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  1. Newcomb's Problem.Arif Ahmed (ed.) - 2018 - Cambridge University Press.
    Newcomb's Problem is a controversial paradox of decision theory. It is easily explained and easily understood, and there is a strong chance that most of us have actually faced it in some form or other. And yet it has proven as thorny and intractable a puzzle as much older and better-known philosophical problems of consciousness, scepticism and fatalism. It brings into very sharp and focused disagreement several long-standing philosophical theories on practical rationality, on the nature of free will, and on (...)
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  2. Team Reasoning: Theory and Evidence.Jurgis Karpus & Natalie Gold - 2017 - In Julian Kiverstein (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of the Social Mind. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 400-417.
    The chapter reviews recent theoretical and empirical developments concerning the theory of team reasoning in game theoretic interactions.
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  3. Stochastic Interactions Increase Cooperation in a Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma.Andrew W. Bausch - 2016 - Complexity 21 (2):82-92.
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  4. Predicting Human Cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Using Case-Based Decision Theory.Todd Guilfoos & Andreas Duus Pape - 2016 - Theory and Decision 80 (1):1-32.
    In this paper, we show that Case-based decision theory, proposed by Gilboa and Schmeidler :605–639, 1995), can explain the aggregate dynamics of cooperation in the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, as observed in the experiments performed by Camera and Casari. Moreover, we find CBDT provides a better fit to the dynamics of cooperation than does the existing Probit model, which is the first time such a result has been found. We also find that humans aspire to a payoff above the mutual defection (...)
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  5. Is the Minimum Wage Ethically Justifiable? An Order-Ethical Answer.Nikil Mukerji & Christoph Schumacher - 2016 - In Christoph Luetge & Nikil Mukerji (eds.), Order Ethics: An Ethical Framework for the Social Market Economy. Springer. pp. 279-292.
    Is the minimum wage ethically justifiable? In this chapter, we attempt to answer this question from an order-ethical perspective. To this end, we develop two simple game theoretical models for different types of labour markets and derive policy implications from an order-ethical viewpoint. Our investigation yields a twofold conclusion. Firstly, order ethicists should prefer a tax-funded wage subsidy over minimum wages, if they assume that labour markets are perfectly competitive. Secondly, order ethics suggests that the minimum wage can be ethically (...)
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  6. Social Interactions and The Prisoner's Dilemma: Martin Peterson : The Prisoner’s Dilemma. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, 306pp, $110.Cédric Paternotte - 2016 - Metascience 25 (2):335-338.
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  7. Explaining Universal Social Institutions: A Game-Theoretic Approach.Michael Vlerick - 2016 - Topoi 35 (1):291-300.
    Universal social institutions, such as marriage, commons management and property, have emerged independently in radically different cultures. This requires explanation. As Boyer and Petersen point out ‘in a purely localist framework would have to constitute massively improbable coincidences’ . According to Boyer and Petersen, those institutions emerged naturally out of genetically wired behavioural dispositions, such as marriage out of mating strategies and borders out of territorial behaviour. While I agree with Boyer and Petersen that ‘unnatural’ institutions cannot thrive, this one-sided (...)
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  8. The Tragedy of the Commons as a Voting Game.Luc Bovens - 2015 - In Martin Peterson (ed.), The Prisoner’s Dilemma. Classic philosophical arguments. Cambridge University Press. pp. 156-176.
    The Tragedy of the Commons is often associated with an n-person Prisoner’s Dilemma. But it can also have the structure of an n-person Game of Chicken, an Assurance Game, or of a Voting Games (or a Three-in-a-Boat Game). I present three historical stories that document tragedies of the commons, as presented in Aristotle, Mahanarayan and Hume and argue that the descriptions of these historical cases align better with Voting Games than with any other games.
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  9. Cooperation and Signaling with Uncertain Social Preferences.John Duffy & Félix Muñoz-García - 2015 - Theory and Decision 78 (1):45-75.
    This paper investigates behavior in finitely repeated simultaneous and sequential-move prisoner’s dilemma games when there is one-sided incomplete information and signaling about players’ concerns for fairness, specifically, their preferences regarding “inequity aversion.” In this environment, we show that only a pooling equilibrium can be sustained, in which a player type who is unconcerned about fairness initially cooperates in order to disguise himself as a player type who is concerned about fairness. This disguising strategy induces the uninformed player to cooperate in (...)
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  10. A Cognitive Model of Dynamic Cooperation With Varied Interdependency Information.Cleotilde Gonzalez, Noam Ben-Asher, Jolie M. Martin & Varun Dutt - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (3):457-495.
    We analyze the dynamics of repeated interaction of two players in the Prisoner's Dilemma under various levels of interdependency information and propose an instance-based learning cognitive model to explain how cooperation emerges over time. Six hypotheses are tested regarding how a player accounts for an opponent's outcomes: the selfish hypothesis suggests ignoring information about the opponent and utilizing only the player's own outcomes; the extreme fairness hypothesis weighs the player's own and the opponent's outcomes equally; the moderate fairness hypothesis weighs (...)
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  11. Economic Rationality and the Optimization Trap.Nikil Mukerji & Julian Nida-Rümelin - 2015 - St. Gallen Business Review 2015 (1):12-17.
    The theme of this issue of the St. Gallen Business Review is "Harmony". For this reason, we would like to discuss whether two aspects of our life- world are in harmony, namely economic optimization and morality. What is the relation between them? According to a widely shared view, which is one aspect of the doctrine of "mainstream economics", the functioning of an economic system does not require moral behaviour on the part of the individual economic agent. In what follows, we (...)
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  12. Prisoner's Dilemma Doesn't Explain Much.Robert Northcott & Anna Alexandrova - 2015 - In Martin Peterson (ed.), The Prisoner’s Dilemma. Classic philosophical arguments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 64-84.
    We make the case that the Prisoner’s Dilemma, notwithstanding its fame and the quantity of intellectual resources devoted to it, has largely failed to explain any phenomena of social scientific or biological interest. In the heart of the paper we examine in detail a famous purported example of Prisoner’s Dilemma empirical success, namely Axelrod’s analysis of WWI trench warfare, and argue that this success is greatly overstated. Further, we explain why this negative verdict is likely true generally and not just (...)
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  13. Http://Www.Academia.Edu/5681005/HttpYoutu.be_PiCfrt8Sr3I_JOHN_KEATS_AS_A_THINKER_IN_RELATION_TO_CRITICAL_APPRECIATION_OF_HIS_ODE_TO_ANIGHTINGALE.Rituparna Ray Chaudhuri - 2015
    "Romanticism, when attains a fullness of complexity..there occurs of the supernatural unique". http://philpapers.org/profile/112741.
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  14. L'ingranaggio della cooperazione. Teorie dei giochi, cooperazione spontanea e produzione di beni pubblici.Gustavo Cevolani & Roberto Festa - 2014 - In Carlo Lottieri & Daniele Velo Dalbrenta (eds.), La città volontaria. IBL Libri. pp. 23-63.
    A survey of some game-theoretic accounts of the emergence and evolution of spontaneuous cooperation in social and public-good dilemmas.
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  15. The Social Motivation Hypothesis for Prosocial Behavior.M. Nagatsu, M. Salmela & Marion Godman - 2014 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44 (5):563-587.
    Existing economic models of prosociality have been rather silent in terms of proximate psychological mechanisms. We nevertheless identify the psychologically most informed accounts and offer a critical discussion of their hypotheses for the proximate psychological explanations. Based on convergent evidence from several fields of research, we argue that there nevertheless is a more plausible alternative proximate account available: the social motivation hypothesis. The hypothesis represents a more basic explanation of the appeal of prosocial behavior, which is in terms of anticipated (...)
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  16. The Real Reason Why the Prisoner’s Dilemma is Not a Newcomb Problem.Mark Thomas Walker - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (3):841-859.
    It is commonly thought, in line with the position defended in an influential paper by David Lewis, that the decision problems faced in the prisoner’s dilemma and the Newcomb situation are essentially the same problem. José Luis Bermúdez has recently attacked the case Lewis makes for this claim. While I think the claim is false, I contend that Bermúdez’s reason for rejecting Lewis’s argument is inadequate, and then outline what I take to be a better reason for doing so.
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  17. Prisoner's Dilemma and Newcomb's Problem: Why Lewis's Argument Fails.José Luis Bermúdez - 2013 - Analysis 73 (3):423-429.
    According to David Lewis, the prisoner's dilemma (PD) and Newcomb's problem (NP) are really just one dilemma in two different forms (Lewis 1979). Lewis's argument for this conclusion is ingenious and has been widely accepted. However, it is flawed. As this paper shows, the considerations that Lewis brings to bear to show that the game he starts with is an NP equally show that the game is not a PD.
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  18. Social Norms: Repeated Interactions, Punishment, and Context Dependence.Jonathan Grose & Cedric Paternotte - 2013 - Public Reason 5 (1):3-13.
  19. Appendix to Chapter Two: Determinacy in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma.Russell Hardin - 2013 - In Indeterminacy and Society. Princeton University Press. pp. 139-140.
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  20. Equilibria Analysis in Social Dilemma Games with Skinnerian Agents.Ugo Merlone, Daren R. Sandbank & Ferenc Szidarovszky - 2013 - Mind and Society 12 (2):219-233.
    Different disciplines have analyzed binary choices to model collective behavior in human systems. Several situations in which social dilemma arise can be modeled as N-person prisoner’s dilemma games including homeland security, public goods, international political economy among others. The purpose of this study is to develop an analytical solution to the N-person prisoner’s dilemma game when boundedly rational agents interact in a population. Previous studies in the literature consider the case in which cooperators and defectors have the same learning factors. (...)
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  21. Dynamic Contractual Incentives in the Face of a Samaritans’s Dilemma.Josepa Miquel-Florensa - 2013 - Theory and Decision 74 (1):151-166.
    We design a project funding contract that provides optimal incentives to agents, in a setting where both principal and agent enjoy the benefits of the project in a non-rival form once completed but may differ in their valuation. To do so, we study optimal incentive payments in a dynamic principal-agent framework in which the principal cannot observe the agent’s investment, but only completed projects, and faces a Samaritan’s Dilemma: he cannot commit to terminate the contract before completion of the project. (...)
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  22. Heterogeneous Strategy Learning in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.Ruggero Rangoni - 2013 - Etica E Politica 15 (2):42-57.
    Axelrod’s work on the prisoner’s dilemma is one of the most discussed models of social co-operation. While many aspects of his computer simulations have been debated, their evolutionary mechanism has not yet received the same attention. We know people do not differ only in the way they act, but also in how they change their behavior – some may like safe routines, others risk with the new. Yet in formal models cultural evolution is taken to be an homogeneous process, such (...)
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  23. What Niche Did Human Cooperativeness Evolve In?Hannes Rusch - 2013 - Ethics and Politics 15 (2):82-100.
    The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is widely used to model social interaction between unrelated individuals in the study of the evolution of cooperative behaviour in humans and other species. Many effective mechanisms and promotive scenarios have been studied which allow for small founding groups of cooperative individuals to prevail even when all social interaction is characterised as a PD. Here, a brief critical discussion of the role of the PD as the most prominent tool in cooperation research is presented, followed by (...)
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  24. What Niche Did Human Cooperativeness Evolve In?Hannes Rusch - 2013 - Etica E Politica 15 (2):82-100.
    The Prisoner’s Dilemma is widely used to model interaction between unrelated individuals in the study of the evolution of cooperativeness. Many mechanisms have been studied which allow for small founding groups of cooperative individuals to prevail even when all social interaction is characterised as a PD. Here, a brief critical discussion of the role of the PD as the most prominent tool in cooperation research is presented, followed by two new objections to such an exclusive focus on PD-based models. It (...)
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  25. Prisoner's Dilemma Game on Adaptive Networks Under Limited Foresight.Fengjie Xie, Wentian Cui & Jun Lin - 2013 - Complexity 18 (3):38-47.
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  26. Infinity in the Lab. How Do People Play Repeated Games?Lisa Bruttel & Ulrich Kamecke - 2012 - Theory and Decision 72 (2):205-219.
    We introduce a novel mechanism to eliminate endgame effects in repeated prisoner’s dilemma experiments. In the main phase of a supergame our mechanism generates more persistent cooperation than finite horizon or random continuation rules. Moreover, we find evidence for cooperation-enhancing “active/reactive” strategies which concentrate in the initial phase of a supergame as subjects gain experience.
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  27. A Choice for 'Me' or for 'Us'? Using We-Reasoning to Predict Cooperation and Coordination in Games.David J. Butler - 2012 - Theory and Decision 73 (1):53-76.
    Cooperation is the foundation of human social life, but it sometimes requires individuals to choose against their individual self-interest. How then is cooperation sustained? How do we decide when instead to follow our own goals? I develop a model that builds on Bacharach (in: Gold, Sugden (eds) Beyond individual choice: teams and frames in game theory, 2006) ‘circumspect we-reasoning’ to address these questions. The model produces a threshold cost/benefit ratio to describe when we-reasoning players should choose cooperatively. After assumptions regarding (...)
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  28. Giochi di altruismo. L'approccio evoluzionistico alla cooperazione umana.Gustavo Cevolani & Roberto Festa - 2012 - In Matt Ridley (ed.), Le Origini della Virtù. IBL Libri. pp. 7--38.
    This is the introductory essay to the Italian translation of Matt Ridley's "The origins of virtue", surveying the game-theoretic and evolutionary approaches to the emergence and evolution of cooperation and altruism.
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  29. Oyun: A New, Free Program for Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Tournaments in the Classroom.Charles H. Pence & Lara Buchak - 2012 - Evolution Education and Outreach 5 (3):467-476.
    Evolutionary applications of game theory present one of the most pedagogically accessible varieties of genuine, contemporary theoretical biology. We present here Oyun (OY-oon, http://charlespence.net/oyun), a program designed to run iterated prisoner’s dilemma tournaments, competitions between prisoner’s dilemma strategies developed by the students themselves. Using this software, students are able to readily design and tweak their own strategies, and to see how they fare both in round-robin tournaments and in “evolutionary” tournaments, where the scores in a given “generation” directly determine contribution (...)
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  30. Identification in Games: Changing Places.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (2):197-206.
    This paper offers a novel ‘changing places’ account of identification in games, where the consequences of role swapping are crucial. First, it illustrates how such an account is consistent with the view, in classical game theory, that only outcomes (and not pathways) are significant. Second, it argues that this account is superior to the ‘pooled resources’ alternative when it comes to dealing with some situations in which many players identify. Third, it shows how such a ‘changing places’ account can be (...)
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  31. Agent Connectedness and Backward Induction.Christian W. Bach & Conrad Heilmann - 2011 - International Game Theory Review 13 (2):195-208.
    We conceive of a player in dynamic games as a set of agents, which are assigned the distinct tasks of reasoning and node-specific choices. The notion of agent connectedness measuring the sequential stability of a player over time is then modeled in an extended type-based epistemic framework. Moreover, we provide an epistemic foundation for backward induction in terms of agent connectedness. Besides, it is argued that the epistemic independence assumption underlying backward induction is stronger than usually presumed.
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  32. Giochi di anarchia. Beni pubblici, teoria dei giochi e anarco-liberalismo.Gustavo Cevolani & Roberto Festa - 2011 - Nuova Civiltà Delle Macchine 29 (1-2):163-180.
    The paper focuses on Anthony de Jasay's "anarcho-liberalism" as based oon his game-theoretic approach to the problem of public goods provision.
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  33. Hume's Natural History of Justice.Mark Collier - 2011 - In C. Taylor & S. Buckle (eds.), Hume and the Enlightenment. Pickering & Chatto. pp. 131-142.
    In Book III, Part 2 of the Treatise, Hume presents a natural history of justice. Self-interest clearly plays a central role in his account; our ancestors invented justice conventions, he maintains, for the sake of reciprocal advantage. But this is not what makes his approach so novel and attractive. Hume recognizes that prudential considerations are not sufficient to explain how human beings – with our propensities towards temporal discounting and free-riding – could have established conventions for social exchange and collective (...)
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  34. Hobbes and Game Theory Revisited: Zero-Sum Games in the State of Nature.Daniel Eggers - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):193-226.
    The aim of this paper is to critically review the game-theoretic discussion of Hobbes and to develop a game-theoretic interpretation that gives due attention both to Hobbes's distinction between “moderates” and “dominators” and to what actually initiates conflict in the state of nature, namely, the competition for vital goods. As can be shown, Hobbes's state of nature contains differently structured situations of choice, the game-theoretic representation of which requires the prisoner's dilemma and the assurance game and the so-called assurance dilemma. (...)
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  35. Traditionally, I Am Entitled to a Last Meal.Bjørn Jespersen - 2011 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 18 (1):5-13.
    Nunberg maintains that there are cases like “I am traditionally entitled to a last meal”, as uttered by a condemned prisoner facing the firing squad, which suggest that an indexical like ‘I’ does double duty as a vehicle of singular and general reference. I argue against this claim. My position is that the sentence should be factored out into two: “Traditionally, a condemned prisoner is entitled to a last meal” and “I am a condemned prisoner”. Nunberg’s sentence is generated by (...)
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  36. Tragedies Without Commons.Christopher Knapp - 2011 - Public Affairs Quarterly 25 (1):81-94.
    Commons problems are, understandably enough, typically thought to be problems about commons. In this paper, however, I argue that what generates some prominent examples of commons problems is not open access to a good. Instead, what generates some commons problems is a conflict of values that have different structures. After making this case, I show how the existence of such problems can motivate a version of the Precautionary Principle and a (qualified) rejection of cost-benefit analysis.
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  37. Promotion of Cooperation Induced by Appropriate Power-Law Exponent in the Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma Game.Ei Tsukamoto & Susumu Shirayama - 2011 - Transactions of the Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence 26 (1):34-41.
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  38. Perceptron Versus Automaton in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma.Sylvain Béal - 2010 - Theory and Decision 69 (2):183-204.
    We study the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma in which the players are restricted to choosing strategies which are implementable by a machine with a bound on its complexity. One player has to use a finite automaton while the other player has to use a finite perceptron. Some examples illustrate that the sets of strategies which are induced by these two types of machines are different and not ordered by set inclusion. Repeated game payoffs are evaluated according to the limit of (...)
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  39. Institutions Matter! Why the Herder Problem is Not a Prisoner’s Dilemma.Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman - 2010 - Theory and Decision 69 (2):219-231.
    In the game theory literature, Garrett Hardin’s famous allegory of the “tragedy of the commons” has been modeled as a variant of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, labeled the Herder Problem (or, sometimes, the Commons Dilemma). This brief paper argues that important differences in the institutional structures of the standard Prisoner’s Dilemma and Herder Problem render the two games different in kind. Specifically, institutional impediments to communication and cooperation that ensure a dominant strategy of defection in the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma are absent (...)
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  40. Collingridge’s Dilemma and Technoscience.Wolfgang Liebert & Jan C. Schmidt - 2010 - Poiesis and Praxis 7 (1-2):55-71.
    Collingridge’s dilemma is one of the most well-established paradigms presenting a challenge to Technology Assessment (TA). This paper aims to reconstruct the dilemma from an analytic perspective and explicates three assumptions underlying the dilemma: the temporal, knowledge and power/actor assumptions. In the light of the recent transformation of the science, technology and innovation system—in the age of technoscience —these underlying assumptions are called into question. The same result is obtained from a normative angle by Collingridge himself; he criticises the dilemma (...)
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  41. Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Premier Zhao Ziyan.Fang Lizhi - 2010 - Common Knowledge 16 (2):289-289.
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  42. Mentalizing in Games: A Subtractive Behavioral Study of Prisoner's Dilemma.Antonio Napoli & Danilo Fum - 2010 - In S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone (eds.), Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society. pp. 338--343.
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  43. The 1929 Prisoners of War Convention and the Building of the Inter-War Prisoner of War Regime.Neville Wylie - 2010 - In Sibylle Scheipers (ed.), Prisoners in War. Oxford University Press.
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  44. Flunking the Prisoner’s Dilemma.Lawrence Crocker - 2009 - Philosophy Now 75:22-23.
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  45. Sort Out Your Neighbourhood: Public Good Games on Dynamic Networks.Kai P. Spiekermann - 2009 - Synthese 168 (2):273 - 294.
    Axelrod (The evolution of cooperation, 1984) and others explain how cooperation can emerge in repeated 2-person prisoner’s dilemmas. But in public good games with anonymous contributions, we expect a breakdown of cooperation because direct reciprocity fails. However, if agents are situated in a social network determining which agents interact, and if they can influence the network, then cooperation can be a viable strategy. Social networks are modelled as graphs. Agents play public good games with their neighbours. After each game, they (...)
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  46. Keynesianism Constrained.Jim Tomlinson - 2009 - Radical Philosophy 155:6-10.
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  47. Cooperation or Defection Strategies of Conduct in Conflict-Prone Situations.Jan Krawczyk - 2008 - Dialogue and Universalism 18 (4-6):119-125.
    The simple model of conflict-prone situations called Prisoner’s Dilemma is discussed. Whereas the best strategy for the model is to defect, in the case of its iterated version (Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma—IPD) it is possible and more profitable to cooperate with the opponent.The simple strategy called Tit for Tat (TFT) which is easy to recognize, never defects first, punishes every defection but is also forgiving is presented. The TFT strategy is very successful being able to establish the cooperation with its opponents. (...)
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  48. Prisoner's Dilemma.Steven Kuhn - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  49. Why Do People Cooperate as Much as They Do?Jim Woodward - 2008 - In Chrysostomos Mantzavinos (ed.), Philosophy of the Social Sciences: Philosophical Theory and Scientific Practice. Cambridge University Press.
    This paper makes use of recent empirical results, mainly from experimental economics, to expore the conditions under which people will cooperate and to assess competing explantions of this cooperation. It is argued that the evidence supports the claim that people differ in type, with some being conditional cooperators and others being motivated by more or less sophisticated forms of self-interest. Stable cooperation requires, among other things, rules and institutions that protect conditional cooperators from myopically self-interested types. Additional empirical features of (...)
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  50. How to Love the Bomb: Trying to Solve the Prisoner's Dilemma with Evolutionary Game Theory.Vasco Castela - 2007 - In Carlos Gershenson, Diederik Aerts & Bruce Edmonds (eds.), Worldviews, Science, and Us: Philosophy and Complexity. World Scientific. pp. 203.
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