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  1. Analysing Chancy Causation Without Appeal to Chance-Raising.Stephen Barker - 2004 - In Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World. Routledge.
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  2. Do Causes Raise the Chances of Effects?H. Beebee - 1998 - Analysis 58 (3):182-190.
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  3. Chance-Changing Causal Processes.Helen Beebee - 2004 - In Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World. Routledge.
    Scepticism concerning the idea of causation being linked to contingent chance-raising is articulated in Beebee’s challenging chapter. She suggests that none of these approaches will avoid the consequence that spraying defoliant on a weed is a cause of the weed’s subsequent health. We will always be able to abstract away enough of the healthy plant processes so all that’s left is the causal chain involving defoliation and health. In those circumstances, there will be contingent chance-raising. Beebee’s conclusion is that we (...)
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  4. Do Causes Raise the Chances of Effects?Helen Beebee - 1998 - Analysis 58 (3):182–190.
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  5. Taking Hindrance Seriously.Helen Beebee - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 88 (1):59-79.
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  6. Concerning a Probabilistic Theory of Causation Adequate for the Causal Theory of Time.Philip Bretzel - 1977 - Synthese 35 (2):173-190.
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  7. Cartwright's Models Are Not Adequate for EPR.Jacek Cachro & Tomasz Placek - 2003 - In A. Rojszczak, J. Cachro & G. Kurczewski (eds.), Philosophical Dimensions of Logic and Science. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 213--231.
    We assess Cartwright's models for probabilistic causality, and in particular, her models for EPR-like experiments of quantum mechanics. We show that her models for the EPR are mathematically incorrect and physically implausible. Finally, we argue that her models are not adequate for EPR-phenomena, since they ignore modal and spatiotemporal aspects inherent in their setup.
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  8. Causes and Probability-Raisers of Processes.Sungho Choi - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):81 – 91.
    Schaffer proposes a new account of probabilistic causation that synthesizes the probability-raising and process-linkage views on causation. The driving idea of Schaffer's account is that, although an effect does not invariably depend on its cause, a process linked to the effect does. In this paper, however, I will advance counterexamples to Schaffer's account and then demonstrate that Schaffer's possible responses to them do not work. Finally, I will argue that my counterexamples suggest that the driving idea of Schaffer's account is (...)
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  9. Paul Humphreys, The Chances of Explanation. [REVIEW]John Collier - 1991 - Philosophy in Review 11:257-259.
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  10. Causation and Counterfactuals.John Collins, Ned Hall & Laurie Paul (eds.) - 2004 - MIT Press.
    Thirty years after Lewis's paper, this book brings together some of the most important recent work connecting—or, in some cases, disputing the connection ...
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  11. Chance-Lowering Causes.Phil Dowe - 2004 - In Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World. Routledge.
    In this paper I reconsider a standard counterexample to the chance-raising theory of singular causation. Extant versions of this theory are so different that it is difficult to formulate the core thesis that they all share, despite the guiding idea that causes raise the chance of their effects. At one extreme, ‘Humean’ theories – which can be traced to Reichenbach – say that a particular event of type C is the cause of a particular event of type E only if (...)
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  12. The Conserved Quantity Theory of Causation and Chance Raising.Phil Dowe - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (3):501.
    In this paper I offer an 'integrating account' of singular causation, where the term 'integrating' refers to the following program for analysing causation. There are two intuitions about causation, both of which face serious counterexamples when used as the basis for an analysis of causation. The 'process' intuition, which says that causes and effects are linked by concrete processes, runs into trouble with cases of 'misconnections', where an event which serves to prevent another fails to do so on a particular (...)
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  13. Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World.Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof (eds.) - 2003 - Routledge.
    Philosophers have long been fascinated by the connection between cause and effect: are 'causes' things we can experience, or are they concepts provided by our minds? The study of causation goes back to Aristotle, but resurged with David Hume and Immanuel Kant, and is now one of the most important topics in metaphysics. Most of the recent work done in this area has attempted to place causation in a deterministic, scientific, worldview. But what about the unpredictable and chancey world we (...)
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  14. Causal Reasoning, Causal Probabilities, and Conceptions of Causation.Isabelle Drouet - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 43 (4):761-768.
    The present paper deals with the tools that can be used to represent causation and to reason about it and, specifically, with their diversity. It focuses on so-called “causal probabilities”—that is, probabilities of effects given one of their causes—and critically surveys a recent paper in which Joyce argues that the values of these probabilities do not depend on one’s conception of causation. I first establish a stronger independence claim: I show that the very definition of causal probabilities is independent of (...)
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  15. Causal Reasoning, Causal Probabilities, and Conceptions of Causation.Isabelle Drouet - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43 (4):761-768.
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  16. Mellor on Chance and Causation. [REVIEW]Dorothy Edgington - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):411-433.
    Mellor's subject is singular causation between facts, expressed ‘E because C’. His central requirement for causation is that the chance that E if C be greater than the chance that E if C: chc(E)>chc(E). The book is as much about chance as it is about causation. I show that his way of distinguishing chc (E) from the traditional notion of conditional chance leaves than him with a problem about the existence of chQ(P) when Q is false (Section 3); and also (...)
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  17. Review: Cartwright on Probabilistic Causality: Types, Tokens, and Capacities. [REVIEW]Ellery Eells - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):169 - 175.
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  18. Probabilistic Causality.Ellery Eells - 1991 - Cambridge University Press.
    In this important book, Ellery Eells explores and refines philosophical conceptions of probabilistic causality. In a probabilistic theory of causation, causes increase the probability of their effects rather than necessitate their effects in the ways traditional deterministic theories have specified. Philosophical interest in this subject arises from attempts to understand population sciences as well as indeterminism in physics. Taking into account issues involving spurious correlation, probabilistic causal interaction, disjunctive causal factors, and temporal ideas, Professor Eells advances the analysis of what (...)
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  19. An Analysis of Probabilistic Causation in Dichotomous Structures.Frederick S. Elett & David P. Ericson - 1986 - Synthese 67 (2):175-193.
    During the past decades several philosophers of science and social scientists have been interested in the problems of causation. Recently attention has been given to probabilistic causation in dichotomous causal systems. The paper uses the basic features of probabilistic causation to argue that the causal modeling approaches developed by such researchers as Blalock (1964) and Duncan (1975) can provide, when an additional assumption is added, adequate qualitative measures of one variable causal influence upon another. Finally, some of the difficulties and (...)
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  20. Probability and Causality.J. Fetzer (ed.) - 1988 - D. Reidel.
  21. Probabilistic Explanations.James H. Fetzer - 1982 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:194-207.
    The purpose of this paper is to provide a systematic defense of the single-case propensity account of probabilistic explanation from the criticisms advanced by Hanna and by Humphreys and to offer a critical appraisal of the aleatory conception advanced by Humphreys and of the deductive-nomological-probabilistic approach Railton has proposed. The principal conclusion supported by this analysis is that the Requirements of Maximal Specificity and of Strict Maximal Specificity afford the foundation for completely objective explanations of probabilistic explananda, so long as (...)
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  22. Probabilistic Measures of Causal Strength.Branden Fitelson & Christopher Hitchcock - 2011 - In Phyllis McKay Illari Federica Russo (ed.), Causality in the Sciences. Oxford University Press. pp. 600--627.
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  23. Probable Causes and the Distinction Between Subjective and Objective Chance.Stuart S. Glennan - 1997 - Noûs 31 (4):496-519.
    In this paper I present both a critical appraisal of Humphreys' probabilistic theory of causality and a sketch of an alternative view of the relationship between the notions of probability and of cause. Though I do not doubt that determinism is false, I claim that the examples used to motivate Humphreys' theory typically refer to subjective rather than objective chance. Additionally, I argue on a number of grounds that Humphreys' suggestion that linear regression models be used as a canonical form (...)
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  24. On the Metaphysics of Probabilistic Causation: Lessons From Social Epidemiology.Bruce Glymour - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1413-1423.
    I argue that the orthodox account of probabilistic causation, on which probabilistic causes determine the probability of their effects, is inconsistent with certain ontological assumptions implicit in scientific practice. In particular, scientists recognize the possibility that properties of populations can cause the behavior of members of the populations. Such emergent population‐level causation is metaphysically impossible on the orthodoxy.
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  25. A Probabilistic Analysis of Causation.Luke Glynn - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (2):343-392.
    The starting point in the development of probabilistic analyses of token causation has usually been the naïve intuition that, in some relevant sense, a cause raises the probability of its effect. But there are well-known examples both of non-probability-raising causation and of probability-raising non-causation. Sophisticated extant probabilistic analyses treat many such cases correctly, but only at the cost of excluding the possibilities of direct non-probability-raising causation, failures of causal transitivity, action-at-a-distance, prevention, and causation by absence and omission. I show that (...)
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  26. The Explanatory Virtues of Probabilistic Causal Laws.Henrik Hallsten - 2005 - In Jan Faye, Paul Needham, Uwe Scheffler & Max Urchs (eds.), Nature's Principles. Springer. pp. 137--150.
  27. Probabilistic Explanation and Probabilistic Causality.Joseph F. Hanna - 1982 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:181 - 193.
    This paper argues that if the world is irreducibly stochastic, then both Salmon's S-R model of explanation and Fetzer's C-R model of explanation have the following undesirable consequence: the objective probability (associated with the model's relevance condition) of any actual macro-event is either undefined or else, if defined, it equals one--so that the event is not even a candidate for a probabilistic explanation. This result follows from the temporal ambiguity of ontic probability in an irreducibly stochastic world. It is argued (...)
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  28. Probabilistic Causality and Causal Generalizations.Daniel M. Hausman - 2010 - In Ellery Eells & James H. Fetzer (eds.), The Place of Probability in Science. Springer. pp. 47--63.
  29. Deterministic Causation of Probabilities.Daniel M. Hausman - 1998 - Communication and Cognition. Monographies 31 (4):365-390.
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  30. Two Notes on the Probabilistic Approach to Causality.Germund Hesslow - 1976 - Philosophy of Science 43 (2):290-292.
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  31. Do All and Only Causes Raise the Probabilities of Effects?C. Hitchcock - 2004 - In J. Collins, E. J. Hall & L. A. Paul (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals. MIT Press.
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  32. Probabilistic Causation.Christopher Hitchcock - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    “Probabilistic Causation” designates a group of theories that aim to characterize the relationship between cause and effect using the tools of probability theory. The central idea behind these theories is that causes change the probabilities of their effects. This article traces developments in probabilistic causation, including recent developments in causal modeling. A variety of issues within, and objections to, probabilistic theories of causation will also be discussed.
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  33. Routes, Processes, and Chance-Lowering Causes.Christopher Hitchcock - 2004 - In Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World. Routledge.
    Causes often influence their effects via multiple routes. Moderate alcohol consumption can raise the level of HDL ('good') cholesterol, which in tum reduces the risk of heart disease. Unfortunately, moderate alcohol consumption can also increase the level of homocysteine, which in tum increases the risk of heart disease. The net or overall effect of alcohol consumption on heart disease will depend upon both of these routes, and no doubt upon many others as well. This is a familiar fact of life (...)
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  34. Probabilistic Causation in Scientific Explanation.Christopher Read Hitchcock - 1993 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    Salmon has argued that science provides explanations by describing a causal nexus: For Salmon, this nexus is a network of processes and interactions. I argue that this picture of the causal nexus is insufficient for an account of scientific explanation: a taxonomy of causal relevance is also needed. ;Probabilistic theories of causation seem to provide such a taxonomy in their dichotomy between promoting and inhibiting causes. However, standard probabilistic theories are beset by a difficulty called the problem of disjunctive factors. (...)
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  35. Some Thoughts on Wesley Salmon's Contributions to the Philosophy of Probability.Paul Humphreys - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (5):942-949.
    Wesley Salmon provided three classic criteria of adequacy for satisfactory interpretations of probability. A fourth criterion is suggested here. A distinction is drawn between frequency‐driven probability models and theory‐driven probability models and it is argued that single case accounts of chance are superior to frequency accounts at least for the latter. Finally it is suggested that theories of chance should be required only to be contingently true, a position which is a natural extension of Salmon's ontic account of probabilistic causality (...)
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  36. Chapter Three. Cause and Chance.Paul Humphreys - 1992 - In The Chances of Explanation: Causal Explanation in the Social, Medical, and Physical Sciences. Princeton University Press. pp. 61-97.
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  37. Cartwright, Capacities, and Probabilities.Gurol Irzik - 1992 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:239 - 250.
    I argue that Nancy Cartwright's largely methodological arguments for capacities and against Hume's regularity account of causation are only partially successful. They are especially problematic in establishing the primacy of singular causation and the reality of mixed-dual capacities. Therefore, her arguments need to be supported by ontological ones, and I propose the propensity interpretation of causal probabilities as a natural way of doing this.
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  38. Varieties of Causation in Consciousness Studies.J. Jordan, H. Atmanspacher & R. Bishop - 2012 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (5-6):7-11.
  39. Causal Contribution.Alex Kaiserman - 2016 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (3):387-394.
    Are there ‘degrees of causation’? Yes and no: causation is not a scalar relation, but different causes can contribute to a causing of an effect to different extents. In this paper, I motivate a probabilistic analysis of an event’s degree of contribution to a causing of an effect and explore some of its consequences.
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  40. Probabilistic Causal Processes.Jonathan Richard Katz - 1983 - Dissertation, The University of British Columbia (Canada)
    Many theorists take causality to be the heart of scientific explanation. If we couple this view with the idea, again common enough, that causes are something like sufficient conditions for their effects, then we have raised a difficulty for any theory of scientific explanation that admits "final" statistical explanations, for a statistical explanation must allow that factors relevant to an event to be explained not determine that event, but only make it probable to some degree . If we do not (...)
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  41. Probabilistic Causality: In Defense of the Unanimity Theory.Joonsung Kim - 2002 - Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison
    My dissertation defends the theory of probabilistic causation called "the unanimity theory" against three challenges, which I call "the metaphysical challenge", "the conceptual challenge" and "the methodological challenge". I argue that the unanimity theory meets these three challenges, and coheres with each of the three theories of probabilistic causation that have been naturally inspired by the three challenges. I conclude that the unanimity theory constitutes a foundation of the three theories, which in fact reveals the versatility of the unanimity theory. (...)
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  42. Physical Process Theories and Token-Probabilistic Causation.S. Kim - 2001 - Erkenntnis 54 (2):235-245.
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  43. Probabilistic Cause, Edge Conditions, Late Preemption, and Discrete Cases.Igal Kvart - 2004 - In Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World. Routledge. pp. 163-188.
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  44. A Theory of Counterfactuals.Igal Kvart - 1986 - Hackett.
  45. Chancy Causation.D. K. Lewis - 1986 - Philosophical Papers 2:175-184.
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  46. James H. Fetzer, Ed., Probability and Causality: Essays in Honor of Wesley C. Salmon Reviewed By.Patrick Maher - 1988 - Philosophy in Review 8 (10):390-393.
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  47. Max Born's Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance.Henry Margenau - 1950 - Review of Metaphysics 4:129.
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  48. The Principle of the Common Cause, the Causal Markov Condition, and Quantum Mechanics: Comments on Cartwright.Iain Martel - 2008 - In Luc Bovens, Carl Hoefer & Stephan Hartmann (eds.), Nancy Cartwright's Philosophy of Science. Routledge. pp. 242-262.
    Nancy Cartwright believes that we live in a Dappled World– a world in which theories, principles, and methods applicable in one domain may be inapplicable in others; in which there are no universal principles. One of the targets of Cartwright’s arguments for this conclusion is the Causal Markov condition, a condition which has been proposed as a universal condition on causal structures.1 The Causal Markov condition, Cartwright argues, is applicable only in a limited domain of special cases, and thus cannot (...)
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  49. Probabilistic Empiricism: In Defence of a Reichenbachian Theory of Causation and the Direction of Time.Iain Thomas Martel - 2000 - Dissertation, University of Colorado at Boulder
    A probabilistic theory of causation is a theory which holds that the central feature of causation is that causes raise the probability of their effects. In this dissertation, I defend Hans Reichenbach's original version of the probabilistic theory of causation, which analyses causal relations in terms of a three place statistical betweenness relation. Unlike most discussions of this theory, I hold that the statistical relation should be taken as a sufficient, but not as a necessary , condition for causal betweenness. (...)
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  50. Metaphysics and Conceptual Analysis: Lewis on Indeterministic Causation.Michael McDermott - 1997 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (3):396 – 403.
    Lewis considers (Postscript B to 'Causation') the objection that what he calls a plain case of probabilistic causation is really a probable case of plain causation. He replies that the objection rests on the false metaphysical assumption that counterfactuals whose consequents are about events (rather than chances) can be true under indeterminism. The present note argues that this is the wrong kind of reply, because metaphysics is never relevant to conceptual analysis.
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