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  1. added 2019-06-06
    Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World. [REVIEW]Jonathan Schaffer - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (4):869-874.
    This is an excellent anthology. The contributors are first-rate, the contributions are state-of-the-art, and the content is highly unified. The introduction further connects the essays and succinctly articulates the main themes. What results will be of interest to anyone interested in the contemporary discussion of causation.
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  2. added 2019-06-06
    Cartwright on Probabilistic Causality: Types, Tokens, and Capacities.Ellery Eells - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):169-175.
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  3. added 2019-06-06
    An Analysis of Probabilistic Causation in Dichotomous Structures.Frederick S. Elett & David P. Ericson - 1986 - Synthese 67 (2):175-193.
    During the past decades several philosophers of science and social scientists have been interested in the problems of causation. Recently attention has been given to probabilistic causation in dichotomous causal systems. The paper uses the basic features of probabilistic causation to argue that the causal modeling approaches developed by such researchers as Blalock and Duncan can provide, when an additional assumption is added, adequate qualitative measures of one variableś causal influence upon another. Finally, some of the difficulties and issues involved (...)
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  4. added 2019-05-05
    Causal Concepts and Temporal Ordering.Reuben Stern - forthcoming - Synthese:1-23.
    Though common sense says that causes must temporally precede their effects, the hugely influential interventionist account of causation makes no reference to temporal precedence. Does common sense lead us astray? In this paper, I evaluate the power of the commonsense assumption from within the interventionist approach to causal modeling. I first argue that if causes temporally precede their effects, then one need not consider the outcomes of interventions in order to infer causal relevance, and that one can instead use temporal (...)
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  5. added 2019-05-03
    Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance.Henry Margenau - 1950 - Review of Metaphysics 4 (1):129-130.
    A definition of causality, somewhat general but clear, is given early in the book. Two ideas which in the popular use of the term "cause" are often intermingled and hidden from view, are exhibited and distinguished; they are antecedence and contiguity. Born's definition of causality is sufficiently wide to include both of them.
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  6. added 2019-04-06
    Causation, Probability, and the Continuity Bind.Anthony F. Peressini - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axw030.
    Analyses of singular (token-level) causation often make use of the idea that a cause increases the probability of its effect. Of particular salience in such accounts are the values of the probability function of the effect, conditional on the presence and absence of the putative cause, analysed around the times of the events in question: causes are characterized by the effect’s probability function being greater when conditionalized upon them. Put this way, it becomes clearer that the ‘behaviour’ (continuity) of probability (...)
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  7. added 2019-02-11
    Separate- Versus Common -Common-Cause-Type Derivations of the Bell Inequalities.Gábor Hofer-Szabó - 2008 - Synthese 163 (2):199 - 215.
    Standard derivations of the Bell inequalities assume a common common cause system that is a common screener-off for all correlations and some additional assumptions concerning locality and no-conspiracy. In a recent paper (Grasshoff et al., 2005) Bell inequalities have been derived via separate common causes assuming perfect correlations between the events. In the paper it will be shown that the assumptions of this separate-common-cause-type derivation of the Bell inequalities in the case of perfect correlations can be reduced to the assumptions (...)
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  8. added 2019-02-11
    Reichenbachian Common Cause Systems of Arbitrary Finite Size Exist.Gábor Hofer-Szabó & Miklós Rédei - 2006 - Foundations of Physics 36 (5):745-756.
    A partition $\{C_i\}_{i\in I}$ of a Boolean algebra Ω in a probability measure space (Ω, p) is called a Reichenbachian common cause system for the correlation between a pair A,B of events in Ω if any two elements in the partition behave like a Reichenbachian common cause and its complement; the cardinality of the index set I is called the size of the common cause system. It is shown that given any non-strict correlation in (Ω, p), and given any finite (...)
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  9. added 2019-02-10
    Do Reichenbachian Common Cause Systems of Arbitrary Finite Size Exist?Claudio Mazzola & Peter W. Evans - 2017 - Foundations of Physics 47 (12):1543-1558.
    The principle of common cause asserts that positive correlations between causally unrelated events ought to be explained through the action of some shared causal factors. Reichenbachian common cause systems are probabilistic structures aimed at accounting for cases where correlations of the aforesaid sort cannot be explained through the action of a single common cause. The existence of Reichenbachian common cause systems of arbitrary finite size for each pair of non-causally correlated events was allegedly demonstrated by Hofer-Szabó and Rédei in 2006. (...)
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  10. added 2019-02-10
    Non-Local Common Cause Explanations for EPR.Matthias Egg & Michael Esfeld - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4 (2):181-196.
    The paper argues that a causal explanation of the correlated outcomes of EPR-type experiments is desirable and possible. It shows how Bohmian mechanics and the GRW mass density theory offer such an explanation in terms of a non-local common cause.
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  11. added 2019-02-10
    Correlations, Deviations and Expectations: The Extended Principle of the Common Cause.Claudio Mazzola - 2013 - Synthese 190 (14):2853-2866.
    The Principle of the Common Cause is usually understood to provide causal explanations for probabilistic correlations obtaining between causally unrelated events. In this study, an extended interpretation of the principle is proposed, according to which common causes should be invoked to explain positive correlations whose values depart from the ones that one would expect to obtain in accordance to her probabilistic expectations. In addition, a probabilistic model for common causes is tailored which satisfies the generalized version of the principle, at (...)
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  12. added 2019-02-10
    Only Countable Reichenbachian Common Cause Systems Exist.Leszek Wroński & Michał Marczyk - 2010 - Foundations of Physics 40 (8):1155-1160.
    In this paper we give a positive answer to a problem posed by Hofer-Szabó and Rédei (Int. J. Theor. Phys. 43:1819–1826, 2004) regarding the existence of infinite Reichenbachian common cause systems (RCCSs). An example of a countably infinite RCCS is presented. It is also determined that no RCCSs of greater cardinality exist.
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  13. added 2019-02-10
    Reichenbach’s Common Cause Principle and Indeterminism: A Review.Iñaki San Pedro & Mauricio Suárez - 2009 - In José Luis González Recio (ed.), Philosophical Essays on Physics and Biology. Georg Olms Verlag. pp. 223-250.
    We offer a review of some of the most influential views on the status of Reichenbach’s Principle of the Common Cause (RPCC) for genuinely indeterministic systems. We first argue that the RPCC is properly a conjunction of two distinct claims, one metaphysical and another methodological. Both claims can and have been contested in the literature, but here we simply assume that the metaphysical claim is correct, in order to focus our analysis on the status of the methodological claim. We briefly (...)
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  14. added 2019-02-10
    Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle.Frank Arntzenius - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Suppose that two geysers, about one mile apart, erupt at irregular intervals, but usually erupt almost exactly at the same time. One would suspect that they come from a common source, or at least that there is a common cause of their eruptions. And this common cause surely acts before both eruptions take place. This idea, that simultaneous correlated events must have prior common causes, was first made precise by Hans Reichenbach (Reichenbach 1956). It can be used to infer the (...)
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  15. added 2019-02-10
    The Limits of Common Cause Approach to EPR Correlation.Katsuaki Higashi - 2008 - Foundations of Physics 38 (7):591-609.
    It is often argued that no local common cause models of EPR correlation exist. However, Szabó and Rédei pointed out that such arguments have the tacit assumption that plural correlations have the same common causes. Furthermore, Szabó showed that for EPR correlation a local common cause model in his sense exists. One of his requirements is that common cause events are statistically independent of apparatus settings on each side. However, as Szabó knows, to meet this requirement does not entail that (...)
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  16. added 2019-02-10
    Venetian Sea Levels, British Bread Prices, and the Principle of the Common Cause.Elliott Sober - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (2):331-346.
    When two causally independent processes each have a quantity that increases monotonically (either deterministically or in probabilistic expectation), the two quantities will be correlated, thus providing a counterexample to Reichenbach's principle of the common cause. Several philosophers have denied this, but I argue that their efforts to save the principle are unsuccessful. Still, one salvage attempt does suggest a weaker principle that avoids the initial counterexample. However, even this weakened principle is mistaken, as can be seen by exploring the concepts (...)
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  17. added 2019-02-10
    The Common Cause Principle.Frank Arntzenius - 1992 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:227 - 237.
    The common cause principle states that correlations have prior common causes which screen off those correlations. I argue that the common cause principle is false in many circumstances, some of which are very general. I then suggest that more restricted versions of the common cause principle might hold, and I prove such a restricted version.
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  18. added 2019-01-30
    Indeterministic Causation and Two Patches for the Pairing Argument.Bradford Saad - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (4):664-682.
    The pairing argument aims to demonstrate the impossibility of non-spatial objects (including minds) standing in causal relations. Its chief premises are (roughly) that causation requires pairing relations between causes and effects and that pairing relations require spatial relations. Critics have argued that the first claim suffers from counterexamples involving indeterministic causation. After briefly rehearsing the pairing argument and the objection from indeterministic causation, I offer two ways of revising the pairing argument to meet the objection from indeterministic causation.
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  19. added 2019-01-30
    An Inchoate Universe: James's Probabilistic Underdeterminism.Kyle Bromhall - 2018 - William James Studies 14 (1):54-83.
    In this paper, I challenge the traditional narrative that William James’s arguments against determinism were primarily motivated by his personal struggles with depression. I argue that James presents an alternative argument against determinism that is motivated by his commitment to sound scientific practice. James argues that determinism illegitimately extrapolates from observations of past events to predictions about future events without acknowledging the distinct metaphysical difference between them. This occupation with futurity suggests that James’s true target is better understood as logical (...)
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  20. added 2019-01-30
    Probability and Causality in the Early Works of Hans Reichenbach.Flavia Padovani - 2008 - Dissertation, University of Geneva
  21. added 2018-05-28
    Causal Overdetermination: Still Crazy After All These Years. Part I: What Is at Stake?Tuomas K. Pernu - 2018 - Philosophical Forum 49 (2):231-244.
    Causal overdetermination occupies an uncomfortable place within all the major theories of causation. A natural solution to the problems it gives rise to would be to resolve overdetermination into preemption or joint causation. However, such a solution would seem to lead to individuate events in a fragile manner. The issue of such modal fragility is addressed and it is argued that events designated as effects are always fragile in a natural way and the putative problems of adopting modal fragility can (...)
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  22. added 2018-02-16
    Natural-Born Determinists: A New Defense of Causation as Probability-Raising.Robert Northcott - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (1):1-20.
    A definition of causation as probability-raising is threatened by two kinds of counterexample: first, when a cause lowers the probability of its effect; and second, when the probability of an effect is raised by a non-cause. In this paper, I present an account that deals successfully with problem cases of both these kinds. In doing so, I also explore some novel implications of incorporating into the metaphysical investigation considerations of causal psychology.
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  23. added 2017-09-28
    Causes, Chances, and Degrees of Effectiveness: Reply to Mellor.P. Mackie - 2000 - Analysis 60 (4):359-363.
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  24. added 2017-09-28
    Mellor on Causes, Chances and Degrees of Effectiveness.P. Mackie - 2000 - Analysis 60 (1):63-71.
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  25. added 2017-09-21
    Review: Causation, Probability, and Chance. [REVIEW]Paul Noordhof - 1998 - Mind 107 (428):855 - 875.
  26. added 2017-09-20
    James H. Fetzer, Ed., Probability and Causality: Essays in Honor of Wesley C. Salmon Reviewed By.Patrick Maher - 1988 - Philosophy in Review 8 (10):390-393.
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  27. added 2017-09-19
    The Principle of the Common Cause, the Causal Markov Condition, and Quantum Mechanics: Comments on Cartwright.Iain Martel - 2008 - In Luc Bovens, Carl Hoefer & Stephan Hartmann (eds.), Nancy Cartwright’s Philosophy of Science. Routledge. pp. 242-262.
    Nancy Cartwright believes that we live in a Dappled World– a world in which theories, principles, and methods applicable in one domain may be inapplicable in others; in which there are no universal principles. One of the targets of Cartwright’s arguments for this conclusion is the Causal Markov condition, a condition which has been proposed as a universal condition on causal structures.1 The Causal Markov condition, Cartwright argues, is applicable only in a limited domain of special cases, and thus cannot (...)
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  28. added 2017-09-18
    Causal Contribution.Alex Kaiserman - 2016 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (3):387-394.
    Are there ‘degrees of causation’? Yes and no: causation is not a scalar relation, but different causes can contribute to a causing of an effect to different extents. In this paper, I motivate a probabilistic analysis of an event’s degree of contribution to a causing of an effect and explore some of its consequences.
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  29. added 2017-09-11
    Imprecise Probability and Chance.Anthony Peressini - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (3):561-586.
    Understanding probabilities as something other than point values has often been motivated by the need to find more realistic models for degree of belief, and in particular the idea that degree of belief should have an objective basis in “statistical knowledge of the world.” I offer here another motivation growing out of efforts to understand how chance evolves as a function of time. If the world is “chancy” in that there are non-trivial, objective, physical probabilities at the macro-level, then the (...)
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  30. added 2017-09-06
    Path-Specific Effects.Naftali Weinberger - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (1):53-76.
    A cause may influence its effect via multiple paths. Paradigmatically (Hesslow [1974]), taking birth control pills both decreases one’s risk of thrombosis by preventing pregnancy and increases it by producing a blood chemical. Building on Pearl ([2001]), I explicate the notion of a path-specific effect. Roughly, a path-specific effect of C on E via path P is the degree to which a change in C would change E were they to be transmitted only via P. Facts about such effects may (...)
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  31. added 2017-06-07
    Probabilistic Causality, Randomization and Mixtures.Jan von Plato - 1986 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:432-437.
    A formulation of probabilistic causality is given in terms of the theory of abstract dynamical systems. Causal factors are identified as invariants of motion of a system. Repetition of an experiment leads to the notion of stationarity, and causal factors yield a decomposition of the stationary probability law of the experiment into ergodic components. In these, statistical behaviour is uniform. Control of identified causal factors leads to a corresponding statistical law for the events, which is offered as a notion of (...)
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  32. added 2017-03-31
    Probabilistic Causality.Wesley C. Salmon - 1980 - In Michael Tooley (ed.), Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. Oxford Up. pp. 137-153.
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  33. added 2017-03-29
    Mellor's Facts and Chances of Causation.G. Rodriguez-Pereyra - 1998 - Analysis 58 (3):175-181.
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  34. added 2017-03-29
    Probabilistic Causality, Explanation, and Detection.Ben Rogers - 1981 - Synthese 48 (2):201 - 223.
  35. added 2017-03-15
    Causation, Probability, and Chance. [REVIEW]Paul Noordhof - 1998 - Mind 107 (428):855-875.
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  36. added 2017-03-15
    Probability and Causality.Richard Edward Otte - 1982 - Dissertation, The University of Arizona
    Probability and Causality is a critical analysis of the problem of causality in indeterministic contexts. Most philosophers who have written about probabilistic causality feel that Hume's requirement of constant conjunction should be replaced by a requirement of positive statistical relevance. After arguing that a theory of probabilistic causality is necessary to account for many causal relations, Hume's theory of probabilistic causality is analyzed. Although Hume's theory is inadequate, it does form the basis for later discussions of probabilistic causality. ;The first (...)
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  37. added 2017-02-27
    Causal Comparability, Causal Generalizations, and Epistemic Homogeneity.Rosa W. Runhardt - 2017 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (3):183-208.
    The issue of causal comparability in the social sciences underlies matters of both generalization and extrapolation. After critiquing two existing interpretations of comparability, due to Hitchcock and Hausman, I propose a distinction between ontological and epistemic comparability. While the former refers to whether two cases are actually comparable, the latter respects that in cases of incomplete information, we need to rely on whatever evidence we have of comparability. I argue, using a political science case study, that in those cases of (...)
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  38. added 2017-02-26
    Metaphysics and Conceptual Analysis: Lewis on Indeterministic Causation.Michael McDermott - 1997 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (3):396 – 403.
    Lewis considers (Postscript B to 'Causation') the objection that what he calls a plain case of probabilistic causation is really a probable case of plain causation. He replies that the objection rests on the false metaphysical assumption that counterfactuals whose consequents are about events (rather than chances) can be true under indeterminism. The present note argues that this is the wrong kind of reply, because metaphysics is never relevant to conceptual analysis.
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  39. added 2017-02-26
    Chancy Causation.D. K. Lewis - 1986 - Philosophical Papers 2:175-184.
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  40. added 2017-02-26
    Probabilistic Causal Processes.Jonathan Richard Katz - 1983 - Dissertation, The University of British Columbia (Canada)
    Many theorists take causality to be the heart of scientific explanation. If we couple this view with the idea, again common enough, that causes are something like sufficient conditions for their effects, then we have raised a difficulty for any theory of scientific explanation that admits "final" statistical explanations, for a statistical explanation must allow that factors relevant to an event to be explained not determine that event, but only make it probable to some degree . If we do not (...)
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  41. added 2017-02-24
    Cartwright, Capacities, and Probabilities.Gurol Irzik - 1992 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:239 - 250.
    I argue that Nancy Cartwright's largely methodological arguments for capacities and against Hume's regularity account of causation are only partially successful. They are especially problematic in establishing the primacy of singular causation and the reality of mixed-dual capacities. Therefore, her arguments need to be supported by ontological ones, and I propose the propensity interpretation of causal probabilities as a natural way of doing this.
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  42. added 2017-02-23
    Probabilistic Causality: In Defense of the Unanimity Theory.Joonsung Kim - 2002 - Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison
    My dissertation defends the theory of probabilistic causation called "the unanimity theory" against three challenges, which I call "the metaphysical challenge", "the conceptual challenge" and "the methodological challenge". I argue that the unanimity theory meets these three challenges, and coheres with each of the three theories of probabilistic causation that have been naturally inspired by the three challenges. I conclude that the unanimity theory constitutes a foundation of the three theories, which in fact reveals the versatility of the unanimity theory. (...)
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  43. added 2017-02-23
    Probabilistic Explanations.James H. Fetzer - 1982 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:194-207.
    The purpose of this paper is to provide a systematic defense of the single-case propensity account of probabilistic explanation from the criticisms advanced by Hanna and by Humphreys and to offer a critical appraisal of the aleatory conception advanced by Humphreys and of the deductive-nomological-probabilistic approach Railton has proposed. The principal conclusion supported by this analysis is that the Requirements of Maximal Specificity and of Strict Maximal Specificity afford the foundation for completely objective explanations of probabilistic explananda, so long as (...)
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  44. added 2017-02-22
    Probabilistic Causality and Causal Generalizations.Daniel M. Hausman - 2010 - In Ellery Eells & James H. Fetzer (eds.), The Place of Probability in Science. Springer. pp. 47--63.
  45. added 2017-02-22
    The Explanatory Virtues of Probabilistic Causal Laws.Henrik Hallsten - 2005 - In Jan Faye, Paul Needham, Uwe Scheffler & Max Urchs (eds.), Nature's Principles. Springer. pp. 137--150.
  46. added 2017-02-22
    Deterministic Causation of Probabilities.Daniel M. Hausman - 1998 - Communication and Cognition. Monographies 31 (4):365-390.
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  47. added 2017-02-22
    Probabilistic Causation in Scientific Explanation.Christopher Read Hitchcock - 1993 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    Salmon has argued that science provides explanations by describing a causal nexus: For Salmon, this nexus is a network of processes and interactions. I argue that this picture of the causal nexus is insufficient for an account of scientific explanation: a taxonomy of causal relevance is also needed. ;Probabilistic theories of causation seem to provide such a taxonomy in their dichotomy between promoting and inhibiting causes. However, standard probabilistic theories are beset by a difficulty called the problem of disjunctive factors. (...)
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  48. added 2017-02-22
    Probabilistic Explanation and Probabilistic Causality.Joseph F. Hanna - 1982 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:181 - 193.
    This paper argues that if the world is irreducibly stochastic, then both Salmon's S-R model of explanation and Fetzer's C-R model of explanation have the following undesirable consequence: the objective probability (associated with the model's relevance condition) of any actual macro-event is either undefined or else, if defined, it equals one--so that the event is not even a candidate for a probabilistic explanation. This result follows from the temporal ambiguity of ontic probability in an irreducibly stochastic world. It is argued (...)
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  49. added 2016-12-21
    Probabilistic Measures of Causal Strength.Branden Fitelson & Christopher Hitchcock - 2011 - In Phyllis McKay Illari Federica Russo (ed.), Causality in the Sciences. Oxford University Press. pp. 600--627.
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  50. added 2016-12-18
    Cartwright's Models Are Not Adequate for EPR.Jacek Cachro & Tomasz Placek - 2003 - In A. Rojszczak, J. Cachro & G. Kurczewski (eds.), Philosophical Dimensions of Logic and Science. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 213--231.
    We assess Cartwright's models for probabilistic causality, and in particular, her models for EPR-like experiments of quantum mechanics. We show that her models for the EPR are mathematically incorrect and physically implausible. Finally, we argue that her models are not adequate for EPR-phenomena, since they ignore modal and spatiotemporal aspects inherent in their setup.
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