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  1. added 2020-02-11
    Perplexities: Rational Choice, the Prisoner's Dilemma, Metaphor, Poetic Ambiguity, and Other Puzzles.Aaron Snyder - 1992 - Ethics 102 (3):668-671.
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  2. added 2020-02-11
    The Common Life: Ambiguity, Agreement, and the Structure of Morals. Burton Zwiebach.Richard Eldridge - 1989 - Ethics 99 (3):641-642.
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  3. added 2019-06-06
    The Law of Damages and the Prisoners' Dilemma: A Comment on ‘Pure and Utilitarian Prisoners' Dilemmas’: Hamish Stewart.Hamish Stewart - 1997 - Economics and Philosophy 13 (2):231-240.
    Kuhn and Moresi have proposed a useful taxonomy for classifying prisoners' dilemmas. This comment is concerned with K&M's observation that legal penalties for defection can transform PDs into cooperative games, and their argument that the role of the law may vary depending on how the PD is classified by their taxonomy. The purpose of this note is to support K&M's analysis by demonstrating that the law of damages, as understood by economic analysis, already performs the function that K&M assign to (...)
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  4. added 2019-06-06
    The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Prisoners of the Prisoner's Dilemma.Daniel R. Gilbert - 1996 - Business Ethics Quarterly 6 (2):165-178.
    The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a popular device used by researchers to analyze such institutions as business and the modem corporation. This popularity is not deserved under a certain condition that is widespread in college education. If we, as management educators, take seriouslyour parts in preparing our students to participate in the institutions of a democratic society, then the Prisoner’s Dilemma-as clever a rhetoricaldevice as it is-is an unacceptable means to that end. By posing certain questions about the prisoners in the (...)
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  5. added 2019-06-06
    A Multi-Stage Game Model Of Morals By Agreement.Joseph Heath - 1996 - Dialogue 35 (3):529-552.
    If there is one aspect of David Gauthier's program for a contractualist morality that has been most sceptically received, it is his view that instrumentally rational agents would choose to adopt a disposition that would in turn constrain their future choices. Instead of remaining “straightforward maximizers” caught in a suboptimal state of nature, they would become “constrained maximizers” who could avoid prisoner's dilemmas by engaging in conditional co-operation. Apart from the fact that Gauthier's entirely prescriptive orientation leads him to omit (...)
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  6. added 2019-06-06
    Must Constrained Maximizers Be Uncharitable?Jordan Howard Sobel - 1996 - Dialogue 35 (2):241-254.
    By his definition of them, David Gauthier's co-operative constrained maximizers are not necessarily unsharing and disposed to exclude straight maximizers from benefits of their co-operation. Here is Gauthier's full and exact account, his official account, of constrained maximization.
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  7. added 2019-06-06
    No Place to Hide: Campbell's and Danielson's Solutions to Gauthier's Coherence Problem.Paul Viminitz - 1996 - Dialogue 35 (2):235-240.
    In Morals by Agreement, David Gauthier convinced many of us—including Peter Danielson, author of Artificial Morality, the latest successor to MA—that morality can best be understood as a set of intramental, strategic responses to patterns of otherwise dilemmatic, game-theory-reducible interactivity. More particularly, Gauthier and Danielson are of a mind that: characteristic of our interactive circumstances are the Prisoner's Dilemma and its cognates; these are circumstances in which our pre-moral, straightforward maximizing disposition fares considerably worse than “constrained maximization” —the latter being (...)
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  8. added 2019-06-06
    Pure and Utilitarian Prisoner's Dilemmas: Steven T. Kuhn and Serge Moresi.Steven T. Kuhn - 1995 - Economics and Philosophy 11 (2):333-343.
    The prisoner 's dilemma game has acquired large literatures in several disciplines. It is surprising, therefore, that a good definition of the game is hard to find. Typically an author relates a story about captured criminals or military rivals, provides a particular payoff matrix and asserts that the PD is characterized, or illustrated, by that matrix. In the few cases in which characterizing conditions are given, the conditions, and the motivations for them, do not always agree with each other or (...)
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  9. added 2019-06-06
    Internal Prisoner's Dilemma Vindicated: Gregory S. Kavka.Gregory S. Kavka - 1993 - Economics and Philosophy 9 (1):171-174.
  10. added 2019-06-06
    William Poundstone, Prisoner's Dilemma: John von Neumann, Game Theory, and the Puzzle of the Bomb. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. Pp. Xi + 290. ISBN 0-19-286162-X. £7.99. [REVIEW]Geoffrey Tweedale - 1993 - British Journal for the History of Science 26 (3):375-376.
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  11. added 2019-06-06
    Straight Versus Constrained Maximization.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1993 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):25-54.
    David Gauthier stages a competition between two arguments, each of which purports to decide once for all transparent agents which is best, being a straight or being a constrained maximizer. The first argument, which he criticizes and rejects, is for the greater utility, on a certain weak assumption, of straight maximization for all transparent agents. The second, which he endorses, is for the greater utility on the same weak assumption of constrained maximization for all transparent agents.In Section I, Gauthier’s account (...)
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  12. added 2019-06-06
    Are There Internal Prisoner's Dilemmas?: A Comment on Kavka's Article: J. Moreh.J. Moreh - 1993 - Economics and Philosophy 9 (1):165-169.
  13. added 2019-06-06
    Cooperation in the Prisoni.J. V. Howard - 1988 - Theory and Decision 24 (3):203.
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  14. added 2019-06-06
    Constrained Maximization and Resolute Choice*: EDWARD F. McCLENNEN.Edward F. McClennen - 1988 - Social Philosophy and Policy 5 (2):95-118.
    In Morals By Agreement, David Gauthier concludes that under certain conditions it is rational for an agent to be disposed to choose in accordance with a fair cooperative scheme rather than to choose the course of action that maximizes his utility. This is only one of a number of important claims advanced in that book. In particular, he also propounds a distinctive view concerning what counts as a fair cooperative arrangement. The thesis concerning the rationality of adopting a cooperative disposition (...)
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  15. added 2019-06-06
    Gauthier's Theory of Morals by Agreement.Richmond Campbell - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (152):343.
  16. added 2019-06-06
    Morals by Agreement.David Copp - 1986 - Philosophical Review 98 (3):411-414.
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  17. added 2019-06-05
    Team Reasoning and a Measure of Mutual Advantage in Games.Jurgis Karpus & Mantas Radzvilas - 0201 - Economics and Philosophy 34 (1):1-30.
    The game theoretic notion of best-response reasoning is sometimes criticized when its application produces multiple solutions of games, some of which seem less compelling than others. The recent development of the theory of team reasoning addresses this by suggesting that interacting players in games may sometimes reason as members of a team – a group of individuals who act together in the attainment of some common goal. A number of properties have been suggested for team-reasoning decision-makers’ goals to satisfy, but (...)
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  18. added 2019-03-07
    Explaining Universal Social Institutions: A Game-Theoretic Approach.Michael Vlerick - 2016 - Topoi 35 (1):291-300.
    Universal social institutions, such as marriage, commons management and property, have emerged independently in radically different cultures. This requires explanation. As Boyer and Petersen point out ‘in a purely localist framework would have to constitute massively improbable coincidences’ . According to Boyer and Petersen, those institutions emerged naturally out of genetically wired behavioural dispositions, such as marriage out of mating strategies and borders out of territorial behaviour. While I agree with Boyer and Petersen that ‘unnatural’ institutions cannot thrive, this one-sided (...)
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  19. added 2019-01-01
    Hume's Natural History of Justice.Mark Collier - 2011 - In C. Taylor & S. Buckle (eds.), Hume and the Enlightenment. Pickering & Chatto. pp. 131-142.
    In Book III, Part 2 of the Treatise, Hume presents a natural history of justice. Self-interest clearly plays a central role in his account; our ancestors invented justice conventions, he maintains, for the sake of reciprocal advantage. But this is not what makes his approach so novel and attractive. Hume recognizes that prudential considerations are not sufficient to explain how human beings – with our propensities towards temporal discounting and free-riding – could have established conventions for social exchange and collective (...)
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  20. added 2018-12-06
    The Dark Side of the Force: When Computer Simulations Lead Us Astray and ``Model Think'' Narrows Our Imagination.Eckhart Arnold - manuscript
    This paper is intended as a critical examination of the question of when the use of computer simulations is beneficial to scientific explanations. This objective is pursued in two steps: First, I try to establish clear criteria that simulations must meet in order to be explanatory. Basically, a simulation has explanatory power only if it includes all causally relevant factors of a given empirical configuration and if the simulation delivers stable results within the measurement inaccuracies of the input parameters. If (...)
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  21. added 2018-07-27
    Book Note: Danielson, P. Artificial Morality: Virtuous Robots for Virtual Games.Luc Bovens - 1993 - Political Studies 41:719.
  22. added 2018-07-13
    The Tragedy of the Commons as a Voting Game.Luc Bovens - 2015 - In Martin Peterson (ed.), The Prisoner’s Dilemma. Classic philosophical arguments. Cambridge University Press. pp. 156-176.
    The Tragedy of the Commons is often associated with an n-person Prisoner’s Dilemma. But it can also have the structure of an n-person Game of Chicken, an Assurance Game, or of a Voting Games (or a Three-in-a-Boat Game). I present three historical stories that document tragedies of the commons, as presented in Aristotle, Mahanarayan and Hume and argue that the descriptions of these historical cases align better with Voting Games than with any other games.
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  23. added 2018-03-06
    Newcomb's Problem.Arif Ahmed (ed.) - 2018 - Cambridge University Press.
    Newcomb's Problem is a controversial paradox of decision theory. It is easily explained and easily understood, and there is a strong chance that most of us have actually faced it in some form or other. And yet it has proven as thorny and intractable a puzzle as much older and better-known philosophical problems of consciousness, scepticism and fatalism. It brings into very sharp and focused disagreement several long-standing philosophical theories on practical rationality, on the nature of free will, and on (...)
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  24. added 2018-02-17
    Re-Considering the Foole’s Rejoinder: Backward Induction in Indefinitely Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemmas.Magnus Jiborn & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2003 - Synthese 136 (2):135-157.
    According to the so-called “Folk Theorem” for repeated games, stable cooperative relations can be sustained in a Prisoner’s Dilemma if the game is repeated an indefinite number of times. This result depends on the possibility of applying strategies that are based on reciprocity, i.e., strategies that reward cooperation with subsequent cooperation and punish defectionwith subsequent defection. If future interactions are sufficiently important, i.e., if the discount rate is relatively small, each agent may be motivated to cooperate by fear of retaliation (...)
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  25. added 2017-10-21
    Team Reasoning: Theory and Evidence.Jurgis Karpus & Natalie Gold - 2017 - In Julian Kiverstein (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of the Social Mind. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 400-417.
    The chapter reviews recent theoretical and empirical developments concerning the theory of team reasoning in game theoretic interactions.
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  26. added 2017-03-02
    What Niche Did Human Cooperativeness Evolve In?Hannes Rusch - 2013 - Etica E Politica 15 (2):82-100.
    The Prisoner’s Dilemma is widely used to model interaction between unrelated individuals in the study of the evolution of cooperativeness. Many mechanisms have been studied which allow for small founding groups of cooperative individuals to prevail even when all social interaction is characterised as a PD. Here, a brief critical discussion of the role of the PD as the most prominent tool in cooperation research is presented, followed by two new objections to such an exclusive focus on PD-based models. It (...)
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  27. added 2017-02-16
    Aptheker and Myrdal’s Dilemma.Lloyd Brown - 1997 - Nature, Society, and Thought 10 (1-2):111-118.
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  28. added 2017-02-15
    Automata and Inner States for Repeated Games.Karl Sigmund, Maarten Boerlijst & Martin Nowak - 1998 - Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 5:131-139.
    The repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma is often used as a game-theoretic paradigm to analyse the evolution of reciprocity, of mutual aid, and of trade. Conceivably, it can also help in understanding the emergence of inner motivational states, like contrition or outrage, which are essential for fuelling the ethics of communal life. A highly internalised sense of fairness and the readiness for moralistic aggression, the ability to be provoked and the feeling of guilt are important and apparently ubiquituous aspects of human socialisation. (...)
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  29. added 2017-02-14
    How to Love the Bomb: Trying to Solve the Prisoner's Dilemma with Evolutionary Game Theory.Vasco Castela - 2007 - In Carlos Gershenson, Diederik Aerts & Bruce Edmonds (eds.), Worldviews, Science, and Us: Philosophy and Complexity. World Scientific. pp. 203.
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  30. added 2017-02-14
    Digraph Competitions and Cooperation Games.René van den Brink & Peter Borm - 2002 - Theory and Decision 53 (4):327-342.
    Digraph games are cooperative TU-games associated to domination structures which can be modeled by directed graphs. Examples come from sports competitions or from simple majority win digraphs corresponding to preference profiles in social choice theory. The Shapley value, core, marginal vectors and selectope vectors of digraph games are characterized in terms of so-called simple score vectors. A general characterization of the class of TU-games where each selectope vector is a marginal vector is provided in terms of game semi-circuits. Finally, applications (...)
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  31. added 2017-02-14
    The Strategy of Cooperation.Edward McClennen - 2001 - In Christopher W. Morris & Arthur Ripstein (eds.), Practical Rationality and Preference: Essays for David Gauthier. Cambridge University Press. pp. 189--208.
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  32. added 2017-02-14
    God or Nature? The Western Dilemma.Manussos Marangudakis - 1999 - Telos: Critical Theory of the Contemporary 31 (116):119-134.
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  33. added 2017-02-14
    The Small Hospital Dilemma.Mark C. Barabas - 1999 - Jona's Healthcare Law, Ethics, and Regulation 1 (4):5-7.
  34. added 2017-02-14
    Education and the Birth Rate: A Social Dilemma.Richard M. Titmuss - 1940 - The Eugenics Review 32 (2):61.
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  35. added 2017-02-13
    Investigation of Context Effects in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Game.Evgenia Hristova & Maurice Grinberg - 2005 - In B. Kokinov A. Dey (ed.), Modeling and Using Context. Springer. pp. 183--196.
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  36. added 2017-02-13
    The Philosophy in the Dilemma.Chen Xianda - 2002 - Modern Philosophy 1:000.
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  37. added 2017-02-12
    Cooperation and Signaling with Uncertain Social Preferences.John Duffy & Félix Muñoz-García - 2015 - Theory and Decision 78 (1):45-75.
    This paper investigates behavior in finitely repeated simultaneous and sequential-move prisoner’s dilemma games when there is one-sided incomplete information and signaling about players’ concerns for fairness, specifically, their preferences regarding “inequity aversion.” In this environment, we show that only a pooling equilibrium can be sustained, in which a player type who is unconcerned about fairness initially cooperates in order to disguise himself as a player type who is concerned about fairness. This disguising strategy induces the uninformed player to cooperate in (...)
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  38. added 2017-02-12
    Institutions Matter! Why the Herder Problem is Not a Prisoner’s Dilemma.Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman - 2010 - Theory and Decision 69 (2):219-231.
    In the game theory literature, Garrett Hardin’s famous allegory of the “tragedy of the commons” has been modeled as a variant of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, labeled the Herder Problem (or, sometimes, the Commons Dilemma). This brief paper argues that important differences in the institutional structures of the standard Prisoner’s Dilemma and Herder Problem render the two games different in kind. Specifically, institutional impediments to communication and cooperation that ensure a dominant strategy of defection in the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma are absent (...)
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  39. added 2017-02-12
    Keynesianism Constrained.Jim Tomlinson - 2009 - Radical Philosophy 155:6-10.
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  40. added 2017-02-12
    A Philanthropic Foundation at Work: Gunnar Myrdal's American Dilemma and the Carnegie Corporation. [REVIEW]Ellen Condliffe Lagemann - 1987 - Minerva 25 (4):441-470.
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  41. added 2017-02-10
    Dynamic Contractual Incentives in the Face of a Samaritans’s Dilemma.Josepa Miquel-Florensa - 2013 - Theory and Decision 74 (1):151-166.
    We design a project funding contract that provides optimal incentives to agents, in a setting where both principal and agent enjoy the benefits of the project in a non-rival form once completed but may differ in their valuation. To do so, we study optimal incentive payments in a dynamic principal-agent framework in which the principal cannot observe the agent’s investment, but only completed projects, and faces a Samaritan’s Dilemma: he cannot commit to terminate the contract before completion of the project. (...)
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  42. added 2017-02-10
    Effective Choice in the Single-Shot Prisoner's Dilemma Tournament.Doede Nauta & Jeljer Hoekstra - 1995 - Theory and Decision 39 (1):1-30.
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  43. added 2017-02-10
    A Theory of Forward Induction in Finitely Repeated Games.Nabil Al-Najjar - 1995 - Theory and Decision 38 (2):173-193.
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  44. added 2017-02-10
    A Note on the Prisoner's Dilemma.C. L. Sheng - 1994 - Theory and Decision 36 (3):233-246.
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  45. added 2017-02-10
    The Repeated Public Goods Game: A Solution Using Tit-for-Tat and the Lindahl Point.Mark Irving Lichbach - 1992 - Theory and Decision 32 (2):133-146.
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  46. added 2017-02-10
    The Impossibility of a Paretian Loyalist.Peter Gärdenfors & Philip Pettit - 1989 - Theory and Decision 27 (3):207-216.
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  47. added 2017-02-09
    Scandinavia: The Dilemma of the Middle Way.Margaret Schlauch - 1945 - Science and Society 9 (2):97 - 124.
  48. added 2017-02-09
    The Dilemma of Science.Hugh S. Taylor - 1942 - Thought: Fordham University Quarterly 17 (1):182-183.
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  49. added 2017-02-08
    Collingridge’s Dilemma and Technoscience.Wolfgang Liebert & Jan C. Schmidt - 2010 - Poiesis and Praxis 7 (1-2):55-71.
    Collingridge’s dilemma is one of the most well-established paradigms presenting a challenge to Technology Assessment (TA). This paper aims to reconstruct the dilemma from an analytic perspective and explicates three assumptions underlying the dilemma: the temporal, knowledge and power/actor assumptions. In the light of the recent transformation of the science, technology and innovation system—in the age of technoscience —these underlying assumptions are called into question. The same result is obtained from a normative angle by Collingridge himself; he criticises the dilemma (...)
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  50. added 2017-02-08
    The Umpire's Dilemma.Colin Radford - 1985 - Analysis 45 (2):109 - 111.
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