This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related

Contents
394 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 394
Material to categorize
  1. Suspension of judgment, non-additivity, and additivity of possibilities.Aldo Filomeno - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-22.
    In situations where we ignore everything but the space of possibilities, we ought to suspend judgment—that is, remain agnostic—about which of these possibilities is the case. This means that we cannot sum our degrees of belief in different possibilities, something that has been formalized as an axiom of non-additivity. Consistent with this way of representing our ignorance, I defend a doxastic norm that recommends that we should nevertheless follow a certain additivity of possibilities: even if we cannot sum degrees of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Fair equality of chances for prediction-based decisions.Michele Loi, Anders Herlitz & Hoda Heidari - forthcoming - Economics and Philosophy:1-24.
    This article presents a fairness principle for evaluating decision-making based on predictions: a decision rule is unfair when the individuals directly impacted by the decisions who are equal with respect to the features that justify inequalities in outcomes do not have the same statistical prospects of being benefited or harmed by them, irrespective of their socially salient morally arbitrary traits. The principle can be used to evaluate prediction-based decision-making from the point of view of a wide range of antecedently specified (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  3. Reasoning Simplifying Attitudes.Michele Palmira - 2023 - Episteme 20 (3):722-735.
    Several philosophers maintain that outright belief exists because it plays a reasoning simplifying role (Holton 2008; Ross and Schroeder 2014; Staffel 2019; Weisberg 2020). This claim has been recently contested, on the grounds that credences also can simplify reasoning (Dinges 2021). This paper takes a step back and asks: what features of an attitude explain its alleged ability to simplify reasoning? The paper contrasts two explanations, one in terms of dispositions and the other in terms of representation, arguing in favour (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Diachronic and Interpersonal Coherence.Kenny Easwaran & Reuben Stern - forthcoming - In Baron Reed & A. K. Flowerree (eds.), Towards an Expansive Epistemology: Norms, Action, and the Social Sphere. Routledge.
    Bayesians standardly claim that there is rational pressure for agents’ credences to cohere across time because they face bad (epistemic or practical) consequences if they fail to diachronically cohere. But as David Christensen has pointed out, groups of individual agents also face bad consequences if they fail to interpersonally cohere, and there is no general rational pressure for one agent's credences to cohere with another’s. So it seems that standard Bayesian arguments may prove too much. Here, we agree with Christensen (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5. Global Constraints on Imprecise Credences: Solving Reflection Violations, Belief Inertia, and Other Puzzles.Sarah Moss - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):620-638.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 103, Issue 3, Page 620-638, November 2021.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  6. Probability Semantics for Aristotelian Syllogisms.Niki Pfeifer & Giuseppe Sanfilippo - manuscript
    We present a coherence-based probability semantics for (categorical) Aristotelian syllogisms. For framing the Aristotelian syllogisms as probabilistic inferences, we interpret basic syllogistic sentence types A, E, I, O by suitable precise and imprecise conditional probability assessments. Then, we define validity of probabilistic inferences and probabilistic notions of the existential import which is required, for the validity of the syllogisms. Based on a generalization of de Finetti's fundamental theorem to conditional probability, we investigate the coherent probability propagation rules of argument forms (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Credible Futures.Andrea Iacona & Samuele Iaquinto - 2021 - Synthese 199:10953-10968.
    This paper articulates in formal terms a crucial distinction concerning future contingents, the distinction between what is true about the future and what is reasonable to believe about the future. Its key idea is that the branching structures that have been used so far to model truth can be employed to define an epistemic property, credibility, which we take to be closely related to knowledge and assertibility, and which is ultimately reducible to probability. As a result, two kinds of claims (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  8. Can Imprecise Probabilities Be Practically Motivated? A Challenge to the Desirability of Ambiguity Aversion.Miriam Schoenfield - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (30):1-21.
    The usage of imprecise probabilities has been advocated in many domains: A number of philosophers have argued that our belief states should be “imprecise” in response to certain sorts of evidence, and imprecise probabilities have been thought to play an important role in disciplines such as artificial intelligence, climate science, and engineering. In this paper I’m interested in the question of whether the usage of imprecise probabilities can be given a practical motivation (a motivation based on practical rather than epistemic, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  9. Phylogenetic Inference, Selection Theory, and History of Science: Selected Papers of A. W. F. Edwards with Commentaries.Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther - 2018 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    A. W. F. Edwards is one of the most influential mathematical geneticists in the history of the discipline. One of the last students of R. A. Fisher, Edwards pioneered the statistical analysis of phylogeny in collaboration with L. L. Cavalli-Sforza, and helped establish Fisher's concept of likelihood as a standard of statistical and scientific inference. In this book, edited by philosopher of science Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther, Edwards's key papers are assembled alongside commentaries by leading scientists, discussing Edwards's influence on their (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  10. Varieties of Risk.Philip A. Ebert, Martin Smith & Ian Durbach - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):432-455.
    The notion of risk plays a central role in economics, finance, health, psychology, law and elsewhere, and is prevalent in managing challenges and resources in day-to-day life. In recent work, Duncan Pritchard (2015, 2016) has argued against the orthodox probabilistic conception of risk on which the risk of a hypothetical scenario is determined by how probable it is, and in favour of a modal conception on which the risk of a hypothetical scenario is determined by how modally close it is. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  11. Combining Probability with Qualitative Degree-of-Certainty Metrics in Assessment.Casey Helgeson, Richard Bradley & Brian Hill - 2018 - Climatic Change 149:517-525.
    Reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) employ an evolving framework of calibrated language for assessing and communicating degrees of certainty in findings. A persistent challenge for this framework has been ambiguity in the relationship between multiple degree-of-certainty metrics. We aim to clarify the relationship between the likelihood and confidence metrics used in the Fifth Assessment Report (2013), with benefits for mathematical consistency among multiple findings and for usability in downstream modeling and decision analysis. We discuss how our (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  12. Probability and Causality. J. H. Fetzer. [REVIEW]Frank Arntzenius - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (2):338-340.
    This is a book review of J. H. Fetzer (ed) Probability and Causality.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. A World of Probability: Experience and Prediction By Hans Reichenbach. [REVIEW]Eleanor Bisbee - 1938 - Philosophy of Science 5 (3):360-366.
  14. Surreal Decisions.Eddy Keming Chen & Daniel Rubio - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (1):54-74.
    Although expected utility theory has proven a fruitful and elegant theory in the finite realm, attempts to generalize it to infinite values have resulted in many paradoxes. In this paper, we argue that the use of John Conway's surreal numbers shall provide a firm mathematical foundation for transfinite decision theory. To that end, we prove a surreal representation theorem and show that our surreal decision theory respects dominance reasoning even in the case of infinite values. We then bring our theory (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  15. Disentangling Mechanisms from Causes: And the Effects on Science.John Protzko - 2018 - Foundations of Science 23 (1):37-50.
    Despite the miraculous progress of science—it’s practitioners continue to run into mistakes, either discrediting research unduly or making leaps of causal inference where none are warranted. In this we isolate two of the reasons for such behavior involving the misplaced understanding of the role of mechanisms and mechanistic knowledge in the establishment of cause-effect relationships. We differentiate causal knowledge into causes, effects, mechanisms, cause-effect relationships, and causal stories. Failing to understand the role of mechanisms in this picture, including their absence (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  16. The qualitative paradox of non-conglomerability.Nicholas DiBella - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1181-1210.
    A probability function is non-conglomerable just in case there is some proposition E and partition \ of the space of possible outcomes such that the probability of E conditional on any member of \ is bounded by two values yet the unconditional probability of E is not bounded by those values. The paradox of non-conglomerability is the counterintuitive—and controversial—claim that a rational agent’s subjective probability function can be non-conglomerable. In this paper, I present a qualitative analogue of the paradox. I (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  17. II.—On a Defect in the Customary Logical Formulation of Inductive Reasoning.Bernard Bosanquet - 1911 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11 (1):29-40.
  18. Discussion: The non-reducibility of Koopman's theorems of probability in Carnap's system for mc.Robert M. Jones - 1965 - Philosophy of Science 32 (3/4):368.
    Carnap gives a definition for a comparative concept of confirmation. For it he uses the notation “MC.” His defined notation is intended to be an explicatum for the explicandum: “the hypothesis h is confirmed by the evidence e equally strongly or more strongly than h′ by e′”.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. Probability logic.Douglas N. Hoover - 1978 - Annals of Mathematical Logic 14 (3):287.
  20. Theory Versions instead of Articulations of a Paradigm.Ruey-lin Chen - 2000 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 31 (3):449-471.
  21. Folk judgments of causation.Joshua Knobe - 2009 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (2):238-242.
    Experimental studies suggest that people’s ordinary causal judgments are affected not only by statistical considerations but also by moral considerations. One way to explain these results would be to construct a model according to which people are trying to make a purely statistical judgment but moral considerations somehow distort their intuitions. The present paper offers an alternative perspective. Specifically, the author proposes a model according to which the very same underlying mechanism accounts for the influence of both statistical and moral (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  22. Metaphysics and Probability, ‘Meaning’ and ‘Justification’.John King-Farlow - 1971 - Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 20:203-209.
    TZIPORAH KASACHKOFF’S most welcome and valuable attack on D Z Phillips’ ‘internalist’ defence of his strange forms of fideism closes with these words.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. 2. Logic and Probability.Richard Johns - 2002 - In A Theory of Physical Probability. University of Toronto Press. pp. 9-52.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. An Internal Limit of the Structural Analysis of Causation.Alessandro Giordani - 2016 - Axiomathes 26 (4):429-450.
    Structural models of systems of causal connections have become a common tool in the analysis of the concept of causation. In the present paper I offer a general argument to show that one of the most powerful definitions of the concept of actual cause, provided within the structural models framework, is not sufficient to grant a full account of our intuitive judgements about actual causation, so that we are still waiting for a comprehensive definition. This is done not simply by (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. Nomic Probability and the Foundations of Induction. [REVIEW]Henry E. Kyburg & John L. Pollock - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (1):115.
  26. Scientific Inference.Stephen F. Barker - 1958 - Philosophical Review 67 (3):404.
  27. A Treatise on Probability.Clarence Irving Lewis - 1922 - Philosophical Review 31 (2):180.
  28. Bayes Factors All the Way: Toward a New View of Coherence and Truth.Lydia McGrew - 2016 - Theoria 82 (4):329-350.
    A focus on the conjunction of the contents of witness reports and on the coherence of their contents has had negative effects on the epistemic clarity of the Bayesian coherence literature. Whether or not increased coherence of witness reports is correlated with higher confirmation for some H depends upon the hypothesis in question and upon factors concerning the confirmation and independence of the reports, not directly on the positive relevance of the contents to each other. I suggest that Bayesians should (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  29. Understanding probability: Darrell Rowbottom: Probability. Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press, 2015, 180pp, $64.95 HB, $22.95 PB.Justin Dallmann - 2016 - Metascience 25 (2):331-333.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. Probability and Paradox.F. Granger - 1929 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 9 (1):1-18.
  31. A probabilistic explanation for the size-effect in crystal plasticity.P. M. Derlet & R. Maaß - 2015 - Philosophical Magazine 95 (16-18):1829-1844.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. XIV*—Probability as the Logic of Science.Mary Hesse - 1972 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 72 (1):257-272.
    Mary Hesse; XIV*—Probability as the Logic of Science, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 72, Issue 1, 1 June 1972, Pages 257–272, https://doi.org/1.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. Epistemic inconsistency and categorical coherence: a study of probabilistic measures of coherence.Michael Hughes - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):3153-3185.
    Is logical consistency required for a set of beliefs or propositions to be categorically coherent? An affirmative answer is often assumed by mainstream epistemologists, and yet it is unclear why. Cases like the lottery and the preface call into question the assumption that beliefs must be consistent in order to be epistemically rational. And thus it is natural to wonder why all inconsistent sets of propositions are incoherent. On the other hand, Easwaran and Fitelson have shown that particular kinds of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  34. Assessing Uncertainty.Amos Tversky - 1974 - Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series B 36 (2):148-159.
    Intuitive judgments of probability are based on a limited number of heuristics that are usually effective but sometimes lead to severe and systematic errors. Research shows, for example, that people judge the probability of a hypothesis by the degree to which it represents the evidence, with little or no regard for its prior probability. Other heuristics lead to an overestimation of the probabilities of highly available or salient events, and to overconfidence in the assessment of subjective probability distributions. These biases (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  35. Chapter 8. Relative Probability Functions Construed as Representing Degrees of Logical Consequence.Peter Roeper & Hughes Leblanc - 1999 - In Peter Roeper & Hugues Leblanc (eds.), Probability Theory and Probability Semantics. University of Toronto Press. pp. 142-166.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Probability and Evidence.Paul Horwich - 1982 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    In this influential study of central issues in the philosophy of science, Paul Horwich elaborates on an important conception of probability, diagnosing the failure of previous attempts to resolve these issues as stemming from a too-rigid conception of belief. Adopting a Bayesian strategy, he argues for a probabilistic approach, yielding a more complete understanding of the characteristics of scientific reasoning and methodology. Presented in a fresh twenty-first-century series livery, and including a specially commissioned preface written by Colin Howson, illuminating its (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   109 citations  
  37. Does causal knowledge help us be faster and more frugal in our decisions?Rocio Garcia-Retamero, Annika Wallin & Anja Dieckmann - unknown
    One challenge that has to be addressed by the fast and frugal heuristics program is how people manage to select, from the abundance of cues that exist in the environment, those to rely on when making decisions. We hypothesize that causal knowledge helps people target particular cues and estimate their validities. This hypothesis was tested in three experiments. Results show that when causal information about some cues was available, participants preferred to search for these cues first and to base their (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  38. Causal Reasoning with Ancestral Graphical Models.Jiji Zhang - 2008 - Journal of Machine Learning Research 9:1437-1474.
    Causal reasoning is primarily concerned with what would happen to a system under external interventions. In particular, we are often interested in predicting the probability distribution of some random variables that would result if some other variables were forced to take certain values. One prominent approach to tackling this problem is based on causal Bayesian networks, using directed acyclic graphs as causal diagrams to relate post-intervention probabilities to pre-intervention probabilities that are estimable from observational data. However, such causal diagrams are (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  39. A note on cancellation axioms for comparative probability.Matthew Harrison-Trainor, Wesley H. Holliday & Thomas F. Icard - 2016 - Theory and Decision 80 (1):159-166.
    We prove that the generalized cancellation axiom for incomplete comparative probability relations introduced by Rios Insua and Alon and Lehrer is stronger than the standard cancellation axiom for complete comparative probability relations introduced by Scott, relative to their other axioms for comparative probability in both the finite and infinite cases. This result has been suggested but not proved in the previous literature.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  40. Shogenji's probabilistic measure of coherence is incoherent.K. Akiba - 2000 - Analysis 60 (4):356-359.
  41. Carnap's inductive probabilities as a contribution to decision theory.Joachim Hornung - 1980 - Metamedicine 1 (3):325-367.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  42. Equivalent testimonies as a touchstone of coherence measures.Mark Siebel & Werner Wolff - 2008 - Synthese 161 (2):167-182.
    Over the past years, a number of probabilistic measures of coherence have been proposed. As shown in the paper, however, many of them do not conform to the intuitition that equivalent testimonies are highly coherent, regardless of their prior probability.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  43. Counterfactuals and Epistemic Probability.R. Otte - 2006 - Synthese 152 (1):81-93.
    Philosophers have often attempted to use counterfactual conditionals to analyze probability. This article focuses on counterfactual analyzes of epistemic probability by Alvin Plantinga and Peter van Inwagen. I argue that a certain type of counterfactual situation creates problems for these analyses. I then argue that Plantinga's intuition about the role of warrant in epistemic probability is mistaken. Both van Inwagen's and Plantinga's intuitions about epistemic probability are flawed.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  44. From Knowledge-based Programs to Graded Belief-based Programs, Part I: On-line Reasoning.Noël Laverny & Jérôme Lang - 2005 - Synthese 147 (2):277-321.
    Knowledge-based programs (KBPs) are a powerful notion for expressing action policies in which branching conditions refer to implicit knowledge and call for a deliberation task at execution time. However, branching conditions in KBPs cannot refer to possibly erroneous beliefs or to graded belief, such as “if my belief that φ holds is high then do some action α else perform some sensing action β”.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  45. Against Probabilistic Measures of Coherence.Mark Siebel - 2005 - Erkenntnis 63 (3):335-360.
    It is shown that the probabilistic theories of coherence proposed up to now produce a number of counter-intuitive results. The last section provides some reasons for believing that no probabilistic measure will ever be able to adequately capture coherence. First, there can be no function whose arguments are nothing but tuples of probabilities, and which assigns different values to pairs of propositions {A, B} and {A, C} if A implies both B and C, or their negations, and if P(B)=P(C). But (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  46. Evaluating Test Cases for Probabilistic Measures of Coherence.Jakob Koscholke - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (1):155-181.
    How can we determine the adequacy of a probabilistic coherence measure? A widely accepted approach to this question besides formulating adequacy constraints is to employ paradigmatic test cases consisting of a scenario providing a joint probability distribution over some specified set of propositions coupled with a normative coherence assessment for this set. However, despite the popularity of the test case approach, a systematic evaluation of the proposed test cases is still missing. This paper’s aim is to change this. Using a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  47. Probability and the Science of Logic.Izumi Takeuchi - 2012 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 45 (2):1-13.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Probabilistic coherence measures: a psychological study of coherence assessment.Jakob Koscholke & Marc Jekel - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4).
    Over the years several non-equivalent probabilistic measures of coherence have been discussed in the philosophical literature. In this paper we examine these measures with respect to their empirical adequacy. Using test cases from the coherence literature as vignettes for psychological experiments we investigate whether the measures can predict the subjective coherence assessments of the participants. It turns out that the participants’ coherence assessments are best described by Roche’s coherence measure based on Douven and Meijs’ average mutual support approach and the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  49. Reliability conducive measures of coherence.Erik J. Olsson & Stefan Schubert - 2007 - Synthese 157 (3):297-308.
    A measure of coherence is said to be truth conducive if and only if a higher degree of coherence (as measured) results in a higher likelihood of truth. Recent impossibility results strongly indicate that there are no (non-trivial) probabilistic coherence measures that are truth conducive. Indeed, this holds even if truth conduciveness is understood in a weak ceteris paribus sense (Bovens & Hartmann, 2003, Bayesian epistemology. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press; Olsson, 2005, Against coherence: Truth probability and justification. Oxford: (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  50. Error statistical modeling and inference: Where methodology meets ontology.Aris Spanos & Deborah G. Mayo - 2015 - Synthese 192 (11):3533-3555.
    In empirical modeling, an important desiderata for deeming theoretical entities and processes as real is that they can be reproducible in a statistical sense. Current day crises regarding replicability in science intertwines with the question of how statistical methods link data to statistical and substantive theories and models. Different answers to this question have important methodological consequences for inference, which are intertwined with a contrast between the ontological commitments of the two types of models. The key to untangling them is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
1 — 50 / 394