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  1. Knowing Wrongly: An Obvious Oxymoron, or a Threat for the Alleged Universality of Epistemological Analyses?Murat Bac & Nurbay Irmak - 2011 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):305-321.
    The traditional tripartite and tetrapartite analyses describe the conceptual components of propositional knowledge from a universal epistemic point of view. According to the classical analysis, since truth is a necessary condition of knowledge, it does not make sense to talk about “false knowledge” or “knowing wrongly.” There are nonetheless some natural languages in which speakers ordinarily make statements about a person’s knowing a given subject matter wrongly. In this paper, we first provide a brief analysis of “knowing wrongly” in Turkish. (...)
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  2. Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Games and Decisions.M. O. L. Bacharach, L. Gérard-Varet, P. Mongin & H. S. Shin (eds.) - 1997 - Dordrecht: Springer.
    This collection of papers in epistemic logic is oriented towards applications to game theory and individual decision theory. Most of these papers were presented at the inaugural conference of the LOFT (Logic for the Theory and Games and Decisions) conference series, which took place in 1994 in Marseille. Among the notions dealt with are those of common knowledge and common belief, infinite hierarchies of beliefs and belief spaces, logical omniscience, positive and negative introspection, backward induction and rationalizable equilibria in game (...)
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  3. Testimony Amidst Diversity.Max Baker-Hytch - 2018 - In Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne & Dani Rabinowitz (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 183-202.
  4. Counter Closure and Knowledge Despite Falsehood.Brian Ball & Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (257):552-568.
    Certain puzzling cases have been discussed in the literature recently which appear to support the thought that knowledge can be obtained by way of deduction from a falsehood; moreover, these cases put pressure, prima facie, on the thesis of counter closure for knowledge. We argue that the cases do not involve knowledge from falsehood; despite appearances, the false beliefs in the cases in question are causally, and therefore epistemologically, incidental, and knowledge is achieved despite falsehood. We also show that the (...)
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  5. Lotteries And Contexts.Peter Baumann - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):415-428.
    There are many ordinary propositions we think we know. Almost every ordinary proposition entails some "lottery proposition" which we think we do not know but to which we assign a high probability of being true (for instance: “I will never be a multi-millionaire” entails “I will not win this lottery”). How is this possible - given that some closure principle is true? This problem, also known as “the Lottery puzzle”, has recently provoked a lot of discussion. In this paper I (...)
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  6. Pragmatic Encroachment and Theistic Knowledge.Matthew A. Benton - 2018 - In Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne & Dani Rabinowitz (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 267-287.
    If knowledge is sensitive to practical stakes, then whether one knows depends in part on the practical costs of being wrong. When considering religious belief, the practical costs of being wrong about theism may differ dramatically between the theist (if there is no God) and the atheist (if there is a God). This paper explores the prospects, on pragmatic encroachment, for knowledge of theism (even if true) and of atheism (even if true), given two types of practical costs: namely, by (...)
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  7. Lotteries and Prefaces.Matthew A. Benton - 2017 - In Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. New York: Routledge. pp. 168-176.
    The lottery and preface paradoxes pose puzzles in epistemology concerning how to think about the norms of reasonable or permissible belief. Contextualists in epistemology have focused on knowledge ascriptions, attempting to capture a set of judgments about knowledge ascriptions and denials in a variety of contexts (including those involving lottery beliefs and the principles of closure). This article surveys some contextualist approaches to handling issues raised by the lottery and preface, while also considering some of the difficulties encountered by those (...)
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  8. Knowledge Norms.Matthew A. Benton - 2014 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:nn-nn.
    Encyclopedia entry covering the growing literature on the Knowledge Norm of Assertion (and its rivals), the Knowledge Norm of Action (and pragmatic encroachment), the Knowledge Norm of Belief, and the Knowledge Norm of Disagreement.
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  9. Luminosity Regained.Selim Berker - 2008 - Philosophers' Imprint 8:1-22.
    The linchpin of Williamson (2000)'s radically externalist epistemological program is an argument for the claim that no non-trivial condition is luminous—that no non-trivial condition is such that whenever it obtains, one is in a position to know that it obtains. I argue that Williamson's anti-luminosity argument succeeds only if one assumes that, even in the limit of ideal reflection, the obtaining of the condition in question and one's beliefs about that condition can be radically disjoint from one another. However, no (...)
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  10. Inferential Knowledge and the Gettier Conjecture.Rodrigo Borges - forthcoming - In Rodrigo Borges Claudio de Almeida & Peter Klein (eds.), Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem. Oxford University Press.
    I propose and defend the conjecture that what explains why Gettiered subjects fail to know is the fact that their justified true belief depends essentially on unknown propositions. The conjecture follows from the plausible principle about inference in general according to which one knows the conclusion of one’s inference only if one knows all the premises it involves essentially.
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  11. Factive Verbs and Protagonist Projection.Wesley Buckwalter - 2014 - Episteme 11 (4):391-409.
    Nearly all philosophers agree that only true things can be known. But does this principle reflect actual patterns of ordinary usage? Several examples in ordinary language seem to show that ‘know’ is literally used non-factively. By contrast, this paper reports five experiments utilizing explicit paraphrasing tasks, which suggest that non-factive uses are actually not literal. Instead, they are better explained by a phenomenon known as protagonist projection. It is argued that armchair philosophical orthodoxy regarding the truth requirement for knowledge withstands (...)
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  12. Review of Sidney Hook, The Metaphysics of Pragmatism. [REVIEW]H. G. Callaway - 1997 - Transactions of the C.S. Peirce Society 33 (No. 3):799-808.
    This work first appeared as Sidney Hook's dissertation, afterward quickly published by Open Court in 1927, the same year Hook began his long career at New York University. Heretofore difficult to find, it now appears as a handsome and timely reprint, carrying John Dewey's original "Introductory Word," and providing opportunity to look back at the pragmatist tradition and the controversial role of metaphysics in it.
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  13. Does Knowledge of Material Objects Depend on Spatial Perception? Comments on Quassim Cassam's the Possibility of Knowledge.John Campbell - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):309-317.
    1. The spatial perception requirementCassam surveys arguments for what he calls the ‘Spatial Perception Requirement’ . This is the following principle: " SPR: In order to perceive that something is the case and thereby to know that it is the case one must be capable of spatial perception. " A couple of preliminary glosses. By ‘spatial perception’ Cassam means either perception of location, or perception of specifically spatial properties of an object, such as its size and shape. Second, Cassam takes (...)
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  14. Justification Before Knowledge?E. J. Coffman - manuscript
    This paper assesses several prominent recent attacks on the view that epistemic justification is conceptually prior to knowledge. I argue that this view—call it the Received View (RV)—emerges from these attacks unscathed. I start with Timothy Williamson’s two strongest arguments for the claim that all evidence is knowledge (E>K), which impugns RV when combined with the claim that justification depends on evidence. One of Williamson’s arguments assumes a false epistemic closure principle; the other misses some alternative (to E>K) explanations of (...)
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  15. Review: Criterial Problems. [REVIEW]Earl Conee - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):417 - 426.
    The two main topics of the paper are an allegedly justified reliability requirement for knowledge and an alleged incoherence among three propositions asserted by Cartesian foundationalism. It is argued that neither the allegation of justified reliability nor the allegation of incoherence is correct.
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  16. Reasons for (Prior) Belief in Bayesian Epistemology.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2013 - Synthese 190 (5):781-786.
    Bayesian epistemology tells us with great precision how we should move from prior to posterior beliefs in light of new evidence or information, but says little about where our prior beliefs come from. It offers few resources to describe some prior beliefs as rational or well-justified, and others as irrational or unreasonable. A different strand of epistemology takes the central epistemological question to be not how to change one’s beliefs in light of new evidence, but what reasons justify a given (...)
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  17. Knowing Against the Odds.Cian Dorr, Jeremy Goodman & John Hawthorne - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):277-287.
    We present and discuss a counterexample to the following plausible principle: if you know that a coin is fair, and for all you know it is going to be flipped, then for all you know it will land tails.
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  18. Qu’est-ce que la connaissance?Julien Dutant - 2010 - Vrin.
    Dans cet ouvrage, l’auteur discute d’abord un un ensemble d’idées de sens commun qui permettent de mieux cerner la notion de connaissance : nous savons beaucoup de choses, ce que nous savons ne vient pas toujours des sciences, tout ce que nous savons est vrai, la connaissance est le but de l’enquête, on ne doit croire et affirmer que ce que l’on sait, on ne doit agir que sur la base de ce que l’on sait, la connaissance a de la (...)
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  19. Replies to Cohen, Neta and Reed.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew Mcgrath - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):473-490.
  20. Knowledge From Falsehood.Branden Fitelson - unknown
    It is useful to note how (CC) differs from closure: (C) If S comes to believe q solely on the basis of competent deduction from p and S knows that p, then S knows that q. I won’t be discussing (C) today, but here is a useful contrast.
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  21. Strengthening the Case for Knowledge From Falsehood.Branden Fitelson - 2010 - Analysis 70 (4):666-669.
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  22. Le voyageur et le pouvoir magique - une étude de la Wissenschaftslehre.Luis Fellipe C. Garcia - 2016 - AUC Interpretationes - Studia Philosophica Europeanea:55-71.
    This article advances the hypothesis that the Fichtean enterprise of grounding all possible experience in a fundamental principle has to fail in order to succeed one of its most important tasks: reformulating the very idea of subjectivity. In order to ground this hypothesis, the paper will be divided in four parts: (i) the first one will analyze the starting point of the work where Fichte lays the foundations of his philosophical project (Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre) so as to show that (...)
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  23. The Myth of Factive Verbs.Allan Hazlett - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):497 - 522.
  24. Knowledge, Safety, and Practical Reasoning.Tim Henning - 2013 - In Tim Henning & David P. Schweikard (eds.), Knowledge, Virtue, and Action: Putting Epistemic Virtues to Work. Routledge.
  25. Process Reliabilism and the Value Problem.Christoph Jäger - 2011 - Theoria 77 (3):201-213.
    Alvin Goldman and Erik Olsson have recently proposed a novel solution to the value problem in epistemology, i.e., to the question of how to account for the apparent surplus value of knowledge over mere true belief. Their “conditional probability solution” maintains that even simple process reliabilism can account for the added value of knowledge, since forming true beliefs in a reliable way raises the objective probability that the subject will have more true belief of a similar kind in the future. (...)
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  26. Ācārya Kundakunda’s Pravacanasāra – Essence of the Doctrine.Vijay K. Jain - 2018 - Dehradun, India: Vikalp Printers.
    Ācārya Kundakunda’s (circa 1st century BCE) Pravacanasāra is among the most popular Jaina Scriptures that are studied with great reverence by the ascetics as well as the laymen. Consciousness manifests in form of cognition (upayoga) – pure-cognition (śuddhopayoga), auspicious-cognition (śubhopayoga) and inauspicious-cognition (aśubhopayoga). Pure-cognition represents conduct without-attachment (vītarāga cāritra). Perfect knowledge or omniscience (kevalajñāna) is the fruit of pure-cognition (śuddhopayoga). The soul engaged in pure-cognition (śuddhopayoga) enjoys supreme happiness engendered by the soul itself; this happiness is beyond the five senses (...)
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  27. The New and Old Ignorance Puzzles: How Badly Do We Need Closure?Brent G. Kyle - 2015 - Synthese 192 (5):1495-1525.
    Skeptical puzzles and arguments often employ knowledge-closure principles . Epistemologists widely believe that an adequate reply to the skeptic should explain why her reasoning is appealing albeit misleading; but it’s unclear what would explain the appeal of the skeptic’s closure principle, if not for its truth. In this paper, I aim to challenge the widespread commitment to knowledge-closure. But I proceed by first examining a new puzzle about failing to know—what I call the New Ignorance Puzzle . This puzzle resembles (...)
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  28. Contextualism and Counter-Closure.Federico Luzzi - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (1):187-199.
    I argue that DeRose's attributor contextualism cannot straightforwardly preserve the widespread view that, when a subject believes q solely on the basis of competent deduction from p, knowledge of q requires knowledge of p. I present a novel challenge to the compatibility of this widespread view with DeRose's contextualism, then argue that the tension can be resolved in only one of two ways: if DeRose rejects the widespread view or if DeRose accepts the existence of a range of contextualism-specific Gettier-style (...)
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  29. Interest-Relative Invariantism and Knowledge From Ignorance.Federico Luzzi - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1):31-42.
    The principle of Counter-Closure embodies the widespread view that when a proposition is believed solely as the conclusion of single-premise deduction, it can be known only if the premise is also known. I raise a problem for the compatibility of Jason Stanley's Interest-Relative Invariantism (IRI) with Counter-Closure. I explore the landscape of options that might help Stanley resolve this tension and argue that a trilemma confronts Stanley: he must either (i) renounce a key intuition that lies at the foundation of (...)
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  30. Common Knowledge and Argumentation Schemes .Fabrizio Macagno & Douglas Walton - 2005 - Studies in Communication Sciences 5 (2):1-22.
    We argue that common knowledge, of the kind used in reasoning in law and computing is best analyzed using a dialogue model of argumentation (Walton & Krabbe 1995). In this model, implicit premises resting on common knowledge are analyzed as endoxa or widely accepted opinions and generalizations (Tardini 2005). We argue that, in this sense, common knowledge is not really knowledge of the kind represent by belief and/or knowledge of the epistemic kind studied in current epistemology. This paper takes a (...)
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  31. The Process of Abstraction in the Creation of Meanings.Jesús Gerardo Martínez del Castillo - 2015 - International Journal of Language and Linguistics 3 (6-1):11-23.
    Linguistics of Saying is to be analyzed in the speech act conceived as an act of knowing. The speaking, saying and knowing subject, based on contexts and the principles of congruency and trust in the speech of other speakers, will create meanings and interpret the sense of utterances supplying the deficiencies of language by means of the intellective operations mentally executed in the act of speech. In the intellective operations you can see three steps or processes: first the starting point, (...)
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  32. Remembering Entails Knowing.Andrew Moon - 2013 - Synthese 190 (14):2717-2729.
    In his recent book, Bernecker (Memory, 2010) has attacked the following prominent view: (RK) S remembers that p only if S knows that p. An attack on RK is also an attack on Timothy Williamson’s view that knowledge is the most general factive stative attitude. In this paper, I defend RK against Bernecker’s attacks and also advance new arguments in favor of it. In Sect. 2, I provide some background on memory. In Sect 3, I respond to Bernecker’s attacks on (...)
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  33. Another Blow to Knowledge From Knowledge.Peter Murphy - 2013 - Logos and Episteme 4 (3): 311–317.
    A novel argument is offered against the following popular condition on inferential knowledge: a person inferentially knows a conclusion only if they know each of the claims from which they essentially inferred that conclusion. The epistemology of conditional proof reveals that we sometimes come to know conditionals by inferring them from assumptions rather than beliefs. Since knowledge requires belief, cases of knowing via conditional proof refute the popular knowledge from knowledge condition. It also suggests more radical cases against the condition (...)
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  34. Logic and Agency: Problems in Identifying Omnipotence and Rational Consistency.Daniel Pech - manuscript
    ABSTRACT Given the complexity of the Cosmos, and of the contingent observer, it is axiomatic that the obverse of the law of identity includes a complex reverse: a thing not only is only what it is, it also is not all those things which it is not. But, given the possible combinations of knowledge and ignorance regarding a given topic, any number of various conflations of the two sides of this axiom is possible regarding that topic. Further, given the extent (...)
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  35. Generating Stable Knowledge Via Reduction in Entropy.Georgios Constantine Pentzaropoulos - 2011 - Philosophy Pathways 2011 (167).
    The purpose of this work is to examine the conditions under which reduction in uncertainty contributes to knowledge stability. Two of Plato’s works, Theaetetus and Meno, are used to illustrate the difficulties. Links with information theory are established by virtue of a computer metaphor. Results are expressed in a series of four statements. According to the final statement, by reducing entropy, uncertainty is also reduced, and the flow of information aproaches steady state. In that state, knowledge is always stable and (...)
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  36. Two Kinds of Discrimination.Adrian M. S. Piper - 1993 - In Bernard Boxill (ed.), Race and Racism. Oxford University Press.
    The two kinds of discrimination I want to talk about are political discrimination and cognitive discrimination. By political discrimination, I mean what we ordinarily understand by the term "discrimination" in political contexts: A manifest attitude in which a particular property of a person which is irrelevant to judgments of that person's intrinsic value or competence, for example his race, gender, class, sexual orientation, or religious or ethnic affiliation, is seen as a source of disvalue or incompetence; in general, as a (...)
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  37. Cartesian Skepticism and the Epistemic Priority Thesis.Brian Ribeiro - 2002 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):573-586.
    In ' Unnatural Doubts' Michael Williams argues that Cartesian skepticism is not truly an "intuitive problem" (that is, one which we can state with little or no appeal to contentious theories) at all. According to Williams, the skeptic has rich theoretical commitments all his own, prominent among which is the epistemic priority thesis. I argue, however, that Williams's diagnostic critique of the epistemic priority thesis fails on his own conception of what is required for success. Furthermore, in a brief "Afterword" (...)
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  38. A Puzzle About Knowing Conditionals.Daniel Rothschild & Levi Spectre - 2018 - Noûs 52 (2):473-478.
    We present a puzzle about knowledge, probability and conditionals. We show that in certain cases some basic and plausible principles governing our reasoning come into conflict. In particular, we show that there is a simple argument that a person may be in a position to know a conditional the consequent of which has a low probability conditional on its antecedent, contra Adams’ Thesis. We suggest that the puzzle motivates a very strong restriction on the inference of a conditional from a (...)
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  39. An Argument for the Safety Condition on Knowledge.Michael Shaffer - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (4):517-520.
    This paper introduces a new argument for the safety condition on knowledge. It is based on the contention that the rejection of safety entails the rejection of the factivity condition on knowledge. But, since we should maintain factivity, we should endorse safery.
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  40. Quasi-Factive Belief and Knowledge-Like States.Michel J. Shaffer - forthcoming - Lexington Books.
    This book is addresses a topic that has received little or no attention in orthodox epistemology. Typical epistemological investigation focuses almost exclusively on knowledge, where knowing that something is the case importantly implies that what is believed is strictly true. This condition on knowledge is known as factivity and it is, to be sure, a bit of epistemological orthodoxy. So, if a belief is to qualify as knowledge according to the orthodox view it cannot be false. There is also an (...)
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  41. Epistemic Friction: An Essay on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic.Gila Sher - 2016 - Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.
    Gila Sher approaches knowledge from the perspective of the basic human epistemic situation—the situation of limited yet resourceful beings, living in a complex world and aspiring to know it in its full complexity. What principles should guide them? Two fundamental principles of knowledge are epistemic friction and freedom. Knowledge must be substantially constrained by the world (friction), but without active participation of the knower in accessing the world (freedom) theoretical knowledge is impossible. This requires a grounding of all knowledge, empirical (...)
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  42. Does Perceiving Entail Knowing?John Turri - 2010 - Theoria 76 (3):197-206.
    This article accomplishes two closely connected things. First, it refutes an influential view about the relationship between perception and knowledge. In particular, it demonstrates that perceiving does not entail knowing. Second, it leverages that refutation to demonstrate that knowledge is not the most general factive propositional attitude.
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  43. Principios reales y conocimiento matemático. La propuesta epistemológica de Leonardo Polo.Claudia Vanney - 2008 - Pamplona: Eunsa.
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  44. Knowledge in Action.Jonathan Weisberg - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13.
    Recent proposals that frame norms of action in terms of knowledge have been challenged by Bayesian decision theorists. Bayesians object that knowledge-based norms conflict with the highly successful and established view that rational action is rooted in degrees of belief. I argue that the knowledge-based and Bayesian pictures are not as incompatible as these objectors have made out. Attending to the mechanisms of practical reasoning exposes space for both knowledge and degrees of belief to play their respective roles.
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  45. Contextualism and Knowledge Norms.Alex Worsnip - 2017 - In Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. Routledge. pp. 177-189.
    I provide an opinionated overview of the literature on the relationship of contextualism to knowledge norms for action, assertion, and belief. I point out that contextualists about ‘knows’ are precluded from accepting the simplest versions of knowledge norms; they must, if they are to accept knowledge norms at all, accept “relativized” versions of them. I survey arguments from knowledge norms both for and against contextualism, tentatively concluding that commitment to knowledge norms does not conclusively win the day either for contextualism (...)
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  46. Modal Epistemology.Juhani Yli-Vakkuri & John Hawthorne - manuscript
    Some central epistemological notions are expressed by sentential operators O that entail the possibility of knowledge in the sense that 'Op' entails 'It is possible to know that p'. We call these modal-epistemological notions. Using apriority and being in a position to know as case studies, we argue that the logics of modal epistemological notions are extremely weak. In particular, their logics are not normal and do not include any closure principles.
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  47. Knowledge Without Safety.Haicheng Zhao - forthcoming - Synthese.
    The safety principle is the view that, roughly, if one knows that p, p could not easily have been false. It is common for safety theorists to relativize safety to belief-formation methods. In this paper, I argue that there is no fixed principle of method-individuation that can stand up to scrutiny. I examine various ways to individuate methods and argue that all of them are subject to serious counterexamples. In the end, I conclude by considering some alternative ways to preserve (...)
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  48. Theories That Refute Themselves.Arnold Zuboff - 2015 - Philosophy Now (106):16-18.
    Many philosophical positions wholly undermine themselves because to possess the truth that they claim for themselves they would have to be false. These are the theories that in one way or another reject the meaningfulness or attainability of objective truth.
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