ulises Moulines - 2012 - Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 1 (1):17--35.
    [ES] El presente trabajo muestra la continuidad, a través de la obra de Frege y en el contexto de su caracterización del hacer científico, de una noción de verdad que no es constructiva ni instrumental y ni siquiera puede entenderse como relación de correspondencia o adecuación. Se trata de un concepto primitivo y no definible, que se intenta llevar a sus últimas consecuencias —algo que no llegó a hacer Frege. El autor defiende, finalmente, una noción alternativa de verdad que podría (...)
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  37. La Noción De Verdad En “el Pensamiento: Una Investigación Lógica” De Gottlob Frege.Ricardo Araujo - 2011 - Episteme NS: Revista Del Instituto de Filosofía de la Universidad Central de Venezuela 31 (1):85-90.
    La noción de verdad juega un papel fundamental dentro del marco lógico- semántico expuesto por Gottlob Frege en sus ensayos “Función y concepto” y “Sentido y referencia”. En su artículo El pensamiento. Una investigación lógica, el filósofo alemán nos dice que la lógica es la ciencia que estudia lo verdadero y las leyes que en cuanto verdadero le competen, pero, ¿qué debemos entender por “verdad”? Esta interrogante será uno de los puntos centrales que Frege expondrá en su artículo. ¿La verdad (...)
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  38. Our Grasp of the Concept of Truth: Reflections on Künne.Paul Boghossian - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (4):553-563.
    Wolfgang Künne's Conceptions of Truth (2003) is a magnificent achievement. Wonderfully clear, erudite, compendious, honest and insightful on some very tricky issues – these are some of its many virtues. I have benefited a great deal from studying it. In this short note, I will concentrate on Künne's own positive proposal about the concept of truth, his modestly named ‘Modest Account’. I will raise some questions about its ultimate viability.
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  39. Axiomatic Theories of Truth.Volker Halbach - 2010 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
    At the centre of the traditional discussion of truth is the question of how truth is defined. Recent research, especially with the development of deflationist accounts of truth, has tended to take truth as an undefined primitive notion governed by axioms, while the liar paradox and cognate paradoxes pose problems for certain seemingly natural axioms for truth. In this book, Volker Halbach examines the most important axiomatizations of truth, explores their properties and shows how the logical results impinge on the (...)
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  40. Truth as conceptually primitive.Douglas Patterson - 2010 - In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave-Macmillan.
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  41. New Waves in Truth.Cory Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.) - 2010 - New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
  42. Russell's Early Metaphysics of Propositions.Anssi Korhonen - 2009 - Prolegomena 8 (2):159-192.
    In Bertrand Russell’s The Principles of Mathematics and related works, the notion of a proposition plays an important role; it is by analyzing propositions, showing what kinds of constituents they have, that Russell arrives at his core logical concepts. At this time, his conception of proposition contains both a conventional and an unconventional part. The former is the view that propositions are the ultimate truth-bearers; the latter is the view that the constituents of propositions are “worldly” entities. In the latter (...)
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  43. Russellova rana metafizika propozicija.Anssi Korhonen - 2009 - Prolegomena 8 (2):159-192.
    In Bertrand Russell’s "The Principles of Mathematics" and related works, the notion of a proposition plays an important role; it is by analyzing propositions,showing what kinds of constituents they have, that Russell arrives at his core logical concepts. At this time, his conception of proposition contains both a conventional and an unconventional part. The former is the view that propositions are the ultimate truth-bearers; the latter is the view that the constituents of propositions are “worldly” entities. In the latter respect, (...)
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  44. Interpretation and the Indefinability of Truth in Heidegger and Davidson.Richard Matthews - 2009 - Analecta Hermeneutica 1:35-45.
    Heidegger famously diminishes the significance of everyday theories of truth like the correspondence theory, disparaging these as a matter of ‘mere’ correctness.They are among the starting points that lead to ‘the true’ but are not themselves genuine or authentic. Donald Davidson develops a theory of interpretation that suggests some reasons why the ordinary senses of truth should not be so mistreated: responsible theories of interpretation should treat the everyday senses of truth more seriously. This paper argues that the necessity of (...)
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  45. Frege on Truths, Truth and the True.Wolfgang Künne - 2008 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (1):5-42.
    The founder of modern logic and grandfather of analytic philosophy was 70 years old when he published his paper 'Der Gedanke' (The Thought ) in 1918. This essay contains some of Gottlob Frege's deepest and most provocative reflections on the concept of truth, and it will play a prominent role in my lectures. The plan for my lectures is as follows. What is it that is (primarily) true or false? 'Thoughts', is Frege's answer. In §1, I shall explain and defend (...)
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  46. Essays on Frege's Conception of Truth.Dirk Greimann (ed.) - 2007 - Rodopi.
    In his writings on the foundations of logic, Gottlob Frege, the father of modern logic, sketched a conception of truth that focuses on the following questions: What is the sense of the word "true"? Is truth a definable concept or a primitive one? What are the kinds of things of which truth is predicated? What is the role of the concept of truth in judgment, assertion and recognition? What is the logical category of truth? What is the significance of the (...)
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  47. Truth and ontology.Trenton Merricks - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Truth and Ontology concludes that some truths do not depend on being in any substantive way at all.
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  48. Primitive Disclosive Alethism.Timothy J. Nulty - 2007 - Metaphysica 8 (1):1-15.
    The contemporary debate about truth is polarized between deflationists and those who offer robust accounts of truth. I present a theory of truth called ‘Primitive Disclosive Alethism’ that occupies the middle ground between these two extremes. Contrary to deflationist claims, truth has a nature beyond its merely linguistic, expressive function. Truth is objective and non-epistemic, yet cannot be characterized in terms of correspondence. Primitive Disclosive Alethism offers a metaphysically satisfying explanation of our correspondence intuitions, while explaining why the concept of (...)
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  49. Primitive disclosive alethism: Davidson, Heidegger, and the nature of truth.Timothy J. Nulty - 2006 - New York: Peter Lang.
    Davidson, truth, and triangulation -- Davidson applied -- Half truths -- Heidegger's analytic of Dasein -- Dasein and truth -- Truthful intersections -- Primitive disclosive alethism.
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  50. Tarski's Grelling and the T-Strategy.Greg Ray - 2006 - In Bryson Brown (ed.), Truth and Probability: Essays in Honour of Hugues Leblanc. College Publications.
    Tarski's argumentative use of the liar paradox is well-known, but officially it is the Grelling paradox that has final pride of place in Tarski's argument, not the Liar at all. Tarski explicitly gives argumentation that adverts to the liar argument, but it is an alternative argument—one he only hints at and which adverts to the Grelling—which he says has the advantage of removing any empirical element. In this paper, we will examine how the Grelling might be used in place of (...)
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