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  1. Issues in Knowledge Representation: Semantics and Knowledge Combination.Chitta Ranjan Baral - 1991 - Dissertation, University of Maryland, College Park
    In this thesis we are concerned with two major issues in knowledge representation: semantics of negation in knowledge representation languages, and combining knowledge bases. ;We take two different approaches to characterize the semantics of negation in knowledge representation languages. The first approach is based on an iterated fixpoint computation of the semantics. We present a uniform framework for iterated fixpoint semantics of logic programs. Based on this framework we study three particular instances in detail: Generalized Well-founded Semantics , $WF\sp3$ semantics, (...)
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  2. DeRose and the Comparative Account of Epistemic Closure.Christopher Buford - 2005 - Facta Philosophica 7 (2):255-259.
  3. Epistemic Paradox.Tyler Burge - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):5-29.
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  4. Reductionism and Perfectibility of Science.Massimiliano Carrara & Davide Fassio - manuscript
    Nicholas Rescher, in The Limits of Science (1984), argued that: «perfected science is a mirage; complete knowledge a chimera» . He reached the above conclusion from a logical argument known as Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability. The argument, starting from the assumption that every truth is knowable, proves that every truth is also actually known and, given that some true propositions are not actually known, it concludes, by modus tollens, that there are unknowable truths. Prima facie, this argument seems to seriously (...)
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  5. At the Threshold of Knowledge.Rothschild Daniel & Spectre Levi - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-12.
    We explore consequences of the view that to know a proposition your rational credence in the proposition must exceed a certain threshold. In other words, to know something you must have evidence that makes rational a high credence in it. We relate such a threshold view to Dorr et al.’s :277–287, 2014) argument against the principle they call fair coins: “If you know a coin won’t land tails, then you know it won’t be flipped.” They argue for rejecting fair coins (...)
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  6. What Is It to Be a Human Knower?Jan Derry - 2007 - Philosophy Now 63:10-11.
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  7. Science, Language and the Human Condition.Jude P. Dougherty - 1989 - Review of Metaphysics 42 (4):843-844.
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  8. Is Tennant Selling Truth Short?Jim Edwards - 1997 - Analysis 57 (2):152–158.
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  9. The Knower Paradox in the Light of Provability Interpretations of Modal Logic.Paul Égré - 2005 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 14 (1):13-48.
    This paper propounds a systematic examination of the link between the Knower Paradox and provability interpretations of modal logic. The aim of the paper is threefold: to give a streamlined presentation of the Knower Paradox and related results; to clarify the notion of a syntactical treatment of modalities; finally, to discuss the kind of solution that modal provability logic provides to the Paradox. I discuss the respective strength of different versions of the Knower Paradox, both in the framework of first-order (...)
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  10. The Paradox of the Knower.Fred Feldman - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 55 (1):93 - 100.
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  11. The Maker’s Knowledge Principle and the Limits of Science.Filho Danilo Marcondes de Souza - 2002 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 76:229-237.
    This paper starts with an analysis of the maker’s knowledge principle as one of the main characteristics of Modern epistemology. We start by showing that maker’s knowledge can be understood in two ways: 1) a negative sense, as a way of establishing limits to human knowledge: we can only know what we create; and 2) a positive sense, as legitimizing human knowledge: we effectively know what we create. We proceed then to examine the roots of the maker’s knowledge principle in (...)
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  12. Knowledge as Construct.Miranda Fricker - 1994 - In Kathleen Lennon & Margaret Whitford (eds.), Knowing the Difference: Feminist Perspectives in Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 95.
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  13. The Logic of Inexact Concepts.J. A. Gougen - 1969 - Synthese 19:325--73.
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  14. Iteration Principles in Epistemology II: Arguments Against.Daniel Greco - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (11):765-771.
    The prequel to this paper introduced the topic of iteration principles in epistemology and surveyed some arguments in support of them. In this sequel, I'll consider two influential families of objection to iteration principles. The first turns on the idea that they lead to some variety of skepticism, and the second turns on ‘margin for error’ considerations adduced by Timothy Williamson.
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  15. A Worry About Safety.Richard Greene - 2007 - Southwest Philosophy Review 23 (1):155-161.
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  16. Operators in the Paradox of the Knower.Patrick Grim - 1993 - Synthese 94 (3):409 - 428.
    Predicates are term-to-sentence devices, and operators are sentence-to-sentence devices. What Kaplan and Montague's Paradox of the Knower demonstrates is that necessity and other modalities cannot be treated as predicates, consistent with arithmetic; they must be treated as operators instead. Such is the current wisdom.A number of previous pieces have challenged such a view by showing that a predicative treatment of modalities neednot raise the Paradox of the Knower. This paper attempts to challenge the current wisdom in another way as well: (...)
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  17. Truth, Omniscience, and the Knower.Patrick Grim - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 54 (1):9 - 41.
    Let us sum up.The paradox of the Knower poses a direct and formal challenge to the coherence of common notions of knowledge and truth. We've considered a number of ways one might try to meet that challenge: propositional views of truth and knowledge, redundancy or operator views, and appeal to hierarchy of various sorts. Mere appeal to propositions or operators, however, seems to be inadequate to the task of the Knower, at least if unsupplemented by an auxiliary recourse to hierarchy. (...)
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  18. Gregory W. Fitch, 1948-2007.Theodore Guleserian - 2007 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 81 (2):172 -.
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  19. Transmission and Closure.Bob Hale - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s1):172 - 190.
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  20. Closure of A Priori Knowability Under A Priori Knowable Material Implication.Jan Heylen - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (2):359-380.
    The topic of this article is the closure of a priori knowability under a priori knowable material implication: if a material conditional is a priori knowable and if the antecedent is a priori knowable, then the consequent is a priori knowable as well. This principle is arguably correct under certain conditions, but there is at least one counterexample when completely unrestricted. To deal with this, Anderson proposes to restrict the closure principle to necessary truths and Horsten suggests to restrict it (...)
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  21. An Argument Concerning the Unknowable.Leon Horsten - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):240-242.
    Williamson has forcefully argued that Fitch's argument shows that the domain of the unknowable is non-empty. And he exhorts us to make more inroads into the land of the unknowable. Concluding his discussion of Fitch's argument, he writes: " Once we acknowledge that [the domain of the unknowable] is non-empty, we can explore more effectively its extent. … We are only beginning to understand the deeper limits of our knowledge. " I shall formulate and evaluate a new argument concerning the (...)
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  22. Epistemic Authority, Preemptive Reasons, and Understanding.Christoph Jäger - 2016 - Episteme 13 (2):167-185.
    One of the key tenets of Linda Zagzebski’s book " Epistemic Authority" is the Preemption Thesis. It says that, when an agent learns that an epistemic authority believes that p, the rational response for her is to adopt that belief and to replace all of her previous reasons relevant to whether p by the reason that the authority believes that p. I argue that such a “Hobbesian approach” to epistemic authority yields problematic results. This becomes especially virulent when we apply (...)
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  23. The "Paradox" of Knowledge and Power: Reading Foucault on a Bias.Tom Keenan - 1987 - Political Theory 15 (1):5-37.
    What if thought freed itself from common sense and decided to think only at the extreme point of its singularity? What if it mischievously practiced the bias of paradox, instead of complacently accepting its citizenship in the doxa? What if it thought difference differentially, instead of searching out the common elements underlying difference?1.
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  24. Fantazma V Kinu: Problem Filmske Reprezentacije Skozi Filmske Manifeste in Filmski Anti-Manifest.Jela Krečič - 2009 - Problemi 4.
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  25. Kroon on Rationality and Epistemic Paradox.Byeong D. Lee - 1998 - Southwest Philosophy Review 14 (2):169-174.
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  26. Sensitivity, Indiscernibility and Knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s1):33 - 37.
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  27. G. W. Fitch's Paleontology.Bernard Linsky - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 73 (2-3):189 - 193.
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  28. F.B. Fitch 1908-1987.Ruth Barcan Marcus - 1988 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 61 (3):551 - 553.
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  29. Reply to Tennant.Colin McGinn - 1980 - Analysis 41 (3):120 - 122.
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  30. Four Paradoxes of Self-Reference: The Being of the Universal.Gregory S. Moss - 2014 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 28 (2):169-189.
    Herein I investigate how four dogmas underpinning the traditional concepts of universality, the genus, class, and abstract universal, generate four paradoxes of self-reference. The four dogmas are the following: (1) that contradiction entails the total absence of determinacy, (2) the necessary finitude of the concept, (3) the separation of principles of universality and particularity, and (4) the necessity of appealing to foundations. In section III I show how these dogmas underpin the paradoxes of self-reference and how one cannot make progress (...)
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  31. Closure Failures for Safety.Peter Murphy - 2005 - Philosophia 33 (1-4):331-334.
    Ernest Sosa and others have proposed a safety condition on knowledge: If S knows p, then in the nearest (non-actual) worlds in which S believes p, p is true.1 Colloquially, this is the idea that knowing requires not being easily mistaken. Here, I will argue that like another condition requiring a counterfactual relation between a subject’s belief and the world, viz. Robert Nozick’s sensitivity condition, safety leads, in certain cases, to the unacceptable result that knowledge is not closed under known (...)
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  32. Note on an Idea of Fitch.John R. Myhill - 1949 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 14 (3):175-176.
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  33. Closure.Sam Nico - 2002 - Philosophy Now 37:45-46.
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  34. A Knower's Evidence.Douglas Odegard - 1978 - American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (2):123 - 128.
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  35. Conclusive Reasons and Knowledge.Douglas Odegard - 1976 - Mind 85 (338):239-241.
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  36. On an Epistemic Paradox.Doris Olin - 1987 - Analysis 47 (4):216 - 217.
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  37. Bagimsiz Yasam Istegi.Hasan Bulent Paksoy - 2012 - Florence: Carrie/European University Institute.
    Universite’nin gorevi nedir? Su tanim’i yapabiliriz: dusunceleri birlestirip,ilerletmek. Dusunceleri birlestirmek ve ilerletmek neden gereklidir? Bir atilim’a gecmek icin, yer alacak olaylarin onceden ve kapsamli olarakdusunulmesi gerekir. Dusunceler, bir atilimin baslangicidir ve yalniz universite icinde gelismez.Dusunceler bir yonetim'e katilim birimi icinde gelkisebilecegi gibi, arkadastopluluklari icinde de yer alabilir. Ayrica, bir tek kisi'ce de olusturulup birkitap icinde dunya'ya sunulabilir.
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  38. A Reply to Tennant.Christopher Peacocke - 1980 - Analysis 40 (1):8 - 9.
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  39. This is Not a Book.Michael Picard - 2007
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  40. Closure and Context.Duncan Pritchard - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):275 – 280.
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  41. Fitch's Paradox and Ceteris Paribus Modalities.Carlo Proietti & Gabriel Sandu - 2010 - Synthese 173 (1):75 - 87.
    The paper attempts to give a solution to the Fitch’s paradox though the strategy of the reformulation of the paradox in temporal logic, and a notion of knowledge which is a kind of ceteris paribus modality. An analogous solution has been offered in a different context to solve the problem of metaphysical determinism.
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  42. Knowledge-to-Fact Arguments (Bootstrapping, Closure, Paradox and KK).Murali Ramachandran - 2016 - Analysis 76 (2):142-149.
    The leading idea of this article is that one cannot acquire knowledge of any non-epistemic fact by virtue of knowing that one that knows something. The lines of reasoning involved in the surprise exam paradox and in Williamson’s _reductio_ of the KK-principle, which demand that one can, are thereby undermined, and new type of counter-example to epistemic closure emerges.
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  43. On an Argument of Williamson's.Mark Richard - 2000 - Analysis 60 (266):213–217.
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  44. Vagueness, Ignorance, and Margin for Error. [REVIEW]R. M. Sainsbury - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):589-601.
  45. The Anti-Theorist's Paradox.Matthew R. Silliman & David K. Johnson - 2000 - Social Philosophy Today 15:199-208.
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  46. Formal Problems About Knowledge.Roy Sorensen - 2002 - In Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 539.
    In ”Formal Problems about Knowledge,” Roy Sorensen examines epistemological issues that have logical aspects. He uses Fitch's proof for unknowables and the surprise test paradox to illustrate the hopes of the modal logicians who developed epistemic logic, and he considers the epistemology of proof with the help of the knower paradox. One solution to this paradox is that knowledge is not closed under deduction. Sorensen reviews the broader history of this maneuver along with the relevant alternatives model of knowledge which (...)
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  47. The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics.Luper-Foy Steven (ed.) - 1987 - Rowman & Littlefield.
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  48. Are Back-Tracking FDCs Deliberationally Useful?Jing Tong - 2011 - Southwest Philosophy Review 27 (2):113-121.
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  49. Skeptical Appeal: The Source‐Content Bias.John Turri - 2014 - Cognitive Science 38 (5):307-324.
    Radical skepticism is the view that we know nothing or at least next to nothing. Nearly no one actually believes that skepticism is true. Yet it has remained a serious topic of discussion for millennia and it looms large in popular culture. What explains its persistent and widespread appeal? How does the skeptic get us to doubt what we ordinarily take ourselves to know? I present evidence from two experiments that classic skeptical arguments gain potency from an interaction between two (...)
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  50. Paradoks znawcy (The Knower Paradox).Zbigniew Tworak - 2011 - Filozofia Nauki 3.
    The Knower Paradox is an element of the class of paradoxes of self-reference. It demonstrates that any theory Ó which (1) extends Robinson arithmetic Q, (2) includes a unary knowledge predicate K, and (3) contains certain elementary epistemic principles involving K is inconsistent. In this paper I present different versions of the Knower Paradox (both in the framework of the first-order arithmetic and in the modal logic). There are several solutions of the paradox. Some of them I discuss in detail, (...)
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