Edited by Alex Byrne (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
|Summary||Primitivist theories of color hold that the colors are primitive properties, not susceptible of further analysis. In particular, they cannot be identified with physical properties or dispositions to produce effects in perceivers. Primitivism is thus incompatible with physicalist and dispositionalist theories of color. Primitivism comes in two main varieties, realist and irrealist (or eliminativist). Realist primitivism holds that physical objects possess the primitive colors; irrealist primitivism hold that they do not. One objection to realist primitivism is that it leaves the colors with no causal role to play, since other properties of objects explain why they look colored.|
|Key works||For defenses of realist primitivism, see Campbell 1993 and Yablo 1995. For irrealist primitivism see Chalmers 2006. Criticisms of both varieties of primitivism are in Byrne & Hilbert 2006.|
|Introductions||For short overviews of the competing theories of color, see the introduction to Byrne & Hilbert 1997, Hilbert 1998 and Byrne & Hilbert 2002. For a more substantial introduction see Maund 2008. A useful annotated bibliography is Brogaard 2010.|
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
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