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  1. A Theory of Forward Induction in Finitely Repeated Games.Nabil Al-Najjar - 1995 - Theory and Decision 38 (2):173-193.
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  2. The Co‐Evolution of Cooperation and Complexity in a Multi‐Player, Local‐Interaction Prisoners' Dilemma.Peter S. Albin & Duncan K. Foley - 2001 - Complexity 6 (3):54-63.
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  3. Should Hobbes's State of Nature Be Represented as a Prisoner's Dilemma?Andrew Alexandra - 1992 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):1-16.
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  4. The Dilemma of Science.Rudolf Allers - 1942 - New Scholasticism 16 (1):97-98.
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  5. Environmental Damage and the Puzzle of the Self-Torturer.Chrisoula Andreou - 2006 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 34 (1):95-108.
    I show, building on Warren Quinn's puzzle of the self-torturer, that destructive conduct with respect to the environment can flourish even in the absence of interpersonal conflicts. As Quinn's puzzle makes apparent, in cases where individually negligible effects are involved, an agent, whether it be an individual or a unified collective, can be led down a course of destruction simply as a result of following its informed and perfectly understandable but intransitive preferences. This is relevant with respect to environmental ethics, (...)
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  6. Marinoff on Evolutionarily Stable Strategies.Brad Armendt - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (4):789-793.
    Louis Marinoff [1990] criticizes Axelrod and Hamilton's [1981] use of the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy, and claims to find an inconsistency between their theory for repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games and empirical results. Marinoff seeks to resolve the inconsistency by arguing that Axelrod and Hamilton's model is ill conceived: he purports to prove, contra Axelrod and Hamilton, that no evolutionarily stable strategy exists in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. But his argument is flawed, and moreover, Marinoff gives no good reason (...)
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  7. Agent Connectedness and Backward Induction.Christian W. Bach & Conrad Heilmann - 2011 - International Game Theory Review 13 (2):195-208.
    We conceive of a player in dynamic games as a set of agents, which are assigned the distinct tasks of reasoning and node-specific choices. The notion of agent connectedness measuring the sequential stability of a player over time is then modeled in an extended type-based epistemic framework. Moreover, we provide an epistemic foundation for backward induction in terms of agent connectedness. Besides, it is argued that the epistemic independence assumption underlying backward induction is stronger than usually presumed.
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  8. A Dynamic Game-Theoretic Approach To The Modified Prisoner's Dilemma.Amit Banerjee - 2005 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 13 (5):493-502.
    In this paper a paradox similar to the classical Prisoners' Dilemma paradox is presented and analyzed using the theory of game transformation. This modified version of Prisoner's Dilemma is more paradoxical than the classical one and the process of game transformation, recently introduced in literature, is used to transform an intractable initial game to a solvable final game with a stable equilibrium state, which is also a rational outcome of the game. The transformation takes into account intangibles like uncertainties, risks, (...)
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  9. The Small Hospital Dilemma.Mark C. Barabas - 1999 - Jona's Healthcare Law, Ethics, and Regulation 1 (4):5-7.
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  10. Information and Strategy in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.Kaushik Basu - 1977 - Theory and Decision 8 (3):293.
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  11. Stochastic Interactions Increase Cooperation in a Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma.Andrew W. Bausch - 2016 - Complexity 21 (2):82-92.
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  12. Perceptron Versus Automaton in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma.Sylvain Béal - 2010 - Theory and Decision 69 (2):183-204.
    We study the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma in which the players are restricted to choosing strategies which are implementable by a machine with a bound on its complexity. One player has to use a finite automaton while the other player has to use a finite perceptron. Some examples illustrate that the sets of strategies which are induced by these two types of machines are different and not ordered by set inclusion. Repeated game payoffs are evaluated according to the limit of (...)
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  13. Indefinitely Repeated Games: A Response to Carroll.Neal C. Becker & Ann E. Cudd - 1990 - Theory and Decision 28 (2):189-195.
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  14. Prisoner's Dilemma and Newcomb's Problem: Why Lewis's Argument Fails.José Luis Bermúdez - 2013 - Analysis 73 (3):423-429.
    According to David Lewis, the prisoner's dilemma (PD) and Newcomb's problem (NP) are really just one dilemma in two different forms (Lewis 1979). Lewis's argument for this conclusion is ingenious and has been widely accepted. However, it is flawed. As this paper shows, the considerations that Lewis brings to bear to show that the game he starts with is an NP equally show that the game is not a PD.
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  15. Symmetry Arguments for Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma.Cristina Bicchieri & Mitchell S. Green - 1999 - In Cristina Bicchieri, Richard C. Jeffrey & Brian Skyrms (eds.), The Logic of Strategy. Oxford University Press. pp. 175.
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  16. The Prisoner's Dilemma and Mutual Trust: Comment.Robert L. Birmingham - 1969 - Ethics 79 (2):156-158.
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  17. Perplexities: Rational Choice, the Prisoner's Dilemma, Metaphor, Poetic Ambiguity, and Other Puzzles.Max Black - 1990 - Cornell University Press.
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  18. The « Prisoner's Dilemma » and the Limits of Rationality.Max Black - 1978 - International Studies in Philosophy 10:7-22.
  19. The Backward Induction Argument for the Finite Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma and the Surprise Exam Paradox.L. Bovens - 1997 - Analysis 57 (3):179-186.
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  20. The Backward Induction Argument for the Finite Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Surprise Exam Paradox.Luc Bovens - 1997 - Analysis 57 (3):179–186.
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  21. Evolutionary Dynamics of the Continuous Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.Rob Boyd - manuscript
    The iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) has been widely used in the biological and social sciences to model dyadic cooperation. While most of this work has focused on the discrete prisoner’s dilemma, in which actors choose between cooperation and defection, there has been some analysis of the continuous IPD, in which actors can choose any level of cooperation from zero to one. Here, we analyse a model of the continuous IPD with a limited strategy set, and show that a generous strategy (...)
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  22. Recenzentova Dilema. Etika Znanstvenih Zajednica I Teorija Igara: The Referee’s Dilemma. The Ethics of Scientific Communities and Game Theory.Tomislav Bracanović - 2002 - Prolegomena 1 (1):55-74.
    This article argues that various deviations from the basic principles of the scientific ethos – primarily the appearance of pseudoscience in scientific communities – can be formulated and explained using specific modelsof game theory, such as the prisoner’s dilemma and the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. The article indirectly tackles the deontology of scientific work as well, in which it is assumed that there is no room for moral skepticism, let alone moral anti-realism, in the ethics of scientific communities. Namely, on the (...)
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  23. The Referee's Dilemma. The Ethics of Scientific Communities and Game Theory.Tomislav Bracanovic - 2002 - Prolegomena 1 (1):55-74.
    This article argues that various deviations from the basic principles of the scientific ethos – primarily the appearance of pseudoscience in scientific communities – can be formulated and explained using specific models of game theory, such as the prisoner’s dilemma and the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. The article indirectly tackles the deontology of scientific work as well, in which it is assumed that there is no room for moral skepticism, let alone moral anti-realism, in the ethics of scientific communities. Namely, on (...)
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  24. Avoiding the Prisoner's Dilemma? Reply to Hurley.Ingar Brinck - unknown
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  25. Digraph Competitions and Cooperation Games.Brink René van den & Borm Peter - 2002 - Theory and Decision 53 (4):327-342.
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  26. Aptheker and Myrdal’s Dilemma.Lloyd Brown - 1997 - Nature, Society, and Thought 10 (1-2):111-118.
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  27. Infinity in the Lab. How Do People Play Repeated Games?Lisa Bruttel & Ulrich Kamecke - 2012 - Theory and Decision 72 (2):205-219.
    We introduce a novel mechanism to eliminate endgame effects in repeated prisoner’s dilemma experiments. In the main phase of a supergame our mechanism generates more persistent cooperation than finite horizon or random continuation rules. Moreover, we find evidence for cooperation-enhancing “active/reactive” strategies which concentrate in the initial phase of a supergame as subjects gain experience.
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  28. Prisoner.Marilyn Buck - forthcoming - Feminist Studies.
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  29. The Novel and the World's Dilemma.Edwin Berry Burgum - 1950 - Science and Society 14 (3):282-284.
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  30. A Choice for 'Me' or for 'Us'? Using We-Reasoning to Predict Cooperation and Coordination in Games.David J. Butler - 2012 - Theory and Decision 73 (1):53-76.
    Cooperation is the foundation of human social life, but it sometimes requires individuals to choose against their individual self-interest. How then is cooperation sustained? How do we decide when instead to follow our own goals? I develop a model that builds on Bacharach (in: Gold, Sugden (eds) Beyond individual choice: teams and frames in game theory, 2006) ‘circumspect we-reasoning’ to address these questions. The model produces a threshold cost/benefit ratio to describe when we-reasoning players should choose cooperatively. After assumptions regarding (...)
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  31. The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Symmetry Argument for Cooperation.Randall K. Campbell - 1989 - Analysis 49 (2):60 - 65.
    Several philosophers have discussed informal versions of a "symmetry argument" that seems to show that two rational maximizers will cooperate when they are in a prisoner's dilemma. I present a more precise version of that argument and I argue that it is valid only if some crucial statements are misinterpreted as material conditionals instead of being interpreted correctly as subjunctive conditionals.
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  32. Review: Gauthier's Theory of Morals by Agreement. [REVIEW]Richmond Campbell - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (152):343 - 364.
  33. Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation: Prisoner's Dilemma and Newcomb's Problem.Richmond Campbell & Lanning Snowden (eds.) - 1985 - University of British Columbia Press.
    1 Background for the Uninitiated RICHMOND CAMPBELL Paradoxes are intrinsically fascinating. They are also distinctively ...
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  34. Decision-Theoretic Finitely Iterated Prisoner's Dilemmas.J. W. Carroll - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):249-256.
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  35. The Backward Induction Argument.John W. Carroll - 2000 - Theory and Decision 48 (1):61-84.
    The backward induction argument purports to show that rational and suitably informed players will defect throughout a finite sequence of prisoner's dilemmas. It is supposed to be a useful argument for predicting how rational players will behave in a variety of interesting decision situations. Here, I lay out a set of assumptions defining a class of finite sequences of prisoner's dilemmas. Given these assumptions, I suggest how it might appear that backward induction succeeds and why it is actually fallacious. Then, (...)
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  36. Decision-Theoretic Finitely Iterated Prisoner's Dilemmas.John W. Carroll - 1999 - Analysis 59 (264):249–256.
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  37. Iterated N-Player Prisoner's Dilemma Games.John W. Carroll - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 53 (3):411 - 415.
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  38. Indefinite Terminating Points and the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.John W. Carroll - 1987 - Theory and Decision 22 (3):247-256.
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  39. How to Love the Bomb: Trying to Solve the Prisoner's Dilemma with Evolutionary Game Theory.Vasco Castela - 2007 - In Carlos Gershenson, Diederik Aerts & Bruce Edmonds (eds.), Worldviews, Science, and Us: Philosophy and Complexity. World Scientific. pp. 203.
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  40. L'€™ingranaggio della cooperazione. Teorie dei giochi, cooperazione spontanea e produzione di beni pubblici.Gustavo Cevolani & Roberto Festa - forthcoming - In Carlo Lottieri & Daniele Velo Dalbrenta (eds.), La città volontaria. IBL Libri.
    A survey of some game-theoretic accounts of the emergence and evolution of spontaneuous cooperation in social and public-good dilemmas.
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  41. Giochi di altruismo. L'approccio evoluzionistico alla cooperazione umana.Gustavo Cevolani & Roberto Festa - 2012 - In Matt Ridley (ed.), Le Origini della Virtù. IBL Libri. pp. 7--38.
    This is the introductory essay to the Italian translation of Matt Ridley's "The origins of virtue", surveying the game-theoretic and evolutionary approaches to the emergence and evolution of cooperation and altruism.
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  42. Giochi di anarchia. Beni pubblici, teoria dei giochi e anarco-liberalismo.Gustavo Cevolani & Roberto Festa - 2011 - Nuova Civiltà Delle Macchine 29 (1-2):163-180.
    The paper focuses on Anthony de Jasay's "anarcho-liberalism" as based oon his game-theoretic approach to the problem of public goods provision.
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  43. Game Relativity: How Context Influences Strategic Decision Making.Nick Chater - unknown
    Existing models of strategic decision making typically assume that only the attributes of the currently played game need be considered when reaching a decision. The results presented in this article demonstrate that the so-called “cooperativeness” of the previously played prisoner’s dilemma games influence choices and predictions in the current prisoner’s dilemma game, which suggests that games are not considered independently. These effects involved reinforcement-based assimilation to the previous choices and also a perceptual contrast of the present game with preceding games, (...)
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  44. Prisoner of Mao.Alvin P. Cohen, Bao Ruo-Wang & Rudolph Chelminski - 1977 - Journal of the American Oriental Society 97 (3):410.
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  45. Institutions Matter! Why the Herder Problem is Not a Prisoner's Dilemma.Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman - 2010 - Theory and Decision 69 (2):219-231.
    In the game theory literature, Garrett Hardin’s famous allegory of the “tragedy of the commons” has been modeled as a variant of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, labeled the Herder Problem (or, sometimes, the Commons Dilemma). This brief paper argues that important differences in the institutional structures of the standard Prisoner’s Dilemma and Herder Problem render the two games different in kind. Specifically, institutional impediments to communication and cooperation that ensure a dominant strategy of defection in the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma are absent (...)
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  46. CAMPBELL, R. And SOWDEN, L. : "Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation: Prisoner's Dilemma and Newcomb's Problem". [REVIEW]J. Collins - 1987 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65:353.
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  47. From Morals by Agreement.Vi Compliance & Maximization Constrained - 1997 - In Stephen L. Darwall (ed.), Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches. Oxford University Press. pp. 341.
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  48. Review of David Gauthier's Morals By Agreement. [REVIEW]David Copp - 1989 - Philosophical Review 98 (3):411-414.
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  49. Morals by Agreement.David Copp & David Gauthier - 1989 - Philosophical Review 98 (3):411.
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  50. Flunking the Prisoner's Dilemma.Lawrence Crocker - 2009 - Philosophy Now 75:22-23.
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